ineffective assistance claim in Nevada

2022See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252 , 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) (stating that an ineffective-assistance claim may excuse a procedural default only if that claim is not itself procedurally defaulted). 2Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

2022See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252 , 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) (stating that an ineffective-assistance claim may excuse a procedural default only if that claim is not itself procedurally defaulted). 2Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

2016Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686 , 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).

2016Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686 , 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).

2018If a petitioner who seeks to excuse a procedural default based on ineffective assistance of counsel makes the showing of prejudice required by Strickland , he also has met the actual prejudice showing required to excuse the procedural default. 16 See, e.g., Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 , 462-63 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that because the Supreme Court has held in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), that the materiality prong of a *1100 Brady 17 violation parallels the prejudice showing required to excuse a procedural default, the prejudice prong of th

2018If a petitioner who seeks to excuse a procedural default based on ineffective assistance of counsel makes the showing of prejudice required by Strickland, he also has met the actual prejudice showing SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 26 (0) )947A e. required to excuse the procedural default. 16 See, e.g., Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 462-63 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that because the Supreme Court has held in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), that the materiality prong of a Bradyn violation parallels the prejudice showing required to excuse a procedural default, the prejudice prong of the ine

2018Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248 , 252, 71 P.3d 503 , 506 (2003) ; accord Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 , 452-54, 120 S.Ct. 1587 , 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000) (holding that ineffective-assistance claim asserted in federal habeas petition as cause for procedural default of another claim may itself be subject to procedural default that can be excused only by satisfying cause-and-prejudice standard with respect to ineffective-assistance claim).

2018Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248 , 252, 71 P.3d 503 , 506 (2003) ; accord Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 , 452-54, 120 S.Ct. 1587 , 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000) (holding that ineffective-assistance claim asserted in federal habeas petition as cause for procedural default of another claim may itself be subject to procedural default that can be excused only by satisfying cause-and-prejudice standard with respect to ineffective-assistance claim).

2018Cir. 1998) ; see Armstrong v. Kemna, 590 F.3d 592 , 606 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing inconsistent decisions on the issue by different Eighth Circuit panels), but we are not persuaded that there is a useful distinction to be made.

2018Cir. 1998); see Armstrong v. Kemna, 590 F.3d 592, 606 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing inconsistent decisions on the issue by different Eighth Circuit panels), but we are not persuaded that there is a useful distinction to be made. n Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 18 This court previously observed in Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 358 , 871 P.2d 944, 949-50 (1994), that the two prejudice showings are "separate and distinct" but also suggested that when "both prejudice requirements happen to address the same concern," then the same showing will satisfy them.

2018If a petitioner who seeks to excuse a procedural default based on ineffective assistance of counsel makes the showing of prejudice required by Strickland , he also has met the actual prejudice showing required to excuse the procedural default. 16 See, e.g., Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 , 462-63 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that because the Supreme Court has held in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), that the materiality prong of a *1100 Brady 17 violation parallels the prejudice showing required to excuse a procedural default, the prejudice prong of th

2018If a petitioner who seeks to excuse a procedural default based on ineffective assistance of counsel makes the showing of prejudice required by Strickland , he also has met the actual prejudice showing required to excuse the procedural default. 16 See, e.g., Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 , 462-63 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that because the Supreme Court has held in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), that the materiality prong of a *1100 Brady 17 violation parallels the prejudice showing required to excuse a procedural default, the prejudice prong of th

2020Second, appellant did not include the letter in his appendix and therefore we must assume that it would support the district court's conclusion that counsel was not ineffective in failing to further challenge the remedy afforded by the trial court for its late disclosure.6 See Riggins v. State, 107 Nev. 178, 182 , 808 P.2d 535, 538 (1991) ("[T]he missing portions of the record are presumed to support the 4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 5Appellant was represented by Laurie Trotter before the preliminary hearing, Wayne Pederson at the preliminary hearing, and Brad Johnston at trial.

2018Cir. 1998); see Armstrong v. Kemna, 590 F.3d 592, 606 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing inconsistent decisions on the issue by different Eighth Circuit panels), but we are not persuaded that there is a useful distinction to be made. n Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 18 This court previously observed in Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 358 , 871 P.2d 944, 949-50 (1994), that the two prejudice showings are "separate and distinct" but also suggested that when "both prejudice requirements happen to address the same concern," then the same showing will satisfy them.

2018Cir. 1998); see Armstrong v. Kemna, 590 F.3d 592, 606 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing inconsistent decisions on the issue by different Eighth Circuit panels), but we are not persuaded that there is a useful distinction to be made. n Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 18 This court previously observed in Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 358 , 871 P.2d 944, 949-50 (1994), that the two prejudice showings are "separate and distinct" but also suggested that when "both prejudice requirements happen to address the same concern," then the same showing will satisfy them.

