Marshall analysis in Texas

2021But see Beasley v. Burns, 7 S.W.3d 768 , 769–70 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) (declining to extend the Marshall rule to summary judgment proceedings).

2021But see Beasley v. Burns, 7 S.W.3d 768 , 769–70 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) (declining to extend the Marshall rule to summary judgment proceedings).

2013The entirety of Appellants’ response to these arguments consists of a complaint that Marshall failed to specify the deficient elements of Appellants’ negligence claim, a global assertion that Appellants produced probative evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to each negligence element, and a contention that Appellants’ evidence establishes that the Marshall defendants “failed to uphold their duty to ISG and its partners to provide competent accounting services to the Partnership from the beginning of their professional relationship in 2004.” A contract for professional accounti

2013The entirety of Appellants’ response to these arguments consists of a complaint that Marshall failed to specify the deficient elements of Appellants’ negligence claim, a global assertion that Appellants produced probative evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to each negligence element, and a contention that Appellants’ evidence establishes that the Marshall defendants “failed to uphold their duty to ISG and its partners to provide competent accounting services to the Partnership from the beginning of their professional relationship in 2004.” A contract for professional accounti

2013Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493 , 494 n.1 (Tex. 1991) and 15 Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Mktg., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 170, 185 (Tex. App. – Waco 1987, writ denied) (certified public accountants owe such duty to their clients).

2013Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493 , 494 n. 1 (Tex.1991) and Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Mktg., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 170, 185 (Tex.App.-Waco 1987, writ denied) (certified public accountants owe such duty to their clients).

2013See Grant Thornton LLP, 314 S.W.3d at 920 .

2013See Grant Thornton LLP, 314 S.W.3d at 920 .

2012See id. ; McBride , 838 S.W.2d at 250 ; Quinones , 592 S.W.2d at 940–41; Abbott v. State , 196 S.W.3d 334, 346 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d).

2012See id.; McBride, 838 S.W.2d at 250 ; Quinones, 592 S.W.2d at 940–41; Abbott v. State, 196 S.W.3d 334, 346 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d).

2010See Hawkins v. State , 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim.

2000We also note that in Young v. State , 8 S.W.3d 656, 665-666 (Tex. Crim.

2000We also note that in Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656, 665-666 (Tex.Crim.App.2000), the court of criminal appeals recently held that: with or without an agreed recommendation of punishment by the State, a valid plea of guilty or nolo contendere "waives” or forfeits the right to appeal a claim of error only when the judgment of guilt was rendered independent of, and is not supported by, the error.

2023We presume, however, that the trial court considered Eureka’s fifth amended petition because the trial court held a hearing on Marshall’s motion concerning the petition and the trial court’s summary-judgment order recited that the court considered “the competent summary judgment evidence, the pleadings on file, and the relevant law.”7 See Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Cessor, 668 S.W.3d 611 , 624 (Tex. 2023) (instructing that leave to amend pleading should be presumed in certain circumstances); Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 276 (presuming that leave was granted for late-filed amended petition because j

2016Id. at 444.

2015The Marshall defendants drafted and submitted a judg- 6 400 S.W.2d 893, 897-898 (Tex. 1966). ment, which the trial court signed on September 8.

2015Enti- 7 866 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. 1993). tled "Final Judgment", it recited the nonsuit of Taylor 8 12 S.W.3d at 891 . and ordered that John take nothing against the Marshall We first consider whether the judgment was final. defendants.

2015Appellees cite this Court’s decision in In re O’Quinn, which held that a foundation designated as a will beneficiary could intervene in probate proceedings over the objection of the alleged common-law wife of the decedent who argued that the foundation lacked a sufficient justiciable interest. 355 S.W.3d 857, 861 (TexApp.— Houston -2011, orig. proceeding).

2015Timeliness Finally, Stern argues that the Marshall defendants’ “declaratory judgment action, filed five weeks after Vickie nonsuited her claims and almost five months into the trial, were not timely filed since Vickie had an absolute right to her nonsuit,” He argues that Vickie timely objected to the new counterclaims, and proved that the new pleadings substantively changed the nature of the case and trial, were prejudicial and a surprise.” A court must allow pleadings to be amended during trial “when the presentation of the merits will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to sat

2015See Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d at 658 (holding that trial amendment -adding new cause of ac *522 tion was not prejudicial on its face because it involved the same subject matter and trial court could have reasonably believed that the trial amendment did not impair defendant’s ability to present defense).

2013See Chon Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. 2005).

2012See id. ; McBride , 838 S.W.2d at 250 ; Quinones , 592 S.W.2d at 940–41; Abbott v. State , 196 S.W.3d 334, 346 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d).

2011See Walling v. Metcalfe , 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993) (“We have held repeatedly that the courts of appeals may not reverse the judgment of a trial court for a reason not raised in a point of error.”). [3] Marshall also asserts “[Witnesses] were precluded by the Judge, from giving the jury testimony on the damages resulting from the construction .” (Emphasis added.) [4] In addition to the evidence mentioned above, Marshall contends the trial court erred in striking some of his testimony.

2007Compare Acevedo , 131 S.W.3d at 105 n.3 (stating that a summary judgment hearing is considered a “trial” for purposes of amended pleadings under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63; therefore, the court could “conceive of no reason it would not be considered a ‘trial’ for purposes of the Marshall rule”) with Beasley v. Burns , 7 S.W.3d 768, 770 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) (stating that the Marshall rule does not apply to summary judgment). 7: Appellee prayed for “judgment for the amount due, with interest”; for interest at the maximum rate per annum allowed by law, whether contractual

2007Compare Acevedo , 131 S.W.3d at 105 n.3 (stating that a summary judgment hearing is considered a “trial” for purposes of amended pleadings under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63; therefore, the court could “conceive of no reason it would not be considered a ‘trial’ for purposes of the Marshall rule”) with Beasley v. Burns , 7 S.W.3d 768, 770 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) (stating that the Marshall rule does not apply to summary judgment). 7: Appellee prayed for “judgment for the amount due, with interest”; for interest at the maximum rate per annum allowed by law, whether contractual

2006See Linton v. State , 15 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd).