retaliatory discharge claim in Kansas

2025In Rockers v. Kansas Turnpike Auth., 268 Kan. 110 , 991 P.2d 889 (1999), Rockers claimed equitable estoppel barred the Kansas Turnpike Authority (KTA) from relying on the statute of limitations for a retaliatory discharge claim.

2025In Rockers v. Kansas Turnpike Auth., 268 Kan. 110 , 991 P.2d 889 (1999), Rockers claimed equitable estoppel barred the Kansas Turnpike Authority (KTA) from relying on the statute of limitations for a retaliatory discharge claim.

2012The court emphasized that the public policy at issue was based on the worker’s use of statutory rights: “Regardless of whether FELA or the Kansas Workers Compensation Act supplies the framework to support an injured worker’s pursuit of recovery, the public policy underlying the framework would be undermined if the worker could be fired/or the exercise of his or her statutory right.” (Emphasis added.) 277 Kan. at 556-57 ; accord Campbell, 292 Kan. at 234 (finding a retaliatory-discharge claim “necessary [to carry out public policy] when an employer fires a worker who seeks to exercise [Kansas W

2007App. 2d 488 , 630 P.2d 186 (1981) (recognizing a retaliatory discharge claim for termination of employment for exercising rights under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act); Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893 , 752 P.2d 685 (1988) (for whistle-blower actions); Flenker v. Williamette *149 Industries, Inc., 266 Kan. 198 , 967 P.2d 295 (1998) (under the Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA]); and Hysten, 277 Kan. 551 (under the Federal Employer s Liability Act [FELA]).

2009In Moyer , the majority of the court determined that under Palmer , a retaliatory discharge claim could be brought on allegations of internal whistleblowing to company management. 20 Kan.App.2d at 208 , 885 P.2d 391 .

2009In Moyer , the majority of the court determined that under Palmer , a retaliatory discharge claim could be brought on allegations of internal whistleblowing to company management. 20 Kan.

2001Consequently, the tort of retaliatory discharge may be committed only by the employer." 182 Ill.2d at 21-22 .

2001Consequently, the tort of retaliatory discharge may be committed only by die employer.” 182 Ill. 2d at 21-22 .

2024As our Supreme Court has stated: "It would be both troublesome and unsettling to the state of the law if we were to allow a retaliatory discharge claim to be based on personal opinion of wrongdoing." 276 Kan. at 592 .

2020Although it concluded that an attempt to shorten the statute of limitations for an employee to bring a retaliatory discharge claim against her employer for seeking workers benefits was unenforceable, our Supreme Court found that interference with the freedom to contract should be "limited to the circumstances in which there is a strongly held public policy interest at issue." 297 Kan. at 559 .

2012We find additional help in determining when a retaliatory-discharge claim might exist before a wage-payment claim has been filed in a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 , 131 S. Ct. 1325 , 179 L.

2012We find additional help in determining when a retaliatory-discharge claim might exist before a wage-payment claim has been filed in a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 , 131 S. Ct. 1325 , 179 L.

2011Applying this same rationale to the facts, the Kistler court held the same was true in the unemployment compensation case before it. 620 F. Supp. at 1270 .

2007App. 2d 488 , 630 P.2d 186 (1981) (recognizing a retaliatory discharge claim for termination of employment for exercising rights under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act); Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893 , 752 P.2d 685 (1988) (for whistle-blower actions); Flenker v. Williamette *149 Industries, Inc., 266 Kan. 198 , 967 P.2d 295 (1998) (under the Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA]); and Hysten, 277 Kan. 551 (under the Federal Employer s Liability Act [FELA]).

