22 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1907–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stonakergreen2 sentences2022See also Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 324, 327 (3) ( 676 SE2d 221 ) (2009); Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 425 (4) ( 554 SE2d 458 ) (2001) (“[w]hile a trial court may charge on a lesser included offense on its own motion, the failure to do so, without a written request is not error”) (punctuation omitted), citing Stonaker, 236 Ga. at 2 (2); Mosley v. State, 257 Ga. 382, 383 (2) ( 359 SE2d 653 ) (1987); Chadwick v. State, ___ Ga. App. ___ *5 (3) ( 861 SE2d 612 ); McMurtry v. State, 338 Ga. App. 622, 625 (3) ( 791 SE2d 196 ) (2016). 1981Under State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1,2 (2) ( 222 SE2d 354 ), it is stated that the trial judge may of his own volition and in his discretion charge on a lesser crime than that included in the indictment but his failure to do so without a written request is not error. | 6 | 9 |
Gaines v. Crompton & Knowles Corp.green2 sentences1994“Unless the failure to give a charge is harmful as a matter of law to the extent that a gross miscarriage of justice is about to result, the absence of a written request is a waiver of the right to complain on appeal. [Cit.] We find no likelihood in the present case of a miscarriage of justice, and no merit in [James’s] enumeration of error on that issue.” Gaines v. Crompton & Knowles Corp., 190 Ga. App. 863, 868 (12) ( 380 SE2d 498 ) (1989). 1994“Unless the failure to give a charge is harmful as a matter of law to the extent that a gross miscarriage of justice is about to result, the absence of a written request is a waiver of the right to complain on appeal. [Cit.] We find no likelihood in the present case of a miscarriage of justice, and no merit in [James’s] enumeration of error on that issue.” Gaines v. Crompton & Knowles Corp., 190 Ga. App. 863, 868 (12) ( 380 SE2d 498 ) (1989). | 2 | 2 |
Powell v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See Powell v. State, 307 Ga. 96, 105 (2019) (“Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request a charge on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence to support the charge”). (c) Marrow contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of three witnesses: Michelle Ray- ford, Markajsha Jenkins, and Ernie “Jamal” Mobley. | 1 | 1 |
Wade v. Stategreen1 sentence2022As Justice Hill explained in his special concurrence 2 In this case, the State requested the lesser included charge of cruelty to children in the second degree in its written requests; however, since the charge conference was not transcribed, there is no evidence that Miles joined in this request, and, on appeal, Miles “does not argue that the State’s request for such an instruction is sufficient to preserve or create error.” Wade v. State, 304 Ga. 5, 13 (6), n.4 ( 815 SE2d 875 ) (2018). 6 in Stonaker, the purpose of this holding is to prevent a defendant from inducing an asserted error, sit s | 1 | 1 |
McMurtry v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See also Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 324, 327 (3) ( 676 SE2d 221 ) (2009); Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 425 (4) ( 554 SE2d 458 ) (2001) (“[w]hile a trial court may charge on a lesser included offense on its own motion, the failure to do so, without a written request is not error”) (punctuation omitted), citing Stonaker, 236 Ga. at 2 (2); Mosley v. State, 257 Ga. 382, 383 (2) ( 359 SE2d 653 ) (1987); Chadwick v. State, ___ Ga. App. ___ *5 (3) ( 861 SE2d 612 ); McMurtry v. State, 338 Ga. App. 622, 625 (3) ( 791 SE2d 196 ) (2016). 