abstract instruction in Texas

2020Even assuming without deciding there was error in the jury charge, we note that “[w]here the application paragraph correctly instructs the jury, an error in 29 the abstract instruction is not egregious.” Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tex. Crim.

2015Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“Where the application paragraph correctly instructs the jury, an error in the abstract instruction is not egregious.”); see also Crenshaw, 378 S.W.3d at 464-66 (“Generally, reversible error occurs in the giving of an abstract instruction only when the instruction is an incorrect or misleading statement of a law that the jury must understand in order to implement.the commands of the application paragraph.”).

2026As the court of criminal appeals has held, [r]eversible error in the giving of an abstract instruction generally occurs only when the instruction is an incorrect or misleading statement of a law that “the jury must understand in order to implement the 6 commands of the application paragraph,” and the “failure to give an abstract instruction is reversible only when such an instruction is necessary to a correct or complete understanding of concepts or terms in the application part of the charge.” Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165 (quoting Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. Crim.

2025“Reversible error in the giving of an abstract instruction generally occurs only when the instruction is an incorrect or misleading statement of a law that ‘the jury must understand in order to implement the commands of the application paragraph,’ and the ‘failure to give an abstract instruction is reversible only when such an instruction is necessary to a correct or complete understanding of concepts or terms in the application part of the charge.’” Id. - 12 - 04-24-00357-CR (quoting Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. Crim.

2026In the context of an abstract instruction, reversible error generally only occurs when the instruction is an incorrect or misleading statement of a law that “the jury must understand in order to implement the commands of the application paragraph.” Crenshaw, 378 S.W.3d at 466 .

2025“Reversible error in the giving of an abstract instruction generally occurs only when the instruction is an incorrect or misleading statement of a law that ‘the jury must understand in order to implement the commands of the application paragraph,’ and the ‘failure to give an abstract instruction is reversible only when such an instruction is necessary to a correct or complete understanding of concepts or terms in the application part of the charge.’” Id. - 12 - 04-24-00357-CR (quoting Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. Crim.

2015For example, in reviewing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims for legal sufficiency, ″we consider the context and the relationship between the parties.″ 24 [**16] Acts that might constitute outrageous conduct when dealing with a hearing-impaired consumer 25 may be legally insufficient between [*812] business parties. 26 In our no-evidence reviews of successful claims, we have invariably reviewed not just evidence showing the conduct was outrageous, but also evidence showing that, in context, it was not. 27 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (″If there is an absolute absence of e

2015For example, in reviewing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims for legal sufficiency, ″we consider the context and the relationship between the parties.″ 24 [**16] Acts that might constitute outrageous conduct when dealing with a hearing-impaired consumer 25 may be legally insufficient between [*812] business parties. 26 In our no-evidence reviews of successful claims, we have invariably reviewed not just evidence showing the conduct was outrageous, but also evidence showing that, in context, it was not. 27 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (″If there is an absolute absence of e

2015For example, in reviewing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims for legal sufficiency, ″we consider the context and the relationship between the parties.″ 24 [**16] Acts that might constitute outrageous conduct when dealing with a hearing-impaired consumer 25 may be legally insufficient between [*812] business parties. 26 In our no-evidence reviews of successful claims, we have invariably reviewed not just evidence showing the conduct was outrageous, but also evidence showing that, in context, it was not. 27 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (″If there is an absolute absence of e

2015For example, in reviewing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims for legal sufficiency, ″we consider the context and the relationship between the parties.″ 24 [**16] Acts that might constitute outrageous conduct when dealing with a hearing-impaired consumer 25 may be legally insufficient between [*812] business parties. 26 In our no-evidence reviews of successful claims, we have invariably reviewed not just evidence showing the conduct was outrageous, but also evidence showing that, in context, it was not. 27 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (″If there is an absolute absence of e

2015For example, in reviewing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims for legal sufficiency, ″we consider the context and the relationship between the parties.″ 24 [**16] Acts that might constitute outrageous conduct when dealing with a hearing-impaired consumer 25 may be legally insufficient between [*812] business parties. 26 In our no-evidence reviews of successful claims, we have invariably reviewed not just evidence showing the conduct was outrageous, but also evidence showing that, in context, it was not. 27 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (″If there is an absolute absence of e

2015For example, in reviewing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims for legal sufficiency, ″we consider the context and the relationship between the parties.″ 24 [**16] Acts that might constitute outrageous conduct when dealing with a hearing-impaired consumer 25 may be legally insufficient between [*812] business parties. 26 In our no-evidence reviews of successful claims, we have invariably reviewed not just evidence showing the conduct was outrageous, but also evidence showing that, in context, it was not. 27 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (″If there is an absolute absence of e

2015Co-op., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 102 , 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 979 (Tex. 1999). 24 Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 714 , 46 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 632 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); see also Tex. Farm Bureau Mut.

