election doctrine in California

2024(Roam, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 1039 .) But the record does not reflect any unequivocal and knowledgeable election by Starflinger.

2023They say the judgment should be reversed and sent back to the trial court to determine whether 3 The issue in Roam was “whether the trial court erred in granting a tort remedy when [the plaintiff], after filing his complaint, had levied on certain of defendant’s property under a writ of attachment.” (Roam, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 1037 .) Levying under the writ “deprived [the defendant] of the use of his property and plaintiff obtained an advantage over him.” (Id. at p. 1040.) Under those circumstances, “presumptively the doctrine of election of remedies is applicable.” (Ibid.) The court ult

2020(Stone, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1147 .) That holding is consistent with the normal operation of the one-challenge-per-side limitation, which allows a party to reserve its peremptory challenge for a subsequent triggering event, even when the party could have exercised its challenge against a previously assigned judge.

2020(Stone, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1147 .) That holding is consistent with the normal operation of the one-challenge-per-side limitation, which allows a party to reserve its peremptory challenge for a subsequent triggering event, even when the party could have exercised its challenge against a previously assigned judge.

2018In such cases, a vote tally would be irrelevant to the determination of the election challenge. ( Triple E Produce , supra , 35 Cal.3d at pp. 48, 52, 55-57, 196 Cal.Rptr. 518 , 671 P.2d 1260 .) The Board did not give a precise definition of "significant" employer interference, but noted that such conduct (i) was something more than de minimus , and (ii) could at least " potentially " put the employer in a position of substantial influence or indirect control over the decertification process. ( Gallo , supra , 30 ALRB No. 2, pp. 16-17, italics added.) Although the Board's decision rarely mentio

2018In such cases, a vote tally would be irrelevant to the determination of the election challenge. ( Triple E Produce , supra , 35 Cal.3d at pp. 48, 52, 55-57, 196 Cal.Rptr. 518 , 671 P.2d 1260 .) The Board did not give a precise definition of "significant" employer interference, but noted that such conduct (i) was something more than de minimus , and (ii) could at least " potentially " put the employer in a position of substantial influence or indirect control over the decertification process. ( Gallo , supra , 30 ALRB No. 2, pp. 16-17, italics added.) Although the Board's decision rarely mentio

2018The elements required to support a defense of laches include unreasonable delay and either acquiescence in the matter at issue or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay....' " ( Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537 , 568, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 .) The party relying on laches has the burden of proving its application. ( Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614 , 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826 , 614 P.2d 258 .) The trial court concluded that Pease's challenge was "not barred by the doctrine of laches," and we find no basis to dist

2018The elements required to support a defense of laches include unreasonable delay and either acquiescence in the matter at issue or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay....' " ( Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537 , 568, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 .) The party relying on laches has the burden of proving its application. ( Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614 , 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826 , 614 P.2d 258 .) The trial court concluded that Pease's challenge was "not barred by the doctrine of laches," and we find no basis to dist

1991In the leading case of People v. Castro (1901) 133 Cal. 11 [ 65 P. 13 ], the defendant was charged with only one count of rape, while the prosecutrix testified to four separate acts of intercourse over several months.

1991In the leading case of People v. Castro (1901) 133 Cal. 11 [ 65 P. 13 ], the defendant was charged with only one count of rape, while the prosecutrix testified to four separate acts of intercourse over several months.

1989(Norton, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 39 .) If the reviewing court determines that the employer’s election challenge was in fact a dilatory tactic designed to avoid bargaining, there is no opportunity to conclude, as the court did in Dal Porto , that innocent and wrongful conduct combined to produce legitimate disagreements on crucial issues, because the employer’s unfair refusal to bargain has prevented any negotiations whatsoever.

1984Norton Co., supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 35 .) Second, the Supreme Court looked at the language of Labor Code section 1160.3 authorizing the make-whole remedy when the Board "deems such relief appropriate." By its per se application of the remedy, the court held, the Board rendered the quoted language surplusage.

1979The board relies for this proposition on federal precedent holding that a union enjoys a rebuttable presumption of majority status after its first year of initial certification. ( National Car Rental System, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (8th Cir.1979) 594 F.2d 1203, 1205 .) Noting that an initial certification serves both to impose on the employer an obligation to bargain with the union (§ 1153, subd. (e)) and to bar for 12 months the holding of another representation election in that bargaining unit (§ 1156.6), the board reasons that certification lapses for one purpose while still retaining its vitality

1979(National Car Rental System, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (8th Cir. 1979) 594 F.2d 1203, 1205 .) Noting that an initial certification serves both to impose on the employer an obligation to bargain with the union (§ 1153, subd. (e)) and to bar for 12 months the holding of another representation election in that bargaining unit (§ 1156.6), the board reasons that certification lapses for one purpose while still retaining its vitality for other purposes; since the code expressly provides a 12-month lifespan for the election bar but does not impose a time limit upon the employer’s duty to bargain, and since th

1951On the contrary, equity regards such statutory requirements as of binding force in law; but, acting in personam and operating directly upon the consciences of the parties to such agreements, equity merely says that a party to such an agreement will be estopped from standing on his legal rights in support of his refusal to carry out his part of the agreement, where the circumstances, as here, disclose that such conduct on his part would be uneonscientious and work a fraud upon the rights of the other party.” ( 18 Cal.App. 683 at pp. 695 and 696.) For like reason, the doctrine of election applie

1951On the contrary, equity regards such statutory requirements as of binding force in law; but, acting in personam and operating directly upon the consciences of the parties to such agreements, equity merely says that a party to such an agreement will be estopped from standing on his legal rights in support of his refusal to carry out his part of the agreement, where the circumstances, as here, disclose that such conduct on his part would be unconscientious and work a fraud upon the rights of the other party." ( 18 Cal.App. 683 at pp. 695 and 696.) [5] For like reason, the doctrine of election ap

1946Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U.S. 415 , 26 L.Ed. 187 ; Grand Rapids & I.

