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29 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1888–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Huddleston v. Stategreen2 sentences1997As Justice Maddox noted, one court has addressed the issue by carving out an exception to the election rule in "multiple act" child sexual abuse cases. "[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma has carved out this exception to the election rule: `[W]hen a child of tender years is under the exclusive domination of one parent for a definite period of time and submits to sexual acts at that parent's demand, the separate acts of abuse become one transaction,' * and `[s]ome situations which fall within the exception are when a continuous application of force is used and no reasonable doubt exist 1997See, e.g., the appellant's brief to the Court of Criminal Appeals, at 18 (stating that "if the defendant's convictions were based on more than one transaction, then .... [t]his denial violated the doctrine of election" (emphasis added)); R.T. 473 (renewing a previous objection to the trial court's refusal to compel an election as to Count III, but this time as to Count I). [3] Huddleston v. State, 695 P.2d 8, 10-11 (Okla. | 2 | 2 |
RLG v. Stategreen2 sentences2008This Court stated that the State had presented only “generic evidence” against Shouldis; therefore, “the limited abrogation of the election rule as set out in R.L.G.[ v. State, 712 So.2d 348 , 355 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 718 So.2d 117 (Ala. 1998),] and R.A.S. [v. State, 718 So.2d 108 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 718 So.2d 117 (Ala.1998),] was applicable.” Shouldis v. State, 953 So.2d at 1282 . 2008However, R.L.G. held that the strict election rule does not apply in cases involving generic evidence 4 and resident child molesters. “[T]he general election rule ... does not apply in child molestation cases involving purely generic evidence. ... “ ‘... [W]e adopt for purposes of this case, the “either/or” rule, but only as that rule is modified for generic evidence: where the evidence of more than one incident of sexual molestation to a child victim by a resident child molester is purely generic and where “there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the | 1 | 7 |
Ex Parte RLGgreen2 sentences2008Thus, pursuant to R.L.G., the jury should have been provided a “unanimity instruction” “‘that it can find the defendant guilty only if it unanimously agrees that he committed all the incidents described by the victim.’ ” Ex parte R.L.G. 712 So.2d 372, 373 (Ala.1998) (quoting R.L.G. v. State, 712 So.2d 348, 367 ) (Ala.Crim.App.1997)) (emphasis added). 2. 2008However, R.L.G. held that the strict election rule does not apply in cases involving generic evidence 4 and resident child molesters. “[T]he general election rule ... does not apply in child molestation cases involving purely generic evidence. ... “ ‘... [W]e adopt for purposes of this case, the “either/or” rule, but only as that rule is modified for generic evidence: where the evidence of more than one incident of sexual molestation to a child victim by a resident child molester is purely generic and where “there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences1997The problem associated with the question presented has been best described by the Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Brown, 55 Wash.App. 738, 746-47 , 780 P.2d 880, 885 (1989), review denied, State v. Brown, 114 Wash.2d 1014 , 791 P.2d 897 (1990): "In more recent times, our courts have had occasion to reconsider whether the election rule strikes a proper balance between the defendant's rights and the problems presented in the prosecution of cases involving sexual molestation of children. 1997The problem associated with the question presented has been best described by the Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Brown, 55 Wash.App. 738, 746-47 , 780 P.2d 880, 885 (1989), review denied, State v. Brown, 114 Wash.2d 1014 , 791 P.2d 897 (1990): "In more recent times, our courts have had occasion to reconsider whether the election rule strikes a proper balance between the defendant's rights and the problems presented in the prosecution of cases involving sexual molestation of children. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See also Jones v. State, 781 P.2d 326 (Okla.Crim.App.1989); and Drake v. State, 761 P.2d 879 (Okla.Crim.App.1988)." 707 So.2d at 661. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
RAS v. State
neutral
2 sentences2008This Court stated that the State had presented only “generic evidence” against Shouldis; therefore, “the limited abrogation of the election rule as set out in R.L.G.[ v. State, 712 So.2d 348 , 355 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 718 So.2d 117 (Ala. 1998),] and R.A.S. [v. State, 718 So.2d 108 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 718 So.2d 117 (Ala.1998),] was applicable.” Shouldis v. State, 953 So.2d at 1282 . 2004In R.A.S. v. State , 718 So.2d 108 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997), aff'd, 718 So.2d 117 (Ala. 1998), this Court addressed the general rule concerning the doctrine of election: "`"The doctrine of election operates to protect a defendant from being prosecuted for more than one offense in the same count of an indictment. | 5 | 1998–2025 |
