municipal ordinance violation in Illinois

2014Importantly, section 2-1402 places certain restrictions on the procedures applicable to a citation to discover assets when related to “the enforcement of any order or judgment - 11 - 2014 IL App (2d) 130654 resulting from an adjudication of a municipal ordinance violation that is subject to Supreme Court Rules 570 through 579, or from an administrative adjudication of such an ordinance violation.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(o) (West 2012); see also 735 ILCS 5/12-107.5 (West 2012) (restricting use of body attachments when related to the enforcement of an order or judgment resulting fro

2014Importantly, section 2-1402 places certain restrictions on the procedures applicable to a citation to discover assets when related to “the enforcement of any order or judgment resulting from an adjudication of a municipal ordinance violation that is subject to Supreme Court Rules 570 through 579, or from an administrative adjudication of such an ordinance - 11 - 2014 IL App (2d) 130654 violation.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(o) (West 2012); see also 735 ILCS 5/12-107.5 (West 2012) (restricting use of body attachments when related to the enforcement of an order or judgment resulting fro

2004Unlike the minor in the city’s case, the minor in the juvenile case faces a possibility of detention for up to 30 days [citation], removal from the custody of his or her parents or guardians [citation], and placement into the custody of some other person or agency [citation], *** The legislature could have reasonably concluded that the minor in juvenile court should have the right to appointed counsel and the other minor should not, because the minor in juvenile court faces weightier potential consequences.” 335 Ill.

2004Unlike the minor in the city’s case, the minor in the juvenile case faces a possibility of detention for up to 30 days [citation], removal from the custody of his or her parents or guardians [citation], and placement into the custody of some other person or agency [citation]. *** The legislature could have reasonably concluded that the minor in juvenile court should have the right to appointed counsel and the other minor should not, because the minor in juvenile court faces weightier potential consequences.” 335 Ill.

1997Normal, 142 Ill.

1997Normal , 142 Ill.

1986(Village of Park Forest v. Fagan (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 264 , 356 N.E.2d 59 ; Village of Park Forst v. Bragg (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 225 , 230 N.E.2d 868 ; Village of Maywood v. Houston (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 117 , 139 N.E.2d 233 .) We note that Fagan post-dates the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Waller and conclude that the prosecution may appeal a defendant’s acquittal of a municipal ordinance violation consistent with the United States and Illinois constitutions’ proscriptions against double jeopardy.

1986(Village of Park Forest v. Fagan (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 264 , 356 N.E.2d 59 ; Village of Park Forst v. Bragg (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 225 , 230 N.E.2d 868 ; Village of Maywood v. Houston (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 117 , 139 N.E.2d 233 .) We note that Fagan post-dates the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Waller and conclude that the prosecution may appeal a defendant’s acquittal of a municipal ordinance violation consistent with the United States and Illinois constitutions’ proscriptions against double jeopardy.

1986(Village of Park Forest v. Fagan (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 264 , 356 N.E.2d 59 ; Village of Park Forst v. Bragg (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 225 , 230 N.E.2d 868 ; Village of Maywood v. Houston (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 117 , 139 N.E.2d 233 .) We note that Fagan post-dates the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Waller and conclude that the prosecution may appeal a defendant’s acquittal of a municipal ordinance violation consistent with the United States and Illinois constitutions’ proscriptions against double jeopardy.

1986(Village of Park Forest v. Fagan (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 264 , 356 N.E.2d 59 ; Village of Park Forst v. Bragg (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 225 , 230 N.E.2d 868 ; Village of Maywood v. Houston (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 117 , 139 N.E.2d 233 .) We note that Fagan post-dates the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Waller and conclude that the prosecution may appeal a defendant’s acquittal of a municipal ordinance violation consistent with the United States and Illinois constitutions’ proscriptions against double jeopardy.

2024Finally, the State concludes, courts should reject applying the exclusionary rule in situations that would encourage bad conduct by criminal defendants, such as encouraging defendants to flee and disobey lawful orders by law enforcement which would run counter to the intent of the exclusionary rule. ¶ 99 In reply, defendant argues that no binding precedent categorically directed that “hot pursuit” could be used to justify an arrest for a municipal ordinance violation, citing Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3 (2013) in support.

2020Cf. People v. Arnold, 394 Ill. App. 3d 63 , 71- 73 (2009) (handcuffing the suspect was unreasonable given that he was wanted for a municipal ordinance violation, not a crime of violence, and the suspect did not pose a flight risk).

2020Defendant did not challenge or rebut that evidence at the motion-to-suppress hearing. ¶ 38 We thus reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Wells, 403 Ill. App. 3d 849 (2010), wherein this court held that handcuffing the defendant transformed what was initially a legally justified Terry stop into an arrest but without the necessary probable cause.

