receipt of Miranda warning in Connecticut

2022Indeed, in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 , 102 S. Ct. 1309 , 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982), ‘‘the United States Supreme Court held that the absence of any indication in the record that the silence of a defendant had been preceded by a Miranda warning render[s] Doyle inapplicable . . . .’’ State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517 , 524-25, 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1986); see also, e.g., State v. Berube, supra, 256 Conn. 751-52 (when record was not clear as to whether defendant’s conversations with police transpired after or before his arrest or rece

2022Indeed, in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 , 102 S. Ct. 1309 , 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982), ‘‘the United States Supreme Court held that the absence of any indication in the record that the silence of a defendant had been preceded by a Miranda warning render[s] Doyle inapplicable . . . .’’ State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517 , 524-25, 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1986); see also, e.g., State v. Berube, supra, 256 Conn. 751-52 (when record was not clear as to whether defendant’s conversations with police transpired after or before his arrest or rece

2017Moreover, when analyzing a defendant's claim that a prosecutor violated the protection set forth in Doyle , we have held that "[i]t is essential to know the timing of these conversations because the use at trial of silence prior to the receipt of Miranda warnings does not violate due process." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Berube , supra, 256 Conn. at 751 , 775 A.2d 966 .

2017Moreover, when analyzing a defendant's claim that a prosecutor violated the protection set forth in Doyle , we have held that "[i]t is essential to know the timing of these conversations because the use at trial of silence prior to the receipt of Miranda warnings does not violate due process." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Berube , supra, 256 Conn. at 751 , 775 A.2d 966 .

2016The defendant essentially claims ‘‘that the state vio- lated the rule established by the United States Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio, [ 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976)], prohibiting the state from eliciting at trial evidence of a defendant’s silence following the receipt of Miranda warnings regarding his right to remain silent.’’ State v. Bell, supra, 283 Conn. 760 . ‘‘In Doyle, the United States Supreme Court expanded the protections it articulated in Miranda, holding that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence following his arrest and receipt o

2016The defendant essentially claims ‘‘that the state vio- lated the rule established by the United States Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio, [ 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976)], prohibiting the state from eliciting at trial evidence of a defendant’s silence following the receipt of Miranda warnings regarding his right to remain silent.’’ State v. Bell, supra, 283 Conn. 760 . ‘‘In Doyle, the United States Supreme Court expanded the protections it articulated in Miranda, holding that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence following his arrest and receipt o

1991Doyle applies, however, only to cases involving “custodial interrogation and their focus is on the period immediately following the defendant’s receipt of Miranda warnings.” State v. Henderson, 24 Conn. App. 295, 299 , 588 A.2d 224 (1991); see also State v. Apostle, 8 Conn. App. 216, 233 , 512 A.2d 947 (1986). “ ‘[Interrogation’ under Miranda refers both to express questioning [and] to any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ ” State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 411-12 , 497 A.2d 9

1991Doyle applies, however, only to cases involving “custodial interrogation and their focus is on the period immediately following the defendant’s receipt of Miranda warnings.” State v. Henderson, 24 Conn. App. 295, 299 , 588 A.2d 224 (1991); see also State v. Apostle, 8 Conn. App. 216, 233 , 512 A.2d 947 (1986). “ ‘[Interrogation’ under Miranda refers both to express questioning [and] to any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’ ” State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 411-12 , 497 A.2d 9

2026Therefore, as a factual predicate to an alleged Doyle violation, the record must demonstrate State v. Robotham that the defendant received a Miranda warning prior to the period of silence that was disclosed to the jury.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Palumbo, 193 Conn. App. 457, 463, 219 A.3d 878, cert. denied, 334 Conn. 909, 221 A.3d 43 (2019), cert. denied, 590 U.S. 906, 140 S. Ct. 2674, 206 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2020).

2026Therefore, as a factual predicate to an alleged Doyle violation, the record must demonstrate State v. Robotham that the defendant received a Miranda warning prior to the period of silence that was disclosed to the jury.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Palumbo, 193 Conn. App. 457, 463, 219 A.3d 878, cert. denied, 334 Conn. 909, 221 A.3d 43 (2019), cert. denied, 590 U.S. 906, 140 S. Ct. 2674, 206 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2020).

2026Therefore, as a factual predicate to an alleged Doyle violation, the record must demonstrate State v. Robotham that the defendant received a Miranda warning prior to the period of silence that was disclosed to the jury.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Palumbo, 193 Conn. App. 457, 463, 219 A.3d 878, cert. denied, 334 Conn. 909, 221 A.3d 43 (2019), cert. denied, 590 U.S. 906, 140 S. Ct. 2674, 206 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2020).