Deason v. State
green
2 sentences1997However, I do not believe the ratio decidendi of the election rule set out in Deason v. State, 363 So.2d 1001 (Ala.1978), and Watkins v. State, 36 Ala.App. 711 , 63 So.2d 293 (1953), "would hypothetically be consented to today by the conscience and the feeling of justice of the majority of all those whose obedience is required by the rule of law on which the ratio decidendi of [those] prior decision[s] was logically based," Laun, Stare Decisis, 25 Va.L.Rev. 12, 22 (1938), in child molestation cases in which a child is under the domination of a parent or a person standing in loco parentis for a 1997Under facts similar to those in this case, the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte King, 707 So.2d 657 (Ala.1997) (five Justices concurring, one Justice concurring in part and dissenting in part, and three Justices dissenting), declined to overrule or to make an exception to the long-standing doctrine of election, as enunciated in Deason v. State, 363 So.2d 1001 (Ala.1978), and Watkins v. State, 36 Ala.App. 711 , 63 So.2d 293 (1953). | 5 | 1996–2004 |
Watkins v. State
green
2 sentences1997Under facts similar to those in this case, the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte King, 707 So.2d 657 (Ala.1997) (five Justices concurring, one Justice concurring in part and dissenting in part, and three Justices dissenting), declined to overrule or to make an exception to the long-standing doctrine of election, as enunciated in Deason v. State, 363 So.2d 1001 (Ala.1978), and Watkins v. State, 36 Ala.App. 711 , 63 So.2d 293 (1953). 1997Under facts similar to those in this case, the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte King, 707 So.2d 657 (Ala.1997) (five Justices concurring, one Justice concurring in part and dissenting in part, and three Justices dissenting), declined to overrule or to make an exception to the long-standing doctrine of election, as enunciated in Deason v. State, 363 So.2d 1001 (Ala.1978), and Watkins v. State, 36 Ala.App. 711 , 63 So.2d 293 (1953). | 5 | 1996–2004 |
RAS v. State
green
2 sentences2008This Court stated that the State had presented only “generic evidence” against Shouldis; therefore, “the limited abrogation of the election rule as set out in R.L.G.[ v. State, 712 So.2d 348 , 355 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 718 So.2d 117 (Ala. 1998),] and R.A.S. [v. State, 718 So.2d 108 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 718 So.2d 117 (Ala.1998),] was applicable.” Shouldis v. State, 953 So.2d at 1282 . 2008This Court stated that the State had presented only “generic evidence” against Shouldis; therefore, “the limited abrogation of the election rule as set out in R.L.G.[ v. State, 712 So.2d 348 , 355 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 718 So.2d 117 (Ala. 1998),] and R.A.S. [v. State, 718 So.2d 108 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 718 So.2d 117 (Ala.1998),] was applicable.” Shouldis v. State, 953 So.2d at 1282 . | 4 | 2004–2025 |
McManus v. State
green
2 sentences1997As Justice Maddox noted, one court has addressed the issue by carving out an exception to the election rule in “multiple act” child sexual abuse cases. “[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma has carved out this exception to the election rule: ‘[W]hen a child of tender years is under the exclusive domination of one parent for a definite period of time and submits to sexual acts at that parent’s demand, the separate acts of abuse become one transaction,’ * and ‘[s]ome situations which fall within the exception are when a continuous application of force is used and no reasonable doubt exist 1997As Justice Maddox noted, one court has addressed the issue by carving out an exception to the election rule in “multiple act” child sexual abuse cases. “[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma has carved out this exception to the election rule: ‘[W]hen a child of tender years is under the exclusive domination of one parent for a definite period of time and submits to sexual acts at that parent’s demand, the separate acts of abuse become one transaction,’ * and ‘[s]ome situations which fall within the exception are when a continuous application of force is used and no reasonable doubt exist | 3 | 1997–1997 |
Carleton v. State
neutral
