severable claim in Texas

1999See, e.g., Forlano v. Joyner, 906 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (holding that transfer order under section 608 of probate code did not resolve a severable claim and therefore could never, by itself, be appealable under Crowson).

1999See, e.g., Forlano v. Joyner, 906 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (holding that transfer order under section 608 of probate code did not resolve a severable claim and therefore could never, by itself, be appealable under Crowson ).

2002We are authorized to sever the claim for attorney’s fees and reverse and remand the judgment as to it only.”); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ dism’d) (“We reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it awards an amount as attorney’s fees, and sever the issues thereupon from all other aspects of the case; and as a severed case remand the same to the trial court for a new trial.”); Uhl v. Uhl, 524 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ) (“We sever and reverse and remand the case upon the issue of reasonable amount to be allowed

2002We are authorized to sever the claim for attorney's fees and reverse and remand the judgment as to it only."); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ dism'd) ("We reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it awards an amount as attorney's fees, and sever the issues thereupon from all other aspects of the case; and as a severed case remand the same to the trial court for a new trial."); Uhl v. Uhl, 524 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ) ("We sever and reverse and remand the case upon the issue of reasonable amount to be allowed

2002We are authorized to sever the claim for attorney’s fees and reverse and remand the judgment as to it only.”); Schec-ter v. Folsom, 417 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex.Civ.

2002We are authorized to sever the claim for attorney's fees and reverse and remand the judgment as to it only."); Schecter v. Folsom , 417 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. Civ.

2023See Zheng v. Vacation Network, Inc., 468 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (remanding appellate attorney’s fees to the trial court for segregation of fees for successful claims, or to demonstrate why segregation is not required); Taylor Morrison of Tex., Inc. v. Fulcher, No. 13-20-00332-CV, 2022 WL 3092553 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 4, 2022, no pet..) (mem. op.) (remanding to trial court on the “issue of conditional appellate attorney’s fees for a determination of the reasonable amount to be awarded to appellee given that appellant was part

2022Goldman v. Alkek, 850 S.W.2d 568 , 578–79 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1993, no writ); see Weizhong Zheng v. Vacation Network, Inc., 468 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (remanding appellate attorney’s fees to the trial court for segregation of fees for successful claims, or to demonstrate why segregation 15 is not required); Pickett v. Keene, 47 S.W.3d 67, 78 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, pet. dism’d) (“An appellee is not entitled to an award of appellate attorney’s fees for that portion of fees attributable to an unsuccessful defense of the

2002See also Zemaco, Inc. v. Navarro, 580 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1979, writ dism’d) (“The claim for attorney’s fees is a severable claim.

2002See Hall, supra, note 2. [4] See also Zemaco, Inc. v. Navarro, 580 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1979, writ dism'd) ("The claim for attorney's fees is a severable claim.

2002Such is true of each case cited by Brad ford: “The claim for attorney fees is a severable claim, and under Rule 503, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, we are authorized to sever the claim and reverse the judgment as to it only, which we do.” Britton, 406 S.W.2d at 907 .

2002Such is true of each case cited by Bradford: "The claim for attorney fees is a severable claim, and under Rule 503, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, we are authorized to sever the claim and reverse the judgment as to it only, which we do." Britton , 406 S.W.2d at 907 .

2002“The claim for attorney’s fees is a severable claim.” Leal, 628 S.W.2d at 171 . 4 With appellate courts consistently advising trial courts that a claim for attorney’s fees is a “severable” claim, it is little wonder that trial courts lost sight of the nuance that only appellate courts could do the severing.

2002"The claim for attorney's fees is a severable claim." Leal , 628 S.W.2d at 171 . (4) With appellate courts consistently advising trial courts that a claim for attorney's fees is a "severable" claim, it is little wonder that trial courts lost sight of the nuance that only appellate courts could do the severing.

