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22 California opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bemoregreen2 sentences2023“It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation].” (Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846 .) By suggesting that the public defender’s office has implemented policies that willfully prohibited the collection of potentially incriminating evidence, the prosecutor was necessarily implying that defense counsel was complicit in a false defense. 2022There’s no evidence to support it.” 26 “ ‘ “A prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel.” ’ ” (People v. Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1336-1337; see also People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846 [“It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury”].) “Such attacks on counsel’s credibility risk focusing the jury’s attention on irrelevant matters and diverting the prosecution from its proper role o | 7 | 15 |
People v. Fryered2 sentences2002(People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 977-978 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense . . . .” (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.) For defendant’s claim to prevail on the merits we ask “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1001; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2 2002(People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 977-978 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense . . . .” (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.) For defendant’s claim to prevail on the merits we ask “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1001; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2 | 3 | 4 |
People v. Hugginsgreen2 sentences2020(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 432 ; Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 207 [not misconduct for prosecutor to argue defense counsel tried to “smoke one past us”]; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553 , 575–576 [no misconduct in referring to defense as “smokescreen”].) Our Supreme Court has made clear that “wide latitude” is the standard applied to a prosecutor’s comments on defense counsel’s tactics and factual accounts: “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [c 2020(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 432 ; Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 207 [not misconduct for prosecutor to argue defense counsel tried to “smoke one past us”]; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553 , 575–576 [no misconduct in referring to defense as “smokescreen”].) Our Supreme Court has made clear that “wide latitude” is the standard applied to a prosecutor’s comments on defense counsel’s tactics and factual accounts: “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [c | 2 | 2 |
People v. Cummingsred2 sentences2015(People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846 .) “When a prosecutor denigrates defense counsel, it directs the jury’s 27 attention away from the evidence and is therefore improper. [Citation.] In addressing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct that is based on the denigration of opposing counsel, we view the prosecutor’s comments in relation to the remarks of defense counsel, and inquire whether the former constitutes a fair response to the latter. [Citation.]” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 978 , overruled on another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 .) “[T]he 2015Such attacks on counsel’s credibility risk focusing the jury’s attention on irrelevant matters and diverting the prosecution from its proper role of commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. [Citations.] [¶] Nevertheless, the prosecutor has wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in [defense] counsel’s tactics and factual account. [Citations.]” (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846 (Bemore).) “An argument which does no more than point out that the defense is attempting to confuse the issues and urges the jury to focus on what the prosecution believes i | 2 | 2 |
People v. Winbushgreen2 sentences2021Such attacks on counsel’s credibility risk focusing the jury’s attention on irrelevant matters and diverting the prosecution from its proper role of commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom.’ (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846 .) However, ‘the prosecutor has wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in opposing counsel’s tactics and factual account.’ ” (Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 484 .) To the extent the jury understood the prosecutor to be disparaging defense counsel by suggesting she fabricated the defense of Ben falling into the poles rather t 2021Such attacks on counsel’s credibility risk focusing the jury’s attention on irrelevant matters and diverting the prosecution from its proper role of commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom.’ [Citation.] However, ‘the prosecutor has wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in opposing counsel’s tactics and factual account.’” (People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 484 .) Viewing the prosecutor’s comments in the context of the arguments below, we see no prosecutorial error. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Seumanugreen2 sentences2023(See Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1338 [misconduct to impugn integrity of defense counsel, such as implying that defense counsel put forward a “sham defense”].) However, even if we assume that the prosecutor’s statements constituted misconduct, reversal is not required unless Castaneda suffered prejudice. 2022There’s no evidence to support it.” 26 “ ‘ “A prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel.” ’ ” (People v. Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1336-1337; see also People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846 [“It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury”].) “Such attacks on counsel’s credibility risk focusing the jury’s attention on irrelevant matters and diverting the prosecution from its proper role o | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hillred2 sentences2015Denigrating Defense Counsel “A prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel.” (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 832 .) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation]. 2002(People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 977-978 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense . . . .” (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.) For defendant’s claim to prevail on the merits we ask “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1001; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2013Such attacks on counsel’s credibility risk focusing the jury’s attention on irrelevant matters and diverting the prosecution from its proper role of commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. [Citations.] [¶] Nevertheless, the prosecutor has wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in opposing counsel’s tactics and factual account. [Citations.] In so doing, the prosecutor may highlight the discrepancies between counsel’s opening statement and the evidence. [Citation.] Misconduct claims also have been rejected where the prosecutor anticipates the flaws likely to 2002(People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 977-978 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense . . . .” (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.) For defendant’s claim to prevail on the merits we ask “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1001; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Woodsgreen1 sentence2021(People v. Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106, 116-117 [“‘It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense’ or to otherwise denigrate defense counsel”].) This argument relies entirely on misconstruing counsel’s comment. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Medinagreen1 sentence2020While it is improper for a prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense, a prosecutor “has wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in opposing counsel’s tactics and factual account.” (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846 , see also People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 759 [no misconduct where prosecutor said counsel can “ ‘twist a little, poke a little, try to draw some speculation, try to get you to buy something’ ”].) We agree with defendant that the facts and law are necessarily on a defendant’s side if there is reasonable doubt that a defendant committed the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Doolingreen1 sentence2015(People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846 .) “When a prosecutor denigrates defense counsel, it directs the jury’s 27 attention away from the evidence and is therefore improper. [Citation.] In addressing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct that is based on the denigration of opposing counsel, we view the prosecutor’s comments in relation to the remarks of defense counsel, and inquire whether the former constitutes a fair response to the latter. [Citation.]” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 978 , overruled on another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 .) “[T]he | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ochoagreen2 sentences2008Additionally, when the claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 427 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408 , 966 P.2d 442 ], quoting People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 , 938 P.2d 2 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation].” (Pe 2008Additionally, when the claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 427 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408 , 966 P.2d 442 ], quoting People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 , 938 P.2d 2 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation].” (Pe | 1 | 1 |
People v. Moralesgreen2 sentences2008Additionally, when the claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 427 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408 , 966 P.2d 442 ], quoting People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 , 938 P.2d 2 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation].” (Pe 2008Additionally, when the claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 427 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408 , 966 P.2d 442 ], quoting People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 , 938 P.2d 2 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation].” (Pe | 1 | 1 |
People v. Samayoagreen2 sentences2008Additionally, when the claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 427 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408 , 966 P.2d 442 ], quoting People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 , 938 P.2d 2 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation].” (Pe 2008Additionally, when the claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 427 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408 , 966 P.2d 442 ], quoting People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 , 938 P.2d 2 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation].” (Pe | 1 | 1 |
People v. Welchred2 sentences2006(People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846 [94 *117 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152 ]; see also People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 753 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 ].) “Conjure” means to “make (something) appear unexpectedly or seemingly from nowhere as if by magic,” call an image to mind, cause someone to feel or think of something, or call upon a spirit or ghost “to appear, by means of a magic ritual.” (The New Oxford American Diet. <http://www. oxfordreference.com> [as of Nov. 30, 2006].) With reference to a witness or other evidence, “conjured up” clearly connotes the creation 2006(People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846 [94 *117 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152 ]; see also People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 753 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 ].) “Conjure” means to “make (something) appear unexpectedly or seemingly from nowhere as if by magic,” call an image to mind, cause someone to feel or think of something, or call upon a spirit or ghost “to appear, by means of a magic ritual.” (The New Oxford American Diet. <http://www. oxfordreference.com> [as of Nov. 30, 2006].) With reference to a witness or other evidence, “conjured up” clearly connotes the creation | 1 | 1 |
Darden v. Wainwrightgreen2 sentences2002(People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 977-978 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense . . . .” (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.) For defendant’s claim to prevail on the merits we ask “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1001; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2 2002(People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 977-978 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense . . . .” (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.) For defendant’s claim to prevail on the merits we ask “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1001; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Berrymanred2 sentences2002(People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 977-978 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense . . . .” (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.) For defendant’s claim to prevail on the merits we ask “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1001; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2 2002(People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 977-978 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense . . . .” (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.) For defendant’s claim to prevail on the merits we ask “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1001; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Perryred2 sentences2000It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense (People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 789-790 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 499 P.2d 129 ]; People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 845-847 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2d 564 ]), or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 129 ]). 2000It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense (People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 789-790 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 499 P.2d 129 ]; People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 845-847 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2d 564 ]), or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 129 ]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bellgreen2 sentences2000It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense (People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 789-790 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 499 P.2d 129 ]; People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 845-847 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2d 564 ]), or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 129 ]). 