salient inquiry in California

2023Such treatment also ignores the statutory interpretation adopted by our state’s high court, which found paragraph (D) sets forth a necessary and independent requirement for using a prior juvenile adjudication as a strike. ( Garcia, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 6, 12.) As the Supreme Court put it: ‘[W]e interpret paragraph (B) as setting out the list of prior juvenile offenses that will qualify as strikes and paragraph (D) as requiring, in addition, that in the prior juvenile proceeding giving rise to the qualifying adjudication the juvenile [had] been adjudged a ward of the court because of a Welf

2023Paragraph (D) requires that the strike prior be based on adjudication of at least one section 707(b) offense. ( Jensen, supra, at p. 267 .) As the court in Jensen explained, “In urging the record of the prior adjudication be examined to satisfy paragraph (D) by showing Jensen’s conduct constituted a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offense, the People effectively treat paragraph (D) as though it merely sets forth the offenses that qualify as juvenile strikes, much like paragraph (B). [¶] In doing so, the People lose sight of the salient requirement of paragraph (D)—namely, the adju

2015(See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15126.6, subd. (e).)” (Save Tara, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 139 .) In this respect, the challenged 2011 Agreements are different from the conditional development agreements set forth in Save Tara, which conditionally committed the City of West Hollywood to take concrete actions toward realizing the development project.

2011(See Jones & Laughlin, supra, 301 U.S. at pp. 43-44.) State or municipal regulation that directly interferes with that right is preempted by the NLRA under Machinists doctrine as surely as is regulation that is directed at the collective bargaining process itself.

2011Comm’n (1976) 427 U.S. 132 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 396 , 96 S.Ct. 2548 ] (Machinists) and its progeny, the salient inquiry is “whether Congress intended that the conduct involved be unregulated because left ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’ ” (Id. at p. 140.) The implicit right of the employer to select its employees in the first instance—recognized by the high court since 1937—is, it seems to me, as fundamental to the structure of the NLRA as is the correlative express right of those selected employees to organize to secure the redress of grievances and to promote agreements with t

2011Comm’n (1976) 427 U.S. 132 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 396 , 96 S.Ct. 2548 ] (Machinists) and its progeny, the salient inquiry is “whether Congress intended that the conduct involved be unregulated because left ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’ ” (Id. at p. 140.) The implicit right of the employer to select its employees in the first instance—recognized by the high court since 1937—is, it seems to me, as fundamental to the structure of the NLRA as is the correlative express right of those selected employees to organize to secure the redress of grievances and to promote agreements with t

2008(See People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 672-673, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687 , 758 P.2d 1217 .) No abuse of discretion occurred.

2008(See People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 672-673, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687 , 758 P.2d 1217 .) No abuse of discretion occurred.

1989The high court held, however, that it did not suffice merely to mention the salient factors: “a trial court’s statement of reasons should contain more than mere findings of ultimate fact or a recitation of the relevant criteria for release on bail; the statement should clearly articulate the basis for the court’s utilization of such criteria.” (In re Pipinos, supra, 33 Cal.3d 189, 193 .) Specifically, the trial court in Pipinos was held to have erred in making no reference to the evidence produced by the defendant: “Once defendant came forward with evidence in support of his application for re

1986The court said it “has been permissive in upholding governmental action that may deny the property owner of some beneficial use of his property or that may restrict the owner’s full exploitation of the property, if such public action is justified as promoting the *412 general welfare. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 163 [ 66 L.Ed.2d at p. 366 ], italics added.) Moreover, “[n]o police power justification [was] offered for the deprivation.