2 sentences1916When there is but one count charging a single offense, the law presumes that the defendant comes to trial prepared to meet the single charge, and the prosecution will not be permitted, after once having elected, to introduce evidence of another and different offense; but where the indictment charges that the offense was committed by different means or with different intents, in the alternative, or where the offenses are of that charter which may be joined in the same indictment, in different counts, the defendant is fully informed of the cause of the prosecution, and the doctrine of election d 1916In the Carlton Case, 100 Ala. 130 , 14 South. 472 , cited in the opinion of Judge Brown, there were two counts in the indictment, and Judge Coleman, speaking for the court, said: “The very purpose for framing the indictment with two or more counts was to prevent the application of the doctrine of election.” Again, in the Untreinor Case, 146 Ala. 133 , 41 South. 170 , also cited by Judge Brown, there were two counts, and the court said: “When the indictment contains only one count, care should be observed that the probative force of such testimony be not extended beyond the limits indicated; th | 3 | 1912–1916 |
People v. Jones
green
2 sentences1997Moreover, in specific regard to a prosecution resting on generic testimony, “recent expansion of criminal defendants’ due process rights and procedural protections casts doubt on the continued validity of [cases following a strict election rule], at least as applied to generic testimony by molested children.” Jones, 51 Cal.3d at 311 , 270 Cal. Rptr. at 620 , 792 P.2d at 652 . 1997Moreover, in specific regard to a prosecution resting on generic testimony, “recent expansion of criminal defendants’ due process rights and procedural protections casts doubt on the continued validity of [cases following a strict election rule], at least as applied to generic testimony by molested children.” Jones, 51 Cal.3d at 311 , 270 Cal. Rptr. at 620 , 792 P.2d at 652 . | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Scott v. State
green
2 sentences1997As Justice Maddox noted, one court has addressed the issue by carving out an exception to the election rule in "multiple act" child sexual abuse cases. "[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma has carved out this exception to the election rule: `[W]hen a child of tender years is under the exclusive domination of one parent for a definite period of time and submits to sexual acts at that parent's demand, the separate acts of abuse become one transaction,' * and `[s]ome situations which fall within the exception are when a continuous application of force is used and no reasonable doubt exist 1997Additionally, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma has carved out this exception to the election rule: "[W]hen a child of tender years is under the exclusive domination of one parent for a definite period of time and submits to sexual acts at that parent's demand, the separate acts of abuse become one transaction," [3] and "[s]ome situations which fall within the exception are when a continuous application of force is used and no reasonable doubt exists as to the occurrence of each act." Scott v. State, 668 P.2d 339 (Okla.Crim.App.1983), citing McManus v. State, 50 Okl.Cr. 354 , 297 P. 83 | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Ex Parte King
green
2 sentences1997Under facts similar to those in this case, the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte King, 707 So.2d 657 (Ala.1997) (five Justices concurring, one Justice concurring in part and dissenting in part, and three Justices dissenting), declined to overrule or to make an exception to the long-standing doctrine of election, as enunciated in Deason v. State, 363 So.2d 1001 (Ala.1978), and Watkins v. State, 36 Ala.App. 711 , 63 So.2d 293 (1953). 1997Under facts similar to those in this case, the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte King, 707 So.2d 657 (Ala.1997) (five Justices concurring, one Justice concurring in part and dissenting in part, and three Justices dissenting), declined to overrule or to make an exception to the long-standing doctrine of election, as enunciated in Deason v. State, 363 So.2d 1001 (Ala.1978), and Watkins v. State, 36 Ala.App. 711 , 63 So.2d 293 (1953). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Ex Parte State, in re Brooms v. State
green
2 sentences1923In Brooms v. State, 197 Ala. 419 , 73 South. 35 , our court holds: “The provision of section 7151, Code, 1907, does not affect the doctrine of election, the doctrine remaining the same whether several offenses be charged in one count, or in different counts, provided the indictment as a whole only attempts to charge one act which may constitute one or more of several offenses, and an indictment thereunder charges one wrongful act as one or the other of two or more offenses, and not the commission of all the offenses named in the alternative.” In Sampson’s Case, 107 Ala. 76 , 18 South. 207 , th 1923In Brooms v. State, 197 Ala. 419 , 73 South. 35 , our court holds: “The provision of section 7151, Code, 1907, does not affect the doctrine of election, the doctrine remaining the same whether several offenses be charged in one count, or in different counts, provided the indictment as a whole only attempts to charge one act which may constitute one or more of several offenses, and an indictment thereunder charges one wrongful act as one or the other of two or more offenses, and not the commission of all the offenses named in the alternative.” In Sampson’s Case, 107 Ala. 76 , 18 South. 207 , th | 2 | 1920–1923 |
