freestanding claim in Connecticut

2017Williams v. Commissioner of Correction , 240 Conn. 547 , 548, 692 A.2d 1231 (1997).

2017Williams v. Commissioner of Correction , 240 Conn. 547 , 548, 692 A.2d 1231 (1997).

2017Such a claim serves as a gateway to permit federal habeas review of an otherwise procedurally barred state conviction that the petitioner asserts is constitutionally flawed'; Miller v. Commissioner of Correction , 242 Conn. 745 , 788 n.28, 700 A.2d 1108 (1997) ; it is '[a] claim based on an antecedent constitutional violation that affects the results of the criminal trial ....' Id., at 813 , 700 A.2d 1108 n.7 ( Berdon, J ., concurring and dissenting)." Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction , 70 Conn.App. 452 , 461 n.2, 800 A.2d 1194 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 921 , 806 A.2d 1061 (2002).

2016Such a claim serves as a gateway to permit federal habeas review of an otherwise procedurally barred state conviction that the petitioner asserts is constitutionally flawed'; Miller v. Commissioner of Correction , [supra, 242 Conn. at 788 n. 28, 700 A.2d 1108 ]; it is '[a] claim based on an antecedent constitutional violation that affects the results of the criminal trial ....' Id., 813 n. 7, 700 A.2d 1108 ( Berdon, J. , concurring and dissenting)." Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction , 70 Conn.App. 452 , 461 n.2, 800 A.2d 1194 , cert. denied 261 Conn. 921 , 806 A.2d 1061 (2002).

2017Such a claim serves as a gateway to permit federal habeas review of an otherwise procedurally barred state conviction that the petitioner asserts is constitutionally flawed'; Miller v. Commissioner of Correction , 242 Conn. 745 , 788 n.28, 700 A.2d 1108 (1997) ; it is '[a] claim based on an antecedent constitutional violation that affects the results of the criminal trial ....' Id., at 813 , 700 A.2d 1108 n.7 ( Berdon, J ., concurring and dissenting)." Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction , 70 Conn.App. 452 , 461 n.2, 800 A.2d 1194 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 921 , 806 A.2d 1061 (2002).

2016Such a claim serves as a gateway to permit federal habeas review of an otherwise procedurally barred state conviction that the petitioner asserts is constitutionally flawed'; Miller v. Commissioner of Correction , [supra, 242 Conn. at 788 n. 28, 700 A.2d 1108 ]; it is '[a] claim based on an antecedent constitutional violation that affects the results of the criminal trial ....' Id., 813 n. 7, 700 A.2d 1108 ( Berdon, J. , concurring and dissenting)." Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction , 70 Conn.App. 452 , 461 n.2, 800 A.2d 1194 , cert. denied 261 Conn. 921 , 806 A.2d 1061 (2002).

2017Such a claim serves as a gateway to permit federal habeas review of an otherwise procedurally barred state conviction that the petitioner asserts is constitutionally flawed'; Miller v. Commissioner of Correction , 242 Conn. 745 , 788 n.28, 700 A.2d 1108 (1997) ; it is '[a] claim based on an antecedent constitutional violation that affects the results of the criminal trial ....' Id., at 813 , 700 A.2d 1108 n.7 ( Berdon, J ., concurring and dissenting)." Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction , 70 Conn.App. 452 , 461 n.2, 800 A.2d 1194 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 921 , 806 A.2d 1061 (2002).

2017Such a claim serves as a gateway to permit federal habeas review of an otherwise procedurally barred state conviction that the petitioner asserts is constitutionally flawed'; Miller v. Commissioner of Correction , 242 Conn. 745 , 788 n.28, 700 A.2d 1108 (1997) ; it is '[a] claim based on an antecedent constitutional violation that affects the results of the criminal trial ....' Id., at 813 , 700 A.2d 1108 n.7 ( Berdon, J ., concurring and dissenting)." Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction , 70 Conn.App. 452 , 461 n.2, 800 A.2d 1194 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 921 , 806 A.2d 1061 (2002).

2017As for the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, it is well established that "a demand for punitive damages is not a freestanding claim; rather, it is parasitic and possesses no viability absent its attachment to a substantive cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gallinari v. Kloth , 148 F.Supp.3d 202 , 217 (D.

2015Co., 282 Conn. 594, 601 , 922 A.2d 1073 (2007). ‘‘The doctrine [of res judicata] . . . applies to criminal as well as civil pro- ceedings and to state habeas corpus proceedings. . . .

2015Co., 282 Conn. 594, 601 , 922 A.2d 1073 (2007). ‘‘The doctrine [of res judicata] . . . applies to criminal as well as civil pro- ceedings and to state habeas corpus proceedings. . . .

