escape rule in Missouri

2024“The escape rule operates to deny the right of appeal to a defendant who escapes justice.” State v. Troupe, 891 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Mo. banc 1995).

2024See, e.g., Troupe, 891 S.W.2d at 811-12 (applying the escape rule because the 4 It further appears Logan continued his criminal activity after his probation was reinstated on November 28, 2023.

2024Nichols v. State, 131 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004); Freeman, 619 S.W.3d at 552 n.2 (“The escape rule does not apply to errors that occur after the defendant is returned to custody.”); Shearin v. State, 440 S.W.3d 586, 588 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (quoting Robinson v. State, 854 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Mo. banc 1993)) (“[T]he escape rule should not be used to dismiss challenges to post-capture errors.”); Fogle v. State, 99 S.W.3d 63, 65 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (“Once a defendant escapes and has been returned to custody, he is entitled to appeal any errors that occurred post-capture.”).

2022The determination of whether to apply the escape rule 3 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016). 2 rests within “the sound discretion of the appellate court.” Id. (quoting Nichols v. State, 131 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004)).

2022“The escape rule is applicable in both appeals on the merits and motions for post-conviction relief under Rules 29.15 and 24.035.” Id.

2022The escape rule is a judicially created doctrine that allows an appellate court to dismiss an appeal of “a criminal defendant who escapes justice.” Parsons v. State, 383 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (quoting Crawley v. State, 155 S.W.3d 836, 837 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005)).

2024On January 16, 2024, Logan again allegedly committed acts giving rise to a first-degree trespass charge and a charge of loitering within 500 feet of a school property as a registered sex offender. 7 defendant’s eight-month absence hindered the administration of justice); State v. Wright, 763 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Mo. App. 1988) (applying the escape rule to preserve respect for the system of justice when the defendant was at large for just over five months); State v. Kearns, 743 S.W.2d 553, 554-55 (Mo. App. 1987) (applying the escape rule due to the administrative problems and delay caused by the de

2021Neither case stands for the proposition that applying the escape rule violates a defendant’s due process rights. 2 principle that “[t]hose who seek the protection of this legal system must … be willing to abide by its rules and decisions.” State v. Wright, 763 S.W.2d 167, 168-69 (Mo.App.1988).

2024Nichols v. State, 131 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004); Freeman, 619 S.W.3d at 552 n.2 (“The escape rule does not apply to errors that occur after the defendant is returned to custody.”); Shearin v. State, 440 S.W.3d 586, 588 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (quoting Robinson v. State, 854 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Mo. banc 1993)) (“[T]he escape rule should not be used to dismiss challenges to post-capture errors.”); Fogle v. State, 99 S.W.3d 63, 65 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (“Once a defendant escapes and has been returned to custody, he is entitled to appeal any errors that occurred post-capture.”).

2019Wartenbe cites Robinson v. State to suggest that the escape rule does not further a legitimate state interest because the rule promotes corruption and “the temptation to complete the proceedings in a less than diligent manner secure in the knowledge that any errors resulting from procedural short cuts would not result in reversal.” 854 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Mo. banc 1993).

2024Nichols v. State, 131 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004); Freeman, 619 S.W.3d at 552 n.2 (“The escape rule does not apply to errors that occur after the defendant is returned to custody.”); Shearin v. State, 440 S.W.3d 586, 588 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (quoting Robinson v. State, 854 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Mo. banc 1993)) (“[T]he escape rule should not be used to dismiss challenges to post-capture errors.”); Fogle v. State, 99 S.W.3d 63, 65 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (“Once a defendant escapes and has been returned to custody, he is entitled to appeal any errors that occurred post-capture.”).

2017Dismissal of a defendant’s appeal pursuant to the escape rale is warranted where a defendant’s escape from justice results in a lengthy delay in their criminal case causing an “adverse impact on the criminal justice system.” Troupe, 891 S.W.2d at 811 (dismissing both defendant’s direct appeal and his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to the escape rule because “appellant was at large for more than eight months and delayed the proceedings” which had an adverse impact on the criminal justice system); Fogle v. State, 99 S.W.3d 63, 65 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (“We find that Movant’s escape fl

2021Ultimately we found that, “[a]lthough we [were] inclined to disagree with Echols’ contentions in this case, we need[ed] not address them because they [were] moot in view of our determination that the motion court did not abuse its discretion in invoking the escape rule to dismiss the post-conviction motion.” Id.

2021We 5 found the claim “moot in view of our determination that the motion court did not abuse its discretion in invoking the escape rule to dismiss the post-conviction motion.” Echols, 168 S.W.3d at 455 .

1996The motion court’s first conclusion of law says, “Movant is not entitled to post conviction relief due to the application of the escape rule. [Stradford v. State], 787 S.W.2d 832 (Mo.App.1990).

1996Regarding application of the escape rule to posteonviction cases, we said: “Applicability of the escape rule is not limited to dismissal of appeals on the merits but also to motions for posteonviction relief under Rules 29.15 ([State v.] Woods, 812 S.W.2d [267] at 268 [Mo.App.1991]; State v. Branch, 811 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Mo.App.1991); Stradford v. State, 787 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Mo.App.1990)), and Rule 24.035.

2013Holmes , 92 S.W.3d at 196 . 3 Further, “ [application of the escape rule is not dependent on the alleged merits of a mov-ant’s underlying claim; if so, the rule would not serve its purposes.” Wagner v. State, 172 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Mo.App.2005).

2007“There is no threshold amount of time an appellant must have escaped justice before dismissal is allowed.” Holmes v. State, 92 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Mo.App.2002). 2 “The relevant inquiry in determining whether to apply the escape rule is deciding whether the escape adversely affected the criminal justice system.” Smith v. State, 174 S.W.3d 74, 75 (Mo.App.2005).

2018See McNeil , 514 S.W.3d at 65 ; see also Kemper v. State , 129 S.W.3d 439 , 440 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) (per curiam) (finding adverse impact on criminal justice system where escape resulted in roughly two-month delay between original sentencing date and actual sentencing and resulted in the need for issuance and execution of warrant); Harvey v. State , 150 S.W.3d 128 , 129-30 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) (per curiam) (applying the escape rule where defendant's escape resulted in two-month delay and required law enforcement resources be employed to capture him pursuant to a capias warrant) and Wagner v. S

2016See Wagner, 172 S.W.3d at 924 (holding a failure to appear for sentencing constitutes an “escape” under the rule); McCartney, 297 S.W.3d at 926 (holding application of the escape rule was warranted where defendant failed to turn himself in after sentencing, • necessitating a warrant for his arrest and efforts by law enforcement to find and apprehend him, causing a sixteen-week delay in the proceedings). *482 III.

2013“The relevant inquiry in determining whether to apply the escape rule is deciding whether the escape adversely affected the criminal justice system.” Marsh, 248 S.W.3d at 650 ; Smith v. State, 174 S.W.3d 74, 75 (Mo.App.2005).

2010“The relevant inquiry in determining whether to apply the escape rule is deciding whether the escape adversely affected the criminal justice system.” Smith v. State, 174 S.W.3d 74, 75 (Mo.App.2005).

2024Missouri appellate courts have held that the escape rule applies “equally to persons who avoid impending or immediate incarceration as well as to persons avoiding the possibility of incarceration through a revocation of probation or parole.” Wartenbe v. State, 583 S.W.3d 115 , 121 (Mo. App. 2019) (citing Hicks v. State, 824 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Mo. App. 1992)).

2024“This Court repeatedly has found that absconding after violating the terms of probation demonstrates the requisite contempt for the judicial process justifying dismissal of the absconder’s claims under the escape rule.” Id. at 123 (citing Theodoran, 319 S.W.3d at 482 ; Hicks v. State, 824 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992)).

2022See, e.g., Caldwell, 556 S.W.3d at 67-68 (dismissing appeal upon finding “[m]ovant’s failure to appear for over thirteen months had an adverse impact on the criminal justice system,” where movant violated probation by failing to report to his probation officer); McNeil v. State, 514 S.W.3d 63, 65 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (dismissing appeal upon finding “[m]ovant’s willful failure to appear bars her claims of error under the escape rule,” where movant failed to appear multiple times for probation revocation hearings and failed to report to her probation officer); see also Parsons, 383 S.W.3d at 73-

2022The escape rule is a judicially created doctrine that allows an appellate court to dismiss an appeal of “a criminal defendant who escapes justice.” Parsons v. State, 383 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) (quoting Crawley v. State, 155 S.W.3d 836, 837 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005)).

