presence of aggravating factors in California

2015(People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 724; People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 1007-1008 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 225 , 261 P.3d 243 ].) “Nor was the court required to articulate the converse, that there is no burden of proof at the penalty phase.” (People v. Boyce, supra, at p. 724 .) Defendant was not entitled to an instruction informing the jury that there is a presumption in favor of a sentence of life without parole.

2015(People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 724; People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 1007-1008 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 225 , 261 P.3d 243 ].) “Nor was the court required to articulate the converse, that there is no burden of proof at the penalty phase.” (People v. Boyce, supra, at p. 724 .) Defendant was not entitled to an instruction informing the jury that there is a presumption in favor of a sentence of life without parole.

2015(People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 150; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1216.) “The federal Constitution is not violated by the failure to require a penalty phase jury to reach unanimity on the presence of aggravating factors . . . .” (People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 150.) The court was not required to instruct that the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion to establish that aggravating factors exist, that they outweigh *297 mitigating factors, and that the death penalty is appropriate.

2015(People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 150; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1216.) “The federal Constitution is not violated by the failure to require a penalty phase jury to reach unanimity on the presence of aggravating factors . . . .” (People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 150.) The court was not required to instruct that the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion to establish that aggravating factors exist, that they outweigh *297 mitigating factors, and that the death penalty is appropriate.

2015(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 469 .) The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional “for failing to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, outweigh the *337 mitigating factors, and render death the appropriate punishment. [Citations.] ‘The federal Constitution is not violated by the failure to require a penalty phase jury to reach unanimity on the presence of aggravating factors [citation] .... [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The high court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ]

2015(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 469 .) The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional “for failing to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, outweigh the *337 mitigating factors, and render death the appropriate punishment. [Citations.] ‘The federal Constitution is not violated by the failure to require a penalty phase jury to reach unanimity on the presence of aggravating factors [citation] .... [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The high court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ]

2014(People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 149 [ 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 , 303 P.3d 1 ] (DeHoyos)-, People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 688-689 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ].) California’s death penalty law does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, or the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process for failing to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, *724 outweigh the mitigating factors, and render death the appropriate punishment. ( DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp

2014(People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 149 [ 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 , 303 P.3d 1 ] (DeHoyos)-, People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 688-689 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ].) California’s death penalty law does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, or the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process for failing to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, *724 outweigh the mitigating factors, and render death the appropriate punishment. ( DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp

2014That case approved the same language proposed here as a correct statement of the law and held that “[a] trial court should, when requested, instruct the jury against double-counting these circumstances.” (Id. at p. 789; accord, People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 867 , 750 P.2d 741 ] (Melton).) Nonetheless, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled by the omission.

2014That case approved the same language proposed here as a correct statement of the law and held that “[a] trial court should, when requested, instruct the jury against double-counting these circumstances.” (Id. at p. 789; accord, People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 768 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 867 , 750 P.2d 741 ] (Melton).) Nonetheless, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled by the omission.

2022Defendant arranged via social media to meet the victim and then robbed him, showing “planning, sophistication, or professionalism.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8), italics added.) And defendant pointed a gun at the victim’s head and threatened to shoot him, which “involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), italics added.) Moreover, a section 12022.53 firearm enhancement is a “ ‘default punishment’ ” (Nazir v. Superior Court, 4 supra, 79

2015(Id. at pp. 724-725.) “The federal Constitution does not require intercase proportionality review.” (People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 725.) “ ‘At the penalty phase, the jury properly may consider a defendant’s unadjudicated criminal activity and need not agree unanimously or beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed those acts.’ ” (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1207 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ].) “ ‘The use of restrictive adjectives, such as “extreme” and “substantial,” in the statute’s list of potential mitigating factors does not render it unconstitu

2015(Id. at pp. 724-725.) “The federal Constitution does not require intercase proportionality review.” (People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 725.) “ ‘At the penalty phase, the jury properly may consider a defendant’s unadjudicated criminal activity and need not agree unanimously or beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed those acts.’ ” (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1207 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ].) “ ‘The use of restrictive adjectives, such as “extreme” and “substantial,” in the statute’s list of potential mitigating factors does not render it unconstitu

2015(People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 150; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1216.) “The federal Constitution is not violated by the failure to require a penalty phase jury to reach unanimity on the presence of aggravating factors . . . .” (People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 150.) The court was not required to instruct that the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion to establish that aggravating factors exist, that they outweigh *297 mitigating factors, and that the death penalty is appropriate.