2011See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 242 Conn. 758 -59 (third party confession); Summerville v. Warden, supra, 229 Conn. 420 (discussing colorable but unsuccessful claim that no crime occurred in light of new expert opinion that cause of victim’s death was acute cocaine intoxication, not asphyxiation from manual strangulation, and marks on victim’s neck could have been caused by resuscitation efforts); People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 132-37 , 461 N.E.2d 398 (1984) (granting relief after petitioner presented affidavits from four convicted codefendants and one acquitted co

2011This evidentiary burden is satisfied if a petitioner can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proffered evidence could not have been discovered prior to the petitioner’s criminal trial by the exercise of due diligence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaston v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 553, 558-59 , 9 A.3d 397 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 908 , 12 A.3d 1003 (2011). “[T]he proper standard for evaluating a freestanding claim of actual innocence ... is twofold.

2011This evidentiary burden is satisfied if a petitioner can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proffered evidence could not have been discovered prior to the petitioner’s criminal trial by the exercise of due diligence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaston v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 553, 558-59 , 9 A.3d 397 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 908 , 12 A.3d 1003 (2011). “[T]he proper standard for evaluating a freestanding claim of actual innocence ... is twofold.

2011This evidentiary burden is satisfied if a petitioner can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proffered evidence could not have been discovered prior to the petitioner’s criminal trial by the exercise of due diligence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaston v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 553, 558-59 , 9 A.3d 397 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 908 , 12 A.3d 1003 (2011). “[T]he proper standard for evaluating a freestanding claim of actual innocence ... is twofold.

2011This evidentiary burden is satisfied if a petitioner can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proffered evidence could not have been discovered prior to the petitioner’s criminal trial by the exercise of due diligence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaston v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 553, 558-59 , 9 A.3d 397 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 908 , 12 A.3d 1003 (2011). “[T]he proper standard for evaluating a freestanding claim of actual innocence ... is twofold.

2011See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 242 Conn. 758 -59 (third party confession); Summerville v. Warden, supra, 229 Conn. 420 (discussing colorable but unsuccessful claim that no crime occurred in light of new expert opinion that cause of victim’s death was acute cocaine intoxication, not asphyxiation from manual strangulation, and marks on victim’s neck could have been caused by resuscitation efforts); People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 132-37 , 461 N.E.2d 398 (1984) (granting relief after petitioner presented affidavits from four convicted codefendants and one acquitted co

2011See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 242 Conn. 758 -59 (third party confession); Summerville v. Warden, supra, 229 Conn. 420 (discussing colorable but unsuccessful claim that no crime occurred in light of new expert opinion that cause of victim’s death was acute cocaine intoxication, not asphyxiation from manual strangulation, and marks on victim’s neck could have been caused by resuscitation efforts); People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 132-37 , 461 N.E.2d 398 (1984) (granting relief after petitioner presented affidavits from four convicted codefendants and one acquitted co

2009First, the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that, taking into account all of the evidence—both the evidence adduced at the original criminal trial and the evidence adduced at the habeas corpus trial—he is actually innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted. 9 Second, the petitioner must *81 also establish that, after considering all of that evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom as the habeas court did, no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty of the crime.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Correia v. Rowland, 263 Conn. 453, 475 , 820

2009First, the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that, taking into account all of the evidence—both the evidence adduced at the original criminal trial and the evidence adduced at the habeas corpus trial—he is actually innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted. 9 Second, the petitioner must *81 also establish that, after considering all of that evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom as the habeas court did, no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty of the crime.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Correia v. Rowland, 263 Conn. 453, 475 , 820

2002Cf. Holley v. Commissioner of Correction, 62 Conn. App. 170, 182 , 774 A.2d 148 (2001) (declining to consider claim of actual innocence where “[n]owhere in [habeas] petitions does the petitioner allege that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advance a defense . . . that he was innocent as a matter of law”).

2002Cf. Holley v. Commissioner of Correction, 62 Conn. App. 170, 182 , 774 A.2d 148 (2001) (declining to consider claim of actual innocence where “[n]owhere in [habeas] petitions does the petitioner allege that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advance a defense . . . that he was innocent as a matter of law”).

2000Id. 355 .

1999Id.

1999As the New York Court of Appeals recently noted in Buckley v. National Freight, Inc., 90 N.Y.2d 210, 215 , 681 N.E.2d 1287 , 659 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1997): “A great many States take a position that is consistent with that of the Restatement. 6 Other State courts allow defendants the option of having the action for loss of consortium joined with the action for illness or bodily harm, 7 while still other States have statutes or rules granting plaintiffs that option. 8 The highest courts in several States have held that joinder is desirable, but not required.” 9 There is good reason for this widespread

1999As the New York Court of Appeals recently noted in Buckley v. National Freight, Inc., 90 N.Y.2d 210, 215 , 681 N.E.2d 1287 , 659 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1997): “A great many States take a position that is consistent with that of the Restatement. 6 Other State courts allow defendants the option of having the action for loss of consortium joined with the action for illness or bodily harm, 7 while still other States have statutes or rules granting plaintiffs that option. 8 The highest courts in several States have held that joinder is desirable, but not required.” 9 There is good reason for this widespread