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22 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Webb v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Webb v. State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 817-19 (Tex.App.Waco 1995, pet. ref’d) (noting that "because a statute criminalizing the defendant’s conduct is necessary to the jurisdiction of the convicting court, the Rabb rule is properly applied when the defendant challenges the constitutionality of the specific statute he is charged with violating.”; distinguishing that rule from a facial attack on the constitutionality of a statute relating to arrests as that statute does not go to the judicial power of the court to enter and enforce a judgment of conviction; holding that the usual rules concerning er 2009See Webb v. State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 817-19 (Tex.App.Waco 1995, pet. ref’d) (noting that "because a statute criminalizing the defendant’s conduct is necessary to the jurisdiction of the convicting court, the Rabb rule is properly applied when the defendant challenges the constitutionality of the specific statute he is charged with violating.”; distinguishing that rule from a facial attack on the constitutionality of a statute relating to arrests as that statute does not go to the judicial power of the court to enter and enforce a judgment of conviction; holding that the usual rules concerning er | 7 | 8 |
Rabb v. Stategreen2 sentences2009The court of appeals cited one of its earlier cases that purported to rely upon the “Rabb rule.”31 In Rabb, the defendant was charged with three offenses.32 In each case, the defendant waived trial by jury, requested a referral to a magistrate, and pled guilty pursuant to an agreement.33 For the first time on appeal, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Dallas County Magistrate’s Act.34 This Court’s analysis regarding why the defendant’s claim was not procedurally defaulted consisted of a single sentence: “Questions involving the constitutionality of a statute upon which a def 2009The court of appeals cited one of its earlier cases that purported to rely upon the “Rabb rule.”31 In Rabb, the defendant was charged with three offenses.32 In each case, the defendant waived trial by jury, requested a referral to a magistrate, and pled guilty pursuant to an agreement.33 For the first time on appeal, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Dallas County Magistrate’s Act.34 This Court’s analysis regarding why the defendant’s claim was not procedurally defaulted consisted of a single sentence: “Questions involving the constitutionality of a statute upon which a def | 7 | 8 |
Barnett v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The “Rabb exception” reasoned that a if a statute is “void from its inception,[it] is no law, … and justifies no act performed under it,” because it results in a defendant having a “criminal conviction based upon an unconstitutional statute.” Karenev v. State, 258 S.W.3d 210, 213 (Tex. App. ― Fort Worth 2008) (quoting Barnett v. State, 201 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. App. ̶ Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)) Thus a defendant should be allowed to bring a facial challenge upon for the first time on appeal. 2008See Rabb v. State, 730 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (holding voidness of statute on which conviction is based may be raised for first time on appeal); see also Barnett v. State, 201 S.W.3d 231, 232 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (discussing rationale for Rabb exception to general rule that failure to object at trial waives any complaint on appeal); 43A George E. | 4 | 5 |
Reyes v. Stategreen2 sentences2006The rationale for the Rabb exception to the general rule that failure to object at trial waives any right to complain is because if the statute giving rise to a prosecution is unconstitutional, it is void from its inception, is no law, confers no rights, bestows no power on anyone, and justifies no act performed under it. *233 See Reyes v. State, 753 S.W.2d 382, 383-84 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). 2006See Reyes v. State , 753 S.W.2d 382, 383-84 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Lasher v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Webb v. State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 817-19 (Tex.App.Waco 1995, pet. ref’d) (noting that "because a statute criminalizing the defendant’s conduct is necessary to the jurisdiction of the convicting court, the Rabb rule is properly applied when the defendant challenges the constitutionality of the specific statute he is charged with violating.”; distinguishing that rule from a facial attack on the constitutionality of a statute relating to arrests as that statute does not go to the judicial power of the court to enter and enforce a judgment of conviction; holding that the usual rules concerning er 2009See Webb v. State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 817-19 (Tex.App.Waco 1995, pet. ref’d) (noting that "because a statute criminalizing the defendant’s conduct is necessary to the jurisdiction of the convicting court, the Rabb rule is properly applied when the defendant challenges the constitutionality of the specific statute he is charged with violating.”; distinguishing that rule from a facial attack on the constitutionality of a statute relating to arrests as that statute does not go to the judicial power of the court to enter and enforce a judgment of conviction; holding that the usual rules concerning er | 3 | 5 |