2015Co-op., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 102 , 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 979 (Tex. 1999). 24 Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 714 , 46 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 632 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); see also Tex. Farm Bureau Mut.

2015Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex. 1998); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791 , 795 n. 3 (Tex. 1991); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509 , 510 n. 2 (Tex. 1991); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660 , 666 n. 9 (Tex. 1990). [17] Calvert, supra note 12, at 364. [18] See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002); Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d at 340 ; Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex. 1982). [19] Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 ("

2015Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex.1998); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791 , 795 n. 3 (Tex.1991); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509 , 510 n. 2 (Tex.1991); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660 , 666 n. 9 (Tex.1990). 17 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364. 18 See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002); Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d at 340 ; Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.1982). 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (“If there is a

2015Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex. 1998); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791 , 795 n. 3 (Tex. 1991); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509 , 510 n. 2 (Tex. 1991); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660 , 666 n. 9 (Tex. 1990). [17] Calvert, supra note 12, at 364. [18] See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002); Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d at 340 ; Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex. 1982). [19] Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 ("

2015Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex.1998); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791 , 795 n. 3 (Tex.1991); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509 , 510 n. 2 (Tex.1991); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660 , 666 n. 9 (Tex.1990). 17 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364. 18 See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002); Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d at 340 ; Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.1982). 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (“If there is a

2015Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex. 1998); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791 , 795 n. 3 (Tex. 1991); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509 , 510 n. 2 (Tex. 1991); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660 , 666 n. 9 (Tex. 1990). [17] Calvert, supra note 12, at 364. [18] See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002); Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d at 340 ; Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex. 1982). [19] Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 ("

2015Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex.1998); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791 , 795 n. 3 (Tex.1991); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509 , 510 n. 2 (Tex.1991); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660 , 666 n. 9 (Tex.1990). 17 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364. 18 See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002); Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d at 340 ; Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.1982). 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (“If there is a

2015Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex. 1998); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791 , 795 n. 3 (Tex. 1991); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509 , 510 n. 2 (Tex. 1991); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660 , 666 n. 9 (Tex. 1990). [17] Calvert, supra note 12, at 364. [18] See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002); Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d at 340 ; Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex. 1982). [19] Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 ("

2015Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex.1998); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791 , 795 n. 3 (Tex.1991); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509 , 510 n. 2 (Tex.1991); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660 , 666 n. 9 (Tex.1990). 17 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364. 18 See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002); Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d at 340 ; Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.1982). 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (“If there is a

2002Appellant cites Sandig v. State, 580 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979) for the proposition that an overly broad definition in the abstract instruction can constitute error when it authorizes conviction on an unalleged theory when read in combination with the application paragraph of the charge.

2002Appellant cites Sandig v. State, 580 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979) for the proposition that an overly broad definition in the abstract instruction can constitute error when it authorizes conviction on an unalleged theory when read in combination with the application paragraph of the charge.

2008In Barrera v. State, 10 S.W.3d 743, 745-46 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.), the trial court included an abstract instruction on the law of self-defense, but did not apply the law of self-defense to the facts and did not instruct the jury that they must acquit appellant if they had a reasonable doubt on the issue of self-defense.

2008In Barrera v. State, 10 S.W.3d 743, 745-46 (TexApp.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.), the trial court included an abstract instruction on the law of self-defense, but did not apply the law of self-defense to the facts and did not instruct the jury that they must acquit appellant if they had a reasonable doubt on the issue of self-defense.

2016App. 1996) (observing that the “failure to give an abstract instruction [calls for a new trial] only when such an instruction is necessary to a correct or complete understanding of concepts or terms in the application part of the charge”), overruled on other grounds, Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim.

2011However, the Court in Plata also observed, “Reversible error only occurs in the giving of an abstract instruction when the instruction is an incorrect or misleading statement of a law which the jury must understand in order to implement the commands of the application paragraph.” Id. at 302 .