2018Cir. 1998); see Armstrong v. Kemna, 590 F.3d 592, 606 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing inconsistent decisions on the issue by different Eighth Circuit panels), but we are not persuaded that there is a useful distinction to be made. n Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 18 This court previously observed in Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 358 , 871 P.2d 944, 949-50 (1994), that the two prejudice showings are "separate and distinct" but also suggested that when "both prejudice requirements happen to address the same concern," then the same showing will satisfy them.

2015When an ineffective-assistance claim is based upon the failure to file a motion to suppress, "the prejudice prong must be established by a showing that the claim was meritorious and that there was a reasonable likelihood that the exclusion of the evidence would have changed the result of a trial." Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 990 , 923 P.2d 1102, 1109 (1996).

2015When an ineffective-assistance claim is based upon the failure to file a motion to suppress, "the prejudice prong must be established by a showing that the claim was meritorious and that there was a reasonable likelihood that the exclusion of the evidence would have changed the result of a trial." Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 990 , 923 P.2d 1102, 1109 (1996).

2018See Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35, 49 (1st Cir. 2006) ("In theory, Strickland attacks (including its own prejudice prong) go to the separate 'cause' as opposed to the 'prejudice' standards for overcoming default."); see also Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377 (explaining that to establish "cause" to allow federal habeas review of trial-counsel claim that was defaulted in state court based on allegation of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, petitioner "must establish that his counsel in the state postconviction proceeding was ineffective" by establishing both prongs of the Strickland test)

2018See Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35, 49 (1st Cir. 2006) ("In theory, Strickland attacks (including its own prejudice prong) go to the separate 'cause' as opposed to the 'prejudice' standards for overcoming default."); see also Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377 (explaining that to establish "cause" to allow federal habeas review of trial-counsel claim that was defaulted in state court based on allegation of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, petitioner "must establish that his counsel in the state postconviction proceeding was ineffective" by establishing both prongs of the Strickland test)

2018See 582 U.S. at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 1910 ("Thus, in the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to 'automatic reversal' regardless of the error's actual 'effect on the outcome.' " (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) ) ); id. at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 1911-12 (listing cases and stating "[t]he errors in those cases necessitated automatic reversal after they were preserved and then raised on direct appeal"); id. at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 1912 ("The reaso

2018See 582 U.S. at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 1910 ("Thus, in the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to 'automatic reversal' regardless of the error's actual 'effect on the outcome.' " (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) ) ); id. at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 1911-12 (listing cases and stating "[t]he errors in those cases necessitated automatic reversal after they were preserved and then raised on direct appeal"); id. at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 1912 ("The reaso

2018If a petitioner who seeks to excuse a procedural default based on ineffective assistance of counsel makes the showing of prejudice required by Strickland , he also has met the actual prejudice showing required to excuse the procedural default. 16 See, e.g., Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 , 462-63 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that because the Supreme Court has held in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), that the materiality prong of a *1100 Brady 17 violation parallels the prejudice showing required to excuse a procedural default, the prejudice prong of th

2018If a petitioner who seeks to excuse a procedural default based on ineffective assistance of counsel makes the showing of prejudice required by Strickland , he also has met the actual prejudice showing required to excuse the procedural default. 16 See, e.g., Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 , 462-63 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that because the Supreme Court has held in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), that the materiality prong of a *1100 Brady 17 violation parallels the prejudice showing required to excuse a procedural default, the prejudice prong of th

2018Other courts have suggested that actual prejudice requires a greater showing than that required for the prejudice prong of an ineffective-assistance claim, see, e.g., United States v. Dale, 140 F.3d 1054 , 1056 n.3 (D.C.

2018Head, 206 F.3d 1106 , 1147 n.86 (11th Cir. 2000) (same); accord State v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 589, 599 , 81 P.3d 1, 8 (2003) (following Strickler and equating Brady materiality with the prejudice required to excuse a procedural default under NRS 34.810). 18 1 0ther courts have suggested that actual prejudice requires a -6 greater showing than that required for the prejudice prong of an ineffective-assistance claim, see, e.g., United States v. Dale, 140 F.3d 1054 , 1056 n.3 (D.C.

2020Cf. Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298 , 468 P.2d 338 , 341 1 Weaver further observed that the trial court was deprived of the opportunity to cure its error when a petitioner first challenges a courtroom closure in an ineffective-assistance claim. 137 S. Ct. at 1912 . 3 (1970) ("If a judgment or order of a trial court reaches the right result, although it is based on an incorrect ground, the judgment or order will be affirmed on appeal.").

