election rule in Washington

2025Id.

2021State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 570 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984) (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988).

2021State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 570 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984) (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988).

2021State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 570 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984) (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988).

2004Labanowski, 117 Wash.2d at 422 , 816 P.2d 26 ; United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir.1984).

2004Labanowski, 117 Wn.2d at 422 ; United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1984).

2004The Court explicitly rejected adoption of the election rule articulated in United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 , 98 S.Ct. 1647 , 56 L.Ed.2d 84 (1978), and used in the Ninth Circuit and other jurisdictions.

2004The court explicitly rejected adoption of the election rule articulated in United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978), and used in the Ninth Circuit and other jurisdictions.

2004The Court explicitly rejected adoption of the election rule articulated in United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 , 98 S.Ct. 1647 , 56 L.Ed.2d 84 (1978), and used in the Ninth Circuit and other jurisdictions.

2004The court explicitly rejected adoption of the election rule articulated in United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978), and used in the Ninth Circuit and other jurisdictions.

2004Labanowski, 117 Wn.2d at 422 ; United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1984).

2004Labanowski, 117 Wn.2d at 420-21 .

1996Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 719 , 100 S. Ct. 2432 , 65 L.

1996Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 719 , 100 S. Ct. 2432 , 65 L.

2026App. 728, 736-37 , 238 P.3d 1211 (2010). 30 Blackburn clarified this election claim at oral argument.

2022“An election or instruction that all 12 jurors must agree that the same underlying act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt assures a unanimous verdict on one criminal act.” Coleman, 159 Wn.2d at 512 .

2016App. 889, 916 , 56 P.3d 569 (2002), review denied, 149Wn.2d 1014(2003).

2016The absence of either an election or instruction constitutes a constitutional error because it is possible that all of the jurors did not rely on the same criminal act when convicting the defendant, "resulting in a lack of unanimity on all elements necessary for a conviction." State v. Greathouse. 113 Wn.

2015Loan Ass’ n v. Nadham, 14 Wn.2d 576, 596-97 , 128 P.2d 982 (1942).

2015Initially, it disregards the election doctrine, discussed above, “ that one who takes under a will must conform to all its provisions, and if he accepts a benefit thereunder, he must renounce every right inconsistent therewith.” Nadham, 14 Wn.2d at 596-97 .

2012In Estate of Mellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 26, 35 (1999), a case dealing with Congress’s basis for taxing QTIP to the estate of the surviving spouse, the tax court characterized its inclusion in the survivor’s estate as “the quid pro quo for allowing the marital deduction for the estate of the first spouse to die,” even though “QTIP property does not actually pass to or from the surviving spouse.” Estate of Morgens v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 402, 412-14 (2009), aff’d, 678 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2012), also recognized that the QTIP regime employs a fiction but adopted Mellinger’s quid pro quo

2004Labanowski., 117 Wash.2d at 420-21 , 816 P.2d 26 . [7] The public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though "the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation." Fong Foo v. U.S., 369 U.S. 141, 143 , 82 S.Ct. 671 , 7 L.Ed.2d 629 (1962). [8] Based on guilty pleas to murder, burglaries, and robbery entered after the first trial, the State added a second aggravating factor in the second trial.

2004Labanowski., 117 Wash.2d at 420-21 , 816 P.2d 26 . [7] The public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though "the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation." Fong Foo v. U.S., 369 U.S. 141, 143 , 82 S.Ct. 671 , 7 L.Ed.2d 629 (1962). [8] Based on guilty pleas to murder, burglaries, and robbery entered after the first trial, the State added a second aggravating factor in the second trial.

2004The Court explicitly rejected adoption of the election rule articulated in United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 , 98 S.Ct. 1647 , 56 L.Ed.2d 84 (1978), and used in the Ninth Circuit and other jurisdictions.

1994It had always been considered that "[s]uch an election is not a waiver of a jury trial.” State v. Allman, 19 Wn.

1994It had always been considered that "[s]uch an election is not a waiver of a jury trial." State v. Allman, 19 Wn.

1988This is not ordinarily a subject of pre-trial discovery and the choice involves the risk that the judgment opted for may prove to be uncollectible, while a solvent party may be discharged, because his liability is viewed as "alternative." Grinder, 290 Md. at 707 .

1964Thus, it has been stated: The Courts on numerous occasions have recognized that a seller’s retaking or repossessing under an express or implied contract provision, does not necessarily demand the conclusion that in so doing he has elected to rescind; and, the application of the election doctrine must be modified by the facts of the particular case.’ “Nevertheless, the mere reclaiming of possession seems generally regarded as an election to rescind; and it seems probable that it is in most cases a correct inference from the reclaiming of possession by the seller that he intends to terminate the

1964Foley v. Superior Court, 57 Wn. (2d) 571, 574, 358 P. (2d) 550 (1961), as follows: “ ‘. . . forfeitures are not favored in law and are never enforced in equity unless the right thereto is so clear as to permit no denial. . . . ’ ” See Dill v. Zielke, 26 Wn. (2d) 246, 173 P. (2d) 977 (1946), and cases cited.

1964Foley v. Superior Court, 57 Wn. (2d) 571, 574, 358 P. (2d) 550 (1961), as follows: “ ‘. . . forfeitures are not favored in law and are never enforced in equity unless the right thereto is so clear as to permit no denial. . . . ’ ” See Dill v. Zielke, 26 Wn. (2d) 246, 173 P. (2d) 977 (1946), and cases cited.

1953Stewart & Holmes Drug Co. v. Reed, 74 Wash. 401, 405 , 133 Pac. 577 (1913).

1953Stewart & Holmes Drug Co. v. Reed, 74 Wash. 401, 405 , 133 Pac. 577 (1913).

1941Jur. 133 , § 10, we find the following statement: “If in truth there is only one remedy, and not a choice between two or more, the doctrine of election does not apply, as where a party misconceives his remedy and the one on which he expected to rely was never available to him.” Our own case of Schotis v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 163 Wash. 305 , 1 P. (2d) 221 , 78 A. L.

1941Jur. 133 , § 10, we find the following statement: “If in truth there is only one remedy, and not a choice between two or more, the doctrine of election does not apply, as where a party misconceives his remedy and the one on which he expected to rely was never available to him.” Our own case of Schotis v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 163 Wash. 305 , 1 P. (2d) 221 , 78 A. L.

1931Howard v. McNaught, 9 Wash. 355 , 37 Pac. 455 , 43 Am.

1931Howard v. McNaught, 9 Wash. 355 , 37 Pac. 455 , 43 Am.

1917In the case of Peth v. Martin, 31 Wash. 1, 71 Pac. 549 , we had under consideration a statute involving this same question, and held that the statute was mandatory, and that a notice of an election in violation of the terms of the statute rendered the election unauthorized.

1917In the case of Peth v. Martin, 31 Wash. 1, 71 Pac. 549 , we had under consideration a statute involving this same question, and held that the statute was mandatory, and that a notice of an election in violation of the terms of the statute rendered the election unauthorized.

1896The one most strongly bearing upon it is that of Carter v. Duggan, 144 Mass. 32 ( 10 N. E. 486 ), where a suit had been brought upon the bond before bringing an action against the sheriff, and which proceeding was sustained in that case, but the question of an election or waiver was not specifically raised or decided therein.

1896The one most strongly bearing upon it is that of Carter v. Duggan, 144 Mass. 32 ( 10 N. E. 486 ), where a suit had been brought upon the bond before bringing an action against the sheriff, and which proceeding was sustained in that case, but the question of an election or waiver was not specifically raised or decided therein.