20 West Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Services Corp.green2 sentences2000Locating no specific guidance in the applicable regulations, we found that the "general admonitions as to the requirement of good care for patients by social workers do not constitute the type of substantial and clear public policy on which a retaliatory discharge claim can be based." 188 W.Va. at 378 , 424 S.E.2d at 613 . 2000Locating no specific guidance in the applicable regulations, we found that the "general admonitions as to the requirement of good care for patients by social workers do not constitute the type of substantial and clear public policy on which a retaliatory discharge claim can be based." 188 W.Va. at 378 , 424 S.E.2d at 613 . | 1 | 3 |
MacE v. Pizza Hut, Inc.green2 sentences2004During that second phase of the retaliatory discharge claim, an employer seeks to rebut the presumption of retaliatory action by offering “credible evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.... ” Mace v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 180 W.Va. 469, 472 , 377 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1988). 2004During that second phase of the retaliatory discharge claim, an employer seeks to rebut the presumption of retaliatory action by offering “credible evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.... ” Mace v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 180 W.Va. 469, 472 , 377 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Mace v. Charleston Area Medical Center Foundation, Inc.green1 sentence1995Found., Inc., 188 W.Va. 57, 67 , 422 S.E.2d 624, 684 (1992) (“In spite of the admitted paucity of evidence of emotional distress ... [as an adjunct to a retaliatory discharge claim,] [w]e will not disturb the jury’s award of $50,000.00 for emotional distress.”); Criss v. Criss, 177 W.Va. 749, 751 , 356 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1987) (“Although the appellant’s claim for damages for emotional distress ... [as an adjunct to a claim for assault and battery] would have been strengthened by supporting medical or psychological evidence, the testimony offered by the appellant and her grandmother was sufficien | 1 | 1 |
Criss v. Crissgreen2 sentences1995Found., Inc., 188 W.Va. 57, 67 , 422 S.E.2d 624, 684 (1992) (“In spite of the admitted paucity of evidence of emotional distress ... [as an adjunct to a retaliatory discharge claim,] [w]e will not disturb the jury’s award of $50,000.00 for emotional distress.”); Criss v. Criss, 177 W.Va. 749, 751 , 356 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1987) (“Although the appellant’s claim for damages for emotional distress ... [as an adjunct to a claim for assault and battery] would have been strengthened by supporting medical or psychological evidence, the testimony offered by the appellant and her grandmother was sufficien 1995Found., Inc., 188 W.Va. 57, 67 , 422 S.E.2d 624, 684 (1992) (“In spite of the admitted paucity of evidence of emotional distress ... [as an adjunct to a retaliatory discharge claim,] [w]e will not disturb the jury’s award of $50,000.00 for emotional distress.”); Criss v. Criss, 177 W.Va. 749, 751 , 356 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1987) (“Although the appellant’s claim for damages for emotional distress ... [as an adjunct to a claim for assault and battery] would have been strengthened by supporting medical or psychological evidence, the testimony offered by the appellant and her grandmother was sufficien | 1 | 1 |
MacE v. CHARLESTON AREA MED CTR. FOUND.green1 sentence1995Found., Inc., 188 W.Va. 57, 67 , 422 S.E.2d 624, 684 (1992) (“In spite of the admitted paucity of evidence of emotional distress ... [as an adjunct to a retaliatory discharge claim,] [w]e will not disturb the jury’s award of $50,000.00 for emotional distress.”); Criss v. Criss, 177 W.Va. 749, 751 , 356 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1987) (“Although the appellant’s claim for damages for emotional distress ... [as an adjunct to a claim for assault and battery] would have been strengthened by supporting medical or psychological evidence, the testimony offered by the appellant and her grandmother was sufficien | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Elkay Mining Co.green2 sentences1992See, e.g., Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 179 W.Va. 549 , 371 S.E.2d 46 (1988) (West Virginia Mine Safety Act, W.Va.Code, 22A-1A-20); McClung v. Marion County Comm’n, 178 W.Va. 444 , 360 S.E.2d 221 (1987) (Wage and Hour Act, W.Va.Code, 21-5C-8); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 165 W.Va. 305 , 270 S.E.2d 178 (1980) (Workers’ Compensation Act, W.Va. 1992See, e.g., Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 179 W.Va. 549 , 371 S.E.2d 46 (1988) (West Virginia Mine Safety Act, W.Va.Code, 22A-1A-20); McClung v. Marion County Comm’n, 178 W.Va. 444 , 360 S.E.2d 221 (1987) (Wage and Hour Act, W.Va.Code, 21-5C-8); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 165 W.Va. 305 , 270 S.E.2d 178 (1980) (Workers’ Compensation Act, W.Va. | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co.green2 sentences1992In Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 174 W.Va. *376 321, 325, 325 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1984), which involved a retaliatory discharge claim, we quoted from Allen v. Commercial Casualty & Insurance Co., 131 N.J.L. 475, 478 , 37 A.2d 37, 39 (1944), where the court gave these sources of “public policy”: “ ‘The