22 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Goudeau v. Stategreen2 sentences2016We too 'have written, “[A]n officer’s honest but mistaken understanding of the traffic' law which prompted a stop is not an exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement.” Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd) (relying on Fifth Circuit case law); see Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“An officer’s suspicion of an alleged traffic violation, however, cannot be based on a mistaken understanding of traffic laws.”). 2015Goudeau, 209 S.W.3d at 716 . | 4 | 10 |
Fowler v. Stategreen2 sentences2016We too 'have written, “[A]n officer’s honest but mistaken understanding of the traffic' law which prompted a stop is not an exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement.” Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd) (relying on Fifth Circuit case law); see Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“An officer’s suspicion of an alleged traffic violation, however, cannot be based on a mistaken understanding of traffic laws.”). 2011Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d); Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Woodardgreen2 sentences2013See Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 412–14 (holding that defendant failed to show he was seized where, even without information that the officer obtained from an anonymous tipster, the officer’s stop and inquiry of person walking along sidewalk was a consensual encounter). 2011See Woodard , 341 S.W.3d at 413 (“Officer Warner did not need any information about Woodard to justify the stop and inquiry. | 2 | 2 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2017The stop and inquiry must be “reasonably related in scope to the justification for [the] initiation.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968). 1992As in Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)], the stop and inquiry must be “reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.” 392 U.S., at 29 , 88 S.Ct. at 1884 . | 1 | 2 |
Stoker v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Stoker v. State, 170 S.W.3d 807, 812 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Granadogreen1 sentence2015Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); U.S. v. Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 423 (5th Cir. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Bostickgreen1 sentence2015See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 ; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Royergreen1 sentence2015See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 ; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Sonia Luz Lopez-Valdezgreen1 sentence2013Lopez- Valdez, 178 F.3d at 289 (refusing to find a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule when an officer’s subjective belief that a traffic violation has occurred serves as the basis for his stop, when in fact, there has been no violation). | 1 | 1 |
Balentine v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Even if we were to find that the initial encounter was an investigative detention requiring reasonable suspicion, see Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See Dowler v. State, 44 S.W.3d at 670 (holding that while an accurate description of the subject’s readily available location and appearance will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse, it does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity); Stewart v. State, 22 S.W.3d at 648 (holding that the corroboration of details that are easily obtainable at the time of the tip and which do not indicate criminal activity will not lend support to the tip). 5 Application of Standard As previously mentioned, the anonymous tip served as the bas | 1 | 1 |
Dowler v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See Dowler v. State, 44 S.W.3d at 670 (holding that while an accurate description of the subject’s readily available location and appearance will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse, it does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity); Stewart v. State, 22 S.W.3d at 648 (holding that the corroboration of details that are easily obtainable at the time of the tip and which do not indicate criminal activity will not lend support to the tip). 5 Application of Standard As previously mentioned, the anonymous tip served as the bas | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Douthitt v. State
green
2 sentences2024As in Douthitt, the challenged testimony came from an expert, “but there is no indication that the jurors were predisposed to give such testimony greater weight than the other evidence before them,” and the retrograde extrapolation testimony “was cumulative of other evidence of intoxication and was not given special emphasis by the State.” 127 S.W.3d at 339 . 14 And although the State did remind the jury about Stump’s testimony during closing arguments, it “did not claim special expertise for [Stump] or suggest that [her] testimony was alone sufficient to convict.” Id. 2024As in Douthitt, the challenged testimony came from an expert, “but there is no indication that the jurors were predisposed to give such testimony greater weight than the other evidence before them,” and the retrograde extrapolation testimony “was cumulative of other evidence of intoxication and was not given special emphasis by the State.” 127 S.W.3d at 339 . 14 And although the State did remind the jury about Stump’s testimony during closing arguments, it “did not claim special expertise for [Stump] or suggest that [her] testimony was alone sufficient to convict.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
green
2 sentences1999As in Terry, the stop and inquiry *746 must be "reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation." (citation omitted). 422 U.S. at 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 . (emphasis added). 1999As in Terry, the stop and inquiry *746 must be "reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation." (citation omitted). 422 U.S. at 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 . (emphasis added). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
cluster 295465
green
2 sentences1988In United States v. Ballard, supra, the Court found the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment but observed that this did not mean the evidence was necessarily admitted improperly for "... in this circuit, consent can, in proper circumstances, validate a search following an illegal arrest...." The Court cited Bretti v. Wainwright, supra, and United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.1971). 1988In United States v. Ballard, supra, the Court found the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment but observed that this did not mean the evidence was necessarily admitted improperly for “... in this circuit, consent can, in proper circumstances, validate a search following an illegal ar-rest_” The Court cited Bretti v. Wainwright, supra, and United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.1971). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Eugene M. Fike
green
2 sentences1988In United States v. Ballard, supra, the Court found the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment but observed that this did not mean the evidence was necessarily admitted improperly for "... in this circuit, consent can, in proper circumstances, validate a search following an illegal arrest...." The Court cited Bretti v. Wainwright, supra, and United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.1971). 1988In United States v. Ballard, supra, the Court found the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment but observed that this did not mean the evidence was necessarily admitted improperly for “... in this circuit, consent can, in proper circumstances, validate a search following an illegal ar-rest_” The Court cited Bretti v. Wainwright, supra, and United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.1971). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Charles Steven Ballard, A/K/A James Bishop
green
2 sentences1988In United States v. Ballard, supra, the Court found the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment but observed that this did not mean the evidence was necessarily admitted improperly for "... in this circuit, consent can, in proper circumstances, validate a search following an illegal arrest...." The Court cited Bretti v. Wainwright, supra, and United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.1971). 1988In United States v. Ballard, supra, the Court found the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment but observed that this did not mean the evidence was necessarily admitted improperly for “... in this circuit, consent can, in proper circumstances, validate a search following an illegal ar-rest_” The Court cited Bretti v. Wainwright, supra, and United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.1971). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.