retaliatory discharge claim in Ohio

2002Brentlinger v. Highlights for Children (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 25 , 36 (involving discharge of employee after employee complained of sexual harassment); Neal v. Hamilton Cty. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 670 , 677-678 , 681 (involving retaliatory discharge for filing discrimination and workers' compensation claims). {¶ 12} If the plaintiff establishes his or her prima facie case, then the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its action.

2001Brentlinger v. Highlights for Children (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 25 , 36 (involving discharge of employee after employee complained of sexual harassment); Chandler v. Empire Chem., Inc. (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 396 , 402 (involving discharge in retaliation for making inquiry to Civil Rights Commission about wage discrimination); Neal v. Hamilton Cty. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 670 , 677-678 , 681 (involving retaliatory discharge for filing discrimination and workers' compensation claims).

2002Brentlinger v. Highlights for Children (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 25 , 36 (involving discharge of employee after employee complained of sexual harassment); Neal v. Hamilton Cty. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 670 , 677-678 , 681 (involving retaliatory discharge for filing discrimination and workers' compensation claims). {¶ 12} If the plaintiff establishes his or her prima facie case, then the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its action.

2001Brentlinger v. Highlights for Children (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 25 , 36 (involving discharge of employee after employee complained of sexual harassment); Chandler v. Empire Chem., Inc. (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 396 , 402 (involving discharge in retaliation for making inquiry to Civil Rights Commission about wage discrimination); Neal v. Hamilton Cty. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 670 , 677-678 , 681 (involving retaliatory discharge for filing discrimination and workers' compensation claims).

1997Extending Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 228 , 551 N.E.2d 981 , a majority of this court held that Kulch could use both whistleblower statutes to support a common-law cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge.

1997Extending Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 228 , 551 N.E.2d 981 , a majority of this court held that Kulch could use both whistleblower statutes to support a common-law cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge.

2018No. 85-2006, 2008-Ohio-6368 , 2008 WL 5124431 , ¶ 10, citing Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. McNulty, Inc. , 28 Ohio St.3d 333 , 336-337, 504 N.E.2d 415 (1986).

2018No. 85-2006, 2008-Ohio-6368 , 2008 WL 5124431 , ¶ 10, citing Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. McNulty, Inc. , 28 Ohio St.3d 333 , 336-337, 504 N.E.2d 415 (1986).

2018No. 85-2006, 2008-Ohio-6368 , 2008 WL 5124431 , ¶ 10, citing Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. McNulty, Inc. , 28 Ohio St.3d 333 , 336-337, 504 N.E.2d 415 (1986).

2016The appellate court cited this court’s determination that the basic purpose of the 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO retaliation statute is “ ‘ “to enable employees to freely exercise their rights without fear of retribution from their employers.” ’ ” 2014-Ohio-4115 , 20 N.E.3d 322 , ¶ 27, quoting Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2011-Ohio- 2723, 950 N.E.2d 938 , ¶ 22, quoting Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School Dist., 100 Ohio St.3d 141 , 2003-Ohio-5357 , 797 N.E.2d 61 , ¶ 43. {¶ 17} In sustaining Onderko’s assignments of error, the court reasoned: Requiring an employee to successfu

2016The appellate court cited this court’s determination that the basic purpose of the retaliation statute is “ ‘ “to enable employees to freely exercise their rights without fear of retribution from their employers.” ’ ” 2014-Ohio-4115 , 20 N.E.3d 322 , ¶ 27, quoting Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2011-Ohio-2723 , 950 N.E.2d 938 , ¶ 22, quoting Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School Dist., 100 Ohio St.3d 141 , 2003-Ohio-5357 , 797 N.E.2d 61 , ¶ 43. {¶ 17} In sustaining Onderko’s assignments of error, the court reasoned: Requiring an employee to successfully prove that the injur

2016The court concluded that because of its determination that a workplace injury is not a required element of a retaliatory-discharge claim under R.C. 4123.90, 6 January Term, 2016 and because Sierra Lobo offered no other grounds to justify Onderko’s termination, summary judgment against Onderko was inappropriate. {¶ 19} On January 28, 2015, this court accepted Sierra Lobo’s discretionary appeal (case No. 2014-1881). 141 Ohio St.3d 1454 , 2015-Ohio-239 , 23 N.E.3d 1196 .

