retaliatory discharge claim in California

2024Herrera v. Stender (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 614, 645 .) “‘[C]onfidential communication between client and lawyer’” is defined as “information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted, and in

2021(Id. at p. 1178.) As the Gutierrez court later noted: “The important thing about General Dynamics for our purposes is that there is no way one can read it without coming away with this basic thought: In-house attorneys employed as attorneys for their employer do indeed have an attorney-client relationship with their employers.” (Gutierrez, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 559 .) Missakian contends that finding section 6147 applicable to in-house attorneys would lead to an untenable situation, where all in-house attorneys would be stripped of any statutory protections relating to their compensation

2016Guz and McCaskey, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th 947 , involved age discrimination claims and Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 95 involved a retaliatory discharge claim related to complaints about sexual harassment in the workplace.

2016Guz and McCaskey, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th 947 , involved age discrimination claims and Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 95 involved a retaliatory discharge claim related to complaints about sexual harassment in the workplace.

2016Earlier in the opinion, the court (1) referred to the January 2006 version of CACI No. 2540; (2) stated that the form instruction typically requires the plaintiff to prove the “[p]laintiff’s physical condition was a motivating reason for the refusal to hire;” and (3) stated that the form jury instruction was modified to require the 15 Guz and McCaskey involved age discrimination claims and Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 95 involved a retaliatory discharge claim related to complains about sexual harassment in the workplace. 22 plaintiff to establish that the “[d]efendant

2016Earlier in the opinion, the court (1) referred to the January 2006 version of CACI No. 2540; (2) stated that the form instruction typically requires the plaintiff to prove the “[p]laintiff’s physical condition was a motivating reason for the refusal to hire;” and (3) stated that the form jury instruction was modified to require the 15 Guz and McCaskey involved age discrimination claims and Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 95 involved a retaliatory discharge claim related to complains about sexual harassment in the workplace. 22 plaintiff to establish that the “[d]efendant

2009Thus, we also hold that, in those instances where the attorney-employee’s retaliatory discharge claim is incapable of complete resolution without breaching the attorney-client privilege, the suit may not proceed.” (General Dynamics, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1170 .) *788 In McDermott, Will & Emery v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 378 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 ] (McDermott), the Court of Appeal concluded that shareholders of a corporation could not bring a legal malpractice action against the corporation’s outside counsel because the attorney-client privilege—absent the corporation’s waiver ther

2009Thus, we also hold that, in those instances where the attorney-employee’s retaliatory discharge claim is incapable of complete resolution without breaching the attorney-client privilege, the suit may not proceed.” (General Dynamics, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1170 .) *788 In McDermott, Will & Emery v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 378 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 ] (McDermott), the Court of Appeal concluded that shareholders of a corporation could not bring a legal malpractice action against the corporation’s outside counsel because the attorney-client privilege—absent the corporation’s waiver ther

2001Under these circumstances, a court must resolve two questions: First, whether the employer’s conduct is of the kind that would give rise to a retaliatory discharge action by a nonattorney employee under Gantt v. Sentry Insurance [(1992)] 1 Cal.4th 1083 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ], and related cases; second, the court must determine whether some statute or ethical rule, such as the statutory exceptions to the attorney-client privilege codified in the Evidence Code (see id., §§ 956-958) specifically permits the attorney to depart from the usual requirement of confidentiality with respec

2001Under these circumstances, a court must resolve two questions: First, whether the employer’s conduct is of the kind that would give rise to a retaliatory discharge action by a nonattorney employee under Gantt v. Sentry Insurance [(1992)] 1 Cal.4th 1083 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ], and related cases; second, the court must determine whether some statute or ethical rule, such as the statutory exceptions to the attorney-client privilege codified in the Evidence Code (see id., §§ 956-958) specifically permits the attorney to depart from the usual requirement of confidentiality with respec

1998(See Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 6076, 6077.) Although General Dynamics did not specifically address how to reconcile its holding with our earlier pronouncements in Gantt, the court implicitly recognized that Gantt 's analysis would not exclude all Tameny claims rooted in statutorily based administrative regulations. ( General Dynamics, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1180, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 876 P.2d 487 .) In Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 876 P.2d 1074 ( Jennings) , and Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pages 892-894, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 , we again narrowly de

1998(See Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 6076, 6077.) Although General Dynamics did not specifically address how to reconcile its holding with our earlier pronouncements in Gantt, the court implicitly recognized that Gantt 's analysis would not exclude all Tameny claims rooted in statutorily based administrative regulations. ( General Dynamics, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1180, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 876 P.2d 487 .) In Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 876 P.2d 1074 ( Jennings) , and Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pages 892-894, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 , we again narrowly de

1998The tort of wrongful discharge is not a vehicle for enforcement of an employer's internal policies or the provisions of its agreements with others. [The plaintiffs] failure to identify a statutory or constitutional policy that would be thwarted by his alleged discharge dooms his cause of action." ( Id. at p. 1257, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223 , 876 P.2d 1022 .) In General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 876 P.2d 487 ( General Dynamics ), we held that, under most circumstances, an in-house attorney could maintain "a retaliatory discharge claim against his or he

1998The tort of wrongful discharge is not a vehicle for enforcement of an employer's internal policies or the provisions of its agreements with others. [The plaintiffs] failure to identify a statutory or constitutional policy that would be thwarted by his alleged discharge dooms his cause of action." ( Id. at p. 1257, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223 , 876 P.2d 1022 .) In General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 876 P.2d 487 ( General Dynamics ), we held that, under most circumstances, an in-house attorney could maintain "a retaliatory discharge claim against his or he

1998(See Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 6076, 6077.) Although General Dynamics did not specifically address how to reconcile its holding with our earlier pronouncements in Gantt, the court implicitly recognized that Gantt 's analysis would not exclude all Tameny claims rooted in statutorily based administrative regulations. ( General Dynamics, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1180, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 876 P.2d 487 .) In Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 876 P.2d 1074 ( Jennings) , and Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pages 892-894, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 , we again narrowly de

1998(See Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 6076, 6077.) Although General Dynamics did not specifically address how to reconcile its holding with our earlier pronouncements in Gantt, the court implicitly recognized that Gantt 's analysis would not exclude all Tameny claims rooted in statutorily based administrative regulations. ( General Dynamics, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1180, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 876 P.2d 487 .) In Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 876 P.2d 1074 ( Jennings) , and Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pages 892-894, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 , we again narrowly de