2022Indeed, in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 , 102 S. Ct. 1309 , 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982), ‘‘the United States Supreme Court held that the absence of any indication in the record that the silence of a defendant had been preceded by a Miranda warning render[s] Doyle inapplicable . . . .’’ State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517 , 524-25, 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1986); see also, e.g., State v. Berube, supra, 256 Conn. 751-52 (when record was not clear as to whether defendant’s conversations with police transpired after or before his arrest or rece

2022Indeed, in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 , 102 S. Ct. 1309 , 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982), ‘‘the United States Supreme Court held that the absence of any indication in the record that the silence of a defendant had been preceded by a Miranda warning render[s] Doyle inapplicable . . . .’’ State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517 , 524-25, 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1986); see also, e.g., State v. Berube, supra, 256 Conn. 751-52 (when record was not clear as to whether defendant’s conversations with police transpired after or before his arrest or rece

2022Indeed, in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 , 102 S. Ct. 1309 , 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982), ‘‘the United States Supreme Court held that the absence of any indication in the record that the silence of a defendant had been preceded by a Miranda warning render[s] Doyle inapplicable . . . .’’ State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517 , 524-25, 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1986); see also, e.g., State v. Berube, supra, 256 Conn. 751-52 (when record was not clear as to whether defendant’s conversations with police transpired after or before his arrest or rece

2022Indeed, in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 , 102 S. Ct. 1309 , 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982), ‘‘the United States Supreme Court held that the absence of any indication in the record that the silence of a defendant had been preceded by a Miranda warning render[s] Doyle inapplicable . . . .’’ State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517 , 524-25, 504 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 , 106 S. Ct. 2922 , 91 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1986); see also, e.g., State v. Berube, supra, 256 Conn. 751-52 (when record was not clear as to whether defendant’s conversations with police transpired after or before his arrest or rece

2019Upon our review of the record, it is clear that the two questions, in which the state referred to the trial as the ‘‘first time’’ that the other hikers were mentioned, pertained to the defendant’s March 31, 2014 pre-Miranda interview. ‘‘[E]vidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, since the rule of Doyle . . . is predicated on the defendant’s reliance on the implicit promise of the Miranda warnings.’’ State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262 , 286 n.19, 973 A.2d 1207 (2009); see also State v. Esposito, 223

2019Upon our review of the record, it is clear that the two questions, in which the state referred to the trial as the ‘‘first time’’ that the other hikers were mentioned, pertained to the defendant’s March 31, 2014 pre-Miranda interview. ‘‘[E]vidence of prearrest, and specifically pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, since the rule of Doyle . . . is predicated on the defendant’s reliance on the implicit promise of the Miranda warnings.’’ State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262 , 286 n.19, 973 A.2d 1207 (2009); see also State v. Esposito, 223

2017We first note that, although the defendant is correct in his assertion that the right to remain silent is not contingent upon the receipt of Miranda warnings, "[i]t has long been settled that the privilege [against self-incrimination] generally is not self-executing and that a witness who desires its protection must claim it." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Salinas v. Texas , --- U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2174 , 2178, 186 L.Ed.2d 376 (2013).

2017We first note that, although the defendant is correct in his assertion that the right to remain silent is not contingent upon the receipt of Miranda warnings, "[i]t has long been settled that the privilege [against self-incrimination] generally is not self-executing and that a witness who desires its protection must claim it." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Salinas v. Texas , --- U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2174 , 2178, 186 L.Ed.2d 376 (2013).

2016Doyle applies whenever Miranda warnings have been given regardless of an arrest or custody." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Plourde, supra, 208 Conn. at 465 -66 , 545 A.2d 1071 .

2016Doyle applies whenever Miranda warnings have been given regardless of an arrest or custody." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Plourde, supra, 208 Conn. at 465 -66 , 545 A.2d 1071 .

2009Because the record does not indicate whether Miranda warnings were given before the [petitioner’s] conversations with the police took place, the record is inadequate for review under [State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 239 -40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989)].” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. [Davey B.], supra, 751.

2001Fletcher v. Weir, [supra, 455 U.S. 603 ] (postarrest silence); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S. Ct. 2124 , 65 L.

2001Fletcher v. Weir, [supra, 455 U.S. 603 ] (postarrest silence); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S. Ct. 2124 , 65 L.

1992State v. Paulino, 26 Conn. App. 86, 93 , 598 A.2d 666 (1991), cert. granted on other grounds, 221 Conn. 907 , 600 A.2d 1361 (1992); State v. Henderson, 24 Conn. App. 295, 299 , 588 A.2d 224 (1991).

1992State v. Paulino, 26 Conn. App. 86, 93 , 598 A.2d 666 (1991), cert. granted on other grounds, 221 Conn. 907 , 600 A.2d 1361 (1992); State v. Henderson, 24 Conn. App. 295, 299 , 588 A.2d 224 (1991).

1992State v. Paulino, 26 Conn. App. 86, 93 , 598 A.2d 666 (1991), cert. granted on other grounds, 221 Conn. 907 , 600 A.2d 1361 (1992); State v. Henderson, 24 Conn. App. 295, 299 , 588 A.2d 224 (1991).

1992State v. Paulino, 26 Conn. App. 86, 93 , 598 A.2d 666 (1991), cert. granted on other grounds, 221 Conn. 907 , 600 A.2d 1361 (1992); State v. Henderson, 24 Conn. App. 295, 299 , 588 A.2d 224 (1991).