12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1944–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
C. v. C. v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2015(See, e.g., C.V.C., supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 920 [“Here petitioners were accorded a judicial hearing before the child was removed but the court erred to their prejudice by restricting its review.” (italics added)]; Marten v. Thies (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 161, 169 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 57 ] [“The court in C. | 1 | 1 |
Marten v. Thiesgreen2 sentences2015(See, e.g., C.V.C., supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 920 [“Here petitioners were accorded a judicial hearing before the child was removed but the court erred to their prejudice by restricting its review.” (italics added)]; Marten v. Thies (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 161, 169 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 57 ] [“The court in C. 2015(See, e.g., C.V.C., supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 920 [“Here petitioners were accorded a judicial hearing before the child was removed but the court erred to their prejudice by restricting its review.” (italics added)]; Marten v. Thies (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 161, 169 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 57 ] [“The court in C. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maikhiogreen2 sentences2015(See People v. Maikhio (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1074, 1093, fn. 8 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 74 , 253 P.3d 247 ].) Our reference to the Controller proving at trial “the significant facts underlying its preliminary injunction request” is simply meant to illustrate one way in which our “reason to believe” standard may be satisfied — this reference is not meant to circumscribe in any way the evidence that may be presented at trial; obviously, if the Controller does not prove at trial these facts, the trial court is not obligated, pursuant to this example of one way in which our “reason to believe” standard may b 2015(See People v. Maikhio (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1074, 1093, fn. 8 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 74 , 253 P.3d 247 ].) Our reference to the Controller proving at trial “the significant facts underlying its preliminary injunction request” is simply meant to illustrate one way in which our “reason to believe” standard may be satisfied — this reference is not meant to circumscribe in any way the evidence that may be presented at trial; obviously, if the Controller does not prove at trial these facts, the trial court is not obligated, pursuant to this example of one way in which our “reason to believe” standard may b | 1 | 1 |
People v. Marshallgreen2 sentences2014(People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 27-28 (Marshall).) (We refer to the above four factors as the Marshall factors.) Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a severance motion is based on the record as it existed at the time of the ruling. 2014(People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 27-28 (Marshall).) (We refer to the above four factors as the Marshall factors.) Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a severance motion is based on the record as it existed at the time of the ruling. | 1 | 1 |
Calderon v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014(See Calderon v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 933, 939 [applying the Marshall factors to evaluate propriety of joinder].) “The pertinent factors are these: (1) would the evidence of the crimes be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) are some of the charges unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) has a weak case been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the total evidence on the joined charges may alter the outcome of some or all of the charged offenses; and (4) is any one of the charges a death penalty offense, or does joinder of the charge 2014(See Calderon v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 933, 939 [applying the Marshall factors to evaluate propriety of joinder].) “The pertinent factors are these: (1) would the evidence of the crimes be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) are some of the charges unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) has a weak case been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the total evidence on the joined charges may alter the outcome of some or all of the charged offenses; and (4) is any one of the charges a death penalty offense, or does joinder of the charge | 1 | 1 |
People v. Zapiengreen2 sentences2008Whether the evidence was sufficient to have required the trial court to give the accomplice instructions sua sponte presents a closer question. “ ‘ “[W]henever the testimony given upon the trial is sufficient to warrant the conclusion upon the part of the jury that a witness implicating a defendant was an accomplice,” ’ the trial court must instruct the jury, sua sponte, to determine whether the witness was an accomplice.” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 982 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122 , 846 P.2d 704 ].) As defendant notes, even the prosecutor disbelieved Marshall’s claim that he had not been 2008Whether the evidence was sufficient to have required the trial court to give the accomplice instructions sua sponte presents a closer question. “ ‘ “[W]henever the testimony given upon the trial is sufficient to warrant the conclusion upon the part of the jury that a witness implicating a defendant was an accomplice,” ’ the trial court must instruct the jury, sua sponte, to determine whether the witness was an accomplice.” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 982 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122 , 846 P.2d 704 ].) As defendant notes, even the prosecutor disbelieved Marshall’s claim that he had not been | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stankewitzgreen2 sentences2008Nonetheless, mere “presence at the scene of a crime or failure to prevent its commission [is not] sufficient to establish aiding and abetting.” (People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ].) Here, there was no physical evidence to support the conclusion that Marshall aided and abetted the assault upon and murder of April Holley, unlike the hair and semen evidence that implicated defendant and Brown, and neither of Marshall’s statements—the one he made to Vicky Lopez or the one overheard by Kim Fleeman—incriminated Marshall in the murder. 2008Nonetheless, mere “presence at the scene of a crime or failure to prevent its commission [is not] sufficient to establish aiding and abetting.” (People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ].) Here, there was no physical evidence to support the conclusion that Marshall aided and abetted the assault upon and murder of April Holley, unlike the hair and semen evidence that implicated defendant and Brown, and neither of Marshall’s statements—the one he made to Vicky Lopez or the one overheard by Kim Fleeman—incriminated Marshall in the murder. | 1 | 1 |
Glage v. Hawes Firearms Co.green2 sentences1992(See, e.g., Glage v. Hawes Firearms Co. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 314, 321-326, 328 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 430 ] [applied Marshall analysis, and reversed judgment where there was a dramatic shift in jury votes after discussion of the word “preponderance”].) The majority itself believes timing of the extraneous information is a factor to consider. 1992(See, e.g., Glage v. Hawes Firearms Co. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 314, 321-326, 328 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 430 ] [applied Marshall analysis, and reversed judgment where there was a dramatic shift in jury votes after discussion of the word “preponderance”].) The majority itself believes timing of the extraneous information is a factor to consider. | 1 | 1 |
Serrano v. Priestgreen2 sentences1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that 1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that | 1 | 1 |
Boreta Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Controlgreen2 sentences1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that 1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that | 1 | 1 |
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green2 sentences1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that 1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that | 1 | 1 |
California v. LaRuegreen1 sentence1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that | 1 | 1 |
Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that 1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that | 1 | 1 |
Robins v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that 1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that | 1 | 1 |
People v. Crawfordgreen2 sentences1968(People v. Marshall, supra, 48 Cal.2d 394, 400 ; People v. Crawford (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 838, 840 [ 252 P.2d 963 ].) Under the Marshall test it is also correct to say that the two counts in the accusatory pleading relate to the same act. 1968(People v. Marshall, supra, 48 Cal.2d 394, 400 ; People v. Crawford (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 838, 840 [ 252 P.2d 963 ].) Under the Marshall test it is also correct to say that the two counts in the accusatory pleading relate to the same act. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ayala
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 271 .) This is because even in cases where the potential for prejudice is stronger—that is, where evidence of a prior conviction for a specific offense is admitted over the defendant’s objection—the evidence is not deemed prejudicial if the record “points convincingly to guilt.” (People v. Allen (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 924, 935 .) And here, though Marshall’s defense was that the prosecution had the wrong person, the evidence of his guilt was strong. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Allen
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 271 .) This is because even in cases where the potential for prejudice is stronger—that is, where evidence of a prior conviction for a specific offense is admitted over the defendant’s objection—the evidence is not deemed prejudicial if the record “points convincingly to guilt.” (People v. Allen (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 924, 935 .) And here, though Marshall’s defense was that the prosecution had the wrong person, the evidence of his guilt was strong. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Cyndie C. v. Geraldine B.
green
1 sentence2015C. discovered that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process requires that prospective adoptive parents be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before the termination of status and removal of the child from the preadoptive placement except in extraordinary circumstances.” (italics added)].) Because J.J. was not removed from Marshall’s home until more than three months after the ex parte hearing and after the court had conducted a hearing on Marshall’s objection, Thompson and Johanesen’s failure to provide Marshall with notice of the June 28 ex parte hearing did not violate Mar | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Comptroller of Treasury v. PHH Corp.