Karenev v. Stategreen2 sentences2010The Rabb rule was overruled in Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex.Crim.App.2009). . 2010The Rabb rule was overruled in Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex.Crim.App.2009). . | 3 | 3 |
Ex Parte Yarbroughgreen2 sentences2009See Webb v. State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 817-19 (Tex.App.Waco 1995, pet. ref’d) (noting that "because a statute criminalizing the defendant’s conduct is necessary to the jurisdiction of the convicting court, the Rabb rule is properly applied when the defendant challenges the constitutionality of the specific statute he is charged with violating.”; distinguishing that rule from a facial attack on the constitutionality of a statute relating to arrests as that statute does not go to the judicial power of the court to enter and enforce a judgment of conviction; holding that the usual rules concerning er 2009See Webb v. State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 817-19 (Tex.App.Waco 1995, pet. ref’d) (noting that "because a statute criminalizing the defendant’s conduct is necessary to the jurisdiction of the convicting court, the Rabb rule is properly applied when the defendant challenges the constitutionality of the specific statute he is charged with violating.”; distinguishing that rule from a facial attack on the constitutionality of a statute relating to arrests as that statute does not go to the judicial power of the court to enter and enforce a judgment of conviction; holding that the usual rules concerning er | 2 | 3 |
In Re KASgreen2 sentences2008Dix et al., Texas Practice: Criminal Practice & Procedure, §§ 42.253-54 (2d ed. 2001). [11] See In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 231 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (holding that because constitutional attacks on section 263.401 were not raised in the trial court, the parent had waived the right to assert them on appeal). [12] TEX.R.APP. 2008Dix et al., Texas Practice: Criminal Practice & Procedure, §§ 42.253–54 (2d ed. 2001). 11: See In re K.A.S. , 131 S.W.3d 215, 231 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (holding that because constitutional attacks on section 263.401 were not raised in the trial court, the parent had waived the right to assert them on appeal). 12: Tex. R. | 2 | 2 |
Weightman v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Weightman v. State, 975 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); McGowan v. State, 938 S.W.2d 732, 741 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996), aff'd., 975 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). 2002See Weightman v. State, 975 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); McGowan v. State, 938 S.W.2d 732, 741 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996), aff'd., 975 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2009Appellate courts have no authority to in any way defer to the trial court’s resolution of them.”). 7 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1838 (2008) (defendant pled guilty to pandering child pornography, but reserved his right to challenge its facial constitutionality on both overbreadth and vagueness grounds). 8 Although I think that the majority paints with too broad a brush, I think that “the Rabb rule” paints with an even broader brush in the opposite direction. 2009Appellate courts have no authority to in any way defer to the trial court’s resolution of them.”). 7 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1838 (2008) (defendant pled guilty to pandering child pornography, but reserved his right to challenge its facial constitutionality on both overbreadth and vagueness grounds). 8 Although I think that the majority paints with too broad a brush, I think that “the Rabb rule” paints with an even broader brush in the opposite direction. | 1 | 2 |
Karenev v. Stategreen1 sentence2015The “Rabb exception” reasoned that a if a statute is “void from its inception,[it] is no law, … and justifies no act performed under it,” because it results in a defendant having a “criminal conviction based upon an unconstitutional statute.” Karenev v. State, 258 S.W.3d 210, 213 (Tex. App. ― Fort Worth 2008) (quoting Barnett v. State, 201 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. App. ̶ Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)) Thus a defendant should be allowed to bring a facial challenge upon for the first time on appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Chambersgreen1 sentence2009The court of appeals cited one of its earlier cases that purported to rely upon the “Rabb rule.”31 In Rabb, the defendant was charged with three offenses.32 In each case, the defendant waived trial by jury, requested a referral to a magistrate, and pled guilty pursuant to an agreement.33 For the first time on appeal, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Dallas County Magistrate’s Act.34 This Court’s analysis regarding why the defendant’s claim was not procedurally defaulted consisted of a single sentence: “Questions involving the constitutionality of a statute upon which a def | 1 | 1 |