2016The court concluded that because of its determination that a workplace injury is not a required element of a retaliatory-discharge claim under R.C. 4123.90 and because Sierra Lobo offered no other grounds to justify Onderko’s termination, summary judgment against Onderko was inappropriate. {¶ 19} On January 28, 2015, this court accepted Sierra Lobo’s discretionary appeal (case No. 2014-1881). 141 Ohio St.3d 1454 , 2015-Ohio-239 , 23 N.E.3d 1196 .

2016The court concluded that because of its determination that a workplace injury is not a required element of a retaliatory-discharge claim under R.C. 4123.90, 6 January Term, 2016 and because Sierra Lobo offered no other grounds to justify Onderko’s termination, summary judgment against Onderko was inappropriate. {¶ 19} On January 28, 2015, this court accepted Sierra Lobo’s discretionary appeal (case No. 2014-1881). 141 Ohio St.3d 1454 , 2015-Ohio-239 , 23 N.E.3d 1196 .

2016The court concluded that because of its determination that a workplace injury is not a required element of a retaliatory-discharge claim under R.C. 4123.90 and because Sierra Lobo offered no other grounds to justify Onderko’s termination, summary judgment against Onderko was inappropriate. {¶ 19} On January 28, 2015, this court accepted Sierra Lobo’s discretionary appeal (case No. 2014-1881). 141 Ohio St.3d 1454 , 2015-Ohio-239 , 23 N.E.3d 1196 .

2016The appellate court cited this court’s determination that the basic purpose of the 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO retaliation statute is “ ‘ “to enable employees to freely exercise their rights without fear of retribution from their employers.” ’ ” 2014-Ohio-4115 , 20 N.E.3d 322 , ¶ 27, quoting Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2011-Ohio- 2723, 950 N.E.2d 938 , ¶ 22, quoting Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School Dist., 100 Ohio St.3d 141 , 2003-Ohio-5357 , 797 N.E.2d 61 , ¶ 43. {¶ 17} In sustaining Onderko’s assignments of error, the court reasoned: Requiring an employee to successfu

2016The appellate court cited this court’s determination that the basic purpose of the retaliation statute is “ ‘ “to enable employees to freely exercise their rights without fear of retribution from their employers.” ’ ” 2014-Ohio-4115 , 20 N.E.3d 322 , ¶ 27, quoting Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2011-Ohio-2723 , 950 N.E.2d 938 , ¶ 22, quoting Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School Dist., 100 Ohio St.3d 141 , 2003-Ohio-5357 , 797 N.E.2d 61 , ¶ 43. {¶ 17} In sustaining Onderko’s assignments of error, the court reasoned: Requiring an employee to successfully prove that the injur

2014Rather, the focus of the holding was that a reference to R.C. 4123.90 in a complaint for retaliatory discharge was sufficient to satisfy the notice pleading requirements, and that the plaintiff was not required to specifically allege that the discharge was in retaliation for her filing of a workers’ compensation claim. {¶ 23} The Tenth District in Sidenstricker further noted that, although Ohio courts frequently cite Wilson for the elements of a retaliatory discharge claim under R.C. 4123.90, only one has directly addressed the element of “injury on the job.” In that single case, Kilbarger v.

2014Rather, the focus of the holding was that a reference to R.C. 4123.90 in a complaint for retaliatory discharge was sufficient to satisfy the notice pleading requirements, and that the plaintiff was not required to specifically allege that the discharge was in retaliation for her filing of a workers’ compensation claim. {¶ 23} The Tenth District in Sidenstricker further noted that, although Ohio courts frequently cite Wilson for the elements of a retaliatory discharge claim under R.C. 4123.90, only one has directly addressed the element of “injury on the job.” In that single case, Kilbarger v.

2006Id. {¶ 15} In the present case, however, we find no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of pretext.

2006Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind. (C.A.7, 1996), 91 F.3d 922 , 939; Boggs at ¶ 23 (plaintiff cannot prevail on a retaliatory discharge claim if the evidence demonstrates that the employer would have terminated her regardless of whether she participated in the protected activity). {¶ 43} In the absence of direct evidence of an employer's intent, courts apply the same burden-shifting analysis to a retaliatory discharge claim that they apply to an age discrimination claim.

