12 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tisius v. Stategreen2 sentences2020As a result, Johnson's second point on appeal, which purports to assert a freestanding claim of prosecutorial misconduct untethered to a claim of trial court error, has no merit because our review on appeal is limited to trial court error.3 See section 512.160.2 ("No appellate court shall reverse any judgment, unless it believes that error was committed by the trial court against the appellant, and materially affecting the merits of the action.") The propriety of this conclusion is underscored by Johnson's unsupported contention in his second point on appeal that a "freestanding" claim of pros 2020“A freestanding claim of prosecutorial misconduct is generally not cognizable in a Rule 29.15 proceeding.” Tisius v. State, 183 S.W.3d 207, 212 (Mo. banc 2006). | 2 | 3 |
Jessie McKim v. Jay Cassady, Warden, JCCCgreen2 sentences2024McKim v. Cassady, 457 S.W.3d 831, 843 (Mo. App. 2015). 102. 2016See, e.g., McKim, 457 S.W.3d at 847 n.27; State ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2016Amrine does cite favorably to cases from other jurisdictions where a freestanding claim of actual innocence as a basis for state habeas relief has been recognized in both death penalty and non-death penalty cases because continued incarceration or execution would violate principles of due process. 102 S.W.3d at 547 n.4 (citing People v. Washington, 171 Ill.2d 475 , 216 Ill.Dec. 773 , 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336-37 (1996) (not a death penalty case); State ex rel. 2016Amrine does cite favorably to cases from other jurisdictions where a freestanding claim of actual innocence as a basis for state habeas relief has been recognized in both death penalty and non-death penalty cases because continued incarceration or execution would violate principles of due process. 102 S.W.3d at 547 n.4 (citing People v. Washington, 171 Ill.2d 475 , 216 Ill.Dec. 773 , 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336-37 (1996) (not a death penalty case); State ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Elizondogreen2 sentences2016Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 397-98 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (a death penalty case, the application of which was expanded on due process grounds to non-death penalty cases in Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)); Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 229 Conn. 397 , 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (1994) (no discussion limiting holding to death penalty cases); In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709 , 177 P.2d 918 (1947) (death penalty case)). 2003See Ex parte Joe Rene Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 205 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108, 1132 (1997). | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Amrine v. Ropergreen2 sentences2024Claims of actual innocence may give rise to habeas relief under the manifest injustice standard either as a gateway to review the merits of the petitioner’s otherwise defaulted constitutional claims or, in some cases, as a freestanding claim of actual innocence. 7 Id. at 546-48 . 2016Amrine does cite favorably to cases from other jurisdictions where a freestanding claim of actual innocence as a basis for state habeas relief has been recognized in both death penalty and non-death penalty cases because continued incarceration or execution would violate principles of due process. 102 S.W.3d at 547 n.4 (citing People v. Washington, 171 Ill.2d 475 , 216 Ill.Dec. 773 , 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336-37 (1996) (not a death penalty case); State ex rel. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Beelergreen1 sentence2022But Reed provides no authority (and we have found none) indicating that Missouri law permits imperfect self-defense to be raised as a freestanding defense in the absence of a claim of traditional self-defense.5 In other 4 Imperfect self-defense is “the intentional act of defending one’s self, [but] in doing so one uses unreasonable force.” State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. banc 2000). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Reesegreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., People v. Reese, 815 N.W.2d 85, 98 (Mich. 2012) (“Under Michigan law, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense does not exist as a freestanding defense that mitigates a murder to manslaughter . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
McIntosh v. Stategreen1 sentence2020As a result, Johnson's second point on appeal, which purports to assert a freestanding claim of prosecutorial misconduct untethered to a claim of trial court error, has no merit because our review on appeal is limited to trial court error.3 See section 512.160.2 ("No appellate court shall reverse any judgment, unless it believes that error was committed by the trial court against the appellant, and materially affecting the merits of the action.") The propriety of this conclusion is underscored by Johnson's unsupported contention in his second point on appeal that a "freestanding" claim of pros | 1 | 1 |
Summerville v. Warden, State Prisongreen2 sentences2016Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 397-98 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (a death penalty case, the application of which was expanded on due process grounds to non-death penalty cases in Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)); Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 229 Conn. 397 , 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (1994) (no discussion limiting holding to death penalty cases); In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709 , 177 P.2d 918 (1947) (death penalty case)). 2016Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 397-98 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (a death penalty case, the application of which was expanded on due process grounds to non-death penalty cases in Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)); Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 229 Conn. 397 , 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (1994) (no discussion limiting holding to death penalty cases); In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709 , 177 P.2d 918 (1947) (death penalty case)). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third Districtgreen1 sentence2016Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 397-98 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (a death penalty case, the application of which was expanded on due process grounds to non-death penalty cases in Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)); Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 229 Conn. 397 , 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (1994) (no discussion limiting holding to death penalty cases); In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709 , 177 P.2d 918 (1947) (death penalty case)). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen2 sentences2003See Ex parte Joe Rene Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 205 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108, 1132 (1997). 2003See Ex parte Joe Rene Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 205 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108, 1132 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Barton
