commentary rule in Connecticut

2022The commentary to instruction 2.6-14 provided: ‘‘ ‘A defendant may . . . rely upon relevant deficiencies or lapses in the police investigation to raise the specter of reasonable doubt, and the trial court violates his right to a fair trial by precluding the jury from considering evidence to that effect.’ State v. Collins, [supra, 299 Conn. 599-600] (finding that such an instruction as this does not preclude the jury from considering the evidence of the police investigation as it might relate to any weaknesses in the state’s case). ‘Collins does not require a court to instruct the jury on the q

2022The commentary to instruction 2.6-14 provided: ‘‘ ‘A defendant may . . . rely upon relevant deficiencies or lapses in the police investigation to raise the specter of reasonable doubt, and the trial court violates his right to a fair trial by precluding the jury from considering evidence to that effect.’ State v. Collins, [supra, 299 Conn. 599-600] (finding that such an instruction as this does not preclude the jury from considering the evidence of the police investigation as it might relate to any weaknesses in the state’s case). ‘Collins does not require a court to instruct the jury on the q

2021A fiduciary role is one such example.13 Our case law also supports the conclusion that the commentary to rule 3.3 is insufficient to exempt attorneys serving as court-appointed fiduciaries. ‘‘[I]t is well established that [t]he Rules of Professional Conduct bind attorneys to uphold the law and to act in accordance with high standards in both their personal and professional lives.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 231 , 890 A.2d 509 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823 , 127 S. Ct. 157 , 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006). ‘‘Disciplinary proceedings

2021A fiduciary role is one such example.13 Our case law also supports the conclusion that the commentary to rule 3.3 is insufficient to exempt attorneys serving as court-appointed fiduciaries. ‘‘[I]t is well established that [t]he Rules of Professional Conduct bind attorneys to uphold the law and to act in accordance with high standards in both their personal and professional lives.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 231 , 890 A.2d 509 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823 , 127 S. Ct. 157 , 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006). ‘‘Disciplinary proceedings

2012Moreover, in State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 405 , 497 A.2d 956 (1985), [the court] concluded that where silence is offered as nonverbal conduct, such evidence is inadmissible unless it is ‘a rehable indicator of what the [preferring party] claims it tended to communicate . . .

2012Moreover, in State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 405 , 497 A.2d 956 (1985), [the court] concluded that where silence is offered as nonverbal conduct, such evidence is inadmissible unless it is ‘a rehable indicator of what the [preferring party] claims it tended to communicate . . .

2026We recognize that it may be “common practice for judges to enter the jury room after a verdict has been returned to thank the jury for its service and [to] converse with jurors about their experience”; State v. Kamel, 115 Conn. App. 338 , 349 n.2, 972 A.2d 780 (2009); and that the commentary to rule 2.8 of the Code of Judicial Conduct contemplates such interactions.

2026We recognize that it may be “common practice for judges to enter the jury room after a verdict has been returned to thank the jury for its service and [to] converse with jurors about their experience”; State v. Kamel, 115 Conn. App. 338 , 349 n.2, 972 A.2d 780 (2009); and that the commentary to rule 2.8 of the Code of Judicial Conduct contemplates such interactions.

2026The respondent also challenges the finding that she violated rule 1.5 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides in relevant part: “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. . . .” Rule 1.5 (a) also enumerates eight factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee.12 “The commentary to rule 1.5 provides [however] that the factors specified in the rule . . . are not exclusive, and not all may be relevant given a particular instance. . . . [As] [w]e have explained [previously] courts .

2026The respondent also challenges the finding that she violated rule 1.5 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides in relevant part: “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. . . .” Rule 1.5 (a) also enumerates eight factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee.12 “The commentary to rule 1.5 provides [however] that the factors specified in the rule . . . are not exclusive, and not all may be relevant given a particular instance. . . . [As] [w]e have explained [previously] courts .

