ineffective assistance claim in Florida

2026Instead, the court addressed the deficiency element of an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2025See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one . . .

2025Counsel reasonably avoided presenting a “double-edged sword.” See Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 437 (Fla. 2004) (“An ineffective assistance claim does not arise from the failure to present mitigation evidence where that evidence presents a double-edged sword.”).

2021Douglas v. State, 141 So. 3d 107, 123 (Fla. 2012); see also Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 437 (Fla. 2004) (“An ineffective assistance claim does not arise from the failure to present mitigation evidence where that - 12 - evidence presents a double-edged sword.”).

2023See Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1182 (Fla. 2001) (noting that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a defendant to demonstrate deficient performance and that such deficient performance prejudiced the defense, and “because the Strickland standard requires establishment of both prongs, when a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong.”) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984)) (“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to

2004See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ("[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one."); see also Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d at 914 (explaining that court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient where defendant fails to establish prejudice prong).

2012See Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 32 (Fla.2005).

2012See Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 32 (Fla.2005).

2023See Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1182 (Fla. 2001) (noting that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a defendant to demonstrate deficient performance and that such deficient performance prejudiced the defense, and “because the Strickland standard requires establishment of both prongs, when a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong.”) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984)) (“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to

2008See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ("[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one."); Downs v. State, 740 So.2d 506 , 518 n. 19 (Fla.1999) (finding no need to address prejudice prong where defendant failed to establish deficient performance element). 2.

2019Smith v. State, 998 So. 2d 516 , 522– 23 (Fla. 2008).

2011However, “[o]n rare occasions, the appellate courts make an exception to this rule when the ineffectiveness is obvious on the face of the appellate record, the prejudice caused by the conduct is indisputable, and a tactical explanation for the conduct is inconceivable.” Id.; see also Smith v. State, 998 So.2d 516, 523 (Fla.2008) (concluding an appellate court may address an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal only in “the rare case[] where both prongs of Strickland — the error and the prejudice-are manifest in the record”).

2019Id.

2007However, Preston "cannot overcome a procedural default by recasting the argument in the guise of an ineffective assistance claim." Id. (citing Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1067 (Fla.2000)); see also Thompson v. State, 796 So.2d 511 , 515 n. 5 (Fla.2001) ("[Conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel] are legally and facially insufficient to warrant relief under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 [, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] (1984))." Therefore, Preston is not entitled to relief on any of these claims.

2006Moreover, trial counsel's failure to object to this isolated ambiguous answer by the victim's husband cannot be deemed an omission that is "outside the broad range of competent performance under prevailing professional standards." Gore, 846 So.2d at 467 . [10] Although Jones asserts that Dr. Lipman and John Bowden's testimony support his allegations, neither of these witnesses testified regarding any medication given to Jones. [11] The Legislature has since eliminated the defense of voluntary intoxication.

2005Thus, for the defendant to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the alleged deficiency "must be shown to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings that confidence in the outcome is undermined." Peterka v. State, 890 So.2d 219, 228 (Fla.2004) (quoting Gore v. State, 846 So.2d 461, 467 (Fla.2003); see also Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986); (stating that to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's deficiency "so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is underm

2014As this Court has previously noted, habeas corpus “is not a second appeal and cannot be used to litigate or relitigate issues which could have been . . . or were raised on direct appeal.” Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1992); see also Taylor v. State, 3 So. 3d 986, 1000 (Fla. 2009) (holding that a petitioner “cannot relitigate the merits of an issue through a habeas petition or use - 76 - an ineffective assistance claim to argue the merits of claims that either were or should have been raised below”).

2014As this Court has previously noted, habeas corpus “is not a second appeal and cannot be used to litigate or relitigate issues which could have been ... or were raised on direct appeal.” Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So.2d 8, 10 (Fla.1992); see also Taylor v. State, 3 So.3d 986, 1000 (Fla.2009) (holding that a petitioner “cannot relitigate the merits of an issue through a habeas petition or use an ineffective assistance claim to argue the merits of claims that either were or should have been raised below”).

2012See Lott v. State, 931 So.2d 807, 816 (Fla.2006) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that ‘conclusory allegations are insufficient to warrant relief on an ineffective assistance claim.”) (quoting Wright v. State, 857 So.2d 861, 877 (Fla.2008)).

2006See Lott v. State, 931 So.2d 807, 816 (Fla.2006) ("[W]e have repeatedly held that `conclusory allegations are insufficient to warrant relief' on an ineffective assistance claim.") (quoting Wright v. State, 857 So.2d 861, 877 (Fla.2003)).

