20 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Juan Mendez, Jr., etc. v. Hampton Court Nursing Center, LLC.green2 sentences2022See Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Center, LLC, 203 So. 3d 146, 149 (Fla. 2016) (“Critically, the third-party beneficiary doctrine enables a non-contracting party to enforce a contract against a contracting party—not the other way around.”); Liberty Commc’ns., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. 2021See Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999) (holding that “no party may be forced to submit a dispute to arbitration that the party did not intend and agree to arbitrate”); Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Ctr., 203 So. 3d 146, 149 (Fla. 2016) (explaining that the third-party beneficiary doctrine “does not permit two parties to bind a 2 third—without the third party’s agreement—merely by conferring a benefit on the third party”). | 2 | 2 |
Shingleton v. Busseygreen2 sentences1981If plaintiff can allege facts sufficient to bring her within the third party beneficiary doctrine as announced in Shingleton v. Bussey, supra , then she should be given the opportunity to do so. 1981One issue which has not been addressed by any party is the question of whether the insurance policy contemplated herein partakes of sufficient public policy considerations to require the application of the third party beneficiary doctrine as was held in Shingleton v. Bussey, supra . | 1 | 4 |
Dingle v. Dellingergreen2 sentences2018"To assert a third-party beneficiary claim, the complaint must allege: (1) a contract; (2) an intent that the contract primarily and directly benefit the third party; (3) breach of the contract; and (4) resulting damages to the third party." Dingle , 134 So.3d at 488 . 2015Generally, “[t]o assert a third-party beneficiary claim, the complaint must allege: (1) a contract; (2) an intent that the contract primarily and directly benefit the third party; (3) breach of the contract; and (4) resulting damages to the third party.” Id. at 488 . | 1 | 2 |
Liberty Communications v. MCIgreen1 sentence2022Corp., 733 So. 2d 571, 575 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (“Signing a contract as an agent for a disclosed principal is not sufficient to bind the agent to arbitrate claims against him personally.”); Armas v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 842 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“Non-signatories can also compel arbitration based on the equitable estoppel doctrine.” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Armas v. Prudential Securities, Inc.green1 sentence2022Corp., 733 So. 2d 571, 575 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (“Signing a contract as an agent for a disclosed principal is not sufficient to bind the agent to arbitrate claims against him personally.”); Armas v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 842 So. 2d 210, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“Non-signatories can also compel arbitration based on the equitable estoppel doctrine.” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Seifert v. US Home Corp.green1 sentence2021See Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999) (holding that “no party may be forced to submit a dispute to arbitration that the party did not intend and agree to arbitrate”); Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Ctr., 203 So. 3d 146, 149 (Fla. 2016) (explaining that the third-party beneficiary doctrine “does not permit two parties to bind a 2 third—without the third party’s agreement—merely by conferring a benefit on the third party”). | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence v. . Foxgreen2 sentences2016Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 275 (1859) (plurality opinion). 2016Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 275 (1859) (plurality opinion). | 1 | 1 |
Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen and Heilbronnergreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Fla. 1993); Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 1969). 2016See, e.g., Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So.2d 1378, 1380 (Fla.1993); Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713, 715 (Fla.1969). | 1 | 1 |
Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Center, LLCgreen2 sentences2016See Mendez, 140 So. 3d at 674-76 ; Alterra Healthcare, 953 So. 2d at 579 . 2016See Mendez, 140 So.3d at 674-76 ; Alterra Healthcare, 953 So.2d at 579 . | 1 | 1 |
Brennan v. Ruffnergreen2 sentences2015“Florida has extended the third party beneficiary exception to the privity requirement in legal malpractice actions to very limited circumstances, mainly in the area of will drafting, where it can be demonstrated that the intent of the clients in engaging the services of the lawyer was to benefit a third party.” Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So.2d 143, 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). 2015“Florida has extended the third party beneficiary exception to the privity requirement in legal malpractice actions to very limited circumstances, mainly in the area of will drafting, where it can be demonstrated that the intent of the clients in engaging the services of the lawyer was to benefit a third party.” Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So.2d 143, 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Caretta Truc. v. Cheoy Lee Shipyardsgreen1 sentence2014To assert a third-party beneficiary claim, the complaint must allege: (1) a contract; (2) an intent that the contract primarily and directly benefit the third party; (3) breach of the contract; and (4) resulting damages to the third party. 1 See, e.g., Caretta Trucking, Inc. v. Cheoy Lee Shipyards, Ltd., 647 So.2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Bross v. Wallacegreen1 sentence2000Co. of No. America, 763 So.2d 429 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Bross v. Wallace, 600 So.2d 1198, 1199 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). [2] This count asserted a third party beneficiary claim against Bowen based on legal malpractice in his representation of Reah, which frustrated Naomi's inheritance under the will. | 1 | 1 |
