escape clause in Iowa

2018I agree. "[T]he objective of the escape clause of section 822.3 is to provide relief from the limitation period when an applicant had 'no opportunity' to assert the claim before the limitation period expired." Cornell v. State , 529 N.W.2d 606 , 611 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Wilkins , 522 N.W.2d at 823-24 ). "[T]he focus of our inquiry has been whether the applicant was or should have been 'alerted' to the potential claim before the limitation period expired." Id. (quoting Wilkins , 522 N.W.2d at 824 ). 10 Schmidt was alerted to his own actual-innocence claim and chose to abandon it by ple

2018I agree. “[T]he objective of the escape clause of section 822.3 is to provide relief from the limitation period when an applicant had ‘no opportunity’ to assert the claim before the limitation period expired.” Cornell v. State, 529 N.W.2d 606, 611 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d at 823–24). “[T]he focus of our inquiry has been whether the applicant was or should have been ‘alerted’ to the potential claim before the limitation period expired.” Id. (quoting Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d at 824 ).10 Schmidt was alerted to his own actual-innocence claim and chose to abandon it by pleading

2020Cf. id. at 521 (“[A] postconviction-relief applicant relying on the ground-of-fact exception must show the ground of fact is relevant to the challenged conviction.

2018See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa 2003) (“In addition to the obvious requirement that an applicant relying on section 822.3 must show the alleged ground of fact could not have been raised earlier, the applicant must also show a nexus between the asserted ground of fact and the challenged conviction.” (emphasis added)); see also Cornell v. State, 529 N.W.2d 608 , 611 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (“Our appellate courts have previously observed that the objective of the escape clause of section 822.3 is to provide relief from the limitation period when an applicant had ‘no opportunity’ t

2018I agree. "[T]he objective of the escape clause of section 822.3 is to provide relief from the limitation period when an applicant had 'no opportunity' to assert the claim before the limitation period expired." Cornell v. State , 529 N.W.2d 606 , 611 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Wilkins , 522 N.W.2d at 823-24 ). "[T]he focus of our inquiry has been whether the applicant was or should have been 'alerted' to the potential claim before the limitation period expired." Id. (quoting Wilkins , 522 N.W.2d at 824 ). 10 Schmidt was alerted to his own actual-innocence claim and chose to abandon it by ple

2018I agree. "[T]he objective of the escape clause of section 822.3 is to provide relief from the limitation period when an applicant had 'no opportunity' to assert the claim before the limitation period expired." Cornell v. State , 529 N.W.2d 606 , 611 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Wilkins , 522 N.W.2d at 823-24 ). "[T]he focus of our inquiry has been whether the applicant was or should have been 'alerted' to the potential claim before the limitation period expired." Id. (quoting Wilkins , 522 N.W.2d at 824 ). 10 Schmidt was alerted to his own actual-innocence claim and chose to abandon it by ple

1998Shortly thereafter we decided Union Insurance Co. (Mutual) v. Iowa Hardware Mutual Insurance Co., 175 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Iowa 1970), in which we held that when one policy contains an excess clause and another policy contains an escape clause, those clauses are mutually repugnant and the loss is prorated between the insurers.

1989The dealership’s insurance policy contained an escape clause which provided coverage for “any other person, but only if no other valid and collectible automobile liability insurance, either primary or excess ... [was] available to such person.” Id.

1970See Continental Casualty Co. v. Suttenfield, (5 Cir.), 236 F.2d 433 .