Untreinor v. State
neutral
2 sentences1916In the Carlton Case, 100 Ala. 130 , 14 South. 472 , cited in the opinion of Judge Brown, there were two counts in the indictment, and Judge Coleman, speaking for the court, said: “The very purpose for framing the indictment with two or more counts was to prevent the application of the doctrine of election.” Again, in the Untreinor Case, 146 Ala. 133 , 41 South. 170 , also cited by Judge Brown, there were two counts, and the court said: “When the indictment contains only one count, care should be observed that the probative force of such testimony be not extended beyond the limits indicated; th 1916In the Carlton Case, 100 Ala. 130 , 14 South. 472 , cited in the opinion of Judge Brown, there were two counts in the indictment, and Judge Coleman, speaking for the court, said: “The very purpose for framing the indictment with two or more counts was to prevent the application of the doctrine of election.” Again, in the Untreinor Case, 146 Ala. 133 , 41 South. 170 , also cited by Judge Brown, there were two counts, and the court said: “When the indictment contains only one count, care should be observed that the probative force of such testimony be not extended beyond the limits indicated; th | 2 | 1907–1916 |
Elam v. State
neutral
2 sentences1916When there is but one count charging a single offense, the law presumes the defendant comes to trial prepared to meet the single charge, and the prosecution will not be. permitted, after once having elected, to introduce evidence of another and different offense; but where the indictment charges that the offense was committed by different means, or with different intents, in the alternative, or where the offenses are of that character which may be joined in the same indictment, in different counts, the defendant is fully informed of the cause of the prosecution, and the doctrine of election do 1890As there was but one count, the State was bound by the doctrine of election, under this indictment, where a single act is a violation of the law, and would have been held to the first offense testified to by the State’s witness. —Elam v. State, 26 Ala. 48 . | 2 | 1890–1916 |
Shouldis v. State
green
1 sentence2008This Court stated that the State had presented only “generic evidence” against Shouldis; therefore, “the limited abrogation of the election rule as set out in R.L.G.[ v. State, 712 So.2d 348 , 355 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 718 So.2d 117 (Ala. 1998),] and R.A.S. [v. State, 718 So.2d 108 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), aff'd, 718 So.2d 117 (Ala.1998),] was applicable.” Shouldis v. State, 953 So.2d at 1282 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Sparrow v. State
green
1 sentence2004Where the evidence discloses two or more offenses growing out of distinct and separate transactions, a court should grant a timely motion to require the State to elect." "` Watkins v. State , 36 Ala.App. 711 , 63 So.2d 293 , 293-94 (1953). "`"The need for election arises where there is but one count charging a single offense, but the proof shows more than one instance of that offense. *Page 473 The cases of Deason v. State , 363 So.2d 1001 (Ala. 1978), and Reed v. State , 512 So.2d 804 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), stand for the proposition that when the State has charged the accused with one offense in | 1 | 2004–2004 |
JDS v. State
green
1 sentence2004Where the evidence discloses two or more offenses growing out of distinct and separate transactions, a court should grant a timely motion to require the State to elect." "` Watkins v. State , 36 Ala.App. 711 , 63 So.2d 293 , 293-94 (1953). "`"The need for election arises where there is but one count charging a single offense, but the proof shows more than one instance of that offense. *Page 473 The cases of Deason v. State , 363 So.2d 1001 (Ala. 1978), and Reed v. State , 512 So.2d 804 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), stand for the proposition that when the State has charged the accused with one offense in | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Giddens v. State
green
1 sentence2004The appellant's theft of funds from Goodwill Industries was systematic and constituted a continuous series of actions." 565 So.2d at 1282 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Reed v. State
green
1 sentence2004Where the evidence discloses two or more offenses growing out of distinct and separate transactions, a court should grant a timely motion to require the State to elect." "` Watkins v. State , 36 Ala.App. 711 , 63 So.2d 293 , 293-94 (1953). "`"The need for election arises where there is but one count charging a single offense, but the proof shows more than one instance of that offense. *Page 473 The cases of Deason v. State , 363 So.2d 1001 (Ala. 1978), and Reed v. State , 512 So.2d 804 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), stand for the proposition that when the State has charged the accused with one offense in | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Drake v. State
