election doctrine in Texas

2016Admission of extraneous offense evidence to show relationship between defendant and child victim With regard to the first purpose of the election requirement, which we consider in a harm analysis pursuant to Phillips and Dixon, appellant “was not entitled to be protected from the admission of evidence of extraneous sexual offenses committed by him against the child.” See Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 734 .

2016Admission of extraneous offense evidence to show relationship between defendant and child victim With regard to the first purpose of the election requirement, which we consider in a harm analysis pursuant to Phillips and Dixon , appellant “was not entitled to be protected from the admission of evidence of extraneous sexual offenses committed by him against the child.” See Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 734 .

2024Co., 605 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex. 1980) (“The election doctrine . . . may constitute a bar to relief when (1) one successfully exercises an informed choice (2) between two or more remedies, rights, or states of facts (3) which are so inconsistent as to (4) constitute manifest injustice.”); Boullt v. Smith, No. 03-02-00303-CC, 2004 WL –16– 2357881, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 21, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“If an employee opts to receive worker’s compensation benefits for an injury sustained in the scope of his employment, the employee may be considered to have made an election of remedies and th

2018See Bocanegra, 605 S.W.2d at 851 (“One’s choice between inconsistent remedies, rights or states of facts does not amount to an election which will bar further action unless the choice is made with a full and clear understanding of the problem, facts, and remedies essential to the exercise of an intelligent choice.”).

2021Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 733, citing Phillips, 130 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) aff’d, 193 S.W.3d 904 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (internal citations omitted); see also Garcia, 614 S.W.3d at 757 (reaffirming the manner in which a reviewing court should analyze harm where an election error has occurred). 13 1.

2016Moreover, the election requirement protects fundamental rights such as notice and [jury] unanimity, insuring both that the defendant is aware of precisely which act he must defend himself against, and that the jurors know precisely which act they must all agree he is guilty of in order to convict him. 193 S.W.3d at 910 (emphasis in original); Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) (noting that one reason for election requirement is to minimize risk that jury chooses to convict defendant “not because one or more crimes were proved beyond a reasonable doubt,

2021Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 733, citing Phillips, 130 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) aff’d, 193 S.W.3d 904 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (internal citations omitted); see also Garcia, 614 S.W.3d at 757 (reaffirming the manner in which a reviewing court should analyze harm where an election error has occurred). 13 1.

2016Moreover, the election requirement protects fundamental rights such as notice and [jury] unanimity, insuring both that the defendant is aware of precisely which act he must defend himself against, and that the jurors know precisely which act they must all agree he is guilty of in order to convict him. 193 S.W.3d at 910 (emphasis in original); Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) (noting that one reason for election requirement is to minimize risk that jury chooses to convict defendant “not because one or more crimes were proved beyond a reasonable doubt,

2015See id. at 771 n.3; Crawford v. State, 696 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. Crim.

2015O'Neal, 746 S.W.2d at 771 n.3; Crawford v. State, 696 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (citing Bates v. State, 165 Tex.Crim. 140 , 305 S.W.2d 366, 368 (1957)) (on showing of more than one act of intercourse, on the defendant's motion, the State must elect and failure to so order is error); Jiminez v. State, No. 07–07–00389–CR, 2009 Tex.App.

2015(Womack, J., concurring) ("we do not reverse for 36 Id. the election error.

2005It would, however, make clear that the jurors must unanimously agree on one of them as constituting the proved offense"). [41] Phillips v. State, 130 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, n.p.h.). [42] See Francis, 36 S.W.3d at 127 n. 10 (Womack, J., concurring) ("[w]e do not reverse for the election error.

2015O'Neal, 746 S.W.2d at 772 . *2 But the State is not obligated to make an election and error is not shown absent the defendant's timely motion for election.

2005Upon the timely motion by the defendant, the State is 3 Our analysis of the election requirement is controlled by O’Neal v. State, 746 S.W.2d 769, 771-73 (Tex. Crim.