green
2 sentences2015(Id. at p. 1323.) We find Lincoln Bank persuasive.6 6 The debate about whether the Marshall standard is properly based on the legal theory of “implied consent” to search or on the theory of “reasonable expectation of privacy,” is 9 But we find even more persuasive the decision in PHH Corp., supra, 717 A.2d 950 [ 123 Md.App. 214 ]. 2015(Id. at p. 1323.) We find Lincoln Bank persuasive.6 6 The debate about whether the Marshall standard is properly based on the legal theory of “implied consent” to search or on the theory of “reasonable expectation of privacy,” is 9 But we find even more persuasive the decision in PHH Corp., supra, 717 A.2d 950 [ 123 Md.App. 214 ]. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. McKinnon
green
2 sentences2014(People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 630 .) Finally, even if a trial court has not abused its discretion in denying a pretrial severance motion, the judgment must be reversed if the defendant shows joinder resulted in gross unfairness amounting to a denial of due process. 2014(People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 630 .) Finally, even if a trial court has not abused its discretion in denying a pretrial severance motion, the judgment must be reversed if the defendant shows joinder resulted in gross unfairness amounting to a denial of due process. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Garrett
green
2 sentences2002The language is thus dicta and, although entitled to due consideration, is not binding on us. ( People v. Garrett (1998) 67 Cal. App.4th 1419, 1422 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 .) Further, in the 75 years since Marshall was decided, that analysis has not been applied by any court in a published opinion as the basis for declining to give effect to Family Code section 8617 (or its predecessors), which is what Annette asks us to do here. 2002The language is thus dicta and, although entitled to due consideration, is not binding on us. ( People v. Garrett (1998) 67 Cal. App.4th 1419, 1422 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 .) Further, in the 75 years since Marshall was decided, that analysis has not been applied by any court in a published opinion as the basis for declining to give effect to Family Code section 8617 (or its predecessors), which is what Annette asks us to do here. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hasson v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1990Nevertheless, since civil litigants are no less entitled to a fair trial than criminal defendants (Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 32 Cal.3d 388, 416 ), the rationale underlying the Marshall court’s “substantial likelihood” test quoted above is equally applicable to civil cases. 1990Nevertheless, since civil litigants are no less entitled to a fair trial than criminal defendants (Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 32 Cal.3d 388, 416 ), the rationale underlying the Marshall court’s “substantial likelihood” test quoted above is equally applicable to civil cases. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
In Re Giannini
green
2 sentences1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that 1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Schacht v. United States
green
2 sentences1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that 1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that | 1 | 1973–1973 |
People v. Noroff
green
1 sentence1973(Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 [outdoor "guerrilla theater"].) [4] "This World," edited by the San Francisco Chronicle, a section of the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 11, 1973, page 1. [5] I find nothing in the majority opinion in LaRue to suggest that the majority there rejected Justice Marshall's analysis: to the contrary, the majority clearly recognize that the regulations at issue in LaRue restrict protected expression. [6] Cf. Schacht v. United States (1970) supra, 398 U.S. 58 , which held unconstitutional a federal statute which provided that | 1 | 1973–1973 |
People v. Marshall
green
2 sentences1968(People v. Marshall, supra, 48 Cal.2d 394, 400 ; People v. Crawford (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 838, 840 [ 252 P.2d 963 ].) Under the Marshall test it is also correct to say that the two counts in the accusatory pleading relate to the same act. 1968(People v. Marshall, supra, 48 Cal.2d 394, 400 ; People v. Crawford (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 838, 840 [ 252 P.2d 963 ].) Under the Marshall test it is also correct to say that the two counts in the accusatory pleading relate to the same act. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Neal v. State of California
green
2 sentences1968Our California Supreme Court, commencing with Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ], has by a series of opinions defined and construed “act or omission" as applied to California’s “multiple punishment" statute. 1968Our California Supreme Court, commencing with Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ], has by a series of opinions defined and construed “act or omission" as applied to California’s “multiple punishment" statute. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Campanella v. Campanella
green
2 sentences1944The plaintiff relies on the decision of this court in Campanella v. Campanella, 204 Cal. 515 [ 269 P. 433 ], wherein it was said at page 523 that "A verdict unduly excessive is a verdict, in part at least, unsupported by the evidence. 1944The plaintiff relies on the decision of this court in Campanella v. Campanella, 204 Cal. 515 [ 269 P. 433 ], wherein it was said at page 523 that "A verdict unduly excessive is a verdict, in part at least, unsupported by the evidence. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.