italicized portion instruction in California

2015Woods contends that this portion of the instruction pinpointed particular evidence, as opposed to the prosecution’s theory of the case, and “invited the jury to draw an inference of great bodily injury in favor of the prosecution based on the specific evidence of the pregnancy in this case.” “A trial court must instruct on the law applicable to the facts of the case.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ].) “[L]egally correct and factually warranted pinpoint instructions designed to elaborate and clarify other instructions should be delivered upon req

2015Woods contends that this portion of the instruction pinpointed particular evidence, as opposed to the prosecution’s theory of the case, and “invited the jury to draw an inference of great bodily injury in favor of the prosecution based on the specific evidence of the pregnancy in this case.” “A trial court must instruct on the law applicable to the facts of the case.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ].) “[L]egally correct and factually warranted pinpoint instructions designed to elaborate and clarify other instructions should be delivered upon req

2015Woods contends that this portion of the instruction pinpointed particular evidence, as opposed to the prosecution’s theory of the case, and “invited the jury to draw an inference of great bodily injury in favor of the prosecution based on the specific evidence of the pregnancy in this case.” “A trial court must instruct on the law applicable to the facts of the case.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ].) “[L]egally correct and factually warranted pinpoint instructions designed to elaborate and clarify other instructions should be delivered upon req

2015Woods contends that this portion of the instruction pinpointed particular evidence, as opposed to the prosecution’s theory of the case, and “invited the jury to draw an inference of great bodily injury in favor of the prosecution based on the specific evidence of the pregnancy in this case.” “A trial court must instruct on the law applicable to the facts of the case.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ].) “[L]egally correct and factually warranted pinpoint instructions designed to elaborate and clarify other instructions should be delivered upon req

2015Woods contends that this portion of the instruction pinpointed particular evidence, as opposed to the prosecution’s theory of the case, and “invited the jury to draw an inference of great bodily injury in favor of the prosecution based on the specific evidence of the pregnancy in this case.” “A trial court must instruct on the law applicable to the facts of the case.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ].) “[L]egally correct and factually warranted pinpoint instructions designed to elaborate and clarify other instructions should be delivered upon req

2015Woods contends that this portion of the instruction pinpointed particular evidence, as opposed to the prosecution’s theory of the case, and “invited the jury to draw an inference of great bodily injury in favor of the prosecution based on the specific evidence of the pregnancy in this case.” “A trial court must instruct on the law applicable to the facts of the case.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ].) “[L]egally correct and factually warranted pinpoint instructions designed to elaborate and clarify other instructions should be delivered upon req

2006(People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 979 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131 , 75 P.3d 53 ]; People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 651-652.) The trial court orally instructed the jury that if it found that “defendant, while unconscious as a result of voluntary intoxication, killed another human being without intent to kill and without malice aforethought, the crime is involuntary manslaughter.” (CALJIC No. 8.47.) Defendant complains that the trial court on its own initiative should have instructed the jury on the meaning of “unconscious” because, in his view, one may lack sufficient mental awareness to

2006(People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 979 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131 , 75 P.3d 53 ]; People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 651-652.) The trial court orally instructed the jury that if it found that “defendant, while unconscious as a result of voluntary intoxication, killed another human being without intent to kill and without malice aforethought, the crime is involuntary manslaughter.” (CALJIC No. 8.47.) Defendant complains that the trial court on its own initiative should have instructed the jury on the meaning of “unconscious” because, in his view, one may lack sufficient mental awareness to

2006The trial court instructed the jury with what was then the standard instruction on reasonable doubt (former CALJIC No. 2.90 (5th ed. 1988)), which included a definition of reasonable doubt as that which “is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs and depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.” (Italics added.) Although the United States Supreme Court expressed reservations about the italicized portion of that instruction, it upheld the instruction against constitutional challenge (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 6 [ 127 L.Ed

2006The trial court instructed the jury with what was then the standard instruction on reasonable doubt (former CALJIC No. 2.90 (5th ed. 1988)), which included a definition of reasonable doubt as that which “is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs and depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.” (Italics added.) Although the United States Supreme Court expressed reservations about the italicized portion of that instruction, it upheld the instruction against constitutional challenge (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 6 [ 127 L.Ed