2024The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that Practice Book § 11-21 did not apply to its motion for contractual attorney’s fees, as opposed to statutory attorney’s fees: the text of Practice Book § 11-21 makes it clear that the rule applies to attorney’s fees sought postjudgment and not to those attorney’s fees assessed as a component of damages, and to the extent there is ambiguity as to whether the rule governs contractual attorney’s fees, the commentary to the rule and dicta in Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman ( 328 Conn. 586 ) support this court’s construction that postjudgment moti

2021A fiduciary role is one such example.13 Our case law also supports the conclusion that the commentary to rule 3.3 is insufficient to exempt attorneys serving as court-appointed fiduciaries. ‘‘[I]t is well established that [t]he Rules of Professional Conduct bind attorneys to uphold the law and to act in accordance with high standards in both their personal and professional lives.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 231 , 890 A.2d 509 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823 , 127 S. Ct. 157 , 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006). ‘‘Disciplinary proceedings

2021A fiduciary role is one such example.13 Our case law also supports the conclusion that the commentary to rule 3.3 is insufficient to exempt attorneys serving as court-appointed fiduciaries. ‘‘[I]t is well established that [t]he Rules of Professional Conduct bind attorneys to uphold the law and to act in accordance with high standards in both their personal and professional lives.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 231 , 890 A.2d 509 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823 , 127 S. Ct. 157 , 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006). ‘‘Disciplinary proceedings

2021The commentary to instruction 2.6-14 provides: ‘‘ ‘A defendant may . . . rely upon relevant deficiencies or lapses in the police investigation to raise the specter of reasonable doubt, and the trial court violates his right to a fair trial by precluding the jury from considering evidence to that effect.’ State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567 , 599-600 [ 10 A.3d 1005 ] (finding that such an instruction as this does not preclude the jury from considering the evidence of the police investigation as it might relate to any weaknesses in the state’s case) [cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S. Ct. 314 , 181

2021The commentary to instruction 2.6-14 provides: ‘‘ ‘A defendant may . . . rely upon relevant deficiencies or lapses in the police investigation to raise the specter of reasonable doubt, and the trial court violates his right to a fair trial by precluding the jury from considering evidence to that effect.’ State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567 , 599-600 [ 10 A.3d 1005 ] (finding that such an instruction as this does not preclude the jury from considering the evidence of the police investigation as it might relate to any weaknesses in the state’s case) [cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S. Ct. 314 , 181

2021The commentary to instruction 2.6-14 provides: ‘‘ ‘A defendant may . . . rely upon relevant deficiencies or lapses in the police investigation to raise the specter of reasonable doubt, and the trial court violates his right to a fair trial by precluding the jury from considering evidence to that effect.’ State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567 , 599-600 [ 10 A.3d 1005 ] (finding that such an instruction as this does not preclude the jury from considering the evidence of the police investigation as it might relate to any weaknesses in the state’s case) [cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S. Ct. 314 , 181

2021A fiduciary role is one such example.13 Our case law also supports the conclusion that the commentary to rule 3.3 is insufficient to exempt attorneys serving as court-appointed fiduciaries. ‘‘[I]t is well established that [t]he Rules of Professional Conduct bind attorneys to uphold the law and to act in accordance with high standards in both their personal and professional lives.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 231 , 890 A.2d 509 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823 , 127 S. Ct. 157 , 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006). ‘‘Disciplinary proceedings

2021A fiduciary role is one such example.13 Our case law also supports the conclusion that the commentary to rule 3.3 is insufficient to exempt attorneys serving as court-appointed fiduciaries. ‘‘[I]t is well established that [t]he Rules of Professional Conduct bind attorneys to uphold the law and to act in accordance with high standards in both their personal and professional lives.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 231 , 890 A.2d 509 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823 , 127 S. Ct. 157 , 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006). ‘‘Disciplinary proceedings

2020The commentary to our rule of evidence makes clear that electronic communications, such as text messages, are subject to the same standard of authentication and the same methods of authentication as other forms of evidence: ‘‘As with any other form of evidence, a party may use any appropriate method, or combination of methods, described in this commentary, or any other proof to demonstrate that the proffer is what its proponent claims it to be, to authenticate any particular item of electronically stored information.’’ Conn. Code Evid. (2018) § 9-1, commentary; cf. State v. Hannah, 448 N.J. Su