2003See Connelly v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 271 Kan. 944, 946 , 26 P.3d 1246 (2001) (involving reports from Kansas Highway Patrol officers of violations of highway motor carrier inspection laws); Prager v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 271 Kan. 1, 44 , 20 P.3d 39 (2001) (reporting violation of Kansas taxation statutes); Flenker v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 266 Kan. 198, 199, 210 , 967 P.2d 295 (1998) (considering OSHA violations for machine safety and holding that plaintiff could maintain a state-law tort claim for retaliatory discharge because the federal OSHA remedy was inadequate); Palmer, 242 Kan

2003See Connelly v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 271 Kan. 944, 946 , 26 P.3d 1246 (2001) (involving reports from Kansas Highway Patrol officers of violations of highway motor carrier inspection laws); Prager v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 271 Kan. 1, 44 , 20 P.3d 39 (2001) (reporting violation of Kansas taxation statutes); Flenker v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 266 Kan. 198, 199, 210 , 967 P.2d 295 (1998) (considering OSHA violations for machine safety and holding that plaintiff could maintain a state-law tort claim for retaliatory discharge because the federal OSHA remedy was inadequate); Palmer, 242 Kan

2002Under the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer can terminate an employee “for good cause, for no cause, or even for a wrong cause, without incurring liability to the employee for wrongful discharge.” Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 508 , 738 P.2d 841 (1987).

2002Under the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer can terminate an employee “for good cause, for no cause, or even for a wrong cause, without incurring liability to the employee for wrongful discharge.” Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 508 , 738 P.2d 841 (1987).

2001App. 2d 139 , 927 P.2d 958 (1996), rev. denied 261 Kan. 1084 (1997), imposed a threshold requirement to a retaliatory discharge claim.

1996Further, Exchange argues that requiring employers to attempt to accommodate all injured workers or face a retaliatory discharge claim would force employers “to ‘featherbed’ its work force with uneconomical ‘make work’ jobs or deny positions to qualified individuals to allow for workers compensation veterans not able to do the job.” Both parties rely on Rowland v. Val-Agri, Inc., 13 Kan.

1996App. 2d 149 , 766 P.2d 819 (1988).

1991In providing guidance to the district courts within the circuit, the Fifth Circuit noted that, to prevail on the retaliatory discharge claim, the seaman had to affirmatively establish that the employer's decision "was motivated in substantial part by the knowledge that the seaman either intends to file, or has already filed, a personal injury action against the employer." 653 F.2d at 1063-64 .

1991In providing guidance to the district courts within the circuit, the Fifth Circuit noted that, to prevail on the retaliatory discharge claim, the seaman had to affirmatively establish that the employer’s decision “was motivated in substantial part by the knowledge that the seaman either intends to file, or has already filed, a personal injury action against the employer.” 653 F.2d at 1063-64 .

1988The majority of this court now overrules the decision in Cox , affirmed in Smith v. United Technologies, 240 Kan. 562, 572 , 731 P.2d 871 (1987), and Armstrong v. Goldblatt Tool Co., 242 Kan. 164 , 747 P.2d 119 (1987), reh. denied January 20, 1988, and extends recognition of the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim to employees protected contractually from such discharge by a collective bargaining agreement.

1988The majority of this court now overrules the decision in Cox , affirmed in Smith v. United Technologies, 240 Kan. 562, 572 , 731 P.2d 871 (1987), and Armstrong v. Goldblatt Tool Co., 242 Kan. 164 , 747 P.2d 119 (1987), reh. denied January 20, 1988, and extends recognition of the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim to employees protected contractually from such discharge by a collective bargaining agreement.

1988The majority of this court now overrules the decision in Cox , affirmed in Smith v. United Technologies, 240 Kan. 562, 572 , 731 P.2d 871 (1987), and Armstrong v. Goldblatt Tool Co., 242 Kan. 164 , 747 P.2d 119 (1987), reh. denied January 20, 1988, and extends recognition of the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim to employees protected contractually from such discharge by a collective bargaining agreement.

1988The majority of this court now overrules the decision in Cox , affirmed in Smith v. United Technologies, 240 Kan. 562, 572 , 731 P.2d 871 (1987), and Armstrong v. Goldblatt Tool Co., 242 Kan. 164 , 747 P.2d 119 (1987), reh. denied January 20, 1988, and extends recognition of the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim to employees protected contractually from such discharge by a collective bargaining agreement.

1987As the court stated in Allis-Chalmers, “[c]learly § 301 does not grant the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law. . . . [I]t would be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.” 471 U.S. at 212 .

1987As the court stated in Allis-Chalmers, "[c]learly § 301 does not grant the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law.... [I]t would be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract." 471 U.S. at 212 .