2018See 582 U.S. at , 137 S. Ct. at 1910 ("Thus, in the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to 'automatic reversal' regardless of the error's actual 'effect on the outcome." (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)); id. at , 137 S. Ct. at 1911-12 (listing SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 8 ;,• 4 Here, Jeremias fails to establish that the exclusion of his family for a small portion of voir dire prejudiced him or rendered his trial unfair.

2018If a petitioner who seeks to excuse a procedural default based on ineffective assistance of counsel makes the showing of prejudice required by Strickland , he also has met the actual prejudice showing required to excuse the procedural default. 16 See, e.g., Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 , 462-63 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that because the Supreme Court has held in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), that the materiality prong of a *1100 Brady 17 violation parallels the prejudice showing required to excuse a procedural default, the prejudice prong of th

2018If a petitioner who seeks to excuse a procedural default based on ineffective assistance of counsel makes the showing of prejudice required by Strickland, he also has met the actual prejudice showing SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 26 (0) )947A e. required to excuse the procedural default. 16 See, e.g., Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 462-63 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that because the Supreme Court has held in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), that the materiality prong of a Bradyn violation parallels the prejudice showing required to excuse a procedural default, the prejudice prong of the ine

2016We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider the ineffective- assistance claim on the ground that it should be raised in a postconviction petition.' See Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 622 , 28 P.3d 498, 507 (2001) (holding that claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel are properly raised in a timely, postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus).

2016We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider the ineffective- assistance claim on the ground that it should be raised in a postconviction petition.' See Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 622 , 28 P.3d 498, 507 (2001) (holding that claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel are properly raised in a timely, postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus).

2020Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988 , 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996).

2017See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988 , 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996).

2018See Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675 , 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978) (recognizing that counsel is not ineffective for failing to file a futile motion); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (explaining that when an ineffective- assistance claim is based on counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the prejudice prong requires a showing that the "Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence").

1996Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). 4 We conclude that the same analysis applies when the ineffective assistance claim is based upon counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress a confession.

2017See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673 , 748 P.3d 3 , 6 (1987) (declining to consider claims not supported by cogent argument or relevant legal authority).

2016Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673 , 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987).

2016Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 235 , 112 P.3d 1070 , 1077 (2005).

2013See Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 120 (1999) (concluding that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim failed as good cause because the ineffective-assistance claim was itself procedurally defaulted); Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 ("[T]o constitute adequate cause, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim itself must not be procedurally defaulted."); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 ; Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 869-70 , 34 P.3d at 526 .

2016Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 235 , 112 P.3d 1070 , 1077 (2005).

2013See Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 120 (1999) (concluding that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim failed as good cause because the ineffective-assistance claim was itself procedurally defaulted); Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 ("[T]o constitute adequate cause, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim itself must not be procedurally defaulted."); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 ; Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 869-70 , 34 P.3d at 526 .

2022See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) (stating that an ineffective-assistance claim may excuse a procedural default only if that claim is not itself procedurally defaulted). 2Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

2022See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252 , 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) (stating that an ineffective-assistance claim may excuse a procedural default only if that claim is not itself procedurally defaulted). 2Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

2022See Reno, 283 P.3d at 1210 ("Habeas corpus counsel, like appellate counsel, 'performs properly and competently when he or she exercises discretion and presents only the strongest claims instead of every conceivable claim.'" (quoting In re Robbins, 959 P.2d 311, 338 (Cal. 1998))).

2022Op. 83 at 13, 501 P.3d at 949-50; see also Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 647, 28 P.3d 498, 523 (2001) (explaining that petitioner's appellate briefs must address ineffective-assistance claims with specificity, not just "in a pro forma, perfunctory way" or with a "conclusory, catchall" statement that counsel provided ineffective assistance), overruled on other grounds by Lisle, 131 Nev. at 366 n.5, 351 P.3d at 732 n.5.

2022Op. 83 at 13, 501 P.3d at 949-50; see also Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 647 , 28 P.3d 498, 523 (2001) (explaining that petitioner's appellate briefs must address ineffective-assistance claims with specificity, not just "in a pro forma, perfunctory way" or with a "conclusory, catchall" statement that counsel provided ineffective assistance), overruled on other grounds by Lisle, 131 Nev. at 366 n.5, 351 P.3d at 732 n.5.

2022See Reno, 283 P.3d at 1210 (stating that "the mere omission of a claim developed by new counsel does not raise a presumption that prior habeas corpus counsel was incompetent" (quotation marks omitted)).

2022See Reno, 283 P.3d at 1210 (indicating that allegations of ineffective assistance by prior counsel in omitting claims were belied by the record where those claims were actually raised on appeal or in a prior habeas petition).