17 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Tyrel L.green2 sentences2023See In re Tyrel L., 2017 ME 212, ¶¶ 6-11 , 172 A.3d 916 (reiterating “the strict procedural requirements applicable to a direct appeal” raising 4 We decline the mother’s invitation to abandon entirely the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance analysis. 2023See In re Tyrel L., 2017 ME 212, ¶¶ 6-11 , 172 A.3d 916 (reiterating “the strict procedural requirements applicable to a direct appeal” raising 4 We decline the mother’s invitation to abandon entirely the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance analysis. | 3 | 3 |
In re M.P.green2 sentences2026Procedure for Raising an Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim [¶15] We further determine that to assert an ineffective-assistance claim in a guardianship or conservatorship proceeding, parties must follow a process similar to that we have articulated for use in termination-of-parental-rights and involuntary-commitment cases, with some modifications. [¶16] First, an individual may raise an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal when “there are no new facts that the [individual] seeks to offer in support of the claim”—in other words, “when the record is sufficiently well developed to p 2026Procedure for Raising an Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim [¶15] We further determine that to assert an ineffective-assistance claim in a guardianship or conservatorship proceeding, parties must follow a process similar to that we have articulated for use in termination-of-parental-rights and involuntary-commitment cases, with some modifications. [¶16] First, an individual may raise an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal when “there are no new facts that the [individual] seeks to offer in support of the claim”—in other words, “when the record is sufficiently well developed to p | 2 | 6 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2023Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim... to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one”). ili. 2006See Pottios v. State, 1997 ME 234, ¶¶ 9-10 , 704 A.2d 1221, 1223-24 ; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (holding that “there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one”). | 2 | 3 |
In re Aliyah M.green2 sentences2024See also, e.g., In re Children of Meagan C., 2019 ME 129, ¶ 22 , 214 A.3d 9 ; In re Aliyah M., 2016 20 ME 106, ¶ 8, 144 A.3d 50 . 35 given time frame or, indeed, at all.21 It is difficult to protect a parent’s due process rights while denying an ineffective-assistance claim solely on the ground that the parent failed to secure affidavits from witnesses. 2017DISCUSSION [¶ 6] In his appeal, the father directly raises a claim that his counsel for the termination proceeding was ineffective. 3 Because we have not “frequently addressed issues of ineffective assistance of counsel in eases of termination of parental rights,” In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, ¶ 38 , 169 A.3d 914 (Alexander, J., dissenting), we first write to address the father’s ineffective assistance claim and reiterate “the strict procedural requirements applicable to a direct appeal.” In re Aliyah M., 2016 ME 106, ¶ 10 , 144 A.3d 50 . [¶ 7] “We have held that there are two ways a parent ca | 2 | 3 |
In re B.C.green2 sentences2021See id. 2021See id. | 2 | 2 |
In re Children of Kacee S.green2 sentences2026We also determine that we can assess R.’s claim on direct appeal because the basis for the claim is apparent from the record and R. does not rely on facts extrinsic to the record in making his argument. [¶20] In keeping with our role as an appellate court, “our task is to determine whether [R.] has made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to justify a remand to the trial court for a hearing on the claim.” In re Children of Kacee S., 2021 ME 36, ¶ 21 , 253 A.3d 1063 ; see also In re Aliyah M., 2016 ME 106, ¶¶ 12-13 , 144 A.3d 50 (explaining that “when a party m 2024See In re Children of Kacee S., 2021 ME 36, ¶ 16 , 253 A.3d 1063 . | 1 | 2 |
In Re Children of Destiny H.green1 sentence2026See In re Children of Destiny H., 2024 ME 66, ¶ 41 , 322 A.3d 1183 (quotation marks omitted). 6 [¶18] Lastly, we address the time in which one must assert an ineffective-assistance claim arising from guardianship or conservatorship proceedings. | 1 | 1 |
In re Henry B.green1 sentence2026Procedure for Raising an Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim [¶15] We further determine that to assert an ineffective-assistance claim in a guardianship or conservatorship proceeding, parties must follow a process similar to that we have articulated for use in termination-of-parental-rights and involuntary-commitment cases, with some modifications. [¶16] First, an individual may raise an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal when “there are no new facts that the [individual] seeks to offer in support of the claim”—in other words, “when the record is sufficiently well developed to p | 1 | 1 |
In re Henry B.green1 sentence2026Procedure for Raising an Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim [¶15] We further determine that to assert an ineffective-assistance claim in a guardianship or conservatorship proceeding, parties must follow a process similar to that we have articulated for use in termination-of-parental-rights and involuntary-commitment cases, with some modifications. [¶16] First, an individual may raise an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal when “there are no new facts that the [individual] seeks to offer in support of the claim”—in other words, “when the record is sufficiently well developed to p | 1 | 1 |
In re Children of Meagan C.green1 sentence2024See also, e.g., In re Children of Meagan C., 2019 ME 129, ¶ 22 , 214 A.3d 9 ; In re Aliyah M., 2016 20 ME 106, ¶ 8, 144 A.3d 50 . 35 given time frame or, indeed, at all.21 It is difficult to protect a parent’s due process rights while denying an ineffective-assistance claim solely on the ground that the parent failed to secure affidavits from witnesses. | 1 | 1 |
Ryan Brown v. Kenneth Romanowskigreen1 sentence2023Cf. Brown v. Romanowski, 845 F.3d 703, 716 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that the accused’s failure to assert the right to a speedy trial 12 See, e.g., State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (“[T]he right of the accused to have a speedy trial may be waived by his own conduct. | 1 | 1 |
