ineffective assistance claim in South Carolina

2025Accordingly, in an ineffective-assistance claim, even when a defendant raises a structural error, "the defendant generally bears the burden to show deficient performance and that the attorney's error 'prejudiced the defense.'" Id. at 287 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ); see also id. at 309 (Alito, J., concurring) ("Weaver's theory conflicts with Strickland because it implies that an attorney's error can be prejudicial even if it 'had no effect,' or only 'some conceivable effect,' on the outcome of his trial.

2025For when a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on 'the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 ).

2025"An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense." Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610-11 , 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)).

2016“An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 , 123 S.Ct. 2527 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 *611 (2003).

2009See Duckson v. State, 355 S.C. 596, 598 , 586 S.E.2d 576, 577 (2003), citing McKnight v. State, 320 S.C. 356 , 465 S.E.2d 352 (1995) (observing that an ineffective assistance claim is premised on the violation of an individual’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel).

2009See Duckson v. State, 355 S.C. 596, 598 , 586 S.E.2d 576, 577 (2003), citing McKnight v. State, 320 S.C. 356 , 465 S.E.2d 352 (1995) (observing that an ineffective assistance claim is premised on the violation of an individual’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel).

2025See 582 U.S. at 301-02 (explaining that "[n]either the reasoning nor the holding" in Weaver "calls into question the Court's precedents determining that certain errors are deemed structural and require reversals because they cause fundamental unfairness" when raised on direct appeal, but stating the "opinion does not address whether the result should be any different if the errors were raised instead in an ineffective-assistance claim on collateral review").

2025The two doctrines are intertwined; for the reasons an error is deemed structural may influence the proper standard used to evaluate an ineffective-assistance claim premised on the failure to object to that error." 582 U.S. at 294.

2025For when a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on 'the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 )); Rivera, 402 S.C. at 249 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he right of an accused to testify in his defense is fundamental to the trial process . . . ."); id. at 249-50 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he error . . . is 'so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'" (last alteration in original) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 289 )); id. at 246, 741 S.E.2d at 705 (disagreeing w

2025For when a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on 'the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 )); Rivera, 402 S.C. at 249 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he right of an accused to testify in his defense is fundamental to the trial process . . . ."); id. at 249-50 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he error . . . is 'so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'" (last alteration in original) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 289 )); id. at 246, 741 S.E.2d at 705 (disagreeing w

2025For when a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on 'the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 )); Rivera, 402 S.C. at 249 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he right of an accused to testify in his defense is fundamental to the trial process . . . ."); id. at 249-50 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he error . . . is 'so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'" (last alteration in original) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 289 )); id. at 246, 741 S.E.2d at 705 (disagreeing w

2025For when a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on 'the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 )); Rivera, 402 S.C. at 249 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he right of an accused to testify in his defense is fundamental to the trial process . . . ."); id. at 249-50 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he error . . . is 'so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'" (last alteration in original) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 289 )); id. at 246, 741 S.E.2d at 705 (disagreeing w

2025For when a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on 'the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 )); Rivera, 402 S.C. at 249 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he right of an accused to testify in his defense is fundamental to the trial process . . . ."); id. at 249-50 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he error . . . is 'so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'" (last alteration in original) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 289 )); id. at 246, 741 S.E.2d at 705 (disagreeing w

2025For when a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on 'the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 )); Rivera, 402 S.C. at 249 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he right of an accused to testify in his defense is fundamental to the trial process . . . ."); id. at 249-50 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he error . . . is 'so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'" (last alteration in original) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 289 )); id. at 246, 741 S.E.2d at 705 (disagreeing w

2025"An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense." Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610-11 , 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)).

2025"An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense." Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610-11 , 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)).

2025For when a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on 'the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 )); Rivera, 402 S.C. at 249 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he right of an accused to testify in his defense is fundamental to the trial process . . . ."); id. at 249-50 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he error . . . is 'so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'" (last alteration in original) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 289 )); id. at 246, 741 S.E.2d at 705 (disagreeing w

2025For when a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on 'the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 )); Rivera, 402 S.C. at 249 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he right of an accused to testify in his defense is fundamental to the trial process . . . ."); id. at 249-50 , 741 S.E.2d at 707 ("[T]he error . . . is 'so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'" (last alteration in original) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 289 )); id. at 246, 741 S.E.2d at 705 (disagreeing w

2024As to deficiency, "the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance." Id. at 687 . "[A] guilty plea cannot be attacked . . . based on inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not 'a reasonably competent attorney' and the advice was not 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'" Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770, 771 (1970)).

2024See Franklin v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 563, 577 , 552 S.E.2d 718, 726 (2001) ("In order to obtain relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a PCR applicant must establish both that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance."); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (stating "there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one").

2024See Franklin v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 563, 577 , 552 S.E.2d 718, 726 (2001) ("In order to obtain relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a PCR applicant must establish both that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance."); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (stating "there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one").

2024"Counsel's performance is accorded a favorable presumption, and a reviewing court proceeds from the rebuttable presumption that counsel 'rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.'" Smith v. State, 386 S.C. 562, 567 , 689 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 ).

