corrective instruction in Washington

2021The failure to object and request a corrective instruction constitutes waiver “unless it can be said that the misconduct was so flagrant, persistent and ill-intentioned, or its wrong so obvious and evil results so certain that the trial court’s instruction to disregard it could not neutralize its effect.” Nelson v. Martinson, 52 Wn.2d 684, 689 , 328 P.2d 703 (1958).

2021The failure to object and request a corrective instruction constitutes waiver “unless it can be said that the misconduct was so flagrant, persistent and ill-intentioned, or its wrong so obvious and evil results so certain that the trial court’s instruction to disregard it could not neutralize its effect.” Nelson v. Martinson, 52 Wn.2d 684, 689 , 328 P.2d 703 (1958).

1981Nelson v. Martinson, 52 Wn.2d 684 , 328 P.2d 703 (1958); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wn.2d 23 , 351 P.2d 153 (1960).

1981Nelson v. Martinson, 52 Wn.2d 684 , 328 P.2d 703 (1958); Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wn.2d 23 , 351 P.2d 153 (1960).

1971Unless the misconduct of counsel in his opening statement is so flagrant, persistent and ill-intentioned, or the wrong inflicted thereby so obvious, and the prejudice resulting therefrom so marked and enduring, that corrective instructions or admonitions clearly could not neutralize their effect, any objection to such misconduct of counsel or error in the opening statement is waived by failure to make adequate timely objection and request for a corrective instruction or admonition. [Citations.] (Italics ours.) State v. Morris, 70 Wn.2d 27, 33 , 422 P.2d 27 (1966).

1971Unless the misconduct of counsel in his opening statement is so flagrant, persistent and ill-intentioned, or the wrong inflicted thereby so obvious, and the prejudice resulting therefrom so marked and enduring, that corrective instructions or admonitions clearly could not neutralize their effect, any objection to such misconduct of counsel or error in the opening statement is waived by failure to make adequate timely objection and request for a corrective instruction or admonition. [Citations.] (Italics ours.) State v. Morris, 70 Wn.2d 27, 33 , 422 P.2d 27 (1966).

1974State v. Whetstone, 30 Wn.2d 301 , 191 P.2d 818 (1948); State v. Van Luven, 24 Wn.2d 241 , 163 P.2d 600 (1945).

1974State v. Whetstone, 30 Wn.2d 301 , 191 P.2d 818 (1948); State v. Van Luven, 24 Wn.2d 241 , 163 P.2d 600 (1945).

1974State v. Whetstone, 30 Wn.2d 301 , 191 P.2d 818 (1948); State v. Van Luven, 24 Wn.2d 241 , 163 P.2d 600 (1945).

1974State v. Whetstone, 30 Wn.2d 301 , 191 P.2d 818 (1948); State v. Van Luven, 24 Wn.2d 241 , 163 P.2d 600 (1945).

1958See Johnson v. Howard, 45 Wn. (2d) 433, 275 P. (2d) 736 (1954); McUne v. Fuqua, 42 Wn. (2d) 65, 253 P. (2d) 632 (1953); Ralston v. Vessey, 43 Wn. (2d) 76, 260 P. (2d) 324 (1953).

1953McUne v. Fuqua, 42 Wn. (2d) 65, 79, 253 P. (2d) 632 (1953).

2025Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 764 .

2023But when “a jury’s question to the court indicates an erroneous understanding of the applicable law, it is incumbent upon the trial court to issue a corrective instruction.” Id. 5 No. 83762-1-I/6 Here, the trial court accurately instructed the jury that “[d]welling means any building or structure that is used or ordinarily used by a person for lodging.” See RCW 9A.04.110(7) (“ ‘Dwelling’ means any building or structure, though movable or temporary, or a portion thereof, which is used or ordinarily used by a person for lodging.”).

2011State v. Davenport, 100 Wash.2d 757, 764 , 675 P.2d 1213 (1984).

2011State v. Davenport, 100 Wash.2d 757, 764 , 675 P.2d 1213 (1984).

1978State v. Brown, 74 Wn.2d 799 , 447 P.2d 82 (1968); State v. Green, 70 Wn.2d 955 , 425 P.2d 913 (1967); State v. Webster, 20 Wn.

1978State v. Brown, 74 Wn.2d 799 , 447 P.2d 82 (1968); State v. Green, 70 Wn.2d 955 , 425 P.2d 913 (1967); State v. Webster, 20 Wn.

1978State v. Brown, 74 Wn.2d 799 , 447 P.2d 82 (1968); State v. Green, 70 Wn.2d 955 , 425 P.2d 913 (1967); State v. Webster, 20 Wn.

1978State v. Brown, 74 Wn.2d 799 , 447 P.2d 82 (1968); State v. Green, 70 Wn.2d 955 , 425 P.2d 913 (1967); State v. Webster, 20 Wn.

1978State v. Brown, 74 Wn.2d 799 , 447 P.2d 82 (1968); State v. Green, 70 Wn.2d 955 , 425 P.2d 913 (1967); State v. Webster, 20 Wn.

1971In State v. La Porte, 58 Wn.2d 816 , 365 P.2d 24 (1961), we recognized an exception to the general rule and held that error can be reversible in the absence of a request for a corrective jury instruction, where the testimony objected to is so prejudicial that an instruction would not cure its effect.

1971In State v. La Porte, 58 Wn.2d 816 , 365 P.2d 24 (1961), we recognized an exception to the general rule and held that error can be reversible in the absence of a request for a corrective jury instruction, where the testimony objected to is so prejudicial that an instruction would not cure its effect.

1970State v. Huson, 73 Wn.2d 660 , 440 P.2d 192 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1096 (1969); State v. Berkins, 2 Wn.

1970State v. Huson, 73 Wn.2d 660 , 440 P.2d 192 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1096 (1969); State v. Berkins, 2 Wn.

1970State v. Huson, 73 Wn.2d 660 , 440 P.2d 192 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1096 (1969); State v. Berkins, 2 Wn.

1970State v. Huson, 73 Wn.2d 660 , 440 P.2d 192 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1096 (1969); State v. Berkins, 2 Wn.

1968Similarly, in State v. Suleski, 67 Wn.2d 45, 50 , 406 P.2d 613 (1965), we said: The basic issue presented in this case is not whether defense counsel tacitly waived his objections or his motions for mistrial, or whether the trial court’s instructions effectively struck the burglary tools charge, and its evi-dentiary derivatives, from the minds of the jury.

1968Similarly, in State v. Suleski, 67 Wn.2d 45, 50 , 406 P.2d 613 (1965), we said: The basic issue presented in this case is not whether defense counsel tacitly waived his objections or his motions for mistrial, or whether the trial court’s instructions effectively struck the burglary tools charge, and its evi-dentiary derivatives, from the minds of the jury.

1958See Johnson v. Howard, 45 Wn. (2d) 433, 275 P. (2d) 736 (1954); McUne v. Fuqua, 42 Wn. (2d) 65, 253 P. (2d) 632 (1953); Ralston v. Vessey, 43 Wn. (2d) 76, 260 P. (2d) 324 (1953).