2020The commentary to our rule of evidence makes clear that electronic communications, such as text messages, are subject to the same standard of authentication and the same methods of authentication as other forms of evidence: ‘‘As with any other form of evidence, a party may use any appropriate method, or combination of methods, described in this commentary, or any other proof to demonstrate that the proffer is what its proponent claims it to be, to authenticate any particular item of electronically stored information.’’ Conn. Code Evid. (2018) § 9-1, commentary; cf. State v. Hannah, 448 N.J. Su

2019Even if hearsay evidence satisfies an exception to the hearsay rule, however, it may remain inadmissible in a criminal case unless it also comports with the confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions. 8 Conn. Code Evid. § 8-2 (b) ; 9 see also California v. Green , 399 U.S. 149 , 155-56, 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (noting that "more than once [the court had] found a violation of confrontation [rights] even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception").

2019Even if hearsay evidence satisfies an exception to the hearsay rule, however, it may remain inadmissible in a criminal case unless it also comports with the confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions. 8 Conn. Code Evid. § 8-2 (b) ; 9 see also California v. Green , 399 U.S. 149 , 155-56, 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (noting that "more than once [the court had] found a violation of confrontation [rights] even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception").

2019"We do not place the same weight on commentaries as we would place on expressed rules." Henry v. Statewide Grievance Committee , 111 Conn. App. 12 , 20, 957 A.2d 547 (2008).

2019"We do not place the same weight on commentaries as we would place on expressed rules." Henry v. Statewide Grievance Committee , 111 Conn. App. 12 , 20, 957 A.2d 547 (2008).

2018With respect to opinion evidence concerning the appearance of persons or things, we find instructive State v. Grant , supra, 286 Conn. 499 , 944 A.2d 947 , in which we considered whether a lay person could testify about whether a substance observed by that person appeared to be blood.

2018With respect to opinion evidence concerning the appearance of persons or things, we find instructive State v. Grant , supra, 286 Conn. 499 , 944 A.2d 947 , in which we considered whether a lay person could testify about whether a substance observed by that person appeared to be blood.

2017On appeal, the defendant contends that the award, predicated on a theory of unjust enrichment, was improper because contingency fee matters are the property of the client, rather than the law firm, and the award violated the fee splitting provisions of rule 1.5 (e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 2 Guided by the commentary to rule 1.5 (e) and the well established line of authority following Jewel v. Boxer , 156 Cal.App.3d 171 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 13 (1984), we conclude that the trial court properly awarded the plaintiff a portion of the contingency fees that the defendant collected subsequent

2017On appeal, the defendant contends that the award, predicated on a theory of unjust enrichment, was improper because contingency fee matters are the property of the client, rather than the law firm, and the award violated the fee splitting provisions of rule 1.5 (e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 2 Guided by the commentary to rule 1.5 (e) and the well established line of authority following Jewel v. Boxer , 156 Cal.App.3d 171 , 203 Cal.Rptr. 13 (1984), we conclude that the trial court properly awarded the plaintiff a portion of the contingency fees that the defendant collected subsequent

2017In re Thelen, LLP, 762 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2014), Hogan Lovells US, LLP v. Howrey, LLP , 531 B.R. 814 , 821 (N.D.

2017Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law...." The commentary to this rule clarifies what is considered to be a frivolous action, providing that an "action is frivolous ... if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a g

2017Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law...." The commentary to this rule clarifies what is considered to be a frivolous action, providing that an "action is frivolous ... if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a g

2017In re Thelen, LLP, 762 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2014), Hogan Lovells US, LLP v. Howrey, LLP , 531 B.R. 814 , 821 (N.D.

2017Acknowledging that the commentary to rule 1.5 (e) allows the sharing of fees generated and earned during the existence of a partnership, the defendant relies on numerous cases, including Geron v. Robinson & Cole, LLP , 476 B.R. 732 , 740-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd sub nom.

2017Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law...." The commentary to this rule clarifies what is considered to be a frivolous action, providing that an "action is frivolous ... if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a g

2017Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law...." The commentary to this rule clarifies what is considered to be a frivolous action, providing that an "action is frivolous ... if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a g