McGowan v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Weightman v. State, 975 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); McGowan v. State, 938 S.W.2d 732, 741 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996), aff'd., 975 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). 2002See Weightman v. State, 975 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); McGowan v. State, 938 S.W.2d 732, 741 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996), aff'd., 975 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). | 1 | 1 |
Prater v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Appellant notes the courts of appeals of this state have often utilized the "Rabb rule." See, e.g., Long v. State, 903 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995) (facial constitutional challenge to the antistalking statute), rev'd, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim.App.1996) [1] ; Prater v. State, 903 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no pet.) (challenge to the statute requiring mandatory assessment of punishment in non-death penalty capital murder cases); Webb v. *740 State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 818-19 (Tex.App.-Waco 1995, pet. ref'd) (refusing to apply Rabb to a constitutional challenge to a statute under w 1997Appellant notes the courts of appeals of this state have often utilized the “Rabb rule.” See, e.g., Long v. State, 903 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995) (facial constitutional challenge to the anti-stalking statute), rev’d, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) 1 ; Prater v. State, 903 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.) (challenge to the statute requiring mandatory assessment of punishment in non-death penalty capital murder cases); Webb v. State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 818-19 (Tex.App.—Waco 1995, pet. ref'd) (refusing to apply Rabb to a constitutional challenge to a statute under which th | 1 | 1 |
Lyon v. Stategreen2 sentences1995In our view, the Rabb rule is properly applied in instances where the questioned statute affects the jurisdiction of the court to render a judgment against the defendant, i.e., when the statute affects “the power of the court over the ‘subject matter’ of the case ... coupled with ‘personal’ jurisdiction over the accused.” See Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981); see also Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex.Crim. 1995In our view, the Rabb rule is properly applied in instances where the questioned statute affects the jurisdiction of the court to render a judgment against the defendant, i.e., when the statute affects “the power of the court over the ‘subject matter’ of the case ... coupled with ‘personal’ jurisdiction over the accused.” See Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981); see also Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex.Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Fairfield v. Stategreen2 sentences1995In our view, the Rabb rule is properly applied in instances where the questioned statute affects the jurisdiction of the court to render a judgment against the defendant, i.e., when the statute affects “the power of the court over the ‘subject matter’ of the case ... coupled with ‘personal’ jurisdiction over the accused.” See Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981); see also Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex.Crim. 1995In our view, the Rabb rule is properly applied in instances where the questioned statute affects the jurisdiction of the court to render a judgment against the defendant, i.e., when the statute affects “the power of the court over the ‘subject matter’ of the case ... coupled with ‘personal’ jurisdiction over the accused.” See Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981); see also Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex.Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Marin v. Stategreen2 sentences1995See Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 . 1995See Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Siebold
green
2 sentences2009Similarly, in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 , 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879), the Supreme Court held that if the law that defines a criminal offense is unconstitutional, then it affects the foundation of the whole proceedings. 2009Similarly, in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 , 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879), the Supreme Court held that if the law that defines a criminal offense is unconstitutional, then it affects the foundation of the whole proceedings. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Harris v. State
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 429 – 430 citing (Rabb v. State, 730 S.W.3d 751 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Shirley Kramer v. Tom Price, Judge, County Criminal Court No. 5, and Carl Thomas, Sheriff, Dallas County, Texas
green
