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9 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1988–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Scott v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2003Police actions are to be tested “under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (footnote omitted). “[T]he validity of an arrest is normally gauged by an objective standard rather than by inquiry into the officer’s presumed motives. 2003Police actions are to be tested "under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved." Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (footnote omitted). | 4 | 4 |
Limonja v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2003Implicit in the statute is the fact that the “clear view of the highway” contemplated is the driver’s view as he is operating his motor vehicle, whose safe operation requires him to look in directions other than simply straight ahead, for that reason the statute prohibits suspending objects “in such a manner as to obstruct the driver’s clear view of the highway through the windshield, the front side windows, or the rear view window.” As the Court of Appeals noted in Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 532, 537-38 , 375 S.E.2d 756 (1989): The objective sufficiency of the reasons for the stop is 2003The appellee also contends the arrest for DUI was a "pre-text to the ultimate motivation of searching the vehicle, investigating the anonymous tip." As we said in Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 532, 537-38 , 383 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1989): The objective sufficiency of the reasons for the stop is the test for determining whether the stop is pretextual. | 1 | 2 |
Bosworth v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2003Implicit in the statute is the fact that the “clear view of the highway” contemplated is the driver’s view as he is operating his motor vehicle, whose safe operation requires him to look in directions other than simply straight ahead, for that reason the statute prohibits suspending objects “in such a manner as to obstruct the driver’s clear view of the highway through the windshield, the front side windows, or the rear view window.” As the Court of Appeals noted in Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 532, 537-38 , 375 S.E.2d 756 (1989): The objective sufficiency of the reasons for the stop is 2000See Bosworth v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 567 (1989). | 1 | 2 |
Ornelas v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2026Whether “evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo on appeal.” Brooks v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 94 (2011) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 177 (2009)); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002) (“[T]he standard for appellate review of reasonable-suspicion determinations should be de novo, rather than for ‘abuse of discretion.’” (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996))). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arvizugreen1 sentence2026Whether “evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo on appeal.” Brooks v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 94 (2011) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 177 (2009)); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002) (“[T]he standard for appellate review of reasonable-suspicion determinations should be de novo, rather than for ‘abuse of discretion.’” (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996))). | 1 | 1 |
Brooks v. Com.green1 sentence2026Whether “evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo on appeal.” Brooks v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 94 (2011) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 177 (2009)); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002) (“[T]he standard for appellate review of reasonable-suspicion determinations should be de novo, rather than for ‘abuse of discretion.’” (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996))). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Com.green1 sentence2026Whether “evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo on appeal.” Brooks v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 94 (2011) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 177 (2009)); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002) (“[T]he standard for appellate review of reasonable-suspicion determinations should be de novo, rather than for ‘abuse of discretion.’” (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996))). | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024“We must presume that the General Assembly chose, with care, the words that appear in a statute.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 412 , 415 (2018) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 738, 742 (2016)). “[W]hen the General Assembly uses two different terms in the same act, it is presumed to mean two different things.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 104, 110 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson, Ronald v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024“We must presume that the General Assembly chose, with care, the words that appear in a statute.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 412 , 415 (2018) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 738, 742 (2016)). “[W]hen the General Assembly uses two different terms in the same act, it is presumed to mean two different things.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 104, 110 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. Com.
green
2 sentences2014The stop was in violation of Harris’s Fourth Amendment rights because the officer’s -5- observations, “when considered together with the anonymous tip, were not sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. at 698 , 668 S.E.2d at 147 . 2014The stop was in violation of Harris’s Fourth Amendment rights because the officer’s -5- observations, “when considered together with the anonymous tip, were not sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. at 698 , 668 S.E.2d at 147 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Delaware v. Prouse
green
2 sentences1991Relying on Murphy , the trial court held that, because the U-turn was legal and was not a traffic infraction, and because the officer had no other reason to suspect that the driver had done anything illegal, the stop was in violation of the fourth amendment protections as defined in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). 1991Relying on Murphy , the trial court held that, because the U-turn was legal and was not a traffic infraction, and because the officer had no other reason to suspect that the driver had done anything illegal, the stop was in violation of the fourth amendment protections as defined in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.