2000It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense (People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 789-790 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 499 P.2d 129 ]; People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 845-847 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2d 564 ]), or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 129 ]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Baingreen2 sentences2000It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense (People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 789-790 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 499 P.2d 129 ]; People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 845-847 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2d 564 ]), or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 129 ]). 2000It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense (People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 789-790 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 499 P.2d 129 ]; People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 845-847 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 684 , 489 P.2d 564 ]), or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 129 ]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Espinoza
green
2 sentences2021(People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 820 .) ‘It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation]. 2017Personal attacks on the integrity of opposing counsel can constitute misconduct. ( People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806 , 820, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 838 P.2d 204 .) "It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation]. | 2 | 2017–2021 |
People v. Marquez
green
2 sentences2020(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 432 ; Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 207 [not misconduct for prosecutor to argue defense counsel tried to “smoke one past us”]; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553 , 575–576 [no misconduct in referring to defense as “smokescreen”].) Our Supreme Court has made clear that “wide latitude” is the standard applied to a prosecutor’s comments on defense counsel’s tactics and factual accounts: “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [c 2020(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 432 ; Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 207 [not misconduct for prosecutor to argue defense counsel tried to “smoke one past us”]; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553 , 575–576 [no misconduct in referring to defense as “smokescreen”].) Our Supreme Court has made clear that “wide latitude” is the standard applied to a prosecutor’s comments on defense counsel’s tactics and factual accounts: “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [c | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Pearson
green
2 sentences2020(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 432 ; Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 207 [not misconduct for prosecutor to argue defense counsel tried to “smoke one past us”]; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553 , 575–576 [no misconduct in referring to defense as “smokescreen”].) Our Supreme Court has made clear that “wide latitude” is the standard applied to a prosecutor’s comments on defense counsel’s tactics and factual accounts: “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [c 2020(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 432 ; Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 207 [not misconduct for prosecutor to argue defense counsel tried to “smoke one past us”]; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553 , 575–576 [no misconduct in referring to defense as “smokescreen”].) Our Supreme Court has made clear that “wide latitude” is the standard applied to a prosecutor’s comments on defense counsel’s tactics and factual accounts: “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [c | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Cole
green
1 sentence2025“A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it ‘infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ [Citations.] In other words, the misconduct must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’ [Citation.] A prosecutor’s misconduct that does not render a trial fundamentally unfair nevertheless 17 violates California law if it involves ‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’” (People v. Co | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Woodruff
green
1 sentence2022Misconduct claims . . . have been rejected where the prosecutor anticipates the flaws likely to appear in counsel’s closing argument based on evidence that was introduced [citation], and where the prosecutor criticizes the defense theory of the case because it lacks evidentiary support.” (People v. Bemore, supra, at p. 846 .) “ ‘ “In evaluating a claim of such misconduct, we determine whether the prosecutor’s comments were a fair response to defense counsel’s remarks” [citation], and whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 221 .) But “[p]ersonal attacks on the integrity of opposing counsel can constitute misconduct. [Citation.] ‘It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation]. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Wharton
green
1 sentence2015The argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] It is also clear that counsel during summation may state matters not in evidence, but which are common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history or literature.’ [Citation.] ‘A prosecutor may “vigorously argue his case and is not limited to ‘Chesterfieldian politeness’” [citation], and he may “use appropriate epithets warranted by the evidence.”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Ayala
green
1 sentence2013We disagree. “‘“‘“A prosecutor’s . . . intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct ‘so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’”’ [Citation.] Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves ‘“‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 283-284 .) 10 “It is generally impr | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Cash
green
1 sentence2013Such attacks on counsel’s credibility risk focusing the jury’s attention on irrelevant matters and diverting the prosecution from its proper role of commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. [Citations.] [¶] Nevertheless, the prosecutor has wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in opposing counsel’s tactics and factual account. [Citations.] In so doing, the prosecutor may highlight the discrepancies between counsel’s opening statement and the evidence. [Citation.] Misconduct claims also have been rejected where the prosecutor anticipates the flaws likely to | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Earp
green
1 sentence2002(People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 977-978 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 , 959 P.2d 183 ].) “It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense . . . .” (People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.) For defendant’s claim to prevail on the merits we ask “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.’ ” (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1001; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2 | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.