2005See Gore, 846 So.2d at 468 ; Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033-34 (Fla.1999).

2004See Freeman v. State, 858 So.2d 319, 323 (Fla.2003); Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999).

2018See Maxwell v. Wainwright , 490 So.2d 927 , 932 (Fla. 1986).

2005Thus, for the defendant to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the alleged deficiency "must be shown to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings that confidence in the outcome is undermined." Peterka v. State, 890 So.2d 219, 228 (Fla.2004) (quoting Gore v. State, 846 So.2d 461, 467 (Fla.2003); see also Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986); (stating that to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's deficiency "so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is underm

2023See Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1182 (Fla. 2001) (noting that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a defendant to demonstrate deficient performance and that such deficient performance prejudiced the defense, and “because the Strickland standard requires establishment of both prongs, when a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong.”) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984)) (“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to

2007See Waterhouse v. State, 792 So.2d 1176, 1189 (Fla.2001) (affirming the trial court's denial of an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance claim involving the failure of defendant's counsel to impeach a State witness, because the claim was conclusively refuted by the record).

2020See State v. Lucas, 183 So. 3d 1027, 1032 (Fla. 2016) (“There is no question that when the ineffective assistance claim alleges trial counsel should have presented a fact witness, such witness must be named and his or her availability attested to.”); see also Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 196 (Fla. 2007) (“To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call certain witnesses, a defendant must allege in the motion ‘what testimony defense counsel could have elicited from [the] witnesses and how defense counsel’s failure to call, interview, or present the witnes

2016See Booker v. State, 969 So.2d 186 (Fla.2007).

2019“In order to sufficiently undermine the court's confidence in the outcome, a claimant ‘must rely on more than mere speculation.’” Id. (quoting Derrick v. State, 983 So.2d 443, 462 (Fla. 2008)).

2009See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“[Tjhere is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”); see also Derrick v. State, 983 So.2d 443, 461 (Fla.2008).

2018To prove the first prong, “[t]he defendant must allege specific facts that, when considering the totality of the circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted by the record and that demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which is detrimental to the defendant.” Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 968 (Fla. 2006) (citing LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 239 (Fla. 1998)). “[T]he two-prong test for determining the validity of an ineffective assistance claim requires the defendant to demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

2018To prove the first prong, “[t]he defendant must allege specific facts that, when considering the totality of the circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted by the record and that demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which is detrimental to the defendant.” Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 968 (Fla. 2006) (citing LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 239 (Fla. 1998)). “[T]he two-prong test for determining the validity of an ineffective assistance claim requires the defendant to demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

2018To prove the first prong, “[t]he defendant must allege specific facts that, when considering the totality of the circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted by the record and that demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which is detrimental to the defendant.” Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 968 (Fla. 2006) (citing LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 239 (Fla. 1998)). “[T]he two-prong test for determining the validity of an ineffective assistance claim requires the defendant to demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

2018To prove the first prong, “[t]he defendant must allege specific facts that, when considering the totality of the circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted by the record and that demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which is detrimental to the defendant.” Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 968 (Fla. 2006) (citing LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 239 (Fla. 1998)). “[T]he two-prong test for determining the validity of an ineffective assistance claim requires the defendant to demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

2018To prove the first prong, “[t]he defendant must allege specific facts that, when considering the totality of the circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted by the record and that demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which is detrimental to the defendant.” Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 968 (Fla. 2006) (citing LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 239 (Fla. 1998)). “[T]he two-prong test for determining the validity of an ineffective assistance claim requires the defendant to demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

2018To prove the first prong, “[t]he defendant must allege specific facts that, when considering the totality of the circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted by the record and that demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which is detrimental to the defendant.” Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 968 (Fla. 2006) (citing LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 239 (Fla. 1998)). “[T]he two-prong test for determining the validity of an ineffective assistance claim requires the defendant to demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

2018Compare, e.g., Johnson v. State, 120 So. 3d 629, 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (holding that a trial court's fundamental error in relying on an impermissible sentencing factor could be raised in a rule 3.850 ineffective assistance motion, even though it could have been but was not raised on direct appeal, because "the fact that a claim of trial court error was or could have been raised on direct appeal does not bar a claim of ineffective assistance that arises from the same facts"), with Hughes v. State, 22 So. 3d 132, 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (stating, in dictum, that an ineffective assistance claim s

2013Id. at 631 (relying on the analogous proposition that failing to object to improper reasons given in support of an upward departure sentence may support postconviction relief).

