escape clause in Connecticut

1992In addition to its claims regarding the factual findings of the arbitrators, the insurer also argues that because the supreme court has held, in Mendes v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, 212 Conn. 652 , 563 A.2d 695 (1989), that an "escape clause" similar to that contained in the policy at issue violated public policy, and this escape clause is not severable from the balance of the arbitration section of the policy, the entire arbitration section should be stricken, "thus rendering the arbitration a nullity." However, the insurer provides no analysis or explanation for this contention, n

1992In addition to its claims regarding the factual findings of the arbitrators, the insurer also argues that because the supreme court has held, in Mendes v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, 212 Conn. 652 , 563 A.2d 695 (1989), that an "escape clause" similar to that contained in the policy at issue violated public policy, and this escape clause is not severable from the balance of the arbitration section of the policy, the entire arbitration section should be stricken, "thus rendering the arbitration a nullity." However, the insurer provides no analysis or explanation for this contention, n

2001Even the soft approach does not countenance speculation or an irrational guess about damages. " (Emphasis added.) At an earlier point, Dobbs says that: "This soft approach is usually accompanied, however, with an escape clause in which the court warns that it will not permit speculation," § 3.4, p. 320, see Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 , 264 (1946) (antitrust case).

1995General Statutes § 53a.-169 (a) provides in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of escape in the first degree . . . (2) if he escapes from any . . . community residence to which he was transferred . . . .” The petitioner claimed that his public defender failed to inform him that pursuant to State v. Lubus, 216 Conn. 402 , 581 A.2d 1045 (1990), he may have had a possible defense to the escape violation.

1995General Statutes § 53a.-169 (a) provides in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of escape in the first degree . . . (2) if he escapes from any . . . community residence to which he was transferred . . . .” The petitioner claimed that his public defender failed to inform him that pursuant to State v. Lubus, 216 Conn. 402 , 581 A.2d 1045 (1990), he may have had a possible defense to the escape violation.

1991The court in VanMarter v. Royal Indemnity Co., 556 A.2d 41 (1989), reviewed the statutory amendment expanding the definition of "uninsured motorist" to include an underinsured motorist when it stated in part at pages 43-44 as follows: As insurance policies provide for uninsured motorist coverage, it must be considered who is an uninsured motorist.