2024On January 16, 2024, Logan again allegedly committed acts giving rise to a first-degree trespass charge and a charge of loitering within 500 feet of a school property as a registered sex offender. 7 defendant’s eight-month absence hindered the administration of justice); State v. Wright, 763 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Mo. App. 1988) (applying the escape rule to preserve respect for the system of justice when the defendant was at large for just over five months); State v. Kearns, 743 S.W.2d 553, 554-55 (Mo. App. 1987) (applying the escape rule due to the administrative problems and delay caused by the de

1993See, e.g., State v. Kearns, 743 S.W.2d 553 (Mo.App.1987) (citing Holmes). 2 Apparently this case presents an issue of first impression in this state; the parties have been unable to unearth a Missouri case in which the escape rule was used to dismiss an appeal or post-conviction motion alleging error occurring after the defendant’s return to custody. 3 The difficulty in *396 finding cases dealing with appeals from post-capture errors may be a result of the summary nature of dismissal; the few reported cases applying the escape rule rarely discuss the grounds for the appeal or motion being dism

2018See Brown , 974 S.W.2d at 631 (finding that defendant's escape from jail "rais[ed] the possibility of confrontation with the jailer[,]" which "showed contempt for the authority of the court and by that, affected the criminal justice system"); State v. Thornton , 930 S.W.2d 54 , 56-57 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996) (concluding that defendant's actions adversely affected the criminal justice system in that defendant's "criminal propensities posed a threat to those around him" and that defendant did not voluntary return to custody, but was recaptured); State v. Burk , 49 S.W.3d 207 , 212 (Mo. App. W.D. 200

2001In a Southern District case that is factually similar to the case at hand, State v. Brown, 974 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Mo.App. 1998), the state had moved to dismiss the defendant’s appeal based upon the escape rule when Brown escaped from jail after a jury convicted him of the class C felony of forgery and sentence had been imposed.

2006See Troupe, 891 S.W.2d at 811 (eight-month sentencing delay); Holmes v. State, 92 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Mo.App.2002) (three-week fugitive status); State v. Burk, 49 S.W.3d 207, 208 (Mo.App.2001) (five-day fugitive status); State v. Surritte, 35 S.W.3d 873, 874-75 (Mo.App.2001) (four-day fugitive status and fourteen-day sentencing delay); State v. Buff, 34 S.W.3d 856, 857 (Mo.App.2000) (six-month sentencing. delay); State v. Sprester, 26 S.W.3d 603, 605 (Mo.App.2000) (five and one-half-month sentencing delay); President v. State, 925 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Mo.App.1996) (four-month sentencing delay); State

2004Troupe, 891 S.W.2d at 811 ; see also Fogle, 99 S.W.3d at 65 (finding adverse impact on the criminal justice system where escape resulted in a seven-week delay and necessitated filing of a capias warrant, among other consequences); Selvy, 72 S.W.3d at 220 (finding that a nineteen-month delay adversely affected the criminal justice system); Bailey, 848 S.W.2d at 612 (applying the escape rule in the case of a six-week delay where a capias warrant issued).

2024“This Court repeatedly has found that absconding after violating the terms of probation demonstrates the requisite contempt for the judicial process justifying dismissal of the absconder’s claims under the escape rule.” Id. at 123 (citing Theodoran, 319 S.W.3d at 482 ; Hicks v. State, 824 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992)).

2015Reasons for applying the escape rule include: (1) the need for a court to have control over the defendant before making a decision on appeal; (2) curtailment of administrative problems caused by the escapee’s absence; (3) preventing prejudice to the State in the event of a remand for a new trial; (4) preventing defendants from selectively abiding by court decisions; (5) discouraging escape; (6) encouraging voluntary surrender; (7) preserving respect for the criminal justice system; and (8) promoting the dignified operation of the appellate courts Shuey, 193 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting State v. Hick

2009In applying the escape rule, “the relevant inquiry is whether the escape adversely affects the criminal justice system, with the decision *766 resting in the sound discretion of this Court.” Stevenson, 246 S.W.3d at 485 (citing State v. Surritte, 35 S.W.3d 873, 874 (Mo.App.2001)).

