Marshall rule in Washington

2003In doing so, the court determined that summary judgment dismissing Marshall's claim on statute of limitations grounds was appropriate, reasoning: "`When a party has given clear answers to unambiguous [deposition] questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot thereafter *706 create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously given clear testimony.'" Marshall, 56 Wash.App. at 185 , 782 P.2d 1107 .

2003In doing so, the court determined that summary judgment dismissing Marshall's claim on statute of limitations grounds was appropriate, reasoning: "`When a party has given clear answers to unambiguous [deposition] questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot thereafter *706 create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously given clear testimony.'" Marshall, 56 Wash.App. at 185 , 782 P.2d 1107 .

2016In re Det. ofMarshall, 156 Wn.2d 150 , 125 P.3d 111 (2005).

2007He admitted that his acts in making the 1989 phone calls to E.C. were a “relapse” and that he “w[ould] always have that potential to possibly reoffend.” RP at 1221, 1209. f 16 Based on the foregoing, “an objective person knowing the factual circumstances of [Mr. Paschke’s] history and mental condition would have a reasonable apprehension that [his] act[s] [in making the obscene phone calls (in 1989)] would cause harm of a sexually violent nature.” Marshall, 156 Wn.2d at 158 .

2016In re Det. ofMarshall, 156 Wn.2d 150 , 125 P.3d 111 (2005).

2007He admitted that his acts in making the 1989 phone calls to E.C. were a "relapse" and that he "w[ould] always have that potential to possibly reoffend." RP at 1221, 1209. ¶ 16 Based on the foregoing: "[A]n objective person knowing the factual circumstances of [Mr. Paschke's] history and mental condition would have a reasonable apprehension that [his] act[s] [in making the obscene phone calls (in 1989)] would cause harm of a sexually violent nature." Marshall, 156 Wash.2d at 158 , 125 P.3d 111 .

2009Id. [24] The hearing officer also found the issues regarding the conflict of interest ranged from how costs of the litigation would be allocated, how global settlement proposals would be dealt with if one client wanted to settle and others did not, and how the different agendas of Mrs. Harris and Mrs. Wormack would be reconciled. [25] Mr. Marshall first complains that the bar failed to allege specific facts concerning what the conflict of interest was.

2009Id.

2005Shortly before the commitment trial was to begin, the trial court granted Mr. Marshall’s motion to exclude the evaluation and testimony by this psychologist in light of In re Detention of Williams, 147 Wn.2d 476 , 55 P.3d 597 (2002), where this court held that CR 35 may not be used to compel a mental examination during pretrial discovery in civil commitment proceedings under chapter 71.09 RCW. ¶7 The State then retained Dr. Amy Phenix, who has been licensed as a clinical psychologist since 1992 in her home state of California.

2005Shortly before the commitment trial was to begin, the trial court granted Mr. Marshall's motion to exclude the evaluation and testimony by this psychologist in light of In re Detention of Williams, 147 Wash.2d 476 , 55 P.3d 597 (2002), where this court held that CR 35 may not be used to compel a mental examination during pretrial discovery in civil commitment proceedings under chapter 71.09 RCW. ¶ 7 The State then retained Dr. Amy Phenix, who has been licensed as a clinical psychologist since 1992 in her home state of California.

2005Shortly before the commitment trial was to begin, the trial court granted Mr. Marshall’s motion to exclude the evaluation and testimony by this psychologist in light of In re Detention of Williams, 147 Wn.2d 476 , 55 P.3d 597 (2002), where this court held that CR 35 may not be used to compel a mental examination during pretrial discovery in civil commitment proceedings under chapter 71.09 RCW. ¶7 The State then retained Dr. Amy Phenix, who has been licensed as a clinical psychologist since 1992 in her home state of California.

2005Shortly before the commitment trial was to begin, the trial court granted Mr. Marshall's motion to exclude the evaluation and testimony by this psychologist in light of In re Detention of Williams, 147 Wash.2d 476 , 55 P.3d 597 (2002), where this court held that CR 35 may not be used to compel a mental examination during pretrial discovery in civil commitment proceedings under chapter 71.09 RCW. ¶ 7 The State then retained Dr. Amy Phenix, who has been licensed as a clinical psychologist since 1992 in her home state of California.

2004The court relied on In re Dependency of Q.L.M., 105 Wn.