green
1 sentence1997See also Jones v. State, 781 P.2d 326 (Okla.Crim.App.1989); and Drake v. State, 761 P.2d 879 (Okla.Crim.App.1988)." 707 So.2d at 661. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Fjermestad
green
1 sentence1997The problem associated with the question presented has been best described by the Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Brown, 55 Wash.App. 738, 746-47 , 780 P.2d 880, 885 (1989), review denied, State v. Brown, 114 Wash.2d 1014 , 791 P.2d 897 (1990): "In more recent times, our courts have had occasion to reconsider whether the election rule strikes a proper balance between the defendant's rights and the problems presented in the prosecution of cases involving sexual molestation of children. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Megginson v. Turner
red
2 sentences1991"Counsel for Davis has also cited the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama in Megginson v. Turner, 565 So.2d 247 (Ala.1990). 1991"Counsel for Davis has also cited the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama in Megginson v. Turner , 565 So.2d 247 (Ala. 1990). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Horton v. State
green
2 sentences1989Horton , cited as authority by Thornton , involved the "doctrine of election." In that case, the court held, "[t]he state having elected to prosecute the defendant for having possession of prohibited liquors at the time 'whiskey was found in the woodhouse,' [as opposed to the whiskey found in the defendant's room at the same time] would only be entitled to a conviction upon evidence establishing that fact." Horton , 17 Ala. App. at 190 , 86 So. at 241 . 1989Horton , cited as authority by Thornton , involved the "doctrine of election." In that case, the court held, "[t]he state having elected to prosecute the defendant for having possession of prohibited liquors at the time 'whiskey was found in the woodhouse,' [as opposed to the whiskey found in the defendant's room at the same time] would only be entitled to a conviction upon evidence establishing that fact." Horton , 17 Ala. App. at 190 , 86 So. at 241 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Jackson v. State
green
1 sentence1988It must be modified, so as to be limited to those cases only where the doctrine of election applies, or where the various counts of the indictment are intended to describe offenses which are separate and district." Jackson v. State , 74 Ala. 26 , 31 (1883). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Brunke v. State
green
1 sentence1981"If proof was made that $25 or more was embezzled, the crime is punishable as grand larceny is punished. . . ." 134 Ala. at 450 , 454 , 33 So.2d 226 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Willis v. State
neutral
1 sentence1981"If proof was made that $25 or more was embezzled, the crime is punishable as grand larceny is punished. . . ." 134 Ala. at 450 , 454 , 33 So.2d 226 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Hamilton neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| State v. Teague neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Barefield v. State neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Skinner v. State neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Breeding v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1954Barefield v. State, 14 Ala.App. 638 , 72 So. 293 ; Skinner v. State, 36 Ala.App. 434 , 60 So.2d 363 ; Breeding v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 128 , 229 S.W. 372 ; State v. Hamilton, 263 Mo. 294 , 172 S.W. 593 . 1954Barefield v. State, 14 Ala.App. 638 , 72 So. 293 ; Skinner v. State, 36 Ala.App. 434 , 60 So.2d 363 ; Breeding v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 128 , 229 S.W. 372 ; State v. Hamilton, 263 Mo. 294 , 172 S.W. 593 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Hornsby v. State green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Sampson v. State neutral | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Sayre v. Weil green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Foley v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. neutral | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| Joyner v. State neutral | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| Beason v. State neutral | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Herring v. State green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Cochran v. State neutral | 1 | 1916–1916 |
| Moss v. State neutral | 1 | 1916–1916 |
| Butler v. State neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Upshur v. State neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.