2003See Worley v. State, 870 S.W.2d 620, 622-23 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref d); see also Crawford v. State, 696 S.W.2d 903, 905-07 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

2003See Worley v. State, 870 S.W.2d 620, 622-23 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd); see also Crawford v. State, 696 S.W.2d 903, 905-07 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

2003The election doctrine may constitute a bar to relief “when (1) one successfully exercises an informed choice (2) between two or more remedies, rights, or states of facts (3) which are so inconsistent as to (4) constitute manifest injustice.” Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 605 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex.1980) (citing Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Company of Dallas, supra).

2003Exxon contends that the election doctrine bars Texas Development from recovering against it because Texas Development “elected to pursue the $117,500 [assigned amount] from IRC rather than [Exxon].” An election of remedies has been defined by the Texas Supreme Court as “the act of choosing between two or more inconsistent but coexistent modes of procedure and relief allowed by law on the same state of facts.” Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Company of Dallas, 491 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.1973).

2015See Smith v. Butler, 19 S.W. 1083 [(Tex. 1892).] Once a benefited party elects to accept the terms of a testamentary gift or bequest, with both its benefits and its burdens, the benefited party is estopped from contesting the provisions of any part of the will that transferred the interest.

1906As applied to the facts alleged in the plea before us, the following quotation from one of our own decisions also seems pertinent, namely: “The principle of election is, that he who accepts a benefit under a will (or deed) must adopt the whole contents of the instrument, so far as it concerns him; conforming to its provisions and renouncing every right inconsistent with it.” (Philleo v. Holliday, 24 Texas, 45 .) Quoting this language and applying the principle in the later case of Smith v. Butler, 85 Texas, 126 , our Supreme Court seems to have held in effect that the will of a deceased husban

2025“The election doctrine, therefore, may constitute a bar to relief when (1) one successfully exercises an informed choice (2) between two or more remedies, - 10 - 04-24-00516-CV & 04-24-00521-CV rights, or states of facts (3) which are so inconsistent as to (4) constitute manifest injustice.” Id. (citation omitted).

2010See Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex.1996) (“[A]n election will bar recovery when the inconsistency in the assertion of a remedy, right, or state of facts is so unconscionable, dishonest, contrary to fair dealing, or so stultifies the legal process or trifles with justice or the courts as to be manifestly unjust.” (quoting Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Ins.

2015See Reza, 339 S.W.3d at 715 .

2015See Reza, 339 S.W.3d at 715 .

2015See Duffey, 326 S.W.3d at 634 with differing details that might have (holding due process concerns not implicated when defendant incrementally added to the idea that the received timely notice of State's election upon request and defendant must have done something when counsel expressly acknowledged understanding the to provoke the plethora of stories about election and did not indicate that the defense was adversely his activities. affected). 201 S.W.3d at 735 .

2015See Duffey, 326 S.W.3d at 634 with differing details that might have (holding due process concerns not implicated when defendant incrementally added to the idea that the received timely notice of State's election upon request and defendant must have done something when counsel expressly acknowledged understanding the to provoke the plethora of stories about election and did not indicate that the defense was adversely his activities. affected). 201 S.W.3d at 735 .

2011See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; see also Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 734–36; Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 913–14; see generally Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 172–74.

2011See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; see also Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 734-36 ; Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 913-14 ; see generally Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 172-74 .

2011See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; see also Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 734–36; Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 913–14; see generally Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 172–74.

2011See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; see also Dixon, 201 S.W.3d at 734-36 ; Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 913-14 ; see generally Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 172-74 .

2009Id. (citing Scoggan v. State , 799 S.W.2d 679 , 680 n.3 (Tex. Crim.

2009Id. (citing Scoggan v. State, 799 S.W.2d 679 , 680 n.3 (Tex. Crim.

2012The election doctrine may constitute a bar to relief when “(1) one successfully exercises an informed choice (2) between two or more remedies, rights or states of facts (3) which are so inconsistent as to (4) constitute manifest injustice.” Sheffield, 55 S.W.3d at 164 (quoting Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Ins.

2003The election doctrine may constitute a bar to relief when “(1) one successfully exercises an informed choice (2) between two or more remedies, rights or states of facts (3) which are so inconsistent as to (4) constitute manifest injustice.” Sheffield , 55 S.W.3d at 164 (quoting Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Ins.

