golden rule in California

2025A “golden rule” argument is one where “counsel asks the jurors to place themselves in the plaintiff’s shoes and to award such damages as they would ‘charge’ to undergo equivalent pain and suffering.” (Beagle v. Vasold (1966) 65 Cal.2d 166, 182, fn. 11 ; see Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 797 .) Making a golden rule argument is improper because “[t]he jury must impartially determine pain and suffering damages based upon evidence specific to the plaintiff, as opposed to statistical data concerning the public at large.

2025A “golden rule” argument is one where “counsel asks the jurors to place themselves in the plaintiff’s shoes and to award such damages as they would ‘charge’ to undergo equivalent pain and suffering.” (Beagle v. Vasold (1966) 65 Cal.2d 166, 182, fn. 11 ; see Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 797 .) Making a golden rule argument is improper because “[t]he jury must impartially determine pain and suffering damages based upon evidence specific to the plaintiff, as opposed to statistical data concerning the public at large.

2025A “golden rule” argument is one where “counsel asks the jurors to place themselves in the plaintiff’s shoes and to award such damages as they would ‘charge’ to undergo equivalent pain and suffering.” (Beagle v. Vasold (1966) 65 Cal.2d 166, 182, fn. 11 ; see Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 797 .) Making a golden rule argument is improper because “[t]he jury must impartially determine pain and suffering damages based upon evidence specific to the plaintiff, as opposed to statistical data concerning the public at large.

2025A “golden rule” argument is one where “counsel asks the jurors to place themselves in the plaintiff’s shoes and to award such damages as they would ‘charge’ to undergo equivalent pain and suffering.” (Beagle v. Vasold (1966) 65 Cal.2d 166, 182, fn. 11 ; see Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 797 .) Making a golden rule argument is improper because “[t]he jury must impartially determine pain and suffering damages based upon evidence specific to the plaintiff, as opposed to statistical data concerning the public at large.

2015What we said in 1983 is no less true today: “ ‘It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result.’ [Citations.]” (Armstrong v. County of San Mateo (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 597, 615 .) Common sense must have some claim.

1991Unmistakably, one of the principal targets of the legislation was intravenous drug users. “ ‘It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result’ (2A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed.) § 45.12, p. 37, . . .” (Armstrong v. County of San Mateo (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 597, 615 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 294 ]; Samarkand of Santa Barbara, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara (1963) 216 Cal

2025(Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 797 .) In the context of damages, a “ ‘golden rule’ argument indicates to the jury that it would be proper in calculating damages to place themselves in the plaintiff’s shoes and award the amount they would ‘charge’ to undergo equivalent disability, pain and suffering.” (Nishihama, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 305 .) This is improper because the “only person whose pain and suffering is relevant in calculating a general damage award is the plaintiff.” (Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 757 , 764–765.) Of the instances cited by Ag-Wise where plaintif

2025How 28 others would feel if placed in the plaintiff’s position is irrelevant.[] It is improper, for example, for an attorney to ask jurors how much ‘they would “charge” to undergo equivalent pain and suffering.’ [Citation.]” (Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 757, 764-765 , fn. omitted.) A golden rule argument, “‘in effect asks each juror to become a personal partisan advocate for the injured party, rather than an unbiased and unprejudiced weigher of the evidence.

2009(Parkview Villas, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1204 .) The plaintiff also advanced six of its own proposed undisputed material facts, which were supported by reference “to the entirety of certain of the declarations [the plaintiff] had submitted,” and “filed several hundred pages of documentary evidence with its opposition papers.” (Id. at pp. 1204-1205.) 6 A panel of this court in San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 315 , earlier cast doubt on the so-called golden rule, stating: “In spite of this unquestioned acceptance of the ‘Golden Rule,’ we respect

2005(See, e.g., San Diego Watercrafts, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 316 [“where evidence is not referenced, is hidden in voluminous papers, and is not called to the attention of the court at all, a summary judgment should not be reversed on grounds the court should have considered such evidence”].) 10 But most cases citing the so-called golden rule are readily distinguishable from the case at bar, either because they involve the failure of the moving party to file a proper separate statement or because the defect is the failure to identify the disputed material fact, rather than the evidence suppo

1991Unmistakably, one of the principal targets of the legislation was intravenous drug users. “ ‘It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result’ (2A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed.) § 45.12, p. 37, . . .” (Armstrong v. County of San Mateo (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 597, 615 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 294 ]; Samarkand of Santa Barbara, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara (1963) 216 Cal

1991Unmistakably, one of the principal targets of the legislation was intravenous drug users. “ ‘It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result’ (2A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed.) § 45.12, p. 37, . . .” (Armstrong v. County of San Mateo (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 597, 615 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 294 ]; Samarkand of Santa Barbara, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara (1963) 216 Cal