2016See Wingate v. State, 729 So.2d 492, 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (finding an ineffective assistance claim' not properly raised on direct appeal in light of the enactment of section 924.051, Florida Statutes); Seccia v. State, 720 So.2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 764 So.2d 573 , 574 (Fla.2000) (declining to address ineffective assistance of counsel issue “because to do so would effectively nullify the preservation requirement contained in section 924.051”).

2016See Wingate v. State, 729 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (finding an ineffective assistance claim not properly raised on direct appeal in light of the enactment of section 924.051, Florida Statutes); Seccia v. State, 720 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 764 So. 2d 573 , 574 (Fla. 2000) (declining to address ineffective assistance of counsel issue “because to do so would effectively nullify the preservation requirement contained in section 924.051”).

2014As this Court has previously noted, habeas corpus “is not a second appeal and cannot be used to litigate or relitigate issues which could have been . . . or were raised on direct appeal.” Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1992); see also Taylor v. State, 3 So. 3d 986, 1000 (Fla. 2009) (holding that a petitioner “cannot relitigate the merits of an issue through a habeas petition or use - 76 - an ineffective assistance claim to argue the merits of claims that either were or should have been raised below”).

2014As this Court has previously noted, habeas corpus “is not a second appeal and cannot be used to litigate or relitigate issues which could have been ... or were raised on direct appeal.” Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So.2d 8, 10 (Fla.1992); see also Taylor v. State, 3 So.3d 986, 1000 (Fla.2009) (holding that a petitioner “cannot relitigate the merits of an issue through a habeas petition or use an ineffective assistance claim to argue the merits of claims that either were or should have been raised below”).

2013Following an evidentiary hearing, the court below granted Medina’s motion for post-conviction relief and vacated his convictions and sentences in both cases, finding that Medina’s counsel was ineffective (1) because “there is no record evidence from the probation [violation] proceeding, such as a colloquy by the judge, that the defendant was made aware of his right to testify, and that he himself made the requisite knowing and intelligent decision to waive his right to testify,” and (2) because “the record is completely devoid of the issue [of the potential benefits and risks of testifying, pa

2006See, e.g., Monlyn v. State, 894 So.2d 832, 838 (Fla. 2004) (holding that "[t]he trial court's finding, based on trial counsel's unswerving testimony, that counsel always advised clients of this right [to testify at the penalty phase] and that he did so in this case, is supported by competent, substantial evidence"); Brown, 894 So.2d at 153 (holding that "the court's discussion with Brown and his subsequent written waiver are more than sufficient"); Peterka, 890 So.2d at 235 (holding that, where defense counsel "advised Peterka not to testify because Peterka's version of events were being intro

2012See Lott v. State, 931 So.2d 807, 816 (Fla.2006) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that ‘conclusory allegations are insufficient to warrant relief on an ineffective assistance claim.”) (quoting Wright v. State, 857 So.2d 861, 877 (Fla.2008)).

2006See Lott v. State, 931 So.2d 807, 816 (Fla.2006) ("[W]e have repeatedly held that `conclusory allegations are insufficient to warrant relief' on an ineffective assistance claim.") (quoting Wright v. State, 857 So.2d 861, 877 (Fla.2003)).

2018To prove the first prong, “[t]he defendant must allege specific facts that, when considering the totality of the circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted by the record and that demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which is detrimental to the defendant.” Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 968 (Fla. 2006) (citing LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 239 (Fla. 1998)). “[T]he two-prong test for determining the validity of an ineffective assistance claim requires the defendant to demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

2018To prove the first prong, “[t]he defendant must allege specific facts that, when considering the totality of the circumstances, are not conclusively rebutted by the record and that demonstrate a deficiency on the part of counsel which is detrimental to the defendant.” Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 968 (Fla. 2006) (citing LeCroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 239 (Fla. 1998)). “[T]he two-prong test for determining the validity of an ineffective assistance claim requires the defendant to demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

2014Cottle ⅛ three-part test for establishing a prima facie ineffectiveness claim was whether “(1) counsel failed to communicate a plea offer or misinformed defendant concerning the penalty faced; (2) defendant would have accepted the plea offer but for the inadequate notice; and (3) acceptance of the State’s plea offer would have resulted in a lesser sentence.” Cottle, 733 So.2d at 967 .

2013See id. at 967, 969.