Angel, Cohen & Rogovin v. Oberon Inv., NVgreen1 sentence1994See Oberon, 512 So.2d at 194 . | 1 | 1 |
Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shawgreen2 sentences1992See also Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815 , 184 So. 852 (1938); Crabtree v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 438 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Riverview Condominium Corp. v. Campagna Constr. 1992See also Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815 , 184 So. 852 (1938); Crabtree v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 438 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Riverview Condominium Corp. v. Campagna Constr. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Marianna Lime Products Co. v. McKay
green
2 sentences1992New Fairway in this appeal correctly notes the third party beneficiary principle of law that “it is the undertaking on the part of the promisor as a consideration to the promisee, to benefit the third person, that gives rise to a cause of action by the beneficiary against the promisor, resting upon the contract itself.” Marianna Lime Products Co. v. McKay, 109 Fla. 275 , 147 So. 264 (1933). 1992New Fairway in this appeal correctly notes the third party beneficiary principle of law that “it is the undertaking on the part of the promisor as a consideration to the promisee, to benefit the third person, that gives rise to a cause of action by the beneficiary against the promisor, resting upon the contract itself.” Marianna Lime Products Co. v. McKay, 109 Fla. 275 , 147 So. 264 (1933). | 2 | 1971–1992 |
ALTERRA HEALTHCARE v. Estate of Linton Ex Rel. Graham
green
2 sentences2016See Mendez, 140 So. 3d at 674-76 ; Alterra Healthcare, 953 So. 2d at 579 . 2016See Mendez, 140 So.3d at 674-76 ; Alterra Healthcare, 953 So.2d at 579 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hansen v. State
green
1 sentence2006Merkle's next argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to grant it leave to amend its complaints to assert a third-party beneficiary claim under Westside EKG Associates v. Foundation Health, 932 So.2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. granted, 917 So.2d 193 (Fla.2005). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Westside EKG Associates v. Foundation Health
green
1 sentence2006Merkle's next argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to grant it leave to amend its complaints to assert a third-party beneficiary claim under Westside EKG Associates v. Foundation Health, 932 So.2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. granted, 917 So.2d 193 (Fla.2005). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
FFB GENERAL INS. CO. v. Insurance Co. of North America
green
1 sentence2000Co. of No. America, 763 So.2d 429 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Bross v. Wallace, 600 So.2d 1198, 1199 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). [2] This count asserted a third party beneficiary claim against Bowen based on legal malpractice in his representation of Reah, which frustrated Naomi's inheritance under the will. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Warren v. MONAHAN BEACHES JEWELRY CTR
green
1 sentence1998Warren v. Monahan Beaches Jewelry Center, Inc., 548 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Crabtree v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.
green
1 sentence1992See also Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815 , 184 So. 852 (1938); Crabtree v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 438 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Riverview Condominium Corp. v. Campagna Constr. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Rihon v. Wilson
green
1 sentence1986Rihon v. Wilson, 415 So.2d 94 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York
green
1 sentence1982Thompson v. Commercial Union Insurance Company of New York, 250 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1971). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Spindler v. Kushner
green
1 sentence1980In Spindler v. Kuschner, 284 So.2d 481 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), the Third District Court of Appeal also held the third party beneficiary doctrine applicable to a situation where the property was destroyed by fire pending the sale. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Maxwell v. Southern American Fire Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1973In Maxwell v. Southern American Fire Insurance Company, Fla.App. 1970, 235 So.2d 768 , the rule was applied to a medical payment coverage provision contained in a homeowner's insurance policy. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Bruce Construction Corp. v. Federal Realty Corp.
