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21 California opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Districtgreen2 sentences2025(Ibid.) The Supreme Court in Travis also considered a number of other statutes permitting fee awards for prevailing defendants to which courts applied the Christiansburg standard, including: (1) the California Fair 19 Employment and Housing Act (§ 12900 et seq.) (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 110 (Williams); (2) the federal Clean Water Act (Browder v. City of Moab (10th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3d 717, 723 ); (3) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Lane v. Residential Funding Corp. (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 739 , 748); (4) the Americans with Disabilities A 2025(Ibid.) The Supreme Court in Travis also considered a number of other statutes permitting fee awards for prevailing defendants to which courts applied the Christiansburg standard, including: (1) the California Fair 19 Employment and Housing Act (§ 12900 et seq.) (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 110 (Williams); (2) the federal Clean Water Act (Browder v. City of Moab (10th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3d 717, 723 ); (3) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Lane v. Residential Funding Corp. (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 739 , 748); (4) the Americans with Disabilities A | 4 | 9 |
Mangano v. Verity, Inc.green2 sentences2018Both sides appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed. *78 No one contended on appeal the FEHA action was frivolous. ( Mangano, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 951, fn. 10 , 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 526 .) With that understanding, Mangano held the Christiansburg standard applied and there was no "persuasive argument for allowing the application of section 998 to supplant the established standard that seeks to deter frivolous suits while providing adequate *82 support and incentive for meritorious actions." ( Id. at p. 951, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 526 .) Accordingly, it affirmed the trial court's denial of an award of a 2018Both sides appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed. *78 No one contended on appeal the FEHA action was frivolous. ( Mangano, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 951, fn. 10 , 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 526 .) With that understanding, Mangano held the Christiansburg standard applied and there was no "persuasive argument for allowing the application of section 998 to supplant the established standard that seeks to deter frivolous suits while providing adequate *82 support and incentive for meritorious actions." ( Id. at p. 951, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 526 .) Accordingly, it affirmed the trial court's denial of an award of a | 4 | 7 |
Cummings v. Benco Building Servicesgreen2 sentences2017(See *1016 Cummings, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 [applying Christiansburg rule to FEHA fee shifting provision in 1992]; Stats. 2000, ch. 1049, §§ 7.5, 11 [extending FEHA liability to individual defendants, effective January 1, 2001]; see also Flannery, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 578 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 , 28 P.3d 860 [statutory language is not considered in isolation; rather, the court must "look to 'the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision' "] ); Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629 , 2017(See *1016 Cummings, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 [applying Christiansburg rule to FEHA fee shifting provision in 1992]; Stats. 2000, ch. 1049, §§ 7.5, 11 [extending FEHA liability to individual defendants, effective January 1, 2001]; see also Flannery, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 578 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 , 28 P.3d 860 [statutory language is not considered in isolation; rather, the court must "look to 'the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision' "] ); Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629 , | 4 | 7 |
Holman v. Altana Pharma US, Inc.green2 sentences2018In Holman , the Court of Appeal held a trial court has discretion to award the prevailing employer in a *79 FEHA case expert witness fees under section 998 without first establishing the plaintiff's case was frivolous. ( Id. at p. 280, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 .) Where the FEHA action is not frivolous, however, the trial court must "scale" an award of expert witness fees to take into account the plaintiff's economic resources. ( Id. at pp. 283-284, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 .) Although it predated Williams, Holman presciently "assume[d] for purposes of this appeal that ... the Christiansburg standard app 2018In Holman , the Court of Appeal held a trial court has discretion to award the prevailing employer in a *79 FEHA case expert witness fees under section 998 without first establishing the plaintiff's case was frivolous. ( Id. at p. 280, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 .) Where the FEHA action is not frivolous, however, the trial court must "scale" an award of expert witness fees to take into account the plaintiff's economic resources. ( Id. at pp. 283-284, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 .) Although it predated Williams, Holman presciently "assume[d] for purposes of this appeal that ... the Christiansburg standard app | 4 | 5 |
