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8 California opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bradshaw v. Parkgreen2 sentences2016Such stop order shall become effective immediately upon service.’ (§ 3710.1.)” (Bradshaw v. Park (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1273 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 872 ].) “An employer’s failure to *805 carry workers’ compensation insurance for its employees can [also] result in criminal punishment, including a fine or imprisonment or both [(§ 3700.5)], administrative penalties [(§§ 3711, 3722)] and a civil suit for damages by an injured employee [(§ 3706)].” (Valdez v. Himmelfarb (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1268 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 195 ], fns. omitted.) “An employer may contest a penalty assessment order by fil 2016Such stop order shall become effective immediately upon service.’ (§ 3710.1.)” (Bradshaw v. Park (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1273 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 872 ].) “An employer’s failure to *805 carry workers’ compensation insurance for its employees can [also] result in criminal punishment, including a fine or imprisonment or both [(§ 3700.5)], administrative penalties [(§§ 3711, 3722)] and a civil suit for damages by an injured employee [(§ 3706)].” (Valdez v. Himmelfarb (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1268 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 195 ], fns. omitted.) “An employer may contest a penalty assessment order by fil | 1 | 1 |
Valdez v. Himmelfarbgreen2 sentences2016Such stop order shall become effective immediately upon service.’ (§ 3710.1.)” (Bradshaw v. Park (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1273 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 872 ].) “An employer’s failure to *805 carry workers’ compensation insurance for its employees can [also] result in criminal punishment, including a fine or imprisonment or both [(§ 3700.5)], administrative penalties [(§§ 3711, 3722)] and a civil suit for damages by an injured employee [(§ 3706)].” (Valdez v. Himmelfarb (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1268 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 195 ], fns. omitted.) “An employer may contest a penalty assessment order by fil 2016Such stop order shall become effective immediately upon service.’ (§ 3710.1.)” (Bradshaw v. Park (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1273 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 872 ].) “An employer’s failure to *805 carry workers’ compensation insurance for its employees can [also] result in criminal punishment, including a fine or imprisonment or both [(§ 3700.5)], administrative penalties [(§§ 3711, 3722)] and a civil suit for damages by an injured employee [(§ 3706)].” (Valdez v. Himmelfarb (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1268 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 195 ], fns. omitted.) “An employer may contest a penalty assessment order by fil | 1 | 1 |
Association for Sensible Development at Northstar, Inc. v. Placer Countygreen2 sentences2010(See also Association for Sensible Development at Northstar, Inc. v. Placer County (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1294 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 ] [pointing out that McCormick is no longer good law].) We also reject Torrey Hills’s argument that filing a written request for a hearing would have been futile within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 583.240, subdivision (d), because when its counsel phoned the court clerk on February 5, 2009, for a hearing date, on February 10 the clerk advised counsel that the court preferred not to set a hearing until after the motion to dismiss was heard. 2010(See also Association for Sensible Development at Northstar, Inc. v. Placer County (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1294 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 ] [pointing out that McCormick is no longer good law].) We also reject Torrey Hills’s argument that filing a written request for a hearing would have been futile within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 583.240, subdivision (d), because when its counsel phoned the court clerk on February 5, 2009, for a hearing date, on February 10 the clerk advised counsel that the court preferred not to set a hearing until after the motion to dismiss was heard. | 1 | 1 |
San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City & County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences2009(See San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San Francisco (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 498, 504 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 527 ].) Consequently, the trial court erred in denying that motion. 2009(See San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San Francisco (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 498, 504 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 527 ].) Consequently, the trial court erred in denying that motion. | 1 | 1 |
Dakin v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protectiongreen2 sentences2009(See, e.g., Dakin v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 681, 687-688 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 ] [holding that the court’s ruling on the applicability of § 21167.4 to timber harvest cases would apply only prospectively, to “petitions filed after the date this opinion becomes final”].) Not surprisingly, Syufy and the county argue for retroactive application, while Forster-Gill argues for prospective application. 2009(See, e.g., Dakin v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 681, 687-688 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 ] [holding that the court’s ruling on the applicability of § 21167.4 to timber harvest cases would apply only prospectively, to “petitions filed after the date this opinion becomes final”].) Not surprisingly, Syufy and the county argue for retroactive application, while Forster-Gill argues for prospective application. | 1 | 1 |
Hayes v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1993(Hayes v. Superior Court (1971) 6 Cal.3d 216, 224, fn. 4 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 490 P.2d 1137 ].) Holt's interpretation of section 1203.2a is contrary to the legislative intent. 1993(Hayes v. Superior Court (1971) 6 Cal.3d 216, 224, fn. 4 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 490 P.2d 1137 ].) Holt's interpretation of section 1203.2a is contrary to the legislative intent. | 1 | 1 |