2007See Surritte, 35 S.W.3d at 875 ; Gray v. State, 976 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Mo.App.1998); Hicks, 824 S.W.2d at 134-35 . *863 Pradt argues that we should not apply the escape rule because he never should have been required to return to Missouri and live at the Victory Mission.

2006See also Wagner v. State, 172 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Mo.App.2005) (applying "the escape rule” where a movant in a post-conviction action failed to appear at his sentencing; caused a warrant to be issued for his arrest; "required law enforcement resources to be employed to execute the warrant;” and caused "a forty-nine day delay in sentencing”); Fogle v. State, 99 S.W.3d 63, 65 (Mo. App.2003) (applying the escape rule where defendant's failure to appear at sentencing resulted in a seven-week delay between the original date of sentencing and the actual sentencing as well as necessitating a warrant and

2006See Troupe, 891 S.W.2d at 811 (eight-month sentencing delay); Holmes v. State, 92 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Mo.App.2002) (three-week fugitive status); State v. Burk, 49 S.W.3d 207, 208 (Mo.App.2001) (five-day fugitive status); State v. Surritte, 35 S.W.3d 873, 874-75 (Mo.App.2001) (four-day fugitive status and fourteen-day sentencing delay); State v. Buff, 34 S.W.3d 856, 857 (Mo.App.2000) (six-month sentencing. delay); State v. Sprester, 26 S.W.3d 603, 605 (Mo.App.2000) (five and one-half-month sentencing delay); President v. State, 925 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Mo.App.1996) (four-month sentencing delay); State

2019We are not blind to the potential misuse of the escape rule, as cautioned in Ortega- Rodriguez: [A]n expansion of this reasoning that would allow an appellate court to sanction by dismissal any conduct that exhibited disrespect for any aspect of the judicial system, even where such conduct has no connection to the course of appellate proceedings ... would sweep far too broadly, permitting, for instance, this Court to dismiss a petition solely because the petitioner absconded for a day during district court proceedings, or even because the petitioner once violated a condition of parole or proba

2019We are not persuaded that the motion court’s dismissal of Wartenbe’s post-conviction-relief motion presents an unjust or arbitrary act of the court as feared in Ortega-Rodriguez. 507 U.S. at 246 . 9 We adhere to well-established judicial precedent in concluding that Wartenbe’s constitutional argument fails because Wartenbe has no constitutional right to post-conviction relief and the motion court’s dismissal of Wartenbe’s claims pursuant to the escape rule does not violate his constitutional right to due process.

2024State v. Shuey, 193 S.W.3d 811, 814 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (quoting State v. Hickerson, 66 S.W.3d 787, 789 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002)).

2015Reasons for applying the escape rule include: (1) the need for a court to have control over the defendant before making a decision on appeal; (2) curtailment of administrative problems caused by the escapee’s absence; (3) preventing prejudice to the State in the event of a remand for a new trial; (4) preventing defendants from selectively abiding by court decisions; (5) discouraging escape; (6) encouraging voluntary surrender; (7) preserving respect for the criminal justice system; and (8) promoting the dignified operation of the appellate courts Shuey, 193 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting State v. Hick

2018See McNeil , 514 S.W.3d at 65 ; see also Kemper v. State , 129 S.W.3d 439 , 440 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) (per curiam) (finding adverse impact on criminal justice system where escape resulted in roughly two-month delay between original sentencing date and actual sentencing and resulted in the need for issuance and execution of warrant); Harvey v. State , 150 S.W.3d 128 , 129-30 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) (per curiam) (applying the escape rule where defendant's escape resulted in two-month delay and required law enforcement resources be employed to capture him pursuant to a capias warrant) and Wagner v. S

2016“Whether or not to use the escape rule to dismiss an appellant’s claims of error rests within the sound discretion of the appellate court.” Id.

2024The determination to apply the escape rule and dismiss Shields’s point on appeal “discourages other defendants from attempting an escape from sentencing and preserves respect for the criminal justice system.” Hogan, 610 S.W.3d at 419 (quoting State v. Kelsall, 545 S.W.3d 355, 357 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018)).