2022See also Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 324, 327 (3) ( 676 SE2d 221 ) (2009); Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 425 (4) ( 554 SE2d 458 ) (2001) (“[w]hile a trial court may charge on a lesser included offense on its own motion, the failure to do so, without a written request is not error”) (punctuation omitted), citing Stonaker, 236 Ga. at 2 (2); Mosley v. State, 257 Ga. 382, 383 (2) ( 359 SE2d 653 ) (1987); Chadwick v. State, ___ Ga. App. ___ *5 (3) ( 861 SE2d 612 ); McMurtry v. State, 338 Ga. App. 622, 625 (3) ( 791 SE2d 196 ) (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Mosley v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See also Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 324, 327 (3) ( 676 SE2d 221 ) (2009); Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 425 (4) ( 554 SE2d 458 ) (2001) (“[w]hile a trial court may charge on a lesser included offense on its own motion, the failure to do so, without a written request is not error”) (punctuation omitted), citing Stonaker, 236 Ga. at 2 (2); Mosley v. State, 257 Ga. 382, 383 (2) ( 359 SE2d 653 ) (1987); Chadwick v. State, ___ Ga. App. ___ *5 (3) ( 861 SE2d 612 ); McMurtry v. State, 338 Ga. App. 622, 625 (3) ( 791 SE2d 196 ) (2016). 2022See also Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 324, 327 (3) ( 676 SE2d 221 ) (2009); Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 425 (4) ( 554 SE2d 458 ) (2001) (“[w]hile a trial court may charge on a lesser included offense on its own motion, the failure to do so, without a written request is not error”) (punctuation omitted), citing Stonaker, 236 Ga. at 2 (2); Mosley v. State, 257 Ga. 382, 383 (2) ( 359 SE2d 653 ) (1987); Chadwick v. State, ___ Ga. App. ___ *5 (3) ( 861 SE2d 612 ); McMurtry v. State, 338 Ga. App. 622, 625 (3) ( 791 SE2d 196 ) (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See also Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 324, 327 (3) ( 676 SE2d 221 ) (2009); Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 425 (4) ( 554 SE2d 458 ) (2001) (“[w]hile a trial court may charge on a lesser included offense on its own motion, the failure to do so, without a written request is not error”) (punctuation omitted), citing Stonaker, 236 Ga. at 2 (2); Mosley v. State, 257 Ga. 382, 383 (2) ( 359 SE2d 653 ) (1987); Chadwick v. State, ___ Ga. App. ___ *5 (3) ( 861 SE2d 612 ); McMurtry v. State, 338 Ga. App. 622, 625 (3) ( 791 SE2d 196 ) (2016). 2022See also Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 324, 327 (3) ( 676 SE2d 221 ) (2009); Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 425 (4) ( 554 SE2d 458 ) (2001) (“[w]hile a trial court may charge on a lesser included offense on its own motion, the failure to do so, without a written request is not error”) (punctuation omitted), citing Stonaker, 236 Ga. at 2 (2); Mosley v. State, 257 Ga. 382, 383 (2) ( 359 SE2d 653 ) (1987); Chadwick v. State, ___ Ga. App. ___ *5 (3) ( 861 SE2d 612 ); McMurtry v. State, 338 Ga. App. 622, 625 (3) ( 791 SE2d 196 ) (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See also Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 324, 327 (3) ( 676 SE2d 221 ) (2009); Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 425 (4) ( 554 SE2d 458 ) (2001) (“[w]hile a trial court may charge on a lesser included offense on its own motion, the failure to do so, without a written request is not error”) (punctuation omitted), citing Stonaker, 236 Ga. at 2 (2); Mosley v. State, 257 Ga. 382, 383 (2) ( 359 SE2d 653 ) (1987); Chadwick v. State, ___ Ga. App. ___ *5 (3) ( 861 SE2d 612 ); McMurtry v. State, 338 Ga. App. 622, 625 (3) ( 791 SE2d 196 ) (2016). 2022See also Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 324, 327 (3) ( 676 SE2d 221 ) (2009); Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 425 (4) ( 554 SE2d 458 ) (2001) (“[w]hile a trial court may charge on a lesser included offense on its own motion, the failure to do so, without a written request is not error”) (punctuation omitted), citing Stonaker, 236 Ga. at 2 (2); Mosley v. State, 257 Ga. 382, 383 (2) ( 359 SE2d 653 ) (1987); Chadwick v. State, ___ Ga. App. ___ *5 (3) ( 861 SE2d 612 ); McMurtry v. State, 338 Ga. App. 622, 625 (3) ( 791 SE2d 196 ) (2016). | 1 | 1 |
SALAZAR-BALDERAS v. the STATE.green1 sentence2021Pursuant to OCGA § 16-10-24 (2016), (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, a person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties is guilty of a misdemeanor. 6 See Salazar-Balderas, 343 Ga. App. at 203-205 (1) (reviewing the substantive argument on appeal from the denial of an oral request to give a jury instruction rather than finding it waived for failure to file a written request for an instruction because the trial court addressed the merits before denying it, and there was no co | 1 | 1 |