2 sentences2009Discussing and relying upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kramer v. Price,7 and our decisions in May v. State8 and Long v. State,9 the court of appeals held that the portion of the harassment statute under which appellant was prosecuted was unconstitutionally vague on its face because it suffered from the same defects that prompted the Fifth Circuit and this Court to declare earlier versions of the statute unconstitutional.10 Consequently, the court of appeals held that the statute was void and rendered a judgment of acquittal.11 In its petition for discretionary review, the State claims tha 2009Discussing and relying upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kramer v. Price,7 and our decisions in May v. State8 and Long v. State,9 the court of appeals held that the portion of the harassment statute under which appellant was prosecuted was unconstitutionally vague on its face because it suffered from the same defects that prompted the Fifth Circuit and this Court to declare earlier versions of the statute unconstitutional.10 Consequently, the court of appeals held that the statute was void and rendered a judgment of acquittal.11 In its petition for discretionary review, the State claims tha | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Shirley Kramer v. Tom Price, Judge, County Criminal Court No. 5, and Carl Thomas, Sheriff, Dallas County, Texas
green
2 sentences2009Discussing and relying upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kramer v. Price,7 and our decisions in May v. State8 and Long v. State,9 the court of appeals held that the portion of the harassment statute under which appellant was prosecuted was unconstitutionally vague on its face because it suffered from the same defects that prompted the Fifth Circuit and this Court to declare earlier versions of the statute unconstitutional.10 Consequently, the court of appeals held that the statute was void and rendered a judgment of acquittal.11 In its petition for discretionary review, the State claims tha 2009Discussing and relying upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kramer v. Price,7 and our decisions in May v. State8 and Long v. State,9 the court of appeals held that the portion of the harassment statute under which appellant was prosecuted was unconstitutionally vague on its face because it suffered from the same defects that prompted the Fifth Circuit and this Court to declare earlier versions of the statute unconstitutional.10 Consequently, the court of appeals held that the statute was void and rendered a judgment of acquittal.11 In its petition for discretionary review, the State claims tha | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Shirley Kramer v. Tom Price, Judge, County Criminal Court No. 5, and Carl Thomas, Sheriff, Dallas County, Texas
green
2 sentences2009Discussing and relying upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kramer v. Price,7 and our decisions in May v. State8 and Long v. State,9 the court of appeals held that the portion of the harassment statute under which appellant was prosecuted was unconstitutionally vague on its face because it suffered from the same defects that prompted the Fifth Circuit and this Court to declare earlier versions of the statute unconstitutional.10 Consequently, the court of appeals held that the statute was void and rendered a judgment of acquittal.11 In its petition for discretionary review, the State claims tha 2009Discussing and relying upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kramer v. Price,7 and our decisions in May v. State8 and Long v. State,9 the court of appeals held that the portion of the harassment statute under which appellant was prosecuted was unconstitutionally vague on its face because it suffered from the same defects that prompted the Fifth Circuit and this Court to declare earlier versions of the statute unconstitutional.10 Consequently, the court of appeals held that the statute was void and rendered a judgment of acquittal.11 In its petition for discretionary review, the State claims tha | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Nix v. State
green
1 sentence2009The court of appeals cited one of its earlier cases that purported to rely upon the “Rabb rule.”31 In Rabb, the defendant was charged with three offenses.32 In each case, the defendant waived trial by jury, requested a referral to a magistrate, and pled guilty pursuant to an agreement.33 For the first time on appeal, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Dallas County Magistrate’s Act.34 This Court’s analysis regarding why the defendant’s claim was not procedurally defaulted consisted of a single sentence: “Questions involving the constitutionality of a statute upon which a def | 1 | 2009–2009 |
May v. State
green
2 sentences2009Discussing and relying upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kramer v. Price,7 and our decisions in May v. State8 and Long v. State,9 the court of appeals held that the portion of the harassment statute under which appellant was prosecuted was unconstitutionally vague on its face because it suffered from the same defects that prompted the Fifth Circuit and this Court to declare earlier versions of the statute unconstitutional.10 Consequently, the court of appeals held that the statute was void and rendered a judgment of acquittal.11 In its petition for discretionary review, the State claims tha 2009Discussing and relying upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kramer v. Price,7 and our decisions in May v. State8 and Long v. State,9 the court of appeals held that the portion of the harassment statute under which appellant was prosecuted was unconstitutionally vague on its face because it suffered from the same defects that prompted the Fifth Circuit and this Court to declare earlier versions of the statute unconstitutional.10 Consequently, the court of appeals held that the statute was void and rendered a judgment of acquittal.11 In its petition for discretionary review, the State claims tha | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Moore v. State