In re Alexandria C.green2 sentences2019In re Children of Jeremy A. , 2018 ME 82 , ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602 (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted); see In re Alexandria C. , 2016 ME 182 , ¶¶ 18-19, 152 A.3d 617 . [¶24] The trial court did not err by concluding that the mother failed to meet her burden to show that her counsel at the consent hearing was deficient; therefore, we need not reach the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance analysis. 2019In re Children of Jeremy A. , 2018 ME 82 , ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602 (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted); see In re Alexandria C. , 2016 ME 182 , ¶¶ 18-19, 152 A.3d 617 . [¶24] The trial court did not err by concluding that the mother failed to meet her burden to show that her counsel at the consent hearing was deficient; therefore, we need not reach the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance analysis. | 1 | 1 |
Whitmore v. Stategreen1 sentence2006With respect to the second prong of the analysis, we have noted that “[t]o establish that he has been deprived of a substantial ground of defense, [the petitioner] must demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance likely affected the outcome of the trial.” Whit-more v. State, 670 A.2d 394, 396 (Me.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Pottios v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Pottios v. State, 1997 ME 234, ¶¶ 9-10 , 704 A.2d 1221, 1223-24 ; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (holding that “there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one”). 2006See Pottios v. State, 1997 ME 234, ¶¶ 9-10 , 704 A.2d 1221, 1223-24 ; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (holding that “there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one”). | 1 | 1 |
Robert Rickenbacker, Relator-Appellant v. The Warden, Auburn Correctional Facility, and the People of the State of New Yorkgreen2 sentences1997See Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.1976) (refraining from modification of the applicable ineffective assistance rule when doing so would not alter the result of the ease). 1997See Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.1976) (refraining from modification of the applicable ineffective assistance rule when doing so would not alter the result of the case). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jordangreen1 sentence1997See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 659 A.2d 849, 851 (Me.1995) (we will not consider an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal “unless the record reveals, beyond the possibility for rational disagreement, that the defendant received inadequate representation”). [¶ 4] Today we make clear that we will not consider a claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal; henceforth, we will consider such a contention only after we issue a certificate of probable cause following a hearing on a post-conviction petition. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Saferiangreen2 sentences1993Lang v. Murch, 438 A.2d 914, 915 (Me.1981) (citing Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 , 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1974)). 1993Lang v. Murch, 438 A.2d 914, 915 (Me.1981) (citing Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 , 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1974)). | 1 | 1 |
Lang v. Murchgreen1 sentence1993Lang v. Murch, 438 A.2d 914, 915 (Me.1981) (citing Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 , 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1974)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Martinez v. Ryan
green
2 sentences2017The Court said that when an appellate system—such as Maine’s— “makes the initial-review collateral proceeding a prisoner’s one and only appeal as to an ineffective-assistance claim,”4 id. (quotation marks omitted), that circumstance “may justify an exception to the constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings,” id. at 9 .5 [¶7] However, contrary to Reese’s assertion that “[i]n light of Martinez, McEachern must be reinterpreted to comport with due process and allow for the state review of ineffective post-conviction counsel,” the Martinez Court was careful to 2017The Court said that when an appellate system—such as Maine’s— “makes the initial-review collateral proceeding a prisoner’s one and only appeal as to an ineffective-assistance claim,”4 id. (quotation marks omitted), that circumstance “may justify an exception to the constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings,” id. at 9 .5 [¶7] However, contrary to Reese’s assertion that “[i]n light of Martinez, McEachern must be reinterpreted to comport with due process and allow for the state review of ineffective post-conviction counsel,” the Martinez Court was careful to | 2 | 2017–2017 |
In re Child of Kenneth S.
neutral
1 sentence2024The Department responds that the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion when it denied the mother’s motion for relief from the judgment because the mother did not demonstrate how the result would have been different but for these alleged deficiencies. [¶34] Although the trial court addressed only the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance analysis, see, e.g., In re Child of Kenneth S., 2022 ME 14, ¶ 31 , 269 A.3d 242 , we take the opportunity to point out that the record reveals troubling points in the mother’s representation leading up to the termination hearing. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Kopelow
green
2 sentences2023Cf. Brown v. Romanowski, 845 F.3d 703, 716 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that the accused’s failure to assert the right to a speedy trial 12 See, e.g., State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (“[T]he right of the accused to have a speedy trial may be waived by his own conduct. 2023Cf. Brown v. Romanowski, 845 F.3d 703, 716 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that the accused’s failure to assert the right to a speedy trial 12 See, e.g., State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (“[T]he right of the accused to have a speedy trial may be waived by his own conduct. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In re Children of Jeremy A.