Leek v. Coopergreen2 sentences2017In his reply brief, Routt notified this court that he was abandoning this fact-based argument "in light of further review of the record, and in recognition of the strict standard of appellate review." As the Williams court noted, numerous appellate decisions had followed Cummings in applying the Christiansburg rule to attorney fee motions by prevailing FEHA defendants. ( Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 103 , 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 ; see, e.g., Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399 , 419-420, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 56 ( Leek ); Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp . (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1467 2017In his reply brief, Routt notified this court that he was abandoning this fact-based argument "in light of further review of the record, and in recognition of the strict standard of appellate review." As the Williams court noted, numerous appellate decisions had followed Cummings in applying the Christiansburg rule to attorney fee motions by prevailing FEHA defendants. ( Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 103 , 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 ; see, e.g., Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399 , 419-420, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 56 ( Leek ); Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp . (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1467 | 4 | 4 |
Chavez v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2017In his reply brief, Routt notified this court that he was abandoning this fact-based argument "in light of further review of the record, and in recognition of the strict standard of appellate review." As the Williams court noted, numerous appellate decisions had followed Cummings in applying the Christiansburg rule to attorney fee motions by prevailing FEHA defendants. ( Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 103 , 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 ; see, e.g., Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399 , 419-420, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 56 ( Leek ); Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp . (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1467 2017In his reply brief, Routt notified this court that he was abandoning this fact-based argument "in light of further review of the record, and in recognition of the strict standard of appellate review." As the Williams court noted, numerous appellate decisions had followed Cummings in applying the Christiansburg rule to attorney fee motions by prevailing FEHA defendants. ( Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 103 , 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 ; see, e.g., Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399 , 419-420, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 56 ( Leek ); Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp . (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1467 | 4 | 4 |
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commissiongreen2 sentences2017In his reply brief, Routt notified this court that he was abandoning this fact-based argument "in light of further review of the record, and in recognition of the strict standard of appellate review." As the Williams court noted, numerous appellate decisions had followed Cummings in applying the Christiansburg rule to attorney fee motions by prevailing FEHA defendants. ( Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 103 , 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 ; see, e.g., Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399 , 419-420, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 56 ( Leek ); Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp . (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1467 2017In his reply brief, Routt notified this court that he was abandoning this fact-based argument "in light of further review of the record, and in recognition of the strict standard of appellate review." As the Williams court noted, numerous appellate decisions had followed Cummings in applying the Christiansburg rule to attorney fee motions by prevailing FEHA defendants. ( Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 103 , 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 ; see, e.g., Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399 , 419-420, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 56 ( Leek ); Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp . (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1467 | 3 | 7 |
Rosenman v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapirogreen2 sentences2017In his reply brief, Routt notified this court that he was abandoning this fact-based argument "in light of further review of the record, and in recognition of the strict standard of appellate review." As the Williams court noted, numerous appellate decisions had followed Cummings in applying the Christiansburg rule to attorney fee motions by prevailing FEHA defendants. ( Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 103 , 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 ; see, e.g., Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399 , 419-420, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 56 ( Leek ); Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp . (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1467 2017In his reply brief, Routt notified this court that he was abandoning this fact-based argument "in light of further review of the record, and in recognition of the strict standard of appellate review." As the Williams court noted, numerous appellate decisions had followed Cummings in applying the Christiansburg rule to attorney fee motions by prevailing FEHA defendants. ( Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 103 , 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 ; see, e.g., Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399 , 419-420, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 56 ( Leek ); Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp . (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1467 | 3 | 4 |