1997“The crime is complete once the kidnapping for extortion occurs whether or not the official act desired is obtained.” (Italics added.) Defendant challenges the italicized portion of the instruction, which is a close paraphrase of language appearing in Magee v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 201, 219 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 758 ], a decision that this court disapproved in People v. Norris (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 56 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 706 P.2d 1141 ], “[t]o the extent [it] implies that any conduct aimed at interfering with law enforcement duties is punishable [as kidnapping for extortion] under secti

1997“The crime is complete once the kidnapping for extortion occurs whether or not the official act desired is obtained.” (Italics added.) Defendant challenges the italicized portion of the instruction, which is a close paraphrase of language appearing in Magee v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 201, 219 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 758 ], a decision that this court disapproved in People v. Norris (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 56 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 706 P.2d 1141 ], “[t]o the extent [it] implies that any conduct aimed at interfering with law enforcement duties is punishable [as kidnapping for extortion] under secti

1997“The crime is complete once the kidnapping for extortion occurs whether or not the official act desired is obtained.” (Italics added.) Defendant challenges the italicized portion of the instruction, which is a close paraphrase of language appearing in Magee v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 201, 219 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 758 ], a decision that this court disapproved in People v. Norris (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 56 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 706 P.2d 1141 ], “[t]o the extent [it] implies that any conduct aimed at interfering with law enforcement duties is punishable [as kidnapping for extortion] under secti

1997“The crime is complete once the kidnapping for extortion occurs whether or not the official act desired is obtained.” (Italics added.) Defendant challenges the italicized portion of the instruction, which is a close paraphrase of language appearing in Magee v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 201, 219 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 758 ], a decision that this court disapproved in People v. Norris (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 56 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 7 , 706 P.2d 1141 ], “[t]o the extent [it] implies that any conduct aimed at interfering with law enforcement duties is punishable [as kidnapping for extortion] under secti

1980Its attention was directed only to the italicized portion of the instruction pertaining to second degree felony murder which it determined was erroneous based upon “parity of reasoning with People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 538-539 . ...” (People v. Heffington, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d at p. 12 .) The appellant also cites language in People v. Hoxie (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 901, 904 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 37 ], and People v. Butts (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 817 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 362 ], for their findings that the intended murder leading to guilt under Penal Code section 217 need only be murder in the second degree.

1969This lecture to the jury is in conflict with the law in California, and the giving of this instruction consitutes error which we find to be prejudicial and therefore reversible. (2) In Whitmore v. French (1951) 37 Cal.2d 744, 746 [ 235 P.2d 3 ], we discussed the distinction between a guest and a passenger using language patently at odds with that of the above instruction: "A person who accepts a ride does not cease to be [a] guest and become a passenger merely by extending customary courtesies of the road, such as paying bridge *522 or ferry tolls [citation], and it has been held that the shar

1969This lecture to the jury is in conflict with the law in California, and the giving of this instruction consitutes error which we find to be prejudicial and therefore reversible. (2) In Whitmore v. French (1951) 37 Cal.2d 744, 746 [ 235 P.2d 3 ], we discussed the distinction between a guest and a passenger using language patently at odds with that of the above instruction: "A person who accepts a ride does not cease to be [a] guest and become a passenger merely by extending customary courtesies of the road, such as paying bridge *522 or ferry tolls [citation], and it has been held that the shar

1962The cases there cited illustrate that such judgment is proper “ ‘only where it is clear that counsel has undertaken to state all of the facts which he expects to prove, and it is plainly evident that the facts thus to be proved will not constitute a cause of action.’ ” (Emphasis added.) {Greenwood v. Mooradian, 137 Cal.App.2d 532, 537 [ 290 P.2d 955 ] ; see also Bias v. Reed, 169 Cal. 33, 37 [ 145 P. 516 ] ; Paul v. Layne & Bowler Corp., 9 Cal.2d 561 [ 71 P.2d 817 ].) Counsel’s opening statement here did not purport to state all the facts he expected to prove. *242 The court here, therefore, d

1962The cases there cited illustrate that such judgment is proper “ ‘only where it is clear that counsel has undertaken to state all of the facts which he expects to prove, and it is plainly evident that the facts thus to be proved will not constitute a cause of action.’ ” (Emphasis added.) {Greenwood v. Mooradian, 137 Cal.App.2d 532, 537 [ 290 P.2d 955 ] ; see also Bias v. Reed, 169 Cal. 33, 37 [ 145 P. 516 ] ; Paul v. Layne & Bowler Corp., 9 Cal.2d 561 [ 71 P.2d 817 ].) Counsel’s opening statement here did not purport to state all the facts he expected to prove. *242 The court here, therefore, d