2002We are authorized to sever the claim for attorney’s fees and reverse and remand the judgment as to it only.”); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ dism’d) (“We reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it awards an amount as attorney’s fees, and sever the issues thereupon from all other aspects of the case; and as a severed case remand the same to the trial court for a new trial.”); Uhl v. Uhl, 524 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ) (“We sever and reverse and remand the case upon the issue of reasonable amount to be allowed

2002We are authorized to sever the claim for attorney's fees and reverse and remand the judgment as to it only."); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ dism'd) ("We reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it awards an amount as attorney's fees, and sever the issues thereupon from all other aspects of the case; and as a severed case remand the same to the trial court for a new trial."); Uhl v. Uhl, 524 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ) ("We sever and reverse and remand the case upon the issue of reasonable amount to be allowed

2026See Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 146, 152 (Tex. 2015) (treating “severable award of past attorney’s fees” as independently subject to post-judgment interest and separately determining date from which interest accrued).

2022Goldman v. Alkek, 850 S.W.2d 568 , 578–79 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1993, no writ); see Weizhong Zheng v. Vacation Network, Inc., 468 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (remanding appellate attorney’s fees to the trial court for segregation of fees for successful claims, or to demonstrate why segregation 15 is not required); Pickett v. Keene, 47 S.W.3d 67, 78 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, pet. dism’d) (“An appellee is not entitled to an award of appellate attorney’s fees for that portion of fees attributable to an unsuccessful defense of the

2022See Currier, 885 S.W.2d at 176 ; see also TEX.

2010See F.F.P., 237 S.W.3d at 693 (“We have explained that avoiding prejudice, doing justice, and increasing convenience are the controlling reasons to allow a severance.”).

2002We shall do the same in this case.”); Rhoades v. Miller, 414 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1967, no writ) ("In view of the fact that the claim for attorney’s fees is a severable claim, we are authorized to sever the claim and reverse the judgment as to it only, which we do.”).

2002We shall do the same in this case."); Rhoades v. Miller, 414 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1967, no writ) ("In view of the fact that the claim for attorney's fees is a severable claim, we are authorized to sever the claim and reverse the judgment as to it only, which we do.").

2002We are authorized to sever the claim for attorney’s fees and reverse and remand the judgment as to it only.”); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ dism’d) (“We reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it awards an amount as attorney’s fees, and sever the issues thereupon from all other aspects of the case; and as a severed case remand the same to the trial court for a new trial.”); Uhl v. Uhl, 524 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ) (“We sever and reverse and remand the case upon the issue of reasonable amount to be allowed

2002We are authorized to sever the claim for attorney's fees and reverse and remand the judgment as to it only."); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ dism'd) ("We reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it awards an amount as attorney's fees, and sever the issues thereupon from all other aspects of the case; and as a severed case remand the same to the trial court for a new trial."); Uhl v. Uhl, 524 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ) ("We sever and reverse and remand the case upon the issue of reasonable amount to be allowed

1992Woods Exploration and Producing Co. v. Arkla Equipment Co., 528 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex.1975); Pelto Oil Company v. CSX Oil & Gas Corp., 804 S.W.2d 583 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Industrial Disposal Supply Co., Inc. v. Perryman Bros.

1983Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Arkla Equipment Co., supra at 571; Leal v. Leal, 628 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1982, no writ); Saums v. Saums, 610 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1980, writ dism’d); Zemaco, Inc. v. Navarro, supra at 621; Hopkins *762 v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1976, writ dism’d); Huntley v. Huntley, 512 S.W.2d 767, 771 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1974, no writ).

1983Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Arkla Equipment Co., supra at 571; Leal v. Leal, 628 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1982, no writ); Saums v. Saums, 610 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1980, writ dism’d); Zemaco, Inc. v. Navarro, supra at 621; Hopkins *762 v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1976, writ dism’d); Huntley v. Huntley, 512 S.W.2d 767, 771 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1974, no writ).

1981We are authorized to sever the claim for attorney’s fees and reverse and remand the judgment as to it only, (citations omitted) Accord, TEC Electric Co. v. AMFAC Distribution Corp., 581 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Tex.Civ.App.1979, no writ); Uhl v. Uhl, 524 S.W.2d 534 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, no writ); Stein v. Lewisville Independent School District, 481 S.W.2d 436 (Tex.Civ.App.1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 948 , 94 S.Ct. 272 , 38 L.Ed.2d 203 (1973).