salient factors in New Jersey

2007Otherwise his sentence would "confirm its own propriety." Morton II, supra, 165 N.J. at 289, 757 A. 2d 184 (Long, J., dissenting) (quoting Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 263 , 613 A. 2d 1059 (Handler, J., dissenting)). [2] I accept the majority's determination to engage in comparisons of the cases agreed upon by the parties.

2002Under the salient-factors test, every death-eligible case is assigned to one of thirteen categories based on the statutory aggravating factors. 1 Id. at 246, 757 A.2d 184 .

1961Joint or several liability to the injured judgment plaintiff * * * enforceable by action, is a substantive element of the right." ( Id., 14 N.J., at p. 395) "An interpretation of the Contribution Law that would sustain contribution in these circumstances would afford the means of rendering the husband indirectly liable to his wife in tort for negligence, and thus to transgress this salient principle that interdicts such intrusions upon marital unity and domestic contentment." ( Id., at pp. 397-398.) In another case, decided the same day as Kennedy, supra, the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Grey

1961Joint or several liability to the injured judgment plaintiff * * * enforceable by action, is a substantive element of the right." ( Id., 14 N.J., at p. 395) "An interpretation of the Contribution Law that would sustain contribution in these circumstances would afford the means of rendering the husband indirectly liable to his wife in tort for negligence, and thus to transgress this salient principle that interdicts such intrusions upon marital unity and domestic contentment." ( Id., at pp. 397-398.) In another case, decided the same day as Kennedy, supra, the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Grey

2022We see no reason to disturb that decision, as it is supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. 3 The motion court found that defendant was engaging in litigation that was "a manifestation of a perpetrator's unhealthy desire to control or abuse a victim." (quoting Kanaszka, 313 N.J.

2002PAPASAVVAS’S COMPARISON GROUP “In precedent-seeking review we use the same comparison group that was used in the salient-factors test.” State v. Feaster, 165 N.J. 888 , 407, 757 A.2d 266 (2000); accord Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 214, 731 A.2d 1070 .

2001If, in similar cases, the ratio of death sentences to penalty-trial cases or the ratio of death sentences to death-eligible cases is high, then the Court may interpret the relatively high rate of death sentencing as "strong evidence of the reliability of [the] defendant's death sentence." State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 358 , 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV) , cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995).

2001If, in similar cases, the ratio of death sentences to penalty-trial eases or the ratio of death sentences to death-eligible cases is high, then the Court may interpret the relatively high rate of death sentencing as “strong evidence of the reliability of [the] defendant’s death sentence.” State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 358 , 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995).

2001If, in similar cases, the ratio of death sentences to penalty-trial cases or the ratio of death sentences to death-eligible cases is high, then the Court may interpret the relatively high rate of death sentencing as "strong evidence of the reliability of [the] defendant's death sentence." State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 358 , 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV) , cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995).

2001If, in similar cases, the ratio of death sentences to penalty-trial eases or the ratio of death sentences to death-eligible cases is high, then the Court may interpret the relatively high rate of death sentencing as “strong evidence of the reliability of [the] defendant’s death sentence.” State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 358 , 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995).

2001If, in similar cases, the ratio of death sentences to penalty-trial cases or the ratio of death sentences to death-eligible cases is high, then the Court may interpret the relatively high rate of death sentencing as "strong evidence of the reliability of [the] defendant's death sentence." State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 358 , 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV) , cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995).

2001If, in similar cases, the ratio of death sentences to penalty-trial eases or the ratio of death sentences to death-eligible cases is high, then the Court may interpret the relatively high rate of death sentencing as “strong evidence of the reliability of [the] defendant’s death sentence.” State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 358 , 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Bey IV), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164 , 115 S.Ct. 1131 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995).

1996Income for this purpose is attributed to the time it is earned, not when it is actually received, Dingleberry v. Board of Review, 154 N.J.Super. 415,419 , 381 A.2d 809 (App.Div.1977).

1996Income for this purpose is attributed to the time it is earned, not when it is actually received, Dingleberry v. Board of Review, 154 N.J.Super. 415,419 , 381 A.2d 809 (App.Div.1977).