2015Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex.1998); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791 , 795 n. 3 (Tex.1991); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509 , 510 n. 2 (Tex.1991); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660 , 666 n. 9 (Tex.1990). 17 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364. 18 See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002); Uniroyal, 977 S.W.2d at 340 ; Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.1982). 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (“If there is a

2015For example, in reviewing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims for legal sufficiency, ″we consider the context and the relationship between the parties.″ 24 [**16] Acts that might constitute outrageous conduct when dealing with a hearing-impaired consumer 25 may be legally insufficient between [*812] business parties. 26 In our no-evidence reviews of successful claims, we have invariably reviewed not just evidence showing the conduct was outrageous, but also evidence showing that, in context, it was not. 27 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (″If there is an absolute absence of e

2015For example, in reviewing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims for legal sufficiency, ″we consider the context and the relationship between the parties.″ 24 [**16] Acts that might constitute outrageous conduct when dealing with a hearing-impaired consumer 25 may be legally insufficient between [*812] business parties. 26 In our no-evidence reviews of successful claims, we have invariably reviewed not just evidence showing the conduct was outrageous, but also evidence showing that, in context, it was not. 27 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (″If there is an absolute absence of e

2015For example, in reviewing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims for legal sufficiency, ″we consider the context and the relationship between the parties.″ 24 [**16] Acts that might constitute outrageous conduct when dealing with a hearing-impaired consumer 25 may be legally insufficient between [*812] business parties. 26 In our no-evidence reviews of successful claims, we have invariably reviewed not just evidence showing the conduct was outrageous, but also evidence showing that, in context, it was not. 27 19 Calvert, supra note 12, at 364 (″If there is an absolute absence of e

2015Co-op., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 102 (Tex.1999). 24 Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 714 (Tex.2003) (per curiam); see also Tex. Farm Bureau Mut.

2015Co-op., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 102 , 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 979 (Tex. 1999). 24 Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 714 , 46 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 632 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); see also Tex. Farm Bureau Mut.

2010See Mauldin v. State, 628 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Mauldin v. State , 628 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tex. Crim.

2019“It is not sufficient for the jury to receive an abstract instruction on the law and then to render a verdict according to a general 6 conclusion on whether the law has been violated.” Williams v. State, 547 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. Crim.

2019Id. “[I]t is not sufficient,” then, “for the jury to receive an abstract instruction on the law and then to render a verdict according to a general conclusion on whether the law has been violated.” Williams v. State, 547 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. Crim.

2015Nugent v. State, 749 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.); see also Barrera v. State, 982 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. Crim.

2015Nugent v. State, 749 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.); see also Barrera v. State, 982 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (trial court erred by including abstract instruction on law of self-defense .but failing to include application paragraph instructing jury to acquit if reasonable doubt existed on-issue of self-defense). ' ■ - Ah erroneous or incomplete jury charge jeopardizes a defendant’s right to jury trial because it fails to properly guide the jury in its fact-finding function.

2019We conclude that the absence of an application paragraph as to felony murder was erroneous as a complete “fail[ure] to apply an abstract instruction to the facts of the case.” See Barrera, 982 S.W.2d at 416 .

2015Nugent v. State, 749 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.); see also Barrera v. State, 982 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. Crim.

2025“Generally, reversible error occurs in the giving of an abstract instruction only when the instruction is an incorrect or misleading statement Joshua Dornell Mayes v. The State of Texas Page 7 of a law that the jury must understand in order to implement the commands of the application paragraph.” Id.

2023Id. at 367 ; Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 172 (holding that “[i]t is not sufficient for the jury to receive an abstract instruction of the law” and holding in favor of egregious harm when the application paragraph incorrectly stated the law); see Gelinas, 398 S.W.3d at 707 (declining to follow Hutch in placing “great weight” on charge error simply because it was located 13 in application paragraph but ultimately holding that such error did weigh in favor of egregious harm).

2021The abstract instruction on self-defense also misstates Texas law, as it varies materially from the relevant statute that defines self-defense.22 18 Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Tex. Crim.

2019Id. “[I]t is not sufficient,” then, “for the jury to receive an abstract instruction on the law and then to render a verdict according to a general conclusion on whether the law has been violated.” Williams v. State, 547 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. Crim.

2025“They do not amount to an abstract instruction that any reasonable doubt as to a defensive issue must be resolved in the appellant’s favor.” Id.

2015The jury charge contained the same reasonable-doubt instructions regarding the elements of the State’s case, but as in Allen, “they do not amount to an abstract instruction that any reasonable doubt as to a defensive issue must be resolved in the appellant’s favor.” Allen 253 S.W.3d at 260, 265 .