green
1 sentence2009The court of appeals cited one of its earlier cases that purported to rely upon the “Rabb rule.”31 In Rabb, the defendant was charged with three offenses.32 In each case, the defendant waived trial by jury, requested a referral to a magistrate, and pled guilty pursuant to an agreement.33 For the first time on appeal, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Dallas County Magistrate’s Act.34 This Court’s analysis regarding why the defendant’s claim was not procedurally defaulted consisted of a single sentence: “Questions involving the constitutionality of a statute upon which a def | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Long v. State
green
2 sentences1997Appellant notes the courts of appeals of this state have often utilized the "Rabb rule." See, e.g., Long v. State, 903 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995) (facial constitutional challenge to the antistalking statute), rev'd, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim.App.1996) [1] ; Prater v. State, 903 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no pet.) (challenge to the statute requiring mandatory assessment of punishment in non-death penalty capital murder cases); Webb v. *740 State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 818-19 (Tex.App.-Waco 1995, pet. ref'd) (refusing to apply Rabb to a constitutional challenge to a statute under w 1997Appellant notes the courts of appeals of this state have often utilized the “Rabb rule.” See, e.g., Long v. State, 903 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995) (facial constitutional challenge to the anti-stalking statute), rev’d, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) 1 ; Prater v. State, 903 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.) (challenge to the statute requiring mandatory assessment of punishment in non-death penalty capital murder cases); Webb v. State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 818-19 (Tex.App.—Waco 1995, pet. ref'd) (refusing to apply Rabb to a constitutional challenge to a statute under which th | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Long v. State
green
2 sentences1997Appellant notes the courts of appeals of this state have often utilized the "Rabb rule." See, e.g., Long v. State, 903 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995) (facial constitutional challenge to the antistalking statute), rev'd, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim.App.1996) [1] ; Prater v. State, 903 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no pet.) (challenge to the statute requiring mandatory assessment of punishment in non-death penalty capital murder cases); Webb v. *740 State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 818-19 (Tex.App.-Waco 1995, pet. ref'd) (refusing to apply Rabb to a constitutional challenge to a statute under w 1997Appellant notes the courts of appeals of this state have often utilized the “Rabb rule.” See, e.g., Long v. State, 903 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995) (facial constitutional challenge to the anti-stalking statute), rev’d, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) 1 ; Prater v. State, 903 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.) (challenge to the statute requiring mandatory assessment of punishment in non-death penalty capital murder cases); Webb v. State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 818-19 (Tex.App.—Waco 1995, pet. ref'd) (refusing to apply Rabb to a constitutional challenge to a statute under which th | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Curry v. State
green
2 sentences1997Appellant notes the courts of appeals of this state have often utilized the "Rabb rule." See, e.g., Long v. State, 903 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995) (facial constitutional challenge to the antistalking statute), rev'd, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim.App.1996) [1] ; Prater v. State, 903 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no pet.) (challenge to the statute requiring mandatory assessment of punishment in non-death penalty capital murder cases); Webb v. *740 State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 818-19 (Tex.App.-Waco 1995, pet. ref'd) (refusing to apply Rabb to a constitutional challenge to a statute under w 1997Appellant notes the courts of appeals of this state have often utilized the “Rabb rule.” See, e.g., Long v. State, 903 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995) (facial constitutional challenge to the anti-stalking statute), rev’d, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) 1 ; Prater v. State, 903 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.) (challenge to the statute requiring mandatory assessment of punishment in non-death penalty capital murder cases); Webb v. State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 818-19 (Tex.App.—Waco 1995, pet. ref'd) (refusing to apply Rabb to a constitutional challenge to a statute under which th | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Morris v. Perlos
green
2 sentences1995App.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2684 , 129 L.Ed.2d 816 (1994) (citing Fair-field). 1995App.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2684 , 129 L.Ed.2d 816 (1994) (citing Fair-field). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.