Hicks v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Cf. Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. App. 105, 106 (1) ( 650 SE2d 767 ) (2007) (reviewing an appeal from a motion to suppress and explaining that “[t]he State waived its right to object to the timing or manner in which the motion was brought by failing to object to the motion at the time it was heard.”) (punctuation omitted). 14 (b) Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer . . . in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer . . . is guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, 2021Cf. Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. App. 105, 106 (1) ( 650 SE2d 767 ) (2007) (reviewing an appeal from a motion to suppress and explaining that “[t]he State waived its right to object to the timing or manner in which the motion was brought by failing to object to the motion at the time it was heard.”) (punctuation omitted). 14 (b) Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer . . . in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer . . . is guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, | 1 | 1 |
White v. Stategreen2 sentences2013“Because an objection voiced at the charge conference does not preserve objections to the charge as subsequently given, the failure to object to the charge as given precludes appellate review unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties.” White v. State, 291 Ga. 7, 8 (2) ( 727 SE2d 109 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2013“Because an objection voiced at the charge conference does not preserve objections to the charge as subsequently given, the failure to object to the charge as given precludes appellate review unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties.” White v. State, 291 Ga. 7, 8 (2) ( 727 SE2d 109 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Lajara v. Stategreen2 sentences1999Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ). 1999Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 441 (3) ( 435 SE2d 600 ). | 1 | 1 |
Garner v. Sharpgreen1 sentence1987Compare Garner v. Sharp, supra; Whitman v. Burden, 155 Ga. App. 67 (2) ( 270 SE2d 235 ) (1980). | 1 | 1 |
McRoy v. Stategreen2 sentences1982Gearin v. State, 127 Ga. App. 811, 812 ( 195 SE2d 211 ) (1973); see McRoy v. State, 131 Ga. App. 307, 308 ( 205 SE2d 445 ) (1974). 1982Gearin v. State, 127 Ga. App. 811, 812 ( 195 SE2d 211 ) (1973); see McRoy v. State, 131 Ga. App. 307, 308 ( 205 SE2d 445 ) (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Gearin v. Stategreen2 sentences1982Gearin v. State, 127 Ga. App. 811, 812 ( 195 SE2d 211 ) (1973); see McRoy v. State, 131 Ga. App. 307, 308 ( 205 SE2d 445 ) (1974). 1982Gearin v. State, 127 Ga. App. 811, 812 ( 195 SE2d 211 ) (1973); see McRoy v. State, 131 Ga. App. 307, 308 ( 205 SE2d 445 ) (1974). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences1981The case cited by the defendant, that is, Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 244, 246 (7) ( 232 SE2d 238 ), merely states that aggravated assault and simple battery convictions in that case were included offenses of kidnapping with bodily harm as a matter of fact. 1981The case cited by the defendant, that is, Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 244, 246 (7) ( 232 SE2d 238 ), merely states that aggravated assault and simple battery convictions in that case were included offenses of kidnapping with bodily harm as a matter of fact. | 1 | 1 |
Maher v. Stategreen2 sentences1978State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1 ( 222 SE2d 354 ) (1976); Maher v. State, 239 Ga. 305, 307 (5) ( 236 SE2d 647 ) (1977). 1978State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1 ( 222 SE2d 354 ) (1976); Maher v. State, 239 Ga. 305, 307 (5) ( 236 SE2d 647 ) (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences1990Williams v. Kennedy, 240 Ga. 163 (2) ( 240 SE2d 51 ) (1977).” Gaines v. Crompton & Knowles Corp., 190 Ga. App. 863, 868 (12) ( 380 SE2d 498 ). 1990Williams v. Kennedy, 240 Ga. 163 (2) ( 240 SE2d 51 ) (1977).” Gaines v. Crompton & Knowles Corp., 190 Ga. App. 863, 868 (12) ( 380 SE2d 498 ). | 2 | 1989–1990 |
