7 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chem-Age Industries, Inc. v. Glovergreen2 sentences2019Bank , 178 Wash.2d 561 , 311 P.3d 1 , ¶ 14 n.2 (2013) ; see also Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover , 652 N.W.2d 756 , ¶¶ 33-35 (S.D. 2002) (recognizing that the Restatement is not binding and concluding that "even if we were to recognize the third party beneficiary exception, plaintiffs have brought forth insufficient evidence to invoke it here"). 2019Bank, 311 P.3d 1 , ¶14 n.2 (Wash. 2013); see also Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, ¶¶33-35 (S.D. 2002) (recognizing that the Restatement is not binding and concluding that "even if we were to recognize the third party beneficiary exception, plaintiffs have brought forth insufficient evidence to invoke it here"). | 2 | 2 |
Severson v. Milwaukee Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2012Rejecting the insurance company's contention that suit was barred because there was "no privity of contract between" the person seeking medical expenses under the policy and the company, Severson applied the well-established third-party-beneficiary doctrine: "Without further discussion of the matter we adhere to the doctrine that where one person, for a consideration moving to him from another, promises to pay to a third person a sum of money, the law immediately operates upon the acts of the parties, establishing the essential of privity between the promisor and the third person requisite to 2012Rejecting the insurance company's contention that suit was barred because there was "no privity of contract between" the person seeking medical expenses under the policy and the company, Severson applied the well-established third-party-beneficiary doctrine: "Without further discussion of the matter we adhere to the doctrine that where one person, for a consideration moving to him from another, promises to pay to a third person a sum of money, the law immediately operates upon the acts of the parties, establishing the essential of privity between the promisor and the third person requisite to | 1 | 1 |
Goossen v. Estate of Standaertgreen2 sentences2004See Goossen v. Estate of Standaert, 189 Wis. 2d 237, 249 , 525 N.W.2d 314 (Ct. App. 1994). 2004See Goossen v. Estate of Standaert, 189 Wis. 2d 237, 249 , 525 N.W.2d 314 (Ct. App. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Ampex Corp. v. Sound Institute, Inc.green2 sentences1994Ampex Corp. v. Sound Inst., 44 Wis. 2d 674, 683 , 172 N.W.2d 170, 174 (1969). 1994Ampex Corp. v. Sound Inst., 44 Wis. 2d 674, 683 , 172 N.W.2d 170, 174 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling Savings Bank
green
2 sentences2019Bank , 178 Wash.2d 561 , 311 P.3d 1 , ¶ 14 n.2 (2013) ; see also Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover , 652 N.W.2d 756 , ¶¶ 33-35 (S.D. 2002) (recognizing that the Restatement is not binding and concluding that "even if we were to recognize the third party beneficiary exception, plaintiffs have brought forth insufficient evidence to invoke it here"). 2019Bank , 178 Wash.2d 561 , 311 P.3d 1 , ¶ 14 n.2 (2013) ; see also Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover , 652 N.W.2d 756 , ¶¶ 33-35 (S.D. 2002) (recognizing that the Restatement is not binding and concluding that "even if we were to recognize the third party beneficiary exception, plaintiffs have brought forth insufficient evidence to invoke it here"). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Amjad T. Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC
green
2 sentences2025Tufail v. Midwest Hosp., LLC, 2013 WI 62, ¶22 , 348 Wis. 2d 631 , 833 N.W.2d 586 . ¶16 Clubb argues that the circuit court erred by “incorrectly conclud[ing] that the [c]ontract had to have a provision allowing a third-party to sue” in order for the third-party beneficiary rule to apply. 2025Tufail v. Midwest Hosp., LLC, 2013 WI 62, ¶22 , 348 Wis. 2d 631 , 833 N.W.2d 586 . ¶16 Clubb argues that the circuit court erred by “incorrectly conclud[ing] that the [c]ontract had to have a provision allowing a third-party to sue” in order for the third-party beneficiary rule to apply. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Milwaukee Area Technical College v. Frontier Adjusters of Milwaukee
green
2 sentences2012This is sort of a "Tinker to Evers to Chance" situation: the insurance company (the "one person" in the quotation from Severson) is paid by the insured (the "another" in the quotation from Severson) and, based on that consideration, promises to pay an injured non-insured (the "third person" in the quotation from Severson). 1 Simply put, "[a] person may enforce a contract as third-party beneficiary if the contract indicates that he or she was either specifically intended by the contracting parties to benefit from the contract or is a member of the class the parties intended to benefit." Milwauk 2012This is sort of a "Tinker to Evers to Chance" situation: the insurance company (the "one person" in the quotation from Severson) is paid by the insured (the "another" in the quotation from Severson) and, based on that consideration, promises to pay an injured non-insured (the "third person" in the quotation from Severson). 1 Simply put, "[a] person may enforce a contract as third-party beneficiary if the contract indicates that he or she was either specifically intended by the contracting parties to benefit from the contract or is a member of the class the parties intended to benefit." Milwauk | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Winnebago Homes, Inc. v. Sheldon
green
2 sentences1969In Winnebago Homes, Inc. v. Sheldon (1966), 29 Wis. 2d 692, 699 , 139 N. W. 2d 606 , this court reaffirmed the position that a third person can only recover on a contract between two other persons if the claimant can show that the agreement was intentionally entered into “ ‘directly and primarily for his benefit.’ ” An indirect benefit, merely incidental to the contract between the parties, will not give rise to a third-party beneficiary claim. 1969In Winnebago Homes, Inