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25 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ramos v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The same is true of silence in the face of repeated questioning, or an effort to end the contact with the interrogator.’” Ramos, 245 S.W.3d at 418 (alterations in original) (quoting W. 2024“The suspect is not required to use any particular phraseology to invoke the right to remain silent.” Kupferer, 408 S.W.3d at 489 ; see also Ramos, 245 S.W.3d at 418 . “‘[A]ny declaration of a desire to terminate the contact or inquiry . . . should suffice. | 6 | 13 |
PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.green1 sentence2019PHC–Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly–Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Tex. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Leonard, William Thomasgreen1 sentence2013See Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570 , 577–81 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Allardgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., United States v. Allard, 464 F.3d 529 , 533–34 (5th Cir. 2006); Autry v. State, Nos. 05-11-00217-CR, 05-11-00218-CR, 2012 WL 1920900 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Brisco v. State, No. 01-00-00762-CR, 2002 WL 595075 , at *1–2 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 18, 2002, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g, not designated for publication). 3 public and the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant] require[] that the terms of supervision for [Appellant] be modified to require that [Appellant] register as a sex offender [for ten years] | 1 | 1 |
TEXAS EMPLOYERS'INSURANCE ASSOCIATION v. McCaslingreen2 sentences2009The McCaslin court noted that “[a] juror’s disavowal of influence derived from misconduct is not a proper inquiry.” Id. at 920. 2009To support their assertion that the juror’s contact with the defense paralegal and insurance representative is sufficient to warrant a new trial, the Losiers cite to Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. McCaslin, 159 Tex. 278 , 317 S.W.2d 916, 921-22 (1958), in which the supreme court held that the plaintiffs overt act in seeking out a juror and asking her to “do all you can to help me” was sufficient to demonstrate probable harm. | 1 | 1 |
Spradling v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2000See Spradling, 566 S.W.2d at 564 ; Leonard & Harral Packing Co., 883 S.W.2d at 345-46 ; George Gmbbs Enterprises, 881 S.W.2d at 866 n. 7. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2015Id. | 3 | 2013–2015 |
In Re Bennett
green
2 sentences2025In re Bennet, 960 S.W.2d at 36-37 . 32 Appellees initially alleged without testimony or affidavits that appellant violated the no contact rule but dropped that claim in the Judgment signed by the 429th. 2025In re Bennet, 960 S.W.2d at 36-37 . 34 Appellees initially alleged without testimony or affidavits that appellant violated the no contact rule but dropped that claim in the Judgment signed by the 429th. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Keith Allen Kupferer v. State
green
1 sentence2024“The suspect is not required to use any particular phraseology to invoke the right to remain silent.” Kupferer, 408 S.W.3d at 489 ; see also Ramos, 245 S.W.3d at 418 . “‘[A]ny declaration of a desire to terminate the contact or inquiry . . . should suffice. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Fritter v. West
green
1 sentence2015In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft ~~ 65 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
City of San Antonio, Acting Through City Public Service Board of San Antonio v. Wheelabrator Air Pollution Control, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013However, the court noted that Tooke brought Gates — a previous supreme court opinion that applied the proprietary-governmental dichotomy to a contact claim — into question because Tooke “used a compare signal when citing Gates right after explicitly stating it has never held that the proprietary/governmental distinct tion applies to determine whether immunity is waived for breach of contract claims .... ” Wheelabrator, 381 S.W.3d at 604 (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 343 n. 89). 2013However, the court noted that Tooke brought Gates—a previous supreme court opinion that applied the proprietary-governmental dichotomy to a contact claim—into question because Tooke “used a compare signal when citing Gates right after explicitly stating it has never held that the proprietary/governmental distinction applies to determine whether immunity is waived for breach of contract claims . . . .” Wheelabrator, 381 S.W.3d at 604 (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 343 n.89). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Tooke v. City of Mexia
green
2 sentences2013However, the court noted that Tooke brought Gates — a previous supreme court opinion that applied the proprietary-governmental dichotomy to a contact claim — into question because Tooke “used a compare signal when citing Gates right after explicitly stating it has never held that the proprietary/governmental distinct tion applies to determine whether immunity is waived for breach of contract claims .... ” Wheelabrator, 381 S.W.3d at 604 (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 343 n. 89). 2013However, the court noted that Tooke brought Gates—a previous supreme court opinion that applied the proprietary-governmental dichotomy to a contact claim—into question because Tooke “used a compare signal when citing Gates right after explicitly stating it has never held that the proprietary/governmental distinction applies to determine whether immunity is waived for breach of contract claims . . . .” Wheelabrator, 381 S.W.3d at 604 (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 343 n.89). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Leonard & Harral Packing Co. v. Ward
green
1 sentence2000See Spradling, 566 S.W.2d at 564 ; Leonard & Harral Packing Co., 883 S.W.2d at 345-46 ; George Gmbbs Enterprises, 881 S.W.2d at 866 n. 7. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
O'Brien v. Lanpar Company
green
1 sentence1973We believe the record here fails to meet the test set out in O’Brien v. Lanpar, supra, and followed by National Truckers Service, Inc. v. Aero Systems, Inc., supra, and Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Consolidated Carpet Corp., supra, and other cases. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.