2015(Id. at pp. 724-725.) “The federal Constitution does not require intercase proportionality review.” (People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 725.) “ ‘At the penalty phase, the jury properly may consider a defendant’s unadjudicated criminal activity and need not agree unanimously or beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed those acts.’ ” (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1207 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ].) “ ‘The use of restrictive adjectives, such as “extreme” and “substantial,” in the statute’s list of potential mitigating factors does not render it unconstitu

2015(Id. at pp. 724-725.) “The federal Constitution does not require intercase proportionality review.” (People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 725.) “ ‘At the penalty phase, the jury properly may consider a defendant’s unadjudicated criminal activity and need not agree unanimously or beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed those acts.’ ” (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1207 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ].) “ ‘The use of restrictive adjectives, such as “extreme” and “substantial,” in the statute’s list of potential mitigating factors does not render it unconstitu

2014(People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 149 [ 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 , 303 P.3d 1 ] (DeHoyos)-, People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 688-689 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ].) California’s death penalty law does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, or the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process for failing to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, *724 outweigh the mitigating factors, and render death the appropriate punishment. ( DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp

2014(People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 149 [ 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 , 303 P.3d 1 ] (DeHoyos)-, People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 688-689 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ].) California’s death penalty law does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, or the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process for failing to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, *724 outweigh the mitigating factors, and render death the appropriate punishment. ( DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp

2014(People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 149 [ 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 , 303 P.3d 1 ] (DeHoyos)-, People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 688-689 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 ].) California’s death penalty law does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, or the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process for failing to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, *724 outweigh the mitigating factors, and render death the appropriate punishment. ( DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp

2013(People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1249-1250 ; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1136-1137 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 , 88 P.3d 498 ].) The death penalty law is not unconstitutional for “failing to inform the jury that no party bore the burden *150 of proof.” (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 213 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 , 226 P.3d 276 ].) “Defendant was not entitled to an instruction regarding a presumption of life.” (People v. Streeter, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 268 .) The federal Constitution is not violated by the failure to require a penalty phase jury to reach unanimity on the

2013(People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1249-1250 ; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1136-1137 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 , 88 P.3d 498 ].) The death penalty law is not unconstitutional for “failing to inform the jury that no party bore the burden *150 of proof.” (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 213 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 , 226 P.3d 276 ].) “Defendant was not entitled to an instruction regarding a presumption of life.” (People v. Streeter, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 268 .) The federal Constitution is not violated by the failure to require a penalty phase jury to reach unanimity on the

2013(People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1249-1250 ; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1136-1137 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 , 88 P.3d 498 ].) The death penalty law is not unconstitutional for “failing to inform the jury that no party bore the burden *150 of proof.” (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 213 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 , 226 P.3d 276 ].) “Defendant was not entitled to an instruction regarding a presumption of life.” (People v. Streeter, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 268 .) The federal Constitution is not violated by the failure to require a penalty phase jury to reach unanimity on the

2013(People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1249-1250 ; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1136-1137 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592 , 88 P.3d 498 ].) The death penalty law is not unconstitutional for “failing to inform the jury that no party bore the burden *150 of proof.” (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 213 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 , 226 P.3d 276 ].) “Defendant was not entitled to an instruction regarding a presumption of life.” (People v. Streeter, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 268 .) The federal Constitution is not violated by the failure to require a penalty phase jury to reach unanimity on the

2011(People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 628 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322 , 208 P.3d 78 ].) The instructions were not defective in failing to require that the jury provide express findings regarding the presence of aggravating factors.

2011(People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 628 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322 , 208 P.3d 78 ].) The instructions were not defective in failing to require that the jury provide express findings regarding the presence of aggravating factors.

2011(People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 861 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 , 200 P.3d 879 ].) Nothing in Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466 , or its progeny, requires a different result.

2011(People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 861 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 , 200 P.3d 879 ].) Nothing in Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466 , or its progeny, requires a different result.

2011(See Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1192 .) In any event, CALJIC No. 8.88 adequately advises jurors on the scope of their discretion to reject death and to return a verdict of life without possibility of parole. ( Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 574.) 4.