act already committed violation in California

2011(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746; see also People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 299-300 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ].) That statute provides: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” (Gov.

2002(Dis. opn. of Bamattre-Manoukian., post, at pp. 587-588.) [16] Government Code section 9608 provides, "The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law." [17] We point out that in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 742, 746-748, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 , the

2022Code, § 9608 [“[t]he termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law”]; Dillon v. United States (2010) 560 U.S. 817, 828 [“We are aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment to the benefit of sub

2020Code, § 9608 [“[t]he termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law”]; Dillon v. United States (2010) 560 U.S. 817, 828 [“We are aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment to the benefit of sub

2011(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746; see also People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 299-300 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ].) That statute provides: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” (Gov.

2011(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746; see also People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 299-300 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ].) That statute provides: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” (Gov.

1986However, California has a general saving clause in Government Code section 9608, and such a clause is just as effective as a specific one. 20 (People v. McNulty (1892) 93 Cal. 427, 437 [ 29 P. 61 ]; cf. Peterson v. Ball (1931) 211 Cal. 461 [ 296 P. 291 , 74 A.L.R. 187 ].) This clause provides: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or inf

1986However, California has a general saving clause in Government Code section 9608, and such a clause is just as effective as a specific one. 20 (People v. McNulty (1892) 93 Cal. 427, 437 [ 29 P. 61 ]; cf. Peterson v. Ball (1931) 211 Cal. 461 [ 296 P. 291 , 74 A.L.R. 187 ].) This clause provides: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or inf

1968(In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740, 746-747 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ]; Spears v. County of Modoc, 101 Cal. 303 [ 35 P. 869 ]; The Irresistible, 7 Wheat. 551 [ 5 L.Ed. 520 ].) California’s saving clause for criminal offenses is found in section 9608, Government Code: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment

1968(In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740, 746-747 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ]; Spears v. County of Modoc, 101 Cal. 303 [ 35 P. 869 ]; The Irresistible, 7 Wheat. 551 [ 5 L.Ed. 520 ].) California’s saving clause for criminal offenses is found in section 9608, Government Code: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment

2026Section 1172.6 creates relief the Legislature crafted in “ ‘an act of lenity’ that requires, under specified circumstances, reduction of 10 the offense for which [a defendant] was properly convicted.” (People v. James (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 604 , 609.) The section 1172.6 vacatur of Garner’s murder conviction does not change that he “was properly convicted of . . . murder under the law that was in effect at the time of his offense.” (James, supra, at p. 609; see ibid. [describing underlying conviction after successful section 1172.6 petition].) Again, Garner provides no authority to the contrary

2026Section 1172.6 creates relief the Legislature crafted in “ ‘an act of lenity’ that requires, under specified circumstances, reduction of 10 the offense for which [a defendant] was properly convicted.” (People v. James (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 604 , 609.) The section 1172.6 vacatur of Garner’s murder conviction does not change that he “was properly convicted of . . . murder under the law that was in effect at the time of his offense.” (James, supra, at p. 609; see ibid. [describing underlying conviction after successful section 1172.6 petition].) Again, Garner provides no authority to the contrary

1976(See fn. 8, post.) Section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” See People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 351 P.2d 329 ]; People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812 [ 346 P.2d 792 ]; In re Crane (1935) 4

1976(See fn. 8, post.) Section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” See People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 351 P.2d 329 ]; People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812 [ 346 P.2d 792 ]; In re Crane (1935) 4

1976(See fn. 8, post.) Section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” See People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 351 P.2d 329 ]; People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812 [ 346 P.2d 792 ]; In re Crane (1935) 4

1976(See fn. 8, post.) Section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” See People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 351 P.2d 329 ]; People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812 [ 346 P.2d 792 ]; In re Crane (1935) 4

2022Rather, [section 1170.95] represents a [legislative] act of lenity . . . . [¶] Viewed that way, proceedings under [section 1170.95] do not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to have essential facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) Our colleagues in the First District reached the same conclusion in People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102 , 1156 and again more recently in People v. James (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 604 , 609-611 (James).) Furthermore, a factual finding that results in ineligibility for section 1170.95 relief does not increase the penalty for a crime. “[I]t sim

2004(In re Griffin (1965) 63 Cal.2d 757, 761 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 183 , 408 P.2d 959 ].) 6 Government Code section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” 7 In view of our conclusion we need not reach petitioners’ alternative argument that

2004(In re Griffin (1965) 63 Cal.2d 757, 761 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 183 , 408 P.2d 959 ].) 6 Government Code section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” 7 In view of our conclusion we need not reach petitioners’ alternative argument that

2002II, § 10, subd. (a).) The majority opinion does not consider whether the July 1, 2001 date contained in section 8 of Proposition 36 describes an effective or operative date, as those terms are defined. ( Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 223, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 , 19 P.3d 1148 .) The postponement of an operative date of a statute does not necessarily mean that it was intended to apply only to cases arising after the operative date. ( Id. at pp. 223-224, 105 Cal. Rptr.2d 407 , 19 P.3d 1148 .) [7] Government Code section 9608 provides that the "termination or suspensi

2002II, § 10, subd. (a).) The majority opinion does not consider whether the July 1, 2001 date contained in section 8 of Proposition 36 describes an effective or operative date, as those terms are defined. ( Preston v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 223, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 , 19 P.3d 1148 .) The postponement of an operative date of a statute does not necessarily mean that it was intended to apply only to cases arising after the operative date. ( Id. at pp. 223-224, 105 Cal. Rptr.2d 407 , 19 P.3d 1148 .) [7] Government Code section 9608 provides that the "termination or suspensi

1994That statute provides, "The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law." This provision "was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, "The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law." This provision "was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994Code, § 11530, allowing for alternative sentencing of county jail or state prison at trial court's discretion]; People v. Durbin (1966) 64 Cal.2d 474, 479 [ 50 Cal. Rptr. 657 , 413 P.2d 433 ] [Pen.

1994Code, § 11530, allowing for alternative sentencing of county jail or state prison at trial court's discretion]; People v. Durbin (1966) 64 Cal.2d 474, 479 [ 50 Cal. Rptr. 657 , 413 P.2d 433 ] [Pen.

1994That statute provides, "The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law." This provision "was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides as follows: "The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law." ( Ibid. ) As discussed below (see fn. 5, post ), and as acknowledged in the minor's briefing, that statute is designed to save prosecutions for criminal acts committed before the

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1994That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law,

1976(See fn. 8, post.) Section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” See People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 351 P.2d 329 ]; People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812 [ 346 P.2d 792 ]; In re Crane (1935) 4

1976(See fn. 8, post.) Section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” See People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 351 P.2d 329 ]; People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812 [ 346 P.2d 792 ]; In re Crane (1935) 4

1976(See fn. 8, post.) Section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” See People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 351 P.2d 329 ]; People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812 [ 346 P.2d 792 ]; In re Crane (1935) 4

1976(See fn. 8, post.) Section 9608 provides in full: “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” See People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 351 P.2d 329 ]; People v. Fowler (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 812 [ 346 P.2d 792 ]; In re Crane (1935) 4