2023“The escape rule is a judicially-created doctrine, the primary purpose of which is to deny the right of appeal to a defendant who escapes justice.” State v. Kelsall, 545 S.W.3d 355, 356 (Mo.App. 2018). “[T]he escape rule only applies to errors that occurred prior to a defendant’s escape, and does not apply to post-capture errors.” Benedict v. State, 569 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Mo.App. 2018).

2020Second, dismissing Appellant’s appeal “pursuant to the escape rule would discourage escape, prevent selectively abiding by court’s decisions, encourage voluntary surrender and preserve respect for the criminal justice system.” Id.

2020Third, because he absconded while on probation, Appellant showed “. . . contempt for the very system of justice that granted him probation in lieu of incarceration.” Id., quoting Hicks v. State, 824 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992) (internal quotations omitted); see also Wartenbe v. State, 583 S.W.3d 115 , 123 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (“This Court repeatedly has found that absconding after violating the terms of probation demonstrates the requisite contempt for the judicial process justifying dismissal of the absconder’s claims under the escape rule.”).

2024Supp. 2010. 4 RSMo 2016, including changes effective January 1, 2017, which authorized term of imprisonment for a class D felony, changed from a maximum of four years to a maximum of seven years. 7 invokes the escape rule.”); Crump, 128 S.W.3d at 643 (“A defendant’s failure to appear constitutes an ‘escape’ for purposes of applying the escape rule.”).

2023See State v. Kelsall, 545 S.W.3d 355 (Mo. App. 2018) (applying the escape rule to dismiss a defendant’s appeal after the defendant failed to appear for the sentencing hearing and it was delayed for three weeks); State v. Spurgeon, 482 S.W.3d 479 (Mo. App. 2016) (dismissing the defendant’s appeal after failing to appear twice for sentencing, issuing a capias warrant, and delaying sentencing for almost six months); State v. McCartney, 297 S.W.3d 924 (Mo. App. 2009) (dismissing the appeal due to the defendant’s failure to appear necessitated a warrant for his arrest and caused a four-month delay

2010See id. (holding that the escape rule did not apply when the accused's sentencing hearing had to be rescheduled due to his failure to appear and when no one was injured during the "escape”).

2001The defendant in Brown opposed dismissal of his appeal under the escape rule by arguing that the facts were analogous to those in State v. Janson, supra, where the court had refused to apply the escape rule.

2005See Rulo v. State, 804 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Mo.App.1991) (holding that the motion court had the discretion to dismiss a post-conviction motion pursuant to the escape rule, sua sponte).

2002E.D.1990) (applying the escape rule to Rule 29.15 proceedings); Rulo v. State, 804 S.W.2d 866 (Mo.App.

2023“Application of the escape rule clearly requires a relationship between the escape and prejudice to the criminal justice system.” State v. Thorton, 930 S.W.2d 54 , 56 (Mo. App. 1996).

2018See Brown , 974 S.W.2d at 631 (finding that defendant's escape from jail "rais[ed] the possibility of confrontation with the jailer[,]" which "showed contempt for the authority of the court and by that, affected the criminal justice system"); State v. Thornton , 930 S.W.2d 54 , 56-57 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996) (concluding that defendant's actions adversely affected the criminal justice system in that defendant's "criminal propensities posed a threat to those around him" and that defendant did not voluntary return to custody, but was recaptured); State v. Burk , 49 S.W.3d 207 , 212 (Mo. App. W.D. 200

2018See Brown , 974 S.W.2d at 631 (finding that defendant's escape from jail "rais[ed] the possibility of confrontation with the jailer[,]" which "showed contempt for the authority of the court and by that, affected the criminal justice system"); State v. Thornton , 930 S.W.2d 54 , 56-57 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996) (concluding that defendant's actions adversely affected the criminal justice system in that defendant's "criminal propensities posed a threat to those around him" and that defendant did not voluntary return to custody, but was recaptured); State v. Burk , 49 S.W.3d 207 , 212 (Mo. App. W.D. 200

2003(Quoting Burk, 49 S.W.3d at 212 .) Thus, the State maintains that Williams “should not be allowed to continue to tax the criminal justice system, which he spurned, by pursuing this appeal.” In rebuttal, Williams argues that the doctrine of laches should somehow operate to bar the State’s assertion of the escape rule.