2024"Counsel's performance is accorded a favorable presumption, and a reviewing court proceeds from the rebuttable presumption that counsel 'rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.'" Smith v. State, 386 S.C. 562, 567 , 689 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 ).

2023See Smalls, 422 S.C. at 191 , 810 S.E.2d at 845 (stating in the context of an ineffective assistance claim, "for the evidence to be 'overwhelming' such that it categorically precludes a finding of prejudice . . . the evidence must include something conclusive, such as a confession, DNA evidence demonstrating guilt, or a combination of physical and corroborating evidence so strong that the [second prong of] Strickland . . . cannot possibly be met").

2023See Smalls, 422 S.C. at 191 , 810 S.E.2d at 845 (stating in the context of an ineffective assistance claim, "for the evidence to be 'overwhelming' such that it categorically precludes a finding of prejudice . . . the evidence must include something conclusive, such as a confession, DNA evidence demonstrating guilt, or a combination of physical and corroborating evidence so strong that the [second prong of] Strickland . . . cannot possibly be met").

2009See Jackson v. State, 342 S.C. 95, 97 , 535 S.E.2d 926, 927 (2000) (rejecting objective evidence requirement established in Judge and finding Petitioner proved he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance in failing to properly advise the Petitioner that he was pleading to a felony rather than a misdemeanor where Petitioner’s uncontradicted testimony established that he would not have pled had he known the charge was a felony), overruling Judge v. State, 321 S.C. 554 , 562, 471 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1996) (“The second prong of the ineffective assistance inquiry — prejudice—is shown by demon

2009See Jackson v. State, 342 S.C. 95, 97 , 535 S.E.2d 926, 927 (2000) (rejecting objective evidence requirement established in Judge and finding Petitioner proved he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance in failing to properly advise the Petitioner that he was pleading to a felony rather than a misdemeanor where Petitioner’s uncontradicted testimony established that he would not have pled had he known the charge was a felony), overruling Judge v. State, 321 S.C. 554 , 562, 471 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1996) (“The second prong of the ineffective assistance inquiry — prejudice—is shown by demon

2009See Jackson v. State, 342 S.C. 95, 97 , 535 S.E.2d 926, 927 (2000) (rejecting objective evidence requirement established in Judge and finding Petitioner proved he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance in failing to properly advise the Petitioner that he was pleading to a felony rather than a misdemeanor where Petitioner’s uncontradicted testimony established that he would not have pled had he known the charge was a felony), overruling Judge v. State, 321 S.C. 554 , 562, 471 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1996) (“The second prong of the ineffective assistance inquiry — prejudice—is shown by demon

2009See Jackson v. State, 342 S.C. 95, 97 , 535 S.E.2d 926, 927 (2000) (rejecting objective evidence requirement established in Judge and finding Petitioner proved he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance in failing to properly advise the Petitioner that he was pleading to a felony rather than a misdemeanor where Petitioner’s uncontradicted testimony established that he would not have pled had he known the charge was a felony), overruling Judge v. State, 321 S.C. 554 , 562, 471 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1996) (“The second prong of the ineffective assistance inquiry — prejudice—is shown by demon

2009See Morrison, at 365, 101 S.Ct. 665 (noting that the United States Supreme Court's "approach has thus been to identify and then neutralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to assure the defendant the effective assistance of counsel"); see also Davie v. State (holding plea counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate a plea offer and crafting specific relief to remedy the violation). [4] A different prejudice analysis is appropriate where, for example, the ineffective assistance claim is that plea counsel failed to communicate a plea offer.

2009See Duckson v. State, 355 S.C. 596, 598 , 586 S.E.2d 576, 577 (2003), citing McKnight v. State, 320 S.C. 356 , 465 S.E.2d 352 (1995) (observing that an ineffective assistance claim is premised on the violation of an individual’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel).

2009See Duckson v. State, 355 S.C. 596, 598 , 586 S.E.2d 576, 577 (2003), citing McKnight v. State, 320 S.C. 356 , 465 S.E.2d 352 (1995) (observing that an ineffective assistance claim is premised on the violation of an individual’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel).

2009Mere statements by the PCR petitioner that he would have accepted the plea agreement but for counsel’s incompetence are insufficient to show prejudice because they are self-serving and inherently unreliable.”) (citation omitted); see also Smith v. State, 369 S.C. 135, 138 , 631 S.E.2d 260, 261 (2006) (“The defendant’s undisputed testimony that he would not have pled guilty to the charges but for trial counsel’s advice is sufficient to prove that defendant would not have pled guilty.”). *614 Applying these principles to the facts of the instant case, we conclude that Petitioner has proven he wa

2009Mere statements by the PCR petitioner that he would have accepted the plea agreement but for counsel’s incompetence are insufficient to show prejudice because they are self-serving and inherently unreliable.”) (citation omitted); see also Smith v. State, 369 S.C. 135, 138 , 631 S.E.2d 260, 261 (2006) (“The defendant’s undisputed testimony that he would not have pled guilty to the charges but for trial counsel’s advice is sufficient to prove that defendant would not have pled guilty.”). *614 Applying these principles to the facts of the instant case, we conclude that Petitioner has proven he wa