green
2 sentences1971Augustine v. Perkins, 81 Fla. 341 , 87 So. 912 * * * we * * * hold that, when it is manifest from the nature or terms of a contract that the formal parties thereto intended to treat a third party as a person primarily entitled to the benefit of its provisions and therefore a party directly, and not merely consequently, interested in its enforcement, such beneficiary may maintain an action in his own name upon the contract, even though the contract be under seal." This language was followed and further explained in Marianna Lime Products Co. v. McKay, 109 Fla. 275 , 147 So. 264 (1933), and Bruc 1971Augustine v. Perkins, 81 Fla. 341 , 87 So. 912 * * * we * * * hold that, when it is manifest from the nature or terms of a contract that the formal parties thereto intended to treat a third party as a person primarily entitled to the benefit of its provisions and therefore a party directly, and not merely consequently, interested in its enforcement, such beneficiary may maintain an action in his own name upon the contract, even though the contract be under seal." This language was followed and further explained in Marianna Lime Products Co. v. McKay, 109 Fla. 275 , 147 So. 264 (1933), and Bruc | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Flintkote Company v. Brewer Co. of Florida, Inc.
green
1 sentence1971Augustine v. Perkins, 81 Fla. 341 , 87 So. 912 * * * we * * * hold that, when it is manifest from the nature or terms of a contract that the formal parties thereto intended to treat a third party as a person primarily entitled to the benefit of its provisions and therefore a party directly, and not merely consequently, interested in its enforcement, such beneficiary may maintain an action in his own name upon the contract, even though the contract be under seal." This language was followed and further explained in Marianna Lime Products Co. v. McKay, 109 Fla. 275 , 147 So. 264 (1933), and Bruc | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory
green
1 sentence1971"Viewed in this light, we think there exists sufficient reason to raise by operation of law the intent to benefit injured third parties and thus to render motor vehicle liability insurance amenable to the third party beneficiary doctrine." Moreover, in Beta Eta House Corp. of Tallahassee, Inc., v. Gregory, supra , we also said: "In the event the carrier denies coverage, this issue may be determined by a separate trial before, as well as after, the trial on the merits. * * * * * * "The separate trial is not necessarily limited to the issue of coverage. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
First National Bank v. Perkins
neutral
2 sentences1971Augustine v. Perkins, 81 Fla. 341 , 87 So. 912 * * * we * * * hold that, when it is manifest from the nature or terms of a contract that the formal parties thereto intended to treat a third party as a person primarily entitled to the benefit of its provisions and therefore a party directly, and not merely consequently, interested in its enforcement, such beneficiary may maintain an action in his own name upon the contract, even though the contract be under seal." This language was followed and further explained in Marianna Lime Products Co. v. McKay, 109 Fla. 275 , 147 So. 264 (1933), and Bruc 1971Augustine v. Perkins, 81 Fla. 341 , 87 So. 912 * * * we * * * hold that, when it is manifest from the nature or terms of a contract that the formal parties thereto intended to treat a third party as a person primarily entitled to the benefit of its provisions and therefore a party directly, and not merely consequently, interested in its enforcement, such beneficiary may maintain an action in his own name upon the contract, even though the contract be under seal." This language was followed and further explained in Marianna Lime Products Co. v. McKay, 109 Fla. 275 , 147 So. 264 (1933), and Bruc | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Sickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guaranty Co.
green
2 sentences1969Appellee cites Sickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guaranty Co., 142 Fla. 528 , 195 So. 195 (1940), and Canaveral Capital Corporation v. Bruce, Fla.App. 1968, 214 So.2d 505 , as authority for a contradictory holding. 1969Appellee cites Sickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guaranty Co., 142 Fla. 528 , 195 So. 195 (1940), and Canaveral Capital Corporation v. Bruce, Fla.App. 1968, 214 So.2d 505 , as authority for a contradictory holding. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Canaveral Capital Corporation v. Bruce neutral | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.