corrective instruction in District of Columbia

2009See (Darryl) Smith v. United States, 665 A.2d 962, 967 (D.C.1995) (''[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion when prejudice can be cured by an instruction to the jury, and a corrective instruction is offered but declined.''). .

2009See ( Darryl) Smith v. United States, 665 A.2d 962, 967 (D.C. 1995) ("[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion when prejudice can be cured by an instruction to the jury, and a corrective instruction is offered but declined."). [46] In the case of Pérez, who did take the stand, any perceived sting from the prosecutor's remark would not have applied to him.

2007D.C. 364, 365, 343 F.2d 233, 234 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 , 85 S.Ct. 1353 , 14 L.Ed.2d 276 (1965) (statement by witness that he and defendant “did time in the penitentiary together” held insufficient to require a mistrial; defense counsel declined trial judge’s offer of a corrective instruction).

1992Hardy v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 364 , 365, 343 F.2d 233, 234 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 , 85 S.Ct. 1353 , 14 L.Ed.2d 276 (1965).

2007Since defense counsel rejected the trial court’s offer to give such an instruction, which could have mitigated any likely prejudice, we view with some skepticism his present claim that the court erred by admitting the evidence. “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion when prejudice can be cured by an instruction to the jury, and a corrective instruction is offered but de-dined.” Smith v. United States, 665 A.2d 962, 967 (D.C.1995) (citing Goins v. United States, 617 A.2d 956, 959 (D.C.1992)).

1995Id. at 959 .

2024Just before declaring a mistrial, the judge said she had “crafted an instruction that the Court believes will cure the problem” and “offered . . . what the Court believes is an appropriate corrective instruction to fix this mess.” The court never walked that assessment back, but instead declared a mistrial on the erroneous basis that the defense refused to accept, or “work with,” “that instruction.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 510, n.28 (in assessing “manifest necessity” ruling, “[i]f the record reveals that the trial judge has failed to exercise the ‘sound discretion’ entrusted to him, the reason

2009A. Standard of Review “Where no objection is made to an instruction, we review for plain error.” Williams v. United States, 858 A.2d 984, 991-92 (D.C.2004) (citation omitted).

1999We recognize that there are times when, “as a matter of strategy, defense counsel may decide that it is more effective simply to let a potentially prejudicial remark pass, rather than drawing attention to it further by requesting a curative instruction.” Clark v. United States, 639 A.2d 76, 80 (D.C.1993).

1994Swanson v. United States, 602 A.2d 1102, 1107 (D.C.1992). [6] Neither party called Adkins to the trial court's attention. [7] Safeway claims that "a lack of any mention of a permanent or chronic condition in Dr. Quraishi's medical records" should be interpreted as a disavowal during discovery that such testimony would be elicited.

1994See Cobb v. Standard Drug Co., 453 A.2d 110, 111-12 (D.C.1982) (appellant responsible for presenting record on appeal); Jefferson v. United States, 631 A.2d 13, 15-16 (D.C.1993) (appellant did not establish racial makeup of venire or jury). [4] In fact, even one early case allowed the judge to give a corrective instruction after a single inadvertent mention of the defendant's insurance in an automobile liability case, "[i]n view of the extent of plaintiff's injuries, the small amount of the verdict, as well as the other circumstances in this case." Knuckles v. Weathersby, 63 App.D.C. 276, 277

1994See Cobb v. Standard Drug Co., 453 A.2d 110, 111-12 (D.C.1982) (appellant responsible for presenting record on appeal); Jefferson v. United States, 631 A.2d 13, 15-16 (D.C.1993) (appellant did not establish racial makeup of venire or jury). [4] In fact, even one early case allowed the judge to give a corrective instruction after a single inadvertent mention of the defendant's insurance in an automobile liability case, "[i]n view of the extent of plaintiff's injuries, the small amount of the verdict, as well as the other circumstances in this case." Knuckles v. Weathersby, 63 App.D.C. 276, 277

1994In fact, even one early case allowed the judge to give a corrective instruction after a single inadvertent mention of the defendant's insurance in an automobile liability case, “[i]n view of the extent of plaintiff’s injuries, the small amount of the verdict, as well as the other circumstances in this case.” Knuckles v. Weathersby, 63 App.D.C. 276, 277 , 72 F.2d 69, 70 (1934) (per curiam). .

1994In fact, even one early case allowed the judge to give a corrective instruction after a single inadvertent mention of the defendant's insurance in an automobile liability case, “[i]n view of the extent of plaintiff’s injuries, the small amount of the verdict, as well as the other circumstances in this case.” Knuckles v. Weathersby, 63 App.D.C. 276, 277 , 72 F.2d 69, 70 (1934) (per curiam). .

1993“It is for the jury to decide whether a witness is truthful, and an attorney may not interject personal evaluations and opinions as to a witness’ veracity.” Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 130 (D.C.1980).

1988See Weeda v. District of Columbia, 521 A.2d 1156, 1163 (D.C.1987) (jurors presumed to have understood and followed the court’s instructions); Olsen v. French, 456 A.2d 869 (Me.1983) (since it must be presumed jury followed judge’s instructions to disregard question violative of in limine order, refusal to order mistrial sua sponte not abuse of discretion).

1988See Weeda v. District of Columbia, 521 A.2d 1156, 1163 (D.C.1987) (jurors presumed to have understood and followed the court's instructions); Olsen v. French, 456 A.2d 869 (Me.1983) (since it must be presumed jury followed judge's instructions to disregard question violative of in limine order, refusal to order mistrial sua sponte not abuse of discretion.