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12 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Brignoni-Poncegreen2 sentences1991Although the time of day and location of the stop are factors which, standing alone, do not justify an investigatory stop, courts have held that they are among relevant factors to be considered when measuring the facts available to the officer which lead him "reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. at 1884 (emphasis added), United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (reputation of an area for criminal activity is an articulable fact upon which a police officer may legitim 1991Although the time of day and location of the stop are factors which, standing alone, do not justify an investigatory stop, courts have held that they are among relevant factors to be considered when measuring the facts available to the officer which lead him "reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. at 1884 (emphasis added), United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (reputation of an area for criminal activity is an articulable fact upon which a police officer may legitim | 1 | 5 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1999Rather, he contends that the officer’s questioning about whether he possessed weapons in his vehicle or on his person after the initial stop was unconstitutional because it impermissibly expanded the scope of the original stop in violation of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 1999Rather, he contends that the officer’s questioning about whether he possessed weapons in his vehicle or on his person after the initial stop was unconstitutional because it impermissibly expanded the scope of the original stop in violation of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). | 1 | 3 |
Dandridge v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“resisting law enforcement statute does not condition the offense upon a lawful order”); Dandridge v. State, 810 N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“an individual may not flee from a police officer who has ordered the person to stop, regardless of the apparent or ultimate lawfulness of the officer’s order”), trans. denied. 5 Our conclusion is unaffected by the fact that Suscha was not ultimately charged with criminal recklessness. | 1 | 1 |
Cole v. Statered1 sentence2012See Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“resisting law enforcement statute does not condition the offense upon a lawful order”); Dandridge v. State, 810 N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“an individual may not flee from a police officer who has ordered the person to stop, regardless of the apparent or ultimate lawfulness of the officer’s order”), trans. denied. 5 Our conclusion is unaffected by the fact that Suscha was not ultimately charged with criminal recklessness. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crabtree v. State
green
2 sentences2018Id. [a]t 247. 14. 2013Id. at 247 . | 3 | 2006–2018 |
State v. E.R.
green
1 sentence2009We also discussed Riffter, which, as noted above, held that it had been proper to stop a vehicle to determine whether it was being driven by its owner, but had also said, " Had [the officer] been able to see the driver of the vehicle, and been able to discern that the person driving the car did not match the description of Ritter, our result might have been different"" Id. (quoting Ritter, 801 N.E.2d at 693 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Bannister v. State
green
2 sentences2009The stop was not a violation of Bannister's Fourth Amendment rights." Id. 2009We also discussed Riffter, which, as noted above, held that it had been proper to stop a vehicle to determine whether it was being driven by its owner, but had also said, " Had [the officer] been able to see the driver of the vehicle, and been able to discern that the person driving the car did not match the description of Ritter, our result might have been different"" Id. (quoting Ritter, 801 N.E.2d at 693 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Reeves v. State
green
2 sentences2001Id. 2001Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Harris
green
1 sentence1999Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” See also State v. Harris, 702 N.E.2d 722 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.