sources determinative of public policy are, among others, our federal and state constitutions, our public statutes, our judicial decisions, the applicable principles of the common law, the acknowledged prevailing concepts of the federal and state governments relating to and affecting the safe 1992In Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 174 W.Va. *376 321, 325, 325 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1984), which involved a retaliatory discharge claim, we quoted from Allen v. Commercial Casualty & Insurance Co., 131 N.J.L. 475, 478 , 37 A.2d 37, 39 (1944), where the court gave these sources of “public policy”: “ ‘The sources determinative of public policy are, among others, our federal and state constitutions, our public statutes, our judicial decisions, the applicable principles of the common law, the acknowledged prevailing concepts of the federal and state governments relating to and affecting the safe | 1 | 1 |
Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp.green1 sentence1992In Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 174 W.Va. *376 321, 325, 325 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1984), which involved a retaliatory discharge claim, we quoted from Allen v. Commercial Casualty & Insurance Co., 131 N.J.L. 475, 478 , 37 A.2d 37, 39 (1944), where the court gave these sources of “public policy”: “ ‘The sources determinative of public policy are, among others, our federal and state constitutions, our public statutes, our judicial decisions, the applicable principles of the common law, the acknowledged prevailing concepts of the federal and state governments relating to and affecting the safe | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Frank's Shoe Store v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission
green
2 sentences2009In syllabus point 4 of Frank’s Shoe Store v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53 , 365 S.E.2d 251 (1986), we set forth the legal standard that an employee must meet in order to succeed on a retaliatory discharge claim. 2009In syllabus point 4 of Frank’s Shoe Store v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53 , 365 S.E.2d 251 (1986), we set forth the legal standard that an employee must meet in order to succeed on a retaliatory discharge claim. | 4 | 2009–2016 |
Brammer v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission
green
2 sentences2016Code, 5-11-1, et seq., as amended, the burden is upon the complainant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the complainant engaged in protected activity, (2) that complainant’s employer was aware of the protected activities, (3) that complainant was subsequently discharged7 and (absent other evidence tending to establish a retaliatory motivation), (4) that complainant’s discharge followed his or her protected activities within such period of time that the court can infer retaliatory motivation.” Syl. pt. 4, Frank’s Shoe Store v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 2016Code, 5-11-1, et seq., as amended, the burden is upon the complainant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the complainant engaged in protected activity, (2) that complainant’s employer was aware of the protected activities, (3) that complainant was subsequently discharged7 and (absent other evidence tending to establish a retaliatory motivation), (4) that complainant’s discharge followed his or her protected activities within such period of time that the court can infer retaliatory motivation.” Syl. pt. 4, Frank’s Shoe Store v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. | 3 | 2010–2016 |
Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont
green
2 sentences1987Syllabus point 5 of Harless v. First National Bank, 169 W.Va. 673 , 289 S.E.2d 692 (1982) (Harless II), states in its entirety: Because there is a certain open-endedness in the limits of recovery for emotional distress in a retaliatory discharge claim, we decline to automatically allow a claim for punitive damages to be added to the damage picture. 1987Syllabus point 5 of Harless v. First National Bank, 169 W.Va. 673 , 289 S.E.2d 692 (1982) (Harless II), states in its entirety: Because there is a certain open-endedness in the limits of recovery for emotional distress in a retaliatory discharge claim, we decline to automatically allow a claim for punitive damages to be added to the damage picture. | 3 | 1987–2001 |
Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont
green
2 sentences1998In these hypothetical cases or others like them, applying our established law under Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 162 W.Va. 116 , 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) and its progenywhich recognize a cause of action for an employee who suffers a retaliatory discharge in violation of public policyI might well be prepared to hold that a constitutionally-derived public policy protecting freedom of speech that does not unfairly impinge on an employer's legitimate business concerns is indeed essential to and inherent in a system of ordered liberty. 1998In these hypothetical cases or others like them, applying our established law under Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 162 W.Va. 116 , 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) and its progenywhich recognize a cause of action for an employee who suffers a retaliatory discharge in violation of public policyI might well be prepared to hold that a constitutionally-derived public policy protecting freedom of speech that does not unfairly impinge on an employer's legitimate business concerns is indeed essential to and inherent in a system of ordered liberty. | 2 | 1988–1998 |
Oakes v. Oxygen Therapy Services
green
1 sentence2024Oakes explicitly distinguished the complex circumstances of that case from the “clear-cut cases of physical injury” to which the lex loci delicti rule has generally been applied. 178 W. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Vest v. St. Albans Psychiatric Hospital, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022Albans Psychiatric Hosp., Inc., 182 W. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021This Court held in Syllabus point 2 of Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hanlon v. Chambers
green
2 sentences2016Code, 5-11-1, et seq., as amended, the burden is upon the complainant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the complainant engaged in protected activity, (2) that complainant’s employer was aware of the protected activities, (3) that complainant was subsequently discharged7 and (absent other evidence tending to establish a retaliatory motivation), (4) that complainant’s discharge followed his or her protected activities within such period of time that the court can infer retaliatory motivation.” Syl. pt. 4, Frank’s Shoe Store v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 2016Code, 5-11-1, et seq., as amended, the burden is upon the complainant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the complainant engaged in protected activity, (2) that complainant’s employer was aware of the protected activities, (3) that complainant was subsequently discharged7 and (absent other evidence tending to establish a retaliatory motivation), (4) that complainant’s discharge followed his or her protected activities within such period of time that the court can infer retaliatory motivation.” Syl. pt. 4, Frank’s Shoe Store v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Conrad v. Ara Szabo
green
2 sentences2012Erroneous Jury Instruction The trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction that substantially lowered the plaintiffs burden of proof on her retaliatory discharge claim. 3 In Syllabus Point 6 of Conrad v. ARA Szabo, 198 W.Va. 362 , 480 S.E.2d 801 (1996), this Court explained what a plaintiff must prove in a retaliatory discharge claim: In an action to redress an unlawful retaliatory discharge under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va.Code, 5-1-1, et. seq., as amended, the burden is upon the complainant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the complainant engaged in prote 2012Erroneous Jury Instruction The trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction that substantially lowered the plaintiffs burden of proof on her retaliatory discharge claim. 3 In Syllabus Point 6 of Conrad v. ARA Szabo, 198 W.Va. 362 , 480 S.E.2d 801 (1996), this Court explained what a plaintiff must prove in a retaliatory discharge claim: In an action to redress an unlawful retaliatory discharge under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va.Code, 5-1-1, et. seq., as amended, the burden is upon the complainant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the complainant engaged in prote | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co.
green
2 sentences1992See, e.g., Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 179 W.Va. 549 , 371 S.E.2d 46 (1988) (West Virginia Mine Safety Act, W.Va.Code, 22A-1A-20); McClung v. Marion County Comm’n, 178 W.Va. 444 , 360 S.E.2d 221 (1987) (Wage and Hour Act, W.Va.Code, 21-5C-8); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 165 W.Va. 305 , 270 S.E.2d 178 (1980) (Workers’ Compensation Act, W.Va. 1992See, e.g., Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 179 W.Va. 549 , 371 S.E.2d 46 (1988) (West Virginia Mine Safety Act, W.Va.Code, 22A-1A-20); McClung v. Marion County Comm’n, 178 W.Va. 444 , 360 S.E.2d 221 (1987) (Wage and Hour Act, W.Va.Code, 21-5C-8); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 165 W.Va. 305 , 270 S.E.2d 178 (1980) (Workers’ Compensation Act, W.Va. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
McClung v. Marion County Commission
green
2 sentences1992See, e.g., Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 179 W.Va. 549 , 371 S.E.2d 46 (1988) (West Virginia Mine Safety Act, W.Va.Code, 22A-1A-20); McClung v. Marion County Comm’n, 178 W.Va. 444 , 360 S.E.2d 221 (1987) (Wage and Hour Act, W.Va.Code, 21-5C-8); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 165 W.Va. 305 , 270 S.E.2d 178 (1980) (Workers’ Compensation Act, W.Va. 1992See, e.g., Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 179 W.Va. 549 , 371 S.E.2d 46 (1988) (West Virginia Mine Safety Act, W.Va.Code, 22A-1A-20); McClung v. Marion County Comm’n, 178 W.Va. 444 , 360 S.E.2d 221 (1987) (Wage and Hour Act, W.Va.Code, 21-5C-8); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 165 W.Va. 305 , 270 S.E.2d 178 (1980) (Workers’ Compensation Act, W.Va. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Geary v. United States Steel Corp.
green
2 sentences1978Pennsylvania has suggested it may recognize the doctrine of retaliatory discharge in Geary v. United States Steel Corporation, 456 Pa. 171 , 319 A.2d 174 (1974). 1978Pennsylvania has suggested it may recognize the doctrine of retaliatory discharge in Geary v. United States Steel Corporation, 456 Pa. 171 , 319 A.2d 174 (1974). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.