Wade v. State
green
1 sentence2022As Justice Hill explained in his special concurrence 2 In this case, the State requested the lesser included charge of cruelty to children in the second degree in its written requests; however, since the charge conference was not transcribed, there is no evidence that Miles joined in this request, and, on appeal, Miles “does not argue that the State’s request for such an instruction is sufficient to preserve or create error.” Wade v. State, 304 Ga. 5, 13 (6), n.4 ( 815 SE2d 875 ) (2018). 6 in Stonaker, the purpose of this holding is to prevent a defendant from inducing an asserted error, sit s | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Graham v. State
green
1 sentence1993Graham v. State, 250 Ga. 473 (5) (298 SE3d 499) (1983). 3. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Spikes v. Citizens State Bank
green
2 sentences1992Spikes v. Citizens State Bank, 179 Ga. App. 479 (1) ( 347 SE2d 310 ) (1986). 1992Spikes v. Citizens State Bank, 179 Ga. App. 479 (1) ( 347 SE2d 310 ) (1986). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Whitman v. Burden
green
2 sentences1987Compare Garner v. Sharp, supra; Whitman v. Burden, 155 Ga. App. 67 (2) ( 270 SE2d 235 ) (1980). 1987Compare Garner v. Sharp, supra; Whitman v. Burden, 155 Ga. App. 67 (2) ( 270 SE2d 235 ) (1980). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Garrison v. Perkins
green
2 sentences1983Appellee is correct in pointing out the distinction between “shall” and the permissive language “may.” In Garrison v. Perkins, 137 Ga. 744 ( 74 SE 541 ) (1912), the Supreme Court of Georgia held, at 755, that “in its ordinary signification ‘shall’ is a word of command, and the context ought to be very strongly persuasive before that word is softened into a mere permission.” In O'Neal v. Spencer, 203 Ga. 588 ( 47 SE2d 646 ) (1948), however, the Supreme Court held that, especially in the absence of injury to the defendant, a statute which directs that some act be done within a given time period, 1983Appellee is correct in pointing out the distinction between “shall” and the permissive language “may.” In Garrison v. Perkins, 137 Ga. 744 ( 74 SE 541 ) (1912), the Supreme Court of Georgia held, at 755, that “in its ordinary signification ‘shall’ is a word of command, and the context ought to be very strongly persuasive before that word is softened into a mere permission.” In O'Neal v. Spencer, 203 Ga. 588 ( 47 SE2d 646 ) (1948), however, the Supreme Court held that, especially in the absence of injury to the defendant, a statute which directs that some act be done within a given time period, | 1 | 1983–1983 |
O'Neal v. Spencer
green
2 sentences1983Appellee is correct in pointing out the distinction between “shall” and the permissive language “may.” In Garrison v. Perkins, 137 Ga. 744 ( 74 SE 541 ) (1912), the Supreme Court of Georgia held, at 755, that “in its ordinary signification ‘shall’ is a word of command, and the context ought to be very strongly persuasive before that word is softened into a mere permission.” In O'Neal v. Spencer, 203 Ga. 588 ( 47 SE2d 646 ) (1948), however, the Supreme Court held that, especially in the absence of injury to the defendant, a statute which directs that some act be done within a given time period, 1983Appellee is correct in pointing out the distinction between “shall” and the permissive language “may.” In Garrison v. Perkins, 137 Ga. 744 ( 74 SE 541 ) (1912), the Supreme Court of Georgia held, at 755, that “in its ordinary signification ‘shall’ is a word of command, and the context ought to be very strongly persuasive before that word is softened into a mere permission.” In O'Neal v. Spencer, 203 Ga. 588 ( 47 SE2d 646 ) (1948), however, the Supreme Court held that, especially in the absence of injury to the defendant, a statute which directs that some act be done within a given time period, | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Hawkins v. Kermode
green
2 sentences1907Hawkins v. Kermode, 85 Ga. 116 (2), ( 11 S. E. 560 ).’ 6. 1907Hawkins v. Kermode, 85 Ga. 116 (2), ( 11 S. E. 560 ).’ 6. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.