1962The cases there cited illustrate that such judgment is proper “ ‘only where it is clear that counsel has undertaken to state all of the facts which he expects to prove, and it is plainly evident that the facts thus to be proved will not constitute a cause of action.’ ” (Emphasis added.) {Greenwood v. Mooradian, 137 Cal.App.2d 532, 537 [ 290 P.2d 955 ] ; see also Bias v. Reed, 169 Cal. 33, 37 [ 145 P. 516 ] ; Paul v. Layne & Bowler Corp., 9 Cal.2d 561 [ 71 P.2d 817 ].) Counsel’s opening statement here did not purport to state all the facts he expected to prove. *242 The court here, therefore, d

1962The cases there cited illustrate that such judgment is proper “ ‘only where it is clear that counsel has undertaken to state all of the facts which he expects to prove, and it is plainly evident that the facts thus to be proved will not constitute a cause of action.’ ” (Emphasis added.) {Greenwood v. Mooradian, 137 Cal.App.2d 532, 537 [ 290 P.2d 955 ] ; see also Bias v. Reed, 169 Cal. 33, 37 [ 145 P. 516 ] ; Paul v. Layne & Bowler Corp., 9 Cal.2d 561 [ 71 P.2d 817 ].) Counsel’s opening statement here did not purport to state all the facts he expected to prove. *242 The court here, therefore, d

1961(Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal.2d 158, 162 [ 265 P.2d 904 ].) As the court stated in this last cited case, at page 163: “The italicized portion of the instruction states the law incorrectly, since plaintiff could have been charged Avith negligence not only if she was aware of the danger present and did not take proper precautions to avoid it, but also if, in the exercise of ordinary care, she should have been aware of that danger and failed to take such precautions. ” There is other evidence on the issue.

1961(Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal.2d 158, 162 [ 265 P.2d 904 ].) As the court stated in this last cited case, at page 163: “The italicized portion of the instruction states the law incorrectly, since plaintiff could have been charged Avith negligence not only if she was aware of the danger present and did not take proper precautions to avoid it, but also if, in the exercise of ordinary care, she should have been aware of that danger and failed to take such precautions. ” There is other evidence on the issue.

1951Evidence of sneh an accusatory statement is not received for the purpose of proving its truth, but only to explain the conduct of the accused in the face of it; and unless you should find that his conduct at the time indicated an admission that the accusatory statement was true, you should entirely disregard the statement.” (See, also, People v. Woods (1950), 35 Cal.2d 504, 510 [ 218 P.2d 981 ], and People v. Liss (1950), 35 Cal.2d 570, 574 [ 219 P.2d 789 ], pointing out the dangers of an instruction such as the italicized portion of the instruction quoted on p. 180, supra, but holding such in

1951Evidence of sneh an accusatory statement is not received for the purpose of proving its truth, but only to explain the conduct of the accused in the face of it; and unless you should find that his conduct at the time indicated an admission that the accusatory statement was true, you should entirely disregard the statement.” (See, also, People v. Woods (1950), 35 Cal.2d 504, 510 [ 218 P.2d 981 ], and People v. Liss (1950), 35 Cal.2d 570, 574 [ 219 P.2d 789 ], pointing out the dangers of an instruction such as the italicized portion of the instruction quoted on p. 180, supra, but holding such in

1951Evidence of sneh an accusatory statement is not received for the purpose of proving its truth, but only to explain the conduct of the accused in the face of it; and unless you should find that his conduct at the time indicated an admission that the accusatory statement was true, you should entirely disregard the statement.” (See, also, People v. Woods (1950), 35 Cal.2d 504, 510 [ 218 P.2d 981 ], and People v. Liss (1950), 35 Cal.2d 570, 574 [ 219 P.2d 789 ], pointing out the dangers of an instruction such as the italicized portion of the instruction quoted on p. 180, supra, but holding such in

1951Evidence of sneh an accusatory statement is not received for the purpose of proving its truth, but only to explain the conduct of the accused in the face of it; and unless you should find that his conduct at the time indicated an admission that the accusatory statement was true, you should entirely disregard the statement.” (See, also, People v. Woods (1950), 35 Cal.2d 504, 510 [ 218 P.2d 981 ], and People v. Liss (1950), 35 Cal.2d 570, 574 [ 219 P.2d 789 ], pointing out the dangers of an instruction such as the italicized portion of the instruction quoted on p. 180, supra, but holding such in