green
2 sentences2019In re Children of Jeremy A. , 2018 ME 82 , ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602 (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted); see In re Alexandria C. , 2016 ME 182 , ¶¶ 18-19, 152 A.3d 617 . [¶24] The trial court did not err by concluding that the mother failed to meet her burden to show that her counsel at the consent hearing was deficient; therefore, we need not reach the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance analysis. 2019In re Children of Jeremy A. , 2018 ME 82 , ¶ 21, 187 A.3d 602 (alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted); see In re Alexandria C. , 2016 ME 182 , ¶¶ 18-19, 152 A.3d 617 . [¶24] The trial court did not err by concluding that the mother failed to meet her burden to show that her counsel at the consent hearing was deficient; therefore, we need not reach the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance analysis. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Nichols
green
2 sentences2019Procedure for Raising an Ineffective Assistance Claim [¶13] Because Petgrave’s claim is barred from both avenues in which we would ordinarily consider assertions of error occurring in a criminal 9 proceeding—i.e., from post-conviction review by statute and from direct appeal by the Nichols rule—we today recognize an exception to the broad rule articulated in Nichols and hold that in the specific context of a discretionary appeal taken from a probation revocation judgment, a defendant may assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel using the procedure described below.3 The procedure we 2019Procedure for Raising an Ineffective Assistance Claim [¶13] Because Petgrave’s claim is barred from both avenues in which we would ordinarily consider assertions of error occurring in a criminal 9 proceeding—i.e., from post-conviction review by statute and from direct appeal by the Nichols rule—we today recognize an exception to the broad rule articulated in Nichols and hold that in the specific context of a discretionary appeal taken from a probation revocation judgment, a defendant may assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel using the procedure described below.3 The procedure we | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Mark A. Amero v. Maria C. Amero
neutral
1 sentence2019Amero v. Amero , 2016 ME 150 , ¶ 13, 149 A.3d 535 (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State of Maine v. Timothy M. Hunt
green
2 sentences2019Procedure for Raising an Ineffective Assistance Claim [¶13] Because Petgrave's claim is barred from both avenues in which we would ordinarily consider assertions of error occurring in a criminal proceeding-i.e., from post-conviction review by statute and from direct appeal by the Nichols rule-we today recognize an exception to the broad rule articulated in Nichols and hold that in the specific context of a discretionary appeal taken from a probation revocation judgment, a defendant may assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel using the procedure described below. 3 The procedure we a 2019Procedure for Raising an Ineffective Assistance Claim [¶13] Because Petgrave's claim is barred from both avenues in which we would ordinarily consider assertions of error occurring in a criminal proceeding-i.e., from post-conviction review by statute and from direct appeal by the Nichols rule-we today recognize an exception to the broad rule articulated in Nichols and hold that in the specific context of a discretionary appeal taken from a probation revocation judgment, a defendant may assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel using the procedure described below. 3 The procedure we a | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Amero v. Amero
neutral
1 sentence2019Amero v. Amero , 2016 ME 150 , ¶ 13, 149 A.3d 535 (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In re Evelyn A.
green
2 sentences2017DISCUSSION [¶ 6] In his appeal, the father directly raises a claim that his counsel for the termination proceeding was ineffective. 3 Because we have not “frequently addressed issues of ineffective assistance of counsel in eases of termination of parental rights,” In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, ¶ 38 , 169 A.3d 914 (Alexander, J., dissenting), we first write to address the father’s ineffective assistance claim and reiterate “the strict procedural requirements applicable to a direct appeal.” In re Aliyah M., 2016 ME 106, ¶ 10 , 144 A.3d 50 . [¶ 7] “We have held that there are two ways a parent ca 2017DISCUSSION [¶ 6] In his appeal, the father directly raises a claim that his counsel for the termination proceeding was ineffective. 3 Because we have not “frequently addressed issues of ineffective assistance of counsel in eases of termination of parental rights,” In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, ¶ 38 , 169 A.3d 914 (Alexander, J., dissenting), we first write to address the father’s ineffective assistance claim and reiterate “the strict procedural requirements applicable to a direct appeal.” In re Aliyah M., 2016 ME 106, ¶ 10 , 144 A.3d 50 . [¶ 7] “We have held that there are two ways a parent ca | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Ali
green
2 sentences2017The precise question here is whether ineffective assistance in an initial-review collateral proceeding on a claim of ineffective assistance at trial may provide cause for a 4 Our precedent establishes that “[w]e do not consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal; such claims will only be considered after a certificate of probable cause has been issued following a hearing on a post-conviction petition.” Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 20 , 32 A.3d 1019 . 5 In Maine, a petitioner who wishes to be represented in a post-conviction proceeding may retain counsel, or may have counsel ap 2017The precise question here is whether ineffective assistance in an initial-review collateral proceeding on a claim of ineffective assistance at trial may provide cause for a 4 Our precedent establishes that “[w]e do not consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal; such claims will only be considered after a certificate of probable cause has been issued following a hearing on a post-conviction petition.” Ali, 2011 ME 122, ¶ 20 , 32 A.3d 1019 . 5 In Maine, a petitioner who wishes to be represented in a post-conviction proceeding may retain counsel, or may have counsel ap | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.