1946Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U.S. 415 , 26 L.Ed. 187 ; Grand Rapids & I.

1945In that case the court said: “The term ‘estate’, is comprehensive, and as has been hitherto declared, ‘One of the most common uses in which the word “estate” is used is to denote and describe in a most general manner the property composing the assets of a deceased,’ and, ‘During the lifetime of the husband, he is the owner and entitled to the possession of all the community property.’ (Estate of Sayre, 114 Cal.App. 649 [300P.833].) It is likewise evident as heretofore noted in effect that upon the death of the husband the property purchased with funds from the joint bank account, by agreement

1939The term “estate” is comprehensive, and as has been hitherto declared, “One of the most common uses in which the word ‘estate’ is used is to denote and describe in a most general manner the property composing the assets of a deceased,” and, “During the lifetime of the husband, he is the owner and entitled to the possession of all the community property.” (Estate of Sayre, 114 Cal. App. 649 [ 300 Pac. 833 ].) It is likewise evident as heretofore noted in effect that upon the death of the husband the property purchased with funds from the joint bank account, by agreement of the parties, became a

2024(Id. at p. 42; see also id. at pp. 37–38 [distinguishing “weight of the evidence” reversal under Florida law from reversal for “insufficient evidence”].) The Tibbs court accordingly framed its holding as grounded in the conviction and the defendant’s election to challenge that conviction by an appeal necessarily contemplating retrial: “[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent an appellate court from granting a convicted defendant 4 an opportunity to seek acquittal through a new trial.” (Id. at p. 45, italics added; see also id. at p. 45, fn. 22 [analogizing a defendant’s motion for new tr

2024(Id. at p. 42; see also id. at pp. 37–38 [distinguishing “weight of the evidence” reversal under Florida law from reversal for “insufficient evidence”].) The Tibbs court accordingly framed its holding as grounded in the conviction and the defendant’s election to challenge that conviction by an appeal necessarily contemplating retrial: “[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent an appellate court from granting a convicted defendant 4 an opportunity to seek acquittal through a new trial.” (Id. at p. 45, italics added; see also id. at p. 45, fn. 22 [analogizing a defendant’s motion for new tr

2018The elements required to support a defense of laches include unreasonable delay and either acquiescence in the matter at issue or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay....' " ( Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537 , 568, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 .) The party relying on laches has the burden of proving its application. ( Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614 , 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826 , 614 P.2d 258 .) The trial court concluded that Pease's challenge was "not barred by the doctrine of laches," and we find no basis to dist

2018The elements required to support a defense of laches include unreasonable delay and either acquiescence in the matter at issue or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay....' " ( Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537 , 568, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 .) The party relying on laches has the burden of proving its application. ( Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614 , 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826 , 614 P.2d 258 .) The trial court concluded that Pease's challenge was "not barred by the doctrine of laches," and we find no basis to dist

2018The elements required to support a defense of laches include unreasonable delay and either acquiescence in the matter at issue or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay....' " ( Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537 , 568, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 .) The party relying on laches has the burden of proving its application. ( Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614 , 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826 , 614 P.2d 258 .) The trial court concluded that Pease's challenge was "not barred by the doctrine of laches," and we find no basis to dist

2018The elements required to support a defense of laches include unreasonable delay and either acquiescence in the matter at issue or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay....' " ( Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537 , 568, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 .) The party relying on laches has the burden of proving its application. ( Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614 , 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826 , 614 P.2d 258 .) The trial court concluded that Pease's challenge was "not barred by the doctrine of laches," and we find no basis to dist

2018The elements required to support a defense of laches include unreasonable delay and either acquiescence in the matter at issue or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay....' " ( Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537 , 568, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 .) The party relying on laches has the burden of proving its application. ( Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614 , 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826 , 614 P.2d 258 .) The trial court concluded that Pease's challenge was "not barred by the doctrine of laches," and we find no basis to dist

2018The elements required to support a defense of laches include unreasonable delay and either acquiescence in the matter at issue or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay....' " ( Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537 , 568, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 .) The party relying on laches has the burden of proving its application. ( Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614 , 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826 , 614 P.2d 258 .) The trial court concluded that Pease's challenge was "not barred by the doctrine of laches," and we find no basis to dist

2018The elements required to support a defense of laches include unreasonable delay and either acquiescence in the matter at issue or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay....' " ( Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537 , 568, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 .) The party relying on laches has the burden of proving its application. ( Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614 , 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826 , 614 P.2d 258 .) The trial court concluded that Pease's challenge was "not barred by the doctrine of laches," and we find no basis to dist

2018The elements required to support a defense of laches include unreasonable delay and either acquiescence in the matter at issue or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay....' " ( Krolikowski v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537 , 568, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 .) The party relying on laches has the burden of proving its application. ( Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614 , 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826 , 614 P.2d 258 .) The trial court concluded that Pease's challenge was "not barred by the doctrine of laches," and we find no basis to dist