stop inquiry in Illinois

2021Cummings II, 2016 IL 115769 , ¶ 6. ¶ 38 In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court considered whether an eight-minute delay to conduct a drug-detecting dog sniff after a traffic stop had been completed impermissibly prolonged the stop in violation of the fourth amendment.

2020Cummings II, 2016 IL 115769 , ¶ 6. ¶ 38 In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court considered whether an eight-minute delay to conduct a drug-detecting dog sniff after a traffic stop had been completed impermissibly prolonged the stop in violation of the fourth amendment.

2021Id. 15 ¶ 40 In Cummings II, our supreme court stated the following in reference to the Rodriguez decision: “[T]he United States Supreme Court drew a bright line against prolonging a stop with inquiries outside the mission of a traffic stop, unless an officer has reasonable suspicion for those inquiries.

2020Id. 15 ¶ 40 In Cummings II, our supreme court stated the following in reference to the Rodriguez decision: “[T]he United States Supreme Court drew a bright line against prolonging a stop with inquiries outside the mission of a traffic stop, unless an officer has reasonable suspicion for those inquiries.

2021Id. (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. ___ , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ).

2020Id. (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. ___ , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ).

2014Such a detention is reasonable if it was initially justified, and if it was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 ; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (holding “the stop and inquiry” must both be related in scope to the justification for their initiation). “[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).

2014Such a detention is reasonable if it was initially -4- justified, and if it was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 ; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (holding “the stop and inquiry” must both be related in scope to the justification for their initiation). “[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).

2014A traffic stop that is initially justified “can become unlawful ‘if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required’ to complete the purpose of the stop.” Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 239 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 ); see Hernandez, 2012 IL App (2d) 110266, ¶ 5 (“an investigative stop that is originally lawful must cease once reasonable suspicion dissipates”). ¶ 16 As we stated in Harris, mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure under the fourth amendment.

2014A traffic stop that is initially justified “can become unlawful ‘if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required’ to complete the purpose of the stop.” Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 239 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 ); see Hernandez, 2012 IL App (2d) 110266, ¶ 5 (“an investigative stop that is originally lawful must cease once reasonable suspicion dissipates”). ¶ 16 As we stated in Harris, mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure under the fourth amendment.

2014A traffic stop that is initially justified “can become unlawful ‘if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required’ to complete the purpose of the stop.” Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 239 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 ); see Hernandez, 2012 IL App (2d) 110266, ¶ 5 (“an investigative stop that is originally lawful must cease once reasonable suspicion dissipates”). ¶ 16 As we stated in Harris, mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure under the fourth amendment.

2014A traffic stop that is initially justified “can become unlawful ‘if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required’ to complete the purpose of the stop.” Harris, 228 Ill. 2d at 239 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 ); see Hernandez, 2012 IL App (2d) 110266, ¶ 5 (“an investigative stop that is originally lawful must cease once reasonable suspicion dissipates”). ¶ 16 As we stated in Harris, mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure under the fourth amendment.

2012LoCoco, 307 Ill.

1999Taylor v. Manhattan Township Park District, 138 Ill.

1999In deciding whether Wheatland is immune from liability, we must determine whether Wheatland, at the direction of Jarnagin, was acting in a discretionary or ministerial manner. “ [Discretionary acts are those which are unique to a particular public office, while ministerial acts are those which a person performs on a given state of facts in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, and without reference to the official’s discretion as to the propriety of the act.” Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 474 , 657 N.E.2d at 993 .

1983The facts that were shown in Schoepke included an ongoing investigation and surveillance of the area where the stop occurred, a showing of incidence of crime in the area and an apparent rendezvous of defendant's vehicle with another vehicle. • 3 Focusing on the question of whether or not a "stop" occurred, it has been held that a stop, and therefore a seizure of a person under the fourth and fourteenth amendments ( People v. Roberts (1981), 96 Ill.

1982Relying on United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544 , 64 L.

1982Relying on United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544 , 64 L.

1974People v. Ezell, 61 Ill.App.2d 326 , 210 N.E.2d 331 , and People v. Cassell, 101 Ill.App.2d 279 , 243 N.E.2d 363 , cited by the defendant, are manifestly not in point.

1974People v. Ezell, 61 Ill.App.2d 326 , 210 N.E.2d 331 , and People v. Cassell, 101 Ill.App.2d 279 , 243 N.E.2d 363 , cited by the defendant, are manifestly not in point.

1974People v. Ezell, 61 Ill.App.2d 326 , 210 N.E.2d 331 , and People v. Cassell, 101 Ill.App.2d 279 , 243 N.E.2d 363 , cited by the defendant, are manifestly not in point.

1974People v. Ezell, 61 Ill.App.2d 326 , 210 N.E.2d 331 , and People v. Cassell, 101 Ill.App.2d 279 , 243 N.E.2d 363 , cited by the defendant, are manifestly not in point.