green
1 sentence2020State v. Barton, 240 S.W.3d 693 (Mo. banc 2007). of clear and convincing evidence required for a freestanding claim of actual innocence. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State ex rel. Woodworth v. Denney
green
2 sentences2016The Supreme Court generally acknowledged that “a freestanding claim of actual innocence, if shown by [] clear and convincing evidence, provides grounds for ha-beas relief without the need to prove any constitutional violation at trial.” 396 S.W.3d 330 , 337 n.5 (Mo.banc 2013) (citing Amrine, 102 S.W.3d 541 ). 2016The Supreme Court generally acknowledged that “a freestanding claim of actual innocence, if shown by [] clear and convincing evidence, provides grounds for ha-beas relief without the need to prove any constitutional violation at trial.” 396 S.W.3d 330 , 337 n.5 (Mo.banc 2013) (citing Amrine, 102 S.W.3d 541 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Herrera v. Collins
green
2 sentences2016The Supreme Court’s holding, plainly read, recognized a freestanding claim of actual innocence in cases where the death penalty has been imposed because the prospect of executing an innocent person, in the face of clear and convincing evidence of innocence, is a manifest injustice. 7 The Court’s rationale for reaching this conclusion is instructive and controlling: In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 , 113 S.Ct. 853 , 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), the United States Supreme Court discussed the viability of a freestanding claim of actual innocence as a basis for habeas relief in the federal courts. 2016The Supreme Court’s holding, plainly read, recognized a freestanding claim of actual innocence in cases where the death penalty has been imposed because the prospect of executing an innocent person, in the face of clear and convincing evidence of innocence, is a manifest injustice. 7 The Court’s rationale for reaching this conclusion is instructive and controlling: In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 , 113 S.Ct. 853 , 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), the United States Supreme Court discussed the viability of a freestanding claim of actual innocence as a basis for habeas relief in the federal courts. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State Ex Rel. Simmons v. White
green
2 sentences2016A freestanding claim of actual innocence presumes that a petitioner received a constitutionally adequate trial, but argues that it would nonetheless be mani *17 festly unjust to continue to restrain the petitioner because newly discovered evidence clearly and convincingly shows “actual innocence that undermines confidence in the correctness of the [trial] judgment.” Id. at 547-48 . 2016The newly discovered evidence supporting a freestanding claim of actual innocence must be of a nature that “no credible evidence remains from ... trial to support- the conviction.” Id. at 548 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re Lindley
green
2 sentences2016Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 397-98 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (a death penalty case, the application of which was expanded on due process grounds to non-death penalty cases in Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)); Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 229 Conn. 397 , 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (1994) (no discussion limiting holding to death penalty cases); In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709 , 177 P.2d 918 (1947) (death penalty case)). 2016Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 397-98 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (a death penalty case, the application of which was expanded on due process grounds to non-death penalty cases in Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)); Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 229 Conn. 397 , 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (1994) (no discussion limiting holding to death penalty cases); In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709 , 177 P.2d 918 (1947) (death penalty case)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Clay v. Dormire
green
1 sentence2015Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Mo. banc 2003) (citing Clay, 37 S.W.3d at 217 ). 21 In addition, Missouri recognizes a freestanding claim of actual innocence. 22 Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 547 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Taylor v. Sturgell
green
2 sentences2013Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 , 128 S.Ct. 2161 , 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008), may call into question the continuing viability of the “virtual representation” doctrine, at least where a litigant seeks only individual relief, and where claim preclusion is based on judge-made rather than statutory principles. 2013Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 , 128 S.Ct. 2161 , 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008), may call into question the continuing viability of the “virtual representation” doctrine, at least where a litigant seeks only individual relief, and where claim preclusion is based on judge-made rather than statutory principles. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State Ex Rel. Nixon v. Jaynes
green
1 sentence2011(A) The Gateway of Cause and Prejudice Rules 29.15 and 24.035 “compel a defendant to raise claims [that the defendant is being held in detention in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government] that, before the enactment of these post-conviction rules, might have been raised in a petition for habeas corpus relief.” Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d at 214 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.