freestanding claim in Iowa

2026“For an applicant to succeed on a freestanding actual-innocence claim, the applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant . . . in light of all the evidence, including the newly discovered evidence.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 797 . “[A]n applicant bringing a freestanding claim of actual innocence is claiming he or she is factually and actually innocent, despite a fair, constitutionally compliant trial ... free of constitutional defects.” Id.

2026“For an applicant to succeed on a freestanding actual-innocence claim, the applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant . . . in light of all the evidence, including the newly discovered evidence.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 797 . “[A]n applicant bringing a freestanding claim of actual innocence is claiming he or she is factually and actually innocent, despite a fair, constitutionally compliant trial ... free of constitutional defects.” Id.

2024Before we decided the appeal, the supreme court issued two decisions that would impact the outcome: Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795 (Iowa 2018) (allowing a freestanding claim of actual innocence under the Iowa Constitution for convictions resulting from guilty pleas), and Allison v. State, 914 N.W.2d 866, 891 (Iowa 2018) (holding that a PCR application alleging PCR counsel provided ineffective assistance in presenting a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a prior PCR proceeding “relates back to the timing of the filing of the original PCR” application for purposes of Iowa

2018See Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795 (Iowa 2018) (recognizing a freestanding claim of actual innocence under the Iowa Constitution is available to applicants even though they pled guilty and that such a claim is not barred by the three-year period of section 822.3); see also Allison v. State, 914 N.W.2d 866, 890 (Iowa 2018) (stating the court was “qualify[ing]” Dible v. State, 557 N.W.2d 881, 886 (Iowa 1996), which held that ineffective assistance of PCR counsel cannot serve as an exception to the three-year statute of limitations Iowa Code section 822.3).

2020Grayson v. State, No. 15-1382, 2016 WL 6652357 , at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016) (noting “the actual innocence exception [announced in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 320 (1995),] has not been addressed nor adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court”).

2019Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316 (explaining a petitioner’s “evidence of innocence need carry less of a burden” in a gateway claim than a freestanding claim due to the underlying constitutional error at trial); see also Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 797 .

2024Consistent with the approach taken by the Supreme Court, “‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Id. at 7 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 3 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)).

2019The Supreme Court has “not resolved whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 , 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013); see Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 790 (stating the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a freestanding claim of actual innocence).

2019The Supreme Court has “not resolved whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 , 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013); see Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 790 (stating the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a freestanding claim of actual innocence).

2019Instead, the Supreme Court has recognized “a gateway claim of actual innocence such that the petitioner may obtain review of the underlying constitutional merits of his or her procedurally defaulted claim.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 790 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 , 113 S. Ct. at 862 (majority opinion), and In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 , 955, 130 S. Ct. 1 , 3 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).

2019Instead, the Supreme Court has recognized “a gateway claim of actual innocence such that the petitioner may obtain review of the underlying constitutional merits of his or her procedurally defaulted claim.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 790 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 , 113 S. Ct. at 862 (majority opinion), and In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 , 955, 130 S. Ct. 1 , 3 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).

2018In Washington , the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly addressed whether a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on new evidence implicated the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution. 216 Ill.Dec. 773 , 665 N.E.2d at 1335 -37 .

2018In Washington , the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly addressed whether a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on new evidence implicated the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution. 216 Ill.Dec. 773 , 665 N.E.2d at 1335 -37 .

2018See Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795 (Iowa 2018) (recognizing a freestanding claim of actual innocence under the Iowa Constitution is available to applicants even though they pled guilty and that such a claim is not barred by the three-year period of section 822.3); see also Allison v. State, 914 N.W.2d 866, 890 (Iowa 2018) (stating the court was “qualify[ing]” Dible v. State, 557 N.W.2d 881, 886 (Iowa 1996), which held that ineffective assistance of PCR counsel cannot serve as an exception to the three-year statute of limitations Iowa Code section 822.3).

2018App. 2002) ; see also People v. Tiger , 149 A.D.3d 86 , 48 N.Y.S.3d 685 , 700-01 (2017) (citing Ex parte Tuley , 109 S.W.3d at 393 ) (holding a defendant's plea does not bar the defendant from bringing a freestanding claim of actual innocence).

2018App. 2002); see also People v. Tiger, 48 N.Y.S.3d 685 , 700–01 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d at 393 ) (holding a defendant’s plea does not bar the defendant from bringing a freestanding claim of actual innocence).

2018In House , the United States Supreme Court mentioned the required proof to establish actual innocence as a freestanding claim is greater than that required to establish a gateway claim of actual innocence. 547 U.S. at 555 , 126 S.Ct. at 2087 ; accord In re Weber , 284 P.3d at 741 ("[A]ny standard by which a free-standing actual innocence claim must be proved will be higher than that applied in the gateway context.").

2018In House, the United States Supreme Court mentioned the required proof to establish actual innocence as a freestanding claim is greater than that required to establish a gateway claim of actual innocence. 547 U.S. at 555 , 126 S. Ct. at 2087 ; accord In re Weber, 284 P.3d at 741 (“[A]ny standard by which a free-standing actual innocence claim must be proved will be higher than that applied in the gateway context.”).

2018If a freestanding claim of actual innocence exists, it would have to overcome an "extraordinarily high threshold." Id. at 1464 & n.85 (collecting cases); see also Carriger v. Stewart , 132 F.3d 463 , 476 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Requiring affirmative proof of innocence is appropriate, because when a petitioner makes a freestanding claim of innocence, he is claiming that he is entitled to relief despite a constitutionally valid conviction.").

2018If a freestanding claim of actual innocence exists, it would have to overcome an “extraordinarily high threshold.” Id. at 1464 & n.85 (collecting cases); see also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) 24 (“Requiring affirmative proof of innocence is appropriate, because when a petitioner makes a freestanding claim of innocence, he is claiming that he is entitled to relief despite a constitutionally valid conviction.”).

2018App. 2002) ; see also People v. Tiger , 149 A.D.3d 86 , 48 N.Y.S.3d 685 , 700-01 (2017) (citing Ex parte Tuley , 109 S.W.3d at 393 ) (holding a defendant's plea does not bar the defendant from bringing a freestanding claim of actual innocence).

2018App. 2002) ; see also People v. Tiger , 149 A.D.3d 86 , 48 N.Y.S.3d 685 , 700-01 (2017) (citing Ex parte Tuley , 109 S.W.3d at 393 ) (holding a defendant's plea does not bar the defendant from bringing a freestanding claim of actual innocence).