2014(See Pauley v. Brodnax (1910) 157 Cal. 386, 396-397 [ 108 P. 271 ] [“. . . ‘The survey as made in the field and the lines actually run on the surface of the earth . . . must control.’ [Citation.]”]; Kimball v. McKee (1906) 149 Cal. 435, 462 [ 86 P. 1089 ] [Trial court correctly instructed that “ ‘any surveyor, who for private parties thereafter undertakes to re-establish or relocate lines or comers, should endeavor as nearly as possible to follow in the footsteps of the surveyor who made the last accepted government survey and place the *737 comers and lines where they were placed by him.’ ”];

2014(See Pauley v. Brodnax (1910) 157 Cal. 386, 396-397 [ 108 P. 271 ] [“. . . ‘The survey as made in the field and the lines actually run on the surface of the earth . . . must control.’ [Citation.]”]; Kimball v. McKee (1906) 149 Cal. 435, 462 [ 86 P. 1089 ] [Trial court correctly instructed that “ ‘any surveyor, who for private parties thereafter undertakes to re-establish or relocate lines or comers, should endeavor as nearly as possible to follow in the footsteps of the surveyor who made the last accepted government survey and place the *737 comers and lines where they were placed by him.’ ”];

2014(See Pauley v. Brodnax (1910) 157 Cal. 386, 396-397 [ 108 P. 271 ] [“. . . ‘The survey as made in the field and the lines actually run on the surface of the earth . . . must control.’ [Citation.]”]; Kimball v. McKee (1906) 149 Cal. 435, 462 [ 86 P. 1089 ] [Trial court correctly instructed that “ ‘any surveyor, who for private parties thereafter undertakes to re-establish or relocate lines or comers, should endeavor as nearly as possible to follow in the footsteps of the surveyor who made the last accepted government survey and place the *737 comers and lines where they were placed by him.’ ”];

2014(See Pauley v. Brodnax (1910) 157 Cal. 386, 396-397 [ 108 P. 271 ] [“. . . ‘The survey as made in the field and the lines actually run on the surface of the earth . . . must control.’ [Citation.]”]; Kimball v. McKee (1906) 149 Cal. 435, 462 [ 86 P. 1089 ] [Trial court correctly instructed that “ ‘any surveyor, who for private parties thereafter undertakes to re-establish or relocate lines or comers, should endeavor as nearly as possible to follow in the footsteps of the surveyor who made the last accepted government survey and place the *737 comers and lines where they were placed by him.’ ”];

2014(See Pauley v. Brodnax (1910) 157 Cal. 386, 396-397 [ 108 P. 271 ] [“. . . ‘The survey as made in the field and the lines actually run on the surface of the earth . . . must control.’ [Citation.]”]; Kimball v. McKee (1906) 149 Cal. 435, 462 [ 86 P. 1089 ] [Trial court correctly instructed that “ ‘any surveyor, who for private parties thereafter undertakes to re-establish or relocate lines or comers, should endeavor as nearly as possible to follow in the footsteps of the surveyor who made the last accepted government survey and place the *737 comers and lines where they were placed by him.’ ”];

2014(See Pauley v. Brodnax (1910) 157 Cal. 386, 396-397 [ 108 P. 271 ] [“. . . ‘The survey as made in the field and the lines actually run on the surface of the earth . . . must control.’ [Citation.]”]; Kimball v. McKee (1906) 149 Cal. 435, 462 [ 86 P. 1089 ] [Trial court correctly instructed that “ ‘any surveyor, who for private parties thereafter undertakes to re-establish or relocate lines or comers, should endeavor as nearly as possible to follow in the footsteps of the surveyor who made the last accepted government survey and place the *737 comers and lines where they were placed by him.’ ”];

2009“All material facts must be set forth in the separate statement.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1208.) Evoking the so-called “golden rule” of summary judgment, the trial court explained, “ ‘ “ ‘[i]f it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not existí ” ’ ” (Ibid.) 6 The appellate court in Parkview Villas, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1202, 1213 , reversed the trial court, reasoning: “[M]ost cases citing the so-called golden rule are readily distinguishable from the case at bar, either because they involve the failure of the moving party to file a proper separate statement or because the defect

2009“All material facts must be set forth in the separate statement.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1208.) Evoking the so-called “golden rule” of summary judgment, the trial court explained, “ ‘ “ ‘[i]f it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not existí ” ’ ” (Ibid.) 6 The appellate court in Parkview Villas, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1202, 1213 , reversed the trial court, reasoning: “[M]ost cases citing the so-called golden rule are readily distinguishable from the case at bar, either because they involve the failure of the moving party to file a proper separate statement or because the defect