2024Owings v. State, 541 S.W.3d 144, 150-51 (Tex. Crim.

2021Id., citing TEX.R.APP.P. 44.2(a) (“If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals constitutional error that is subject to harmless error review, the court of appeals must reverse a judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.”).

1999Because it was created to afford defendants adequate notice and an opportunity to defend, the election requirement triggers fundamental constitutional due process principles. (5) See Cole v. Arkansas , 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948) ("No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal.").

1999Because it was created to afford defendants adequate notice and an opportunity to defend, the election requirement triggers fundamental constitutional due process principles. (5) See Cole v. Arkansas , 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948) ("No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal.").

2015See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at CR, 02–08–00395–CR, 2010 WL 3377797 , at *13 (Tex. App 171; see also Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 777 ; Dixon, 201 S.W.3d © 2015 Thomson Reuters.

2015See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at CR, 02–08–00395–CR, 2010 WL 3377797 , at *13 (Tex. App 171; see also Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 777 ; Dixon, 201 S.W.3d © 2015 Thomson Reuters.

1994See Branaum , 643 S.W.2d at 750 ; Shrader , 306 S.W.2d at 809-10 ; see also Chumney v. Craig , 805 S.W.2d 864, 870 (Tex. App.--Waco 1991, writ denied) (holding that the contestant has the burden of proving that the outcome of the election was not the true outcome because of alleged irregularities); Ware v. Crystal City Indep.

1994See Branaum, 643 S.W.2d at 750 ; Shrader, 306 S.W.2d at 809-10 ; see also Chumney v. Craig, 805 S.W.2d 864, 870 (Tex.App.—Waco 1991, writ denied) (holding that the contestant has the burden of proving that the outcome of the election was not the true outcome because of alleged irregularities); Ware v. Crystal City Indep.

1994See Branaum v. Patrick , 643 S.W.2d 745, 749-50 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1982, no writ).

1994See Branaum , 643 S.W.2d at 750 ; Shrader , 306 S.W.2d at 809-10 ; see also Chumney v. Craig , 805 S.W.2d 864, 870 (Tex. App.--Waco 1991, writ denied) (holding that the contestant has the burden of proving that the outcome of the election was not the true outcome because of alleged irregularities); Ware v. Crystal City Indep.

2021We have previously explained that “[b]ecause it was created to afford defendants adequate notice and an opportunity to defend, the election requirement triggers fundamental constitutional due process principles.” Gutierrez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 739, 747 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Palmer v. State, No. PD-1746-04, 2006 WL 2846864 , *1 (Tex. Crim.

2009Id. (citing Scoggan v. State , 799 S.W.2d 679 , 680 n.3 (Tex. Crim.

2017Phillips , 193 S.W.3d at 910 n.27 ("The jury may have taken both [offenses] into account, and have considered that one or the other was not sufficiently made out to warrant a conviction, but that both together convinced [it] of the guilt of the defendant....") (quoting Fisher v. State , 33 Tex. 792 , 794 (Tex. 1870) ).

2017Phillips, 193 S.W.3d at 910 n.27 (“The jury may have taken both [offenses] into account, and have considered that one or the other was not sufficiently made out to warrant a conviction, but that both together convinced [it] of the guilt of the defendant . . . .”) (quoting Fisher v. State, 33 Tex. 792, 794 (Tex. 1870)).

1965This is the rule of all the decisions hereinabove cited.” See also Daken v. Daken, 125 Tex. 305 , 83 S.W.2d 620 , where it is stated: “The law does not permit the husband to devise either separate property or community property of the wife, without her consent; but if he attempts to do so, and she accepts under the will, as devisee, rights she would not otherwise be entitled to, she is estopped from questioning the disposition of her property upon the doctrine of election.

1965This is the rule of all the decisions hereinabove cited.” See also Daken v. Daken, 125 Tex. 305 , 83 S.W.2d 620 , where it is stated: “The law does not permit the husband to devise either separate property or community property of the wife, without her consent; but if he attempts to do so, and she accepts under the will, as devisee, rights she would not otherwise be entitled to, she is estopped from questioning the disposition of her property upon the doctrine of election.