Knight v. Hayward Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2015We agree with the Romans that the trial court has discretion to deny or reduce a cost award to a prevailing FEHA defendant when a large award would impose undue hardship on the plaintiff — the financial circumstances of the losing plaintiff and the impact of the award on that party are relevant circumstances in determining whether the costs to be awarded are “reasonable in amount” within the meaning of Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), and section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(3). 21 (See Holman v. Altana Pharma US, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 262, 283-285 [111 *1063 Cal.Rptr.3d 554] [ 2013(Knight, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 135 .) It said: “Unlike the court in Cummings, which did not focus on costs, and simply assumed they should be treated in the same manner as attorney fees, the Perez court explained that the policies justifying the Christiansburg standard for awarding attorney fees to a prevailing defendant do not persuasively apply to the award to such a party of costs. | 3 | 4 |
Seever v. Copley Press, Inc.green2 sentences2018Both sides appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed. *78 No one contended on appeal the FEHA action was frivolous. ( Mangano, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 951, fn. 10 , 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 526 .) With that understanding, Mangano held the Christiansburg standard applied and there was no "persuasive argument for allowing the application of section 998 to supplant the established standard that seeks to deter frivolous suits while providing adequate *82 support and incentive for meritorious actions." ( Id. at p. 951, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 526 .) Accordingly, it affirmed the trial court's denial of an award of a 2018Both sides appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed. *78 No one contended on appeal the FEHA action was frivolous. ( Mangano, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 951, fn. 10 , 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 526 .) With that understanding, Mangano held the Christiansburg standard applied and there was no "persuasive argument for allowing the application of section 998 to supplant the established standard that seeks to deter frivolous suits while providing adequate *82 support and incentive for meritorious actions." ( Id. at p. 951, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 526 .) Accordingly, it affirmed the trial court's denial of an award of a | 2 | 4 |
Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp.green2 sentences2017In his reply brief, Routt notified this court that he was abandoning this fact-based argument "in light of further review of the record, and in recognition of the strict standard of appellate review." As the Williams court noted, numerous appellate decisions had followed Cummings in applying the Christiansburg rule to attorney fee motions by prevailing FEHA defendants. ( Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 103 , 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 ; see, e.g., Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399 , 419-420, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 56 ( Leek ); Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp . (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1467 2017In his reply brief, Routt notified this court that he was abandoning this fact-based argument "in light of further review of the record, and in recognition of the strict standard of appellate review." As the Williams court noted, numerous appellate decisions had followed Cummings in applying the Christiansburg rule to attorney fee motions by prevailing FEHA defendants. ( Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 103 , 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 ; see, e.g., Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399 , 419-420, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 56 ( Leek ); Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp . (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1467 | 2 | 4 |
Perez v. County of Santa Claragreen2 sentences2013Several federal courts themselves have refused to apply the Christiansburg test for recovery of defense attorney fees to ordinary litigation expenses. [Citations.]” ( Perez, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 680-681, fn. omitted.) The Perez court concluded that “ordinary litigation costs are recoverable by a prevailing FEHA defendant even if the lawsuit was not frivolous, groundless, or unreasonable.” (Perez, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 681 .) Accordingly, it affirmed the trial court’s decision and remanded to permit the trial court to exercise its discretion on the county’s request for costs. 2013Several federal courts themselves have refused to apply the Christiansburg test for recovery of defense attorney fees to ordinary litigation expenses. [Citations.]” ( Perez, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 680-681, fn. omitted.) The Perez court concluded that “ordinary litigation costs are recoverable by a prevailing FEHA defendant even if the lawsuit was not frivolous, groundless, or unreasonable.” (Perez, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 681 .) Accordingly, it affirmed the trial court’s decision and remanded to permit the trial court to exercise its discretion on the county’s request for costs. | 2 | 4 |