1995Although the prosecution of a municipal ordinance violation is considered civil in nature, successive State and municipal prosecutions for the same conduct can constitute double jeopardy (People v. Allison (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 147 , 263 N.E.2d 80 ), when the potential penalty for the ordinance violation is punitive in nature (see United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435 , 104 L.

1995Although the prosecution of a municipal ordinance violation is considered civil in nature, successive State and municipal prosecutions for the same conduct can constitute double jeopardy (People v. Allison (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 147 , 263 N.E.2d 80 ), when the potential penalty for the ordinance violation is punitive in nature (see United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435 , 104 L.

1995Although the prosecution of a municipal ordinance violation is considered civil in nature, successive State and municipal prosecutions for the same conduct can constitute double jeopardy (People v. Allison (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 147 , 263 N.E.2d 80 ), when the potential penalty for the ordinance violation is punitive in nature (see United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435 , 104 L.

1995Although the prosecution of a municipal ordinance violation is considered civil in nature, successive State and municipal prosecutions for the same conduct can constitute double jeopardy (People v. Allison (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 147 , 263 N.E.2d 80 ), when the potential penalty for the ordinance violation is punitive in nature (see United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435 , 104 L.

1993App. 3d 991, 994 , 559 N.E.2d 1081, 1083 , where a fine imposed for a municipal ordinance violation was held to be immune from interest.

1986App. 3d 1092 , 408 N.E.2d 769 , in which the court found that a prior municipal-ordinance violation did not constitute an “offense” as defined in sections 2 — 12 and 2 — 22 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.

1986(Village of Park Forest v. Fagan (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 264 , 356 N.E.2d 59 ; Village of Park Forst v. Bragg (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 225 , 230 N.E.2d 868 ; Village of Maywood v. Houston (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 117 , 139 N.E.2d 233 .) We note that Fagan post-dates the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Waller and conclude that the prosecution may appeal a defendant’s acquittal of a municipal ordinance violation consistent with the United States and Illinois constitutions’ proscriptions against double jeopardy.

1986(Village of Park Forest v. Fagan (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 264 , 356 N.E.2d 59 ; Village of Park Forst v. Bragg (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 225 , 230 N.E.2d 868 ; Village of Maywood v. Houston (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 117 , 139 N.E.2d 233 .) We note that Fagan post-dates the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Waller and conclude that the prosecution may appeal a defendant’s acquittal of a municipal ordinance violation consistent with the United States and Illinois constitutions’ proscriptions against double jeopardy.

1981People v. Crabtree (1980), 82 Ill.

1980Ed. 2d 930,934 , 87 S. Ct. 1727,1730 , that a municipal ordinance violation wherein a fine not to exceed $500 or imprisonment not to exceed six months could be imposed for a violation of a housing code, is a criminal prosecution subject to the protections of the United States Constitution.

1980App. 2d 254 , 206 N.E.2d 124 , for the proposition that their convictions of the municipal ordinance violation bar their subsequent State prosecution.

1979In City of Danville v. Clark (1976), 63 Ill.2d 408 , 348 N.E.2d 844 , cert. denied (1977), 429 U.S. 899 , 50 L.Ed.2d 184 , 97 S.Ct. 266 , the supreme court held that appointment of a guardian ad litem was not necessary where the judgment was based on a municipal ordinance violation.

1979In City of Danville v. Clark (1976), 63 Ill.2d 408 , 348 N.E.2d 844 , cert. denied (1977), 429 U.S. 899 , 50 L.Ed.2d 184 , 97 S.Ct. 266 , the supreme court held that appointment of a guardian ad litem was not necessary where the judgment was based on a municipal ordinance violation.

1979Ed. 2d 184 , 97 S. Ct. 266 , the supreme court held that appointment of a guardian ad litem was not necessary where the judgment was based on a municipal ordinance violation.

1979In City of Danville v. Clark (1976), 63 Ill.2d 408 , 348 N.E.2d 844 , cert. denied (1977), 429 U.S. 899 , 50 L.Ed.2d 184 , 97 S.Ct. 266 , the supreme court held that appointment of a guardian ad litem was not necessary where the judgment was based on a municipal ordinance violation.

1979In City of Danville v. Clark (1976), 63 Ill.2d 408 , 348 N.E.2d 844 , cert. denied (1977), 429 U.S. 899 , 50 L.Ed.2d 184 , 97 S.Ct. 266 , the supreme court held that appointment of a guardian ad litem was not necessary where the judgment was based on a municipal ordinance violation.

1978Ed. 2d 208 , 90 S. Ct. 263 , the court considered the sufficiency of a complaint for prosecution of a municipal ordinance violation, concluding: * *.