Tucker v. San Francisco Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences1975(Tucker v. S. F. Unified School Dist. (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 875, 883 [ 245 P.2d 597 ].) Respondent attempted to effect service of the notice of intent to dismiss by certified mail. 1975(Tucker v. S. F. Unified School Dist. (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 875, 883 [ 245 P.2d 597 ].) Respondent attempted to effect service of the notice of intent to dismiss by certified mail. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Garcia v. Hejmadi
green
1 sentence2022Just as obviously, an attorney acting within his or her professional capacity is held to a different standard of care and may not 12 be excused by section 473 from errors occurring during the discharge of strictly professional duties.” (Garcia v. Hejmadi, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 .) The mistake here in failing to file the written request for a hearing under 21167.4(a) was clearly “one involving professional skill,” not one, such as a calendaring error, that “ ‘ “anyone could have made.” ’ ” (Comunidad en Accion, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135 .) HUM CPR does not claim that its counse | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma
green
1 sentence2022(See § 21094, subd. (b)(3); Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307 , 1319–1320.) 2 section 21167.4(a) for it to submit a written request for a hearing. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Comunidad en Accion v. Los Angeles City Council
green
2 sentences2022Just as obviously, an attorney acting within his or her professional capacity is held to a different standard of care and may not 12 be excused by section 473 from errors occurring during the discharge of strictly professional duties.” (Garcia v. Hejmadi, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 .) The mistake here in failing to file the written request for a hearing under 21167.4(a) was clearly “one involving professional skill,” not one, such as a calendaring error, that “ ‘ “anyone could have made.” ’ ” (Comunidad en Accion, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135 .) HUM CPR does not claim that its counse 2022Just as obviously, an attorney acting within his or her professional capacity is held to a different standard of care and may not 12 be excused by section 473 from errors occurring during the discharge of strictly professional duties.” (Garcia v. Hejmadi, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 .) The mistake here in failing to file the written request for a hearing under 21167.4(a) was clearly “one involving professional skill,” not one, such as a calendaring error, that “ ‘ “anyone could have made.” ’ ” (Comunidad en Accion, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135 .) HUM CPR does not claim that its counse | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Palagin v. Paniagua Construction, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Filed concurrently with the written waiver request was Robertson's declaration that he did not have the financial ability to pay the undertaking and was told by a surety company he lacked sufficient liquid collateral to qualify for an appeal bond. *92 At the continued hearing, the trial court noted Robertson appeared eligible for a waiver, but questioned whether, under Palagin, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 124 , 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , it had jurisdiction to grant the waiver because it was not requested prior to filing deadline for the section 98.2 appeal. 2018Filed concurrently with the written waiver request was Robertson's declaration that he did not have the financial ability to pay the undertaking and was told by a surety company he lacked sufficient liquid collateral to qualify for an appeal bond. *92 At the continued hearing, the trial court noted Robertson appeared eligible for a waiver, but questioned whether, under Palagin, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 124 , 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , it had jurisdiction to grant the waiver because it was not requested prior to filing deadline for the section 98.2 appeal. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
County of Sacramento v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2010We disagree with its assertion there is a “lack of clarity in the statute.” Torrey Hills submits that since County of Sacramento, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th 943 , was not decided until December 29, 2009, when its counsel orally requested a hearing on the writ petition “there was no clear requirement the hearing must be requested in writing.” Torrey Hills asserts it would be unfair to apply County of Sacramento retroactively. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
McCormick v. Board of Supervisors
green
2 sentences2009In support of its argument that a written request is not required, Forster-Gill cites McCormick v. Board of Supervisors (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 352 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 617 ] for the proposition that a petitioner need only “take affirmative steps sufficient to place the matter on the court’s docket for a hearing, either by filing and serving a notice of hearing or utilizing some other method authorized by the local rules of the court in which the matter is pending.” (Id. at p. 358, italics added.) Forster-Gill asserts that it “requested] a hearing date with the court, per the trial court’s own proced 2009In support of its argument that a written request is not required, Forster-Gill cites McCormick v. Board of Supervisors (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 352 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 617 ] for the proposition that a petitioner need only “take affirmative steps sufficient to place the matter on the court’s docket for a hearing, either by filing and serving a notice of hearing or utilizing some other method authorized by the local rules of the court in which the matter is pending.” (Id. at p. 358, italics added.) Forster-Gill asserts that it “requested] a hearing date with the court, per the trial court’s own proced | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Willett
green
1 sentence1996(Willett, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 8 .) It is true, as the Willett court noted, “[t]he Legislature intended that sentence be imposed only on the defendant’s written request and waiver . . . .” (Id. at p. 7, citations omitted.) The first paragraph of section 1203.2a outlines the procedures which effectuate that intent. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Ruster
green
1 sentence1993(People v. Ruster, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at p. 871 .) The Legislature intended that sentence be imposed only on the defendant’s written request and waiver. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.