2004The court relied on Dependency of Q.L.M., 105 Wash. App. 532 , 20 P.3d 465 (2001).

2003Safeco, 63 Wn.

2003Safeco, 63 Wn.

2001Dr. Lewis, the same defense expert who testified at Marshall's hearing to withdraw guilty plea, also concluded Marshall did not understand the choice between life and death saying, "Just as he was not competent to plead guilty when he did (note he shortly thereafter changed his mind) so he is not now competent to waive his appeal." Id., App. C at 5.

2001Dr. Lewis, the same defense expert who testified at Marshall’s hearing to withdraw guilty plea, also concluded Marshall did not understand the choice between life and death, saying: “Just as he was not competent to plead guilty when he did (note he shortly thereafter changed his mind) so he is not now competent to waive his appeal.” Id., App. C at 5.

2000In Duckworth v. Langland, 95 Wn.

2000In Duckworth v. Langland, 95 Wn.

2024App. 116 , 225 P.3d 1028 (2010), where that court applied the Marshall inquiry by declining to require a factual hearing, declining to find facts by clear cogent and convincing evidence, and instead applied the legal test to already established facts.

2024App. 116 , 225 P.3d 1028 (2010), where that court applied the Marshall inquiry by declining to require a factual hearing, declining to find facts by clear cogent and convincing evidence, and instead applied the legal test to already established facts.

2023We 6 No. 81659-4-I/7 reviewed Marshall’s claim and noted, “ ‘A defendant may challenge a search or seizure only if he or she has a personal Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the area searched or the property seized.’ ” Id. at 21 (quoting State v. Goucher, 124 Wn.2d 778, 787 , 881 P.2d 210 (1994)).

2023We 6 No. 81659-4-I/7 reviewed Marshall’s claim and noted, “ ‘A defendant may challenge a search or seizure only if he or she has a personal Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the area searched or the property seized.’ ” Id. at 21 (quoting State v. Goucher, 124 Wn.2d 778, 787 , 881 P.2d 210 (1994)).

2023We 6 No. 81659-4-I/7 reviewed Marshall’s claim and noted, “ ‘A defendant may challenge a search or seizure only if he or she has a personal Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the area searched or the property seized.’ ” Id. at 21 (quoting State v. Goucher, 124 Wn.2d 778, 787 , 881 P.2d 210 (1994)).

2021Id. at 912-13 .

2018Taylor v. Bell, 185 Wn.

2018Taylor v. Bell, 185 Wn.

2004The court relied on Dependency of Q.L.M., 105 Wash. App. 532 , 20 P.3d 465 (2001).

2000NOTES [1] Marshall v. AC & S, Inc., 56 Wash.App. 181 , 782 P.2d 1107 (1989). [2] For ease of reference, James Berry will be referred to as "Berry," and those suing on his behalf will be referred to as plaintiffs or appellants. [3] Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 235, 248-49 , 744 P.2d 605 (1987), discussed infra. [4] Marshall v. AC & S, Inc., 56 Wash.App. 181 , 782 P.2d 1107 (1989). [5] Appellants also contend that the Marshall rule only applies where the affidavit contradicts earlier deposition testimony, not vice versa.

2000NOTES [1] Marshall v. AC & S, Inc., 56 Wash.App. 181 , 782 P.2d 1107 (1989). [2] For ease of reference, James Berry will be referred to as "Berry," and those suing on his behalf will be referred to as plaintiffs or appellants. [3] Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 235, 248-49 , 744 P.2d 605 (1987), discussed infra. [4] Marshall v. AC & S, Inc., 56 Wash.App. 181 , 782 P.2d 1107 (1989). [5] Appellants also contend that the Marshall rule only applies where the affidavit contradicts earlier deposition testimony, not vice versa.

2000In Duckworth v. Langland, 95 Wash.App. 1, 8 , 988 P.2d 967 (1998), review denied, 138 Wash.2d 1002 , 984 P.2d 1033 (1999) this court declined to apply the rule, stating: Duckworth's declaration is arguably inconsistent with his pleadings, but his statements are not directly contradictory.

2000In Duckworth v. Langland, 95 Wash.App. 1, 8 , 988 P.2d 967 (1998), review denied, 138 Wash.2d 1002 , 984 P.2d 1033 (1999) this court declined to apply the rule, stating: Duckworth's declaration is arguably inconsistent with his pleadings, but his statements are not directly contradictory.