1993In other words, the FPPC would require the notice on a mailing to which it would not apply. “ ‘It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result.’” (Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City and County of San Francisco (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 814, 828 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 875 ].) We agree with the interpretation of the slate mailer statutes adopted by respondents and the trial court: In the typ

1993In other words, the FPPC would require the notice on a mailing to which it would not apply. “ ‘It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result.’” (Terminal Plaza Corp. v. City and County of San Francisco (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 814, 828 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 875 ].) We agree with the interpretation of the slate mailer statutes adopted by respondents and the trial court: In the typ

1991Unmistakably, one of the principal targets of the legislation was intravenous drug users. “ ‘It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result’ (2A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed.) § 45.12, p. 37, . . .” (Armstrong v. County of San Mateo (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 597, 615 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 294 ]; Samarkand of Santa Barbara, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara (1963) 216 Cal

1991Unmistakably, one of the principal targets of the legislation was intravenous drug users. “ ‘It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result’ (2A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed.) § 45.12, p. 37, . . .” (Armstrong v. County of San Mateo (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 597, 615 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 294 ]; Samarkand of Santa Barbara, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara (1963) 216 Cal

1988(Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ].) 3 The Department of Motor Vehicles has not challenged the propriety of this procedure to avoid the payment of California fees and taxes. 4 This was done because the department chief was apparently convinced by plaintiffs’ additional evidence—presented in a letter to the department—which indicated they had not driven the motorhome in California within 90 days of taking delivery in Oregon. 5 Subsequent statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise noted. 6 Plaintiffs’ motorhome is a motor vehicle as defi

1988(Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ].) 3 The Department of Motor Vehicles has not challenged the propriety of this procedure to avoid the payment of California fees and taxes. 4 This was done because the department chief was apparently convinced by plaintiffs’ additional evidence—presented in a letter to the department—which indicated they had not driven the motorhome in California within 90 days of taking delivery in Oregon. 5 Subsequent statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise noted. 6 Plaintiffs’ motorhome is a motor vehicle as defi

1986(See Armstrong v. County of San Mateo, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d 597, 615 ; Silver v. Brown (1966) 63 Cal.2d 841, 845 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 409 P.2d 689 ] [“[t]he literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results or to give effect to manifest purposes that, in the light of the statute’s legislative history, appear from its provisions considered as a whole. [Citations.]”].) We remain unconvinced that the resolution at issue is ambiguous, and we hesitate to explore the asserted “realities” which respondents claim lead to absurd results when we interpret the resoluti

1986(See Armstrong v. County of San Mateo, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d 597, 615 ; Silver v. Brown (1966) 63 Cal.2d 841, 845 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 409 P.2d 689 ] [“[t]he literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results or to give effect to manifest purposes that, in the light of the statute’s legislative history, appear from its provisions considered as a whole. [Citations.]”].) We remain unconvinced that the resolution at issue is ambiguous, and we hesitate to explore the asserted “realities” which respondents claim lead to absurd results when we interpret the resoluti

1978The pertinent rules are summarized in Stewart v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 172, 179 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 641 ], as follows: “On passing upon this issue this court adverts to those well established rules of statutory construction which require first and foremost that the statutory scheme be given a reasonable and practical interpretation. [Citation.] It is the golden rule of statutory construction that where several alternatives exist that interpretation which appears the most reasonable shall be favored. [Citation.] ‘Statutes must be given a fair and reasonable interpr

1978The pertinent rules are summarized in Stewart v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 172, 179 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 641 ], as follows: “On passing upon this issue this court adverts to those well established rules of statutory construction which require first and foremost that the statutory scheme be given a reasonable and practical interpretation. [Citation.] It is the golden rule of statutory construction that where several alternatives exist that interpretation which appears the most reasonable shall be favored. [Citation.] ‘Statutes must be given a fair and reasonable interpr

1978The pertinent rules are summarized in Stewart v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 172, 179 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 641 ], as follows: "On passing upon this issue this court adverts to those well established rules of statutory construction which require first and foremost that the statutory scheme be given a reasonable and practical interpretation. [Citation.] It is the golden rule of statutory construction that where several alternatives exist that interpretation which appears the most reasonable shall be favored. [Citation.] `Statutes must be given a fair and reasonable inter

1978The pertinent rules are summarized in Stewart v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 172, 179 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 641 ], as follows: "On passing upon this issue this court adverts to those well established rules of statutory construction which require first and foremost that the statutory scheme be given a reasonable and practical interpretation. [Citation.] It is the golden rule of statutory construction that where several alternatives exist that interpretation which appears the most reasonable shall be favored. [Citation.] `Statutes must be given a fair and reasonable inter