Flannery v. Prenticegreen2 sentences2017(See *1016 Cummings, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 [applying Christiansburg rule to FEHA fee shifting provision in 1992]; Stats. 2000, ch. 1049, §§ 7.5, 11 [extending FEHA liability to individual defendants, effective January 1, 2001]; see also Flannery, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 578 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 , 28 P.3d 860 [statutory language is not considered in isolation; rather, the court must "look to 'the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision' "] ); Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629 , 2017(See *1016 Cummings, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 [applying Christiansburg rule to FEHA fee shifting provision in 1992]; Stats. 2000, ch. 1049, §§ 7.5, 11 [extending FEHA liability to individual defendants, effective January 1, 2001]; see also Flannery, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 578 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 , 28 P.3d 860 [statutory language is not considered in isolation; rather, the court must "look to 'the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision' "] ); Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629 , | 2 | 2 |
Browder v. City of Moabgreen2 sentences2025(Ibid.) The Supreme Court in Travis also considered a number of other statutes permitting fee awards for prevailing defendants to which courts applied the Christiansburg standard, including: (1) the California Fair 19 Employment and Housing Act (§ 12900 et seq.) (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 110 (Williams); (2) the federal Clean Water Act (Browder v. City of Moab (10th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3d 717, 723 ); (3) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Lane v. Residential Funding Corp. (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 739 , 748); (4) the Americans with Disabilities A 2025(Ibid.) The Supreme Court in Travis also considered a number of other statutes permitting fee awards for prevailing defendants to which courts applied the Christiansburg standard, including: (1) the California Fair 19 Employment and Housing Act (§ 12900 et seq.) (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 110 (Williams); (2) the federal Clean Water Act (Browder v. City of Moab (10th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3d 717, 723 ); (3) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Lane v. Residential Funding Corp. (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 739 , 748); (4) the Americans with Disabilities A | 1 | 2 |
Commissioners Court of Medina County, Texas v. United States of America Antonio Garcia, IIIgreen2 sentences2023Cir. 1982) 683 F.2d 435, 439 [declaring that the Christiansburg standard generally applies to fee awards under the Voting Rights Act, except “where the procedural posture of a particular case renders the general rule inapplicable”]; Consol. 2023Cir. 1982) 683 F.2d 435, 439 [declaring that the Christiansburg standard generally applies to fee awards under the Voting Rights Act, except “where the procedural posture of a particular case renders the general rule inapplicable”]; Consol. | 1 | 2 |
Rick Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc., a California Corporationgreen2 sentences2011(Molski, at p. 791.) The plaintiff argued for application of the standard under the ADA, where an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party is discretionary ( 42 U.S.C. § 12205 ; Hubbard, supra, 554 F.3d at p. 744 ), but a prevailing defendant may only be awarded fees “ ‘upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.’ ” (Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 , quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 421 [ 54 L.Ed.2d 648 , 98 S.Ct. 694 ] (Christiansburg).) 12 Molski rejected application 2011(Molski, at p. 791.) The plaintiff argued for application of the standard under the ADA, where an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party is discretionary ( 42 U.S.C. § 12205 ; Hubbard, supra, 554 F.3d at p. 744 ), but a prevailing defendant may only be awarded fees “ ‘upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.’ ” (Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 , quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 421 [ 54 L.Ed.2d 648 , 98 S.Ct. 694 ] (Christiansburg).) 12 Molski rejected application | 1 | 2 |
| Thirteen Committee v. Weinrebgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anthony Arcese v. Daniel Schmitt & Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Odessa CARRION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. YESHIVA UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appelleegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garcia v. Santanagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Akins v. ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR CO.green | 1 | 1 |
| Jersey v. John Muir Medical Centergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Turner v. Ass'n of American Medical Collegesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alpersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Agnew v. State Board of Equalizationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Canales v. City of Alvisogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025(Ibid.) The Supreme Court in Travis also considered a number of other statutes permitting fee awards for prevailing defendants to which courts applied the Christiansburg standard, including: (1) the California Fair 19 Employment and Housing Act (§ 12900 et seq.) (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 110 (Williams); (2) the federal Clean Water Act (Browder v. City of Moab (10th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3d 717, 723 ); (3) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Lane v. Residential Funding Corp. (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 739 , 748); (4) the Americans with Disabilities A 2025(Ibid.) The Supreme Court in Travis also considered a number of other statutes permitting fee awards for prevailing defendants to which courts applied the Christiansburg standard, including: (1) the California Fair 19 Employment and Housing Act (§ 12900 et seq.) (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 110 (Williams); (2) the federal Clean Water Act (Browder v. City of Moab (10th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3d 717, 723 ); (3) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Lane v. Residential Funding Corp. (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 739 , 748); (4) the Americans with Disabilities A | 2 | 2023–2025 |
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025(Travis, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 418–421.) The Court of Appeal in Travis disagreed with those two decisions, stating that the United States Supreme Court “had ‘considerably limited’ the scope of the Christiansburg standard” in a subsequent case, Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. (1994) 510 U.S. 517 (Fogerty). 2025(Travis, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 418–421.) The Court of Appeal in Travis disagreed with those two decisions, stating that the United States Supreme Court “had ‘considerably limited’ the scope of the Christiansburg standard” in a subsequent case, Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. (1994) 510 U.S. 517 (Fogerty). | 2 | 2023–2025 |
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt
green
2 sentences2025(Ibid.) The Supreme Court in Travis also considered a number of other statutes permitting fee awards for prevailing defendants to which courts applied the Christiansburg standard, including: (1) the California Fair 19 Employment and Housing Act (§ 12900 et seq.) (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 110 (Williams); (2) the federal Clean Water Act (Browder v. City of Moab (10th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3d 717, 723 ); (3) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Lane v. Residential Funding Corp. (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 739 , 748); (4) the Americans with Disabilities A 2025(Ibid.) The Supreme Court in Travis also considered a number of other statutes permitting fee awards for prevailing defendants to which courts applied the Christiansburg standard, including: (1) the California Fair 19 Employment and Housing Act (§ 12900 et seq.) (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 110 (Williams); (2) the federal Clean Water Act (Browder v. City of Moab (10th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3d 717, 723 ); (3) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Lane v. Residential Funding Corp. (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 739 , 748); (4) the Americans with Disabilities A | 2 | 2023–2025 |
cluster 781332
green
2 sentences2025(Ibid.) The Supreme Court in Travis also considered a number of other statutes permitting fee awards for prevailing defendants to which courts applied the Christiansburg standard, including: (1) the California Fair 19 Employment and Housing Act (§ 12900 et seq.) (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 110 (Williams); (2) the federal Clean Water Act (Browder v. City of Moab (10th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3d 717, 723 ); (3) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Lane v. Residential Funding Corp. (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 739 , 748); (4) the Americans with Disabilities A 2025(Ibid.) The Supreme Court in Travis also considered a number of other statutes permitting fee awards for prevailing defendants to which courts applied the Christiansburg standard, including: (1) the California Fair 19 Employment and Housing Act (§ 12900 et seq.) (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 110 (Williams); (2) the federal Clean Water Act (Browder v. City of Moab (10th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3d 717, 723 ); (3) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Lane v. Residential Funding Corp. (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 739 , 748); (4) the Americans with Disabilities A | 2 | 2023–2025 |
Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018In Holman , the Court of Appeal held a trial court has discretion to award the prevailing employer in a *79 FEHA case expert witness fees under section 998 without first establishing the plaintiff's case was frivolous. ( Id. at p. 280, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 .) Where the FEHA action is not frivolous, however, the trial court must "scale" an award of expert witness fees to take into account the plaintiff's economic resources. ( Id. at pp. 283-284, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 .) Although it predated Williams, Holman presciently "assume[d] for purposes of this appeal that ... the Christiansburg standard app 2018In Holman , the Court of Appeal held a trial court has discretion to award the prevailing employer in a *79 FEHA case expert witness fees under section 998 without first establishing the plaintiff's case was frivolous. ( Id. at p. 280, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 .) Where the FEHA action is not frivolous, however, the trial court must "scale" an award of expert witness fees to take into account the plaintiff's economic resources. ( Id. at pp. 283-284, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 .) Although it predated Williams, Holman presciently "assume[d] for purposes of this appeal that ... the Christiansburg standard app | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Baker v. Mulholland Security & Patrol, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Like attorney's fees, expert fees should be treated differently than ordinary litigation costs because they can be expensive and unpredictable, and could chill plaintiffs from bringing meritorious actions." ( Id. at p. 783, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 235 .) Finally, in Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th 97 , 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 , the California Supreme Court held the Christiansburg standard applies to the award of ordinary costs as *81 well as attorney fees 13 when the defendant prevails in a nonfrivolous FEHA action: "To reiterate, under that standard a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily rec 2018Like attorney's fees, expert fees should be treated differently than ordinary litigation costs because they can be expensive and unpredictable, and could chill plaintiffs from bringing meritorious actions." ( Id. at p. 783, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 235 .) Finally, in Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th 97 , 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 , the California Supreme Court held the Christiansburg standard applies to the award of ordinary costs as *81 well as attorney fees 13 when the defendant prevails in a nonfrivolous FEHA action: "To reiterate, under that standard a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily rec | 2 | 2013–2018 |
Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics
green
2 sentences2017When the Legislature amends a statute that has been the subject of judicial construction, changing it only in part, the presumption is that the Legislature intended to leave the law unchanged in the aspects not amended."].) 7 To support his contention that "countervailing public policies" militate in favor of treating fee requests by prevailing individual employee defendants differently from requests by employer defendants, Routt relies on the discussion in Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 ( Janken ), regarding the rationales for not imposing person 2017When the Legislature amends a statute that has been the subject of judicial construction, changing it only in part, the presumption is that the Legislature intended to leave the law unchanged in the aspects not amended."].) 7 To support his contention that "countervailing public policies" militate in favor of treating fee requests by prevailing individual employee defendants differently from requests by employer defendants, Routt relies on the discussion in Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 ( Janken ), regarding the rationales for not imposing person | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Flannery v. California Highway Patrol
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2 sentences2017(See *1016 Cummings, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 [applying Christiansburg rule to FEHA fee shifting provision in 1992]; Stats. 2000, ch. 1049, §§ 7.5, 11 [extending FEHA liability to individual defendants, effective January 1, 2001]; see also Flannery, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 578 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 , 28 P.3d 860 [statutory language is not considered in isolation; rather, the court must "look to 'the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision' "] ); Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629 , 2017(See *1016 Cummings, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1387 , 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 [applying Christiansburg rule to FEHA fee shifting provision in 1992]; Stats. 2000, ch. 1049, §§ 7.5, 11 [extending FEHA liability to individual defendants, effective January 1, 2001]; see also Flannery, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 578 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 809 , 28 P.3d 860 [statutory language is not considered in isolation; rather, the court must "look to 'the entire substance of the statute ... in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision' "] ); Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629 , | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Karen L. Brown, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Lucky Stores, Inc. John Hunt, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants
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2 sentences2015(Brown, supra, 246 F.3d at p. 1190 .) By contrast, several federal circuit court decisions have, as previously explained, declined to apply the Christiansburg standard to costs awarded in actions under Title VII. 2015(Brown, supra, 246 F.3d at p. 1190 .) By contrast, several federal circuit court decisions have, as previously explained, declined to apply the Christiansburg standard to costs awarded in actions under Title VII. | 2 | 2013–2015 |
Estate of Martin v. California Department of Veterans Affairs
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2 sentences2013(Brown, at p. 1190.) It concluded: “Because [section] 12205 makes fees and costs parallel, we hold that the Christiansburg test also applies to an award of costs to a prevailing defendant under the ADA. [Citations.]”3 (Brown, at p. 1190.) Williams also cites Estate of Martin v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (9th Cir. 2009) 560 F.3d 1042 (Martin). 2013(Brown, at p. 1190.) It concluded: “Because [section] 12205 makes fees and costs parallel, we hold that the Christiansburg test also applies to an award of costs to a prevailing defendant under the ADA. [Citations.]”3 (Brown, at p. 1190.) Williams also cites Estate of Martin v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (9th Cir. 2009) 560 F.3d 1042 (Martin). | 2 | 2013–2015 |
Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc.
