salient inquiry (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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salient inquiry in Pennsylvania

31 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1982–2025 10 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (18)

CaseFollowedCited
Commonwealth v. Morgangreen
pasuperct · 2011 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2021–2023
2 sentences

2023“The salient inquiry to be made by the trial court is the identification of the impetus behind the commission of the crime and the extent to which the offender is likely to reoffend.” Commonwealth v. Morgan, 16 A.3d 1165, 1169 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Fuentes, 991 A.2d at 943 ) (emphasis omitted).

2021“The salient inquiry to be made by the trial court is the identification of the impetus behind the commission of the crime and the extent to which the offender is likely to reoffend.” Commonwealth v. Morgan, 16 A.3d 1165, 1169 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting Fuentes v. Commonwealth, 991 A.2d 935, 943 (Pa. Super. 2010) (emphasis omitted)). “[O]ne’s risk of re-offending is -3- but one factor to be considered when making an assessment; it is not an ‘independent element.’” Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034 , 1038– 39 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Morgan, 16 A.3d 1165, 1170-72 (Pa. Sup

44
Commonwealth v. Geitergreen
pasuperct · 2007 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2008–2024
2 sentences

2024Commonwealth. v. Geiter, 929 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“The salient inquiry to be made by the trial court is the identification of the impetus behind the commission of the crime ….”).

2021Appellant insists “the salient inquiry to be made by the trial court is the identification of the impetus behind the commission of the crime and the extent to which the offender is likely to -6- reoffend.” Id. at 13, citing Commonwealth v. Geiter, 929 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa. Super. 2007).

34
Commonwealth v. Pricegreen
pasuperct · 2005 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2007–2015
2 sentences

2015See Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2005).

2010Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 706 , 897 A.2d 1184 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 902 , 127 S.Ct. 224 , 166 L.Ed.2d 179 (2006).

33
Commonwealth v. Fuentesgreen
pasuperct · 2010 · cited in 5 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2021–2024
2 sentences

2024Aumick, 297 A.3d at 778-79 (citations and quotation marks omitted). -5- “The salient inquiry to be made by the trial court is the identification of the impetus behind the commission of the crime and the extent to which the offender is likely to reoffend.” Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 991 A.2d 935, 943 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (citation and emphases omitted).

2023“The salient inquiry to be made by the trial court is the identification of the impetus behind the commission of the crime and the extent to which the offender is likely to reoffend.” Commonwealth v. Morgan, 16 A.3d 1165, 1169 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Fuentes, 991 A.2d at 943 ) (emphasis omitted).

25
Commonwealth v. Beygreen
pasuperct · 2004 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005Commonwealth v. Plucinski, 868 A.2d 20, 26 (Pa. Super. 2005); Commonwealth v. Bey, 841 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. Super. 2004).

2005Id. at 26 (citing Commonwealth v. Bey, 841 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa.Super.2004)). ¶ 30 In the present case, the Commonwealth’s expert opined a contributing impetus behind Appellant’s crimes was his homosexual pedophilie interest in boys, and that “research suggests homosexual pedophiles are twice as likely to recidivate versus heterosexual pedophiles.” (N.T.

22
Commonwealth v. Weissgreen
pa · 2009 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2013–2025
2 sentences

2025See Commonwealth v. Weiss, 986 A.2d 808, 816 (Pa. 2009). ____________________________________________ 11 Since the PCRA court did not divulge the parameters of its prejudice analysis until it entered the Rule 1925(a) opinion, we decline Brown-Camp’s invitation to find that the Commonwealth waived this issue by failing to preserve it in the PCRA court or in its Rule 1925(b) statement.

2013Id. (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (holding that in determining whether there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome resulting from the prosecution’s suppression of Brady material, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”)).

12
Commonwealth v. Plucinskigreen
pasuperct · 2005 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005Commonwealth v. Plucinski, 868 A.2d 20, 26 (Pa. Super. 2005); Commonwealth v. Bey, 841 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. Super. 2004).

2005Id. at 26 (citing Commonwealth v. Bey, 841 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa.Super.2004)). ¶ 30 In the present case, the Commonwealth’s expert opined a contributing impetus behind Appellant’s crimes was his homosexual pedophilie interest in boys, and that “research suggests homosexual pedophiles are twice as likely to recidivate versus heterosexual pedophiles.” (N.T.

12
Com. v. Aumick, J.green
pasuperct · 2023 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Aumick, 297 A.3d at 778-79 (citations and quotation marks omitted). -5- “The salient inquiry to be made by the trial court is the identification of the impetus behind the commission of the crime and the extent to which the offender is likely to reoffend.” Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 991 A.2d 935, 943 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (citation and emphases omitted).

11
Com. v. Gindraw, S.green
pasuperct · 2023 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
2 sentences

2023Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 852 ; see also Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 2021 WL 3702577 , *5 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non- precedential decision) (“The crux of Appellant’s argument . . . that there were no objective facts indicating she was in need of assistance . . . goes to the weight of the evidence presented”).

2023Gindraw, 297 A.3d at 852; see also Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 2021 WL 3702577 , *5 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non- precedential decision) (“The crux of Appellant’s argument . . . that there were no objective facts indicating she was in need of assistance . . . goes to the weight of the evidence presented”).

11
Commonwealth v. Feuchtgreen
pasuperct · 2008 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021“The salient inquiry to be made by the trial court is the identification of the impetus behind the commission of ____________________________________________ 6 See also Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 382 (Pa.Super. 2008) (stating challenge to credibility or reliability of expert’s SVP determination goes to the weight of the evidence). -6- the crime and the extent to which the offender is likely to reoffend.” Commonwealth v. Morgan, 16 A.3d 1165, 1169 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Fuentes, 991 A.2d at 943 ) (emphasis omitted).

11
Commonwealth v. Duncangreen
pa · 2003 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015We also note that, while this Court’s decisions in Mohn and Raffle were based, in part, on our Supreme Court's decision in the criminal case Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438 , 817 A.2d 455, 459 (2003), the Supreme Court did not hold in Duncan that an individual would never have a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in his or her home address.

2015We also note that, while this Court’s decisions in Mohn and Raffle were based, in part, on our Supreme Court's decision in the criminal case Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438 , 817 A.2d 455, 459 (2003), the Supreme Court did not hold in Duncan that an individual would never have a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in his or her home address.

11
Commonwealth v. Mortongreen
pa · 1986 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Commonwealth v. Thomas, 376 Pa.Super. 455, 459-60 , 546 A.2d 116, 118 (1988) citing Commonwealth v. Morton, 355 Pa.Super. 183, 186 , 512 A.2d 1273, 1275 (1986).

2015Commonwealth v. Thomas, 376 Pa.Super. 455, 459-60 , 546 A.2d 116, 118 (1988) citing Commonwealth v. Morton, 355 Pa.Super. 183, 186 , 512 A.2d 1273, 1275 (1986).

11
State v. Leuluaialiigreen
washctapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015See Leuluaialii 77 P.3d at 1197 .

11
Commonwealth v. Thomasgreen
pa · 1988 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Commonwealth v. Thomas, 376 Pa.Super. 455, 459-60 , 546 A.2d 116, 118 (1988) citing Commonwealth v. Morton, 355 Pa.Super. 183, 186 , 512 A.2d 1273, 1275 (1986).

2015Commonwealth v. Thomas, 376 Pa.Super. 455, 459-60 , 546 A.2d 116, 118 (1988) citing Commonwealth v. Morton, 355 Pa.Super. 183, 186 , 512 A.2d 1273, 1275 (1986).

11
Commonwealth v. Lantzygreen
pa · 1999 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011See, e.g., Lantzy II, 558 Pa. at 222-23 , 736 A.2d at 569 .

2011See, e.g., Lantzy II, 558 Pa. at 222-23 , 736 A.2d at 569 .

11
Commonwealth v. Cartergreen
pa · 1967 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010See generally Commonwealth v. Carter , 427 Pa. 53 , 63-64 , 233 A.2d 284 , 289 (1967) (rejecting the Commonwealth's policy argument in favor of the maximum restriction of the disclosure rule).

2010See generally Commonwealth v. Carter , 427 Pa. 53 , 63-64 , 233 A.2d 284 , 289 (1967) (rejecting the Commonwealth's policy argument in favor of the maximum restriction of the disclosure rule).

11
Kenneth Eugene Bousley v. Joseph M. Brooks, Wardenred
ca8 · 1996 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004See generally Bousley v. Brooks, 97 F.3d 284 , 287 n. 2 (8th Cir.1996) (noting the distinction between waiver and retroactivity in the context of collateral review), rev’d on other grounds, Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 , 118 S.Ct. 1604 , 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). .

2004See generally Bousley v. Brooks, 97 F.3d 284 , 287 n. 2 (8th Cir.1996) (noting the distinction between waiver and retroactivity in the context of collateral review), rev'd on other grounds, Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 , 118 S.Ct. 1604 , 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). [21] The PCRA court treated this issue as previously litigated, explaining that Appellant had argued on direct appeal that his taking of Thorazine and Elavil demonstrated his lack of competency.

11
Bousley v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1998 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004See generally Bousley v. Brooks, 97 F.3d 284 , 287 n. 2 (8th Cir.1996) (noting the distinction between waiver and retroactivity in the context of collateral review), rev’d on other grounds, Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 , 118 S.Ct. 1604 , 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). .

2004See generally Bousley v. Brooks, 97 F.3d 284 , 287 n. 2 (8th Cir.1996) (noting the distinction between waiver and retroactivity in the context of collateral review), rev’d on other grounds, Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 , 118 S.Ct. 1604 , 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

CaseCitedYears
Com. v. Hunsberger green
pa · 2006
2 sentences

2010Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 706 , 897 A.2d 1184 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 902 , 127 S.Ct. 224 , 166 L.Ed.2d 179 (2006).

2010Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 706 , 897 A.2d 1184 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 902 , 127 S.Ct. 224 , 166 L.Ed.2d 179 (2006).

22007–2010
Commonwealth v. Montgomery green
pasuperct · 1977
2 sentences

1983We stated, 246 Pa.Super.Ct. at p. 377 , 371 A.2d 885 : The salient factors in our case are that the robbery, the informer’s tip, and the subsequent arrest of the Appellant all occurred within 15 minutes time and within a block of each other.

1983We stated, 246 Pa.Super.Ct. at p. 377 , 371 A.2d 885 : The salient factors in our case are that the robbery, the informer’s tip, and the subsequent arrest of the Appellant all occurred within 15 minutes time and within a block of each other.

21982–1983
Commonwealth v. Stephens green
pasuperct · 2013
1 sentence

2021“The salient inquiry to be made by the trial court is the identification of the impetus behind the commission of the crime and the extent to which the offender is likely to reoffend.” Commonwealth v. Morgan, 16 A.3d 1165, 1169 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting Fuentes v. Commonwealth, 991 A.2d 935, 943 (Pa. Super. 2010) (emphasis omitted)). “[O]ne’s risk of re-offending is -3- but one factor to be considered when making an assessment; it is not an ‘independent element.’” Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034 , 1038– 39 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Morgan, 16 A.3d 1165, 1170-72 (Pa. Sup

12021–2021
Commonwealth v. Nieves green
pa · 1990
1 sentence

2017For example, in Commonwealth v. Nieves, 582 A.2d 341 (Pa. Super. 1990), [t]he trial court found that [Nieves] was well aware of the evidence to be presented to rebut his alibi claim, and that the technical error of the Commonwealth in not submitting a list with the complainant’s name and the name of the police officer to whom prior inconsistent statements had been made by [Nieves] was harmless. [Nieves] was aware that the victim would contradict his alibi claim, and he was provided with copies of the police reports which recorded his prior inconsistent statements during informal discovery. […]

12017–2017
Kyles v. Whitley green
scotus · 1995
2 sentences

2013Id. (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (holding that in determining whether there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome resulting from the prosecution’s suppression of Brady material, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”)).

2013Id. (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (holding that in determining whether there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome resulting from the prosecution’s suppression of Brady material, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”)).

12013–2013
Lincoln v. United States green
scotus · 2006
2 sentences

2010Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 706 , 897 A.2d 1184 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 902 , 127 S.Ct. 224 , 166 L.Ed.2d 179 (2006).

2010Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 706 , 897 A.2d 1184 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 902 , 127 S.Ct. 224 , 166 L.Ed.2d 179 (2006).

12010–2010
James J. Gory Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. Philadelphia Housing Authority green
pa · 2004
2 sentences

2009Id.

2009Id.

12009–2009
Rita v. United States green
scotus · 2007
2 sentences

2008The Supreme Court’s “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence.” Rita v. United States, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66 , 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). ¶ 6 In the case sub judice, the salient inquiry is the characterization of the triggering facts which define the range of sentences within which the judge could legitimately impose a life sentence.

2008The Supreme Court’s “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence.” Rita v. United States, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66 , 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). ¶ 6 In the case sub judice, the salient inquiry is the characterization of the triggering facts which define the range of sentences within which the judge could legitimately impose a life sentence.

12008–2008
Hardisty v. Hardisty green
conn · 1981
2 sentences

1990"In essence, by carefully evaluating the most salient factors comprising the family’s total circumstances, the court [Hardisty v. Hardisty, 183 Conn. 253 , 439 A.2d 307 (1981) ] attempted to identify the approach which the parties themselves would have taken to educate their child had their marriage not been terminated.” Note, Support Obligations of the Non-Custodial Parent for Private Secondary and College Education: Toward a Uniform and Equitable Resolution, 16 Suffolk U.L.

1990"In essence, by carefully evaluating the most salient factors comprising the family’s total circumstances, the court [Hardisty v. Hardisty, 183 Conn. 253 , 439 A.2d 307 (1981) ] attempted to identify the approach which the parties themselves would have taken to educate their child had their marriage not been terminated.” Note, Support Obligations of the Non-Custodial Parent for Private Secondary and College Education: Toward a Uniform and Equitable Resolution, 16 Suffolk U.L.

11990–1990
Ralph D. Smith and Thelma Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., a Body Corporate green
cadc · 1973
1 sentence

1983In recent years, many jurisdictions have followed California’s example, among them: New York, Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433 , 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 , 354 N.E.2d 794 (1976); Rhode Island, Mariorenzi v. DiPonte, 114 R.I. 294 , 333 A.2d 127 (1975); the District of Columbia, Smith v. Arbaugh’s Restaurant, Inc., 152 U.S.App.D.C. 86 , 469 F.2d 97 (1972); Colorado, Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537 , 489 P.2d 308 (1971); and Hawaii, Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134 , 452 P.2d 445 (1969). 3 Under such a test as that which was adopted in Rowland , foreseeability

11983–1983
Scurti v. City of New York green
ny · 1976
11983–1983
Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu green
haw · 1969
11983–1983
Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc. green
ri · 1975
2 sentences

1983In recent years, many jurisdictions have followed California’s example, among them: New York, Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433 , 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 , 354 N.E.2d 794 (1976); Rhode Island, Mariorenzi v. DiPonte, 114 R.I. 294 , 333 A.2d 127 (1975); the District of Columbia, Smith v. Arbaugh’s Restaurant, Inc., 152 U.S.App.D.C. 86 , 469 F.2d 97 (1972); Colorado, Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537 , 489 P.2d 308 (1971); and Hawaii, Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134 , 452 P.2d 445 (1969). 3 Under such a test as that which was adopted in Rowland , foreseeability

1983In recent years, many jurisdictions have followed California’s example, among them: New York, Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433 , 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 , 354 N.E.2d 794 (1976); Rhode Island, Mariorenzi v. DiPonte, 114 R.I. 294 , 333 A.2d 127 (1975); the District of Columbia, Smith v. Arbaugh’s Restaurant, Inc., 152 U.S.App.D.C. 86 , 469 F.2d 97 (1972); Colorado, Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537 , 489 P.2d 308 (1971); and Hawaii, Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134 , 452 P.2d 445 (1969). 3 Under such a test as that which was adopted in Rowland , foreseeability

11983–1983
Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich red
colo · 1971
2 sentences

1983In recent years, many jurisdictions have followed California’s example, among them: New York, Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433 , 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 , 354 N.E.2d 794 (1976); Rhode Island, Mariorenzi v. DiPonte, 114 R.I. 294 , 333 A.2d 127 (1975); the District of Columbia, Smith v. Arbaugh’s Restaurant, Inc., 152 U.S.App.D.C. 86 , 469 F.2d 97 (1972); Colorado, Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537 , 489 P.2d 308 (1971); and Hawaii, Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134 , 452 P.2d 445 (1969). 3 Under such a test as that which was adopted in Rowland , foreseeability

1983In recent years, many jurisdictions have followed California’s example, among them: New York, Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433 , 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 , 354 N.E.2d 794 (1976); Rhode Island, Mariorenzi v. DiPonte, 114 R.I. 294 , 333 A.2d 127 (1975); the District of Columbia, Smith v. Arbaugh’s Restaurant, Inc., 152 U.S.App.D.C. 86 , 469 F.2d 97 (1972); Colorado, Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537 , 489 P.2d 308 (1971); and Hawaii, Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134 , 452 P.2d 445 (1969). 3 Under such a test as that which was adopted in Rowland , foreseeability

11983–1983

Statutes the citing opinions construe

PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9792 (4) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9543 (3) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9544 (3) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545 (3) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711 (3) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9799.12 (3) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9799.24 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

PA 31 (1982–2025) NJ 22 (1960–2022) CT 19 (1992–2024) NY 12 (1949–2025) OK 11 (1960–1993) GA 9 (1985–2020) MO 8 (1979–2019) IL 8 (1951–2015) MA 7 (1977–2020) MI 7 (2015–2022) IN 6 (2009–2019) CA 6 (1986–2023) OH 6 (2007–2017) RI 4 (1982–2020) WA 4 (1965–2019) TX 4 (1949–2019) OR 4 (2015–2024) FL 3 (2005–2022) AZ 2 (1980–1983) SC 2 (1935–2008) WI 2 (1936–2019) HI 2 (1994–2007) NC 2 (2001–2011) MS 2 (1978–2008) MD 2 (2017–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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