1995Applying the same logic but with the opposite motivation, the State seeks to add death-sentenced cases such as Martini's to the comparison group, and extract life-sentenced cases. [11] The facts of Martini's case are reported in State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176 , 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993) ( Martini I ), and again in State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3 , 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ). [12] Justice *226 O'Hern, post at 247-248, 662 A. 2d at 492 -493 describes the essential facts of Lanzel's crime. [13] The facts of Daniel Nicini's crime are summarized in Appendix D of the DiFrisco Report, and in greate

1995Applying the same logic but with the opposite motivation, the State seeks to add death-sentenced cases such as Martini's to the comparison group, and extract life-sentenced cases. [11] The facts of Martini's case are reported in State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176 , 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993) ( Martini I ), and again in State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3 , 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ). [12] Justice *226 O'Hern, post at 247-248, 662 A. 2d at 492 -493 describes the essential facts of Lanzel's crime. [13] The facts of Daniel Nicini's crime are summarized in Appendix D of the DiFrisco Report, and in greate

1993As noted in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. ___ , ___, 113 S.Ct. 732, 735 , 122 L.Ed. 2d 1, 9 (1993), "the concept of a textual commitment ... is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards." The salient inquiry is whether in committing the power to confirm gubernatorial nominations to the Senate, the constitutional text contains "judicially discoverable and manageable standards *446 for resolving [the question]." Baker, supra, 369 U.S. at 216 , 82 S.Ct. at 709 , 7 L.Ed. 2d at 686 .

1993As noted in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. ___ , ___, 113 S.Ct. 732, 735 , 122 L.Ed. 2d 1, 9 (1993), "the concept of a textual commitment ... is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards." The salient inquiry is whether in committing the power to confirm gubernatorial nominations to the Senate, the constitutional text contains "judicially discoverable and manageable standards *446 for resolving [the question]." Baker, supra, 369 U.S. at 216 , 82 S.Ct. at 709 , 7 L.Ed. 2d at 686 .

1993The discovery of such standards is crucial to the issue of justiciability for, as we noted in Gladden , "in the absence of constitutional ... standards, it is not the function of this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature." 87 N.J. at 282 , 432 A. 2d 1351 .

1993The discovery of such standards is crucial to the issue of justiciability for, as we noted in Gladden , "in the absence of constitutional ... standards, it is not the function of this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature." 87 N.J. at 282 , 432 A. 2d 1351 .

1992Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A. 2d 288, 304 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 , 104 S.Ct. 3547 , 82 L.Ed. 2d 850 (1984). *151 Justice Utter, in his separate dissent in State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398 , 717 P. 2d 722 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 , 107 S.Ct. 328 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 301 (1986), suggested the use of a "balancing approach superimposed upon a `salient factors' approach" to identify the pool of similar cases. [2] Id. 717 P. 2d 722 at 744 .

1992Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A. 2d 288, 304 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 , 104 S.Ct. 3547 , 82 L.Ed. 2d 850 (1984). *151 Justice Utter, in his separate dissent in State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398 , 717 P. 2d 722 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 , 107 S.Ct. 328 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 301 (1986), suggested the use of a "balancing approach superimposed upon a `salient factors' approach" to identify the pool of similar cases. [2] Id. 717 P. 2d 722 at 744 .

1992Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288, 304 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 , 104 S.Ct. 3547 , 82 L.Ed.2d 850 (1984).

1992Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A. 2d 288, 304 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 , 104 S.Ct. 3547 , 82 L.Ed. 2d 850 (1984). *151 Justice Utter, in his separate dissent in State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398 , 717 P. 2d 722 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 , 107 S.Ct. 328 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 301 (1986), suggested the use of a "balancing approach superimposed upon a `salient factors' approach" to identify the pool of similar cases. [2] Id. 717 P. 2d 722 at 744 .

1992Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A. 2d 288, 304 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 , 104 S.Ct. 3547 , 82 L.Ed. 2d 850 (1984). *151 Justice Utter, in his separate dissent in State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398 , 717 P. 2d 722 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 , 107 S.Ct. 328 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 301 (1986), suggested the use of a "balancing approach superimposed upon a `salient factors' approach" to identify the pool of similar cases. [2] Id. 717 P. 2d 722 at 744 .

1992Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A. 2d 288, 304 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 , 104 S.Ct. 3547 , 82 L.Ed. 2d 850 (1984). *151 Justice Utter, in his separate dissent in State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398 , 717 P. 2d 722 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 , 107 S.Ct. 328 , 93 L.Ed. 2d 301 (1986), suggested the use of a "balancing approach superimposed upon a `salient factors' approach" to identify the pool of similar cases. [2] Id. 717 P. 2d 722 at 744 .