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2 sentences2013The District cites several federal cases to demonstrate that there is not a general federal rule that “in all types of discrimination cases, a prevailing defendant is only entitled to costs if the Christiansburg standard is met.” For example, in Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc. (5th Cir. 2000) 209 F.3d 419 , the court found that “the standard procedure [in Title VII cases] is to award costs to the prevailing party in Title VII suits. . . . 2013The District cites several federal cases to demonstrate that there is not a general federal rule that “in all types of discrimination cases, a prevailing defendant is only entitled to costs if the Christiansburg standard is met.” For example, in Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc. (5th Cir. 2000) 209 F.3d 419 , the court found that “the standard procedure [in Title VII cases] is to award costs to the prevailing party in Title VII suits. . . . | 2 | 2003–2013 |
American Federation Of State, County And Municipal Employees, Afl-Cio (Afscme) v. Nassau County
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2 sentences2010Bill No. 1670 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 6, 1999, pp. 4-5.) Thus, we could infer that, in seeking uniformity with federal law, the Legislature intended to adopt the federal rule that “[attorney’s fees and expert witness fees may not be awarded to a *280 prevailing defendant in a Title VII case unless the plaintiff’s claim is ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or . . . the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.’ [Citations.]” (AFSME v. County of Nassau (2d Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 644 , 646, italics added.) Accordingly, we will assume for purposes of this appeal 2010Bill No. 1670 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 6, 1999, pp. 4-5.) Thus, we could infer that, in seeking uniformity with federal law, the Legislature intended to adopt the federal rule that “[attorney’s fees and expert witness fees may not be awarded to a *280 prevailing defendant in a Title VII case unless the plaintiff’s claim is ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or . . . the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.’ [Citations.]” (AFSME v. County of Nassau (2d Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 644 , 646, italics added.) Accordingly, we will assume for purposes of this appeal | 2 | 2010–2012 |
Molski v. Arciero Wine Group
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2 sentences2011Defendant relies on statements made by the court in Molski, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 786 , in the course of rejecting application of the federal Christiansburg standard to section 55. 2010On appeal, the appellate court first found Section 55's mandatory language to be unambiguous authorizing "bilateral fee recovery" for both the prevailing plaintiffs and the prevailing defendants. ( Molski, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 790 .) Next, the court determined that the defendant winery was the "prevailing party" because Molski had obtained none of the relief he sought. ( Id. at p. 791.) The court then considered Molski's assertion that, "notwithstanding the plain language of section 55 and the outcome of this litigation," attorney fees should not be assessed against a plaintiff unless | 2 | 2010–2011 |
Hubbard v. SOBRECK, LLC
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2 sentences2011(Molski, at p. 791.) The plaintiff argued for application of the standard under the ADA, where an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party is discretionary ( 42 U.S.C. § 12205 ; Hubbard, supra, 554 F.3d at p. 744 ), but a prevailing defendant may only be awarded fees “ ‘upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.’ ” (Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 , quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 421 [ 54 L.Ed.2d 648 , 98 S.Ct. 694 ] (Christiansburg).) 12 Molski rejected application 2011(Molski, at p. 791.) The plaintiff argued for application of the standard under the ADA, where an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party is discretionary ( 42 U.S.C. § 12205 ; Hubbard, supra, 554 F.3d at p. 744 ), but a prevailing defendant may only be awarded fees “ ‘upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.’ ” (Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 , quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 421 [ 54 L.Ed.2d 648 , 98 S.Ct. 694 ] (Christiansburg).) 12 Molski rejected application | 2 | 2010–2011 |
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Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.