escape clause in Maryland

1991King, 168 Md. at 148-49 , 176 A. 626 .

1991King, 168 Md. at 148-49 , 176 A. 626 .

1991See Loewinger v. Prince George’s County, 266 Md. 316 , 292 A.2d 67 (1972) (fact that municipality knew about the accident and had investigated it would not excuse failure to give notice required by statute); Rich v. City of Baltimore, 265 Md. 647 , 290 A.2d 777 (1972) (giving of required notice was condition precedent to right to file action); Cotham and Maldonado v. Board, 260 Md. 556 , 273 A.2d 115 (1971) (discovery rule, applicable to statute of limitations triggered by accrual of cause of action, is not applicable to notice provision requiring notice within a specified time “after the inju

1991See Loewinger v. Prince George’s County, 266 Md. 316 , 292 A.2d 67 (1972) (fact that municipality knew about the accident and had investigated it would not excuse failure to give notice required by statute); Rich v. City of Baltimore, 265 Md. 647 , 290 A.2d 777 (1972) (giving of required notice was condition precedent to right to file action); Cotham and Maldonado v. Board, 260 Md. 556 , 273 A.2d 115 (1971) (discovery rule, applicable to statute of limitations triggered by accrual of cause of action, is not applicable to notice provision requiring notice within a specified time “after the inju

1991See Loewinger v. Prince George’s County, 266 Md. 316 , 292 A.2d 67 (1972) (fact that municipality knew about the accident and had investigated it would not excuse failure to give notice required by statute); Rich v. City of Baltimore, 265 Md. 647 , 290 A.2d 777 (1972) (giving of required notice was condition precedent to right to file action); Cotham and Maldonado v. Board, 260 Md. 556 , 273 A.2d 115 (1971) (discovery rule, applicable to statute of limitations triggered by accrual of cause of action, is not applicable to notice provision requiring notice within a specified time “after the inju

1991See Loewinger v. Prince George’s County, 266 Md. 316 , 292 A.2d 67 (1972) (fact that municipality knew about the accident and had investigated it would not excuse failure to give notice required by statute); Rich v. City of Baltimore, 265 Md. 647 , 290 A.2d 777 (1972) (giving of required notice was condition precedent to right to file action); Cotham and Maldonado v. Board, 260 Md. 556 , 273 A.2d 115 (1971) (discovery rule, applicable to statute of limitations triggered by accrual of cause of action, is not applicable to notice provision requiring notice within a specified time “after the inju

1987In Zurich Insurance Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 289 Md. 421 , 212 A.2d 96 (1965), the Court held that an excess clause prevailed over a broadly worded escape clause which excluded coverage “if there is other valid and collectible insurance in force for such person or organization either as an insured under a policy applicable with respect to the automobile or otherwise.” But in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 270 Md. 591 , 312 A.2d 265 (1973), the Court held that an escape clause, which specifically referred to the existence of excess in

1987In Zurich Insurance Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 289 Md. 421 , 212 A.2d 96 (1965), the Court held that an excess clause prevailed over a broadly worded escape clause which excluded coverage “if there is other valid and collectible insurance in force for such person or organization either as an insured under a policy applicable with respect to the automobile or otherwise.” But in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 270 Md. 591 , 312 A.2d 265 (1973), the Court held that an escape clause, which specifically referred to the existence of excess in

1987In Zurich Insurance Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 289 Md. 421 , 212 A.2d 96 (1965), the Court held that an excess clause prevailed over a broadly worded escape clause which excluded coverage “if there is other valid and collectible insurance in force for such person or organization either as an insured under a policy applicable with respect to the automobile or otherwise.” But in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 270 Md. 591 , 312 A.2d 265 (1973), the Court held that an escape clause, which specifically referred to the existence of excess in

1982Thus, Employers liability was created subordinate to every other type of insurance afforded to its insured. [ 445 F.2d at 1283 ], After consideration of all of the terms of the insurance contracts here involved, the Court in the Allstate case decided that the coverage afforded under Employers’ policy was a contingent excess clause and not an escape clause and the basic excess coverage of Lumbermens, Allstate and USF & G were first required to be exhausted before the umbrella carrier could be obligated to contribute to the loss.

1982Id., at 1284 .

1971The cases are Penn. v. National Union Indemnity Co., 5 Cir., 68 F. 2d 567 , and McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc., 7 Cir., 200 F. 2d 5 .

1971The cases are Penn. v. National Union Indemnity Co., 5 Cir., 68 F. 2d 567 , and McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc., 7 Cir., 200 F. 2d 5 .

1971“Three general types of ‘other insurance’ clauses commonly appear in modern automobile liability policies: (1) the escape clause, whereby the policy is declared not to cover the insured in a double coverage situation; (2) the excess clause, whereby the insurer declares itself liable up to the limits of its policy only for the excess amount, if any, necessary to indemnify the insured after the other insurer has paid to the full limit of its coverage; (3) the pro-rata clause, whereby the insurer obligates itself for a ratable share of the loss in the same proportion which the limit of its own po

1971Vol.), Art. 66%, § 7-324 and such clauses are in regular use in the insurance field as we observed in Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bankers Insurance Co., 244 Md. 392 , 223 A. 2d 594 (1966), supra. Finally, it should be observed that the present case is a controversy between two liability insurance companies in regard to the liability between themselves-for the damages resulting to the injured members of the public and does not involve any rights of such injured persons under either policy.

1971See Couch on Insurance 2d, Section 45:182 at p. 233: “[T]he so-called ‘automatic insurance’ clauses generally read as follows: ‘Automatic Insurance For Newly Acquired Automobiles.’ If the. named Insured who is the owner of the automobile acquires ownership of another automobile, such insurance as is afforded by this policy applies also to such other automobile as of the date of its delivery to him, subject to the following additional conditions: (1) if the Company insures all automobiles owned by the named Insured at the date of such delivery, insurance applies to such other automobile, if it

1935“Such contracts at least should be specific and definite, with little or no room for misunderstanding, even if they are not required to be in writing.” Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 249 N. Y., 439 , 164 N. E. 342, 344 .

1935“Such contracts at least should be specific and definite, with little or no room for misunderstanding, even if they are not required to be in writing.” Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 249 N. Y., 439 , 164 N. E. 342, 344 .