2006See Stanley v. Miamisburg (Jan. 28, 2000), Montgomery App. No. 17912 (rejecting, on the basis of judicial estoppel, a retaliatory discharge claim by a former police officer who testified in prior proceedings that his disability prohibited him from performing the duties of a police officer); Advanced Analytics Laboratories, Inc. v. Kegler, Brown, Hill Ritter, 148 Ohio App. 3d 440 , 773 N.E.2d 1081 , 2002-Ohio-3328 (holding that plaintiff was judicially estopped in legal malpractice action from arguing that defendant attorneys breached their duty to ensure that all financial documents comported

2006See Stanley v. Miamisburg (Jan. 28, 2000), Montgomery App. No. 17912 (rejecting, on the basis of judicial estoppel, a retaliatory discharge claim by a former police officer who testified in prior proceedings that his disability prohibited him from performing the duties of a police officer); Advanced Analytics Laboratories, Inc. v. Kegler, Brown, Hill Ritter, 148 Ohio App. 3d 440 , 773 N.E.2d 1081 , 2002-Ohio-3328 (holding that plaintiff was judicially estopped in legal malpractice action from arguing that defendant attorneys breached their duty to ensure that all financial documents comported

2003Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks (1993), 509 U.S. 502 , 515 . {¶ 24} The trial court granted summary judgment based on Doe's failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the third element of a retaliatory discharge claim, i.e., Doe failed to establish a causal link between her lodging of a sexual harassment claim against Marker and her termination.

2003Home , 153 Ohio App.3d 441 , 794 N.E.2d 716 , 2003-Ohio-3383 (rejecting, in accordance with Wiles, a wrongful-discharge action based on the reporting of abuse in a nursing home when the plaintiff has a remedy by means of a retaliatory discharge claim, pursuant to R.C. 3721.24 .).

2003Home , 153 Ohio App.3d 441 , 794 N.E.2d 716 , 2003-Ohio-3383 (rejecting, in accordance with Wiles, a wrongful-discharge action based on the reporting of abuse in a nursing home when the plaintiff has a remedy by means of a retaliatory discharge claim, pursuant to R.C. 3721.24 .).

2002Sinea v. Denman Tire Corp. (1999), 135 Ohio App.3d 44 , 732 N.E.2d 1033 . {¶ 31} The court in Lingle found that no interpretation of the “just cause” termination clause in the collective bargaining agreement was necessary to resolve the state retaliatory claim. {¶ 32} Unlike the retaliatory-discharge claim in Lingle, supra, Wilson’s claim cannot be resolved by a purely factual inquiry into Wilson’s conduct and Glastic’s conduct and motive.

2002Sinea v. Denman Tire Corp. (1999), 135 Ohio App.3d 44 , 732 N.E.2d 1033 . {¶ 31} The court in Lingle found that no interpretation of the “just cause” termination clause in the collective bargaining agreement was necessary to resolve the state retaliatory claim. {¶ 32} Unlike the retaliatory-discharge claim in Lingle, supra, Wilson’s claim cannot be resolved by a purely factual inquiry into Wilson’s conduct and Glastic’s conduct and motive.

2002Auditor (Sept. 28, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-1502, citing Barker v. Dayton Walther Corp. (1989), 56 Ohio App.3d 1 , 3 . {¶ 11} In examining the requirements for establishing a retaliatory discharge claim in other contexts, the courts of this state have held a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing (1) he or she engaged in an activity protected by statute or public policy, (2) he or she was subject to some adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.

2001Brentlinger v. Highlights for Children (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 25 , 36 (involving discharge of employee after employee complained of sexual harassment); Chandler v. Empire Chem., Inc. (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 396 , 402 (involving discharge in retaliation for making inquiry to Civil Rights Commission about wage discrimination); Neal v. Hamilton Cty. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 670 , 677-678 , 681 (involving retaliatory discharge for filing discrimination and workers' compensation claims).

2001See, e.g., Kilbarger, supra; Wilson v. Semco, Inc. (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 488 , 492 ; Markham v. Earle M.

2000In Thomas v. Mastership Corp. (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 91 , we affirmed a summary judgment that denied a retaliatory discharge claim in part because the evidence showed the employer did not know about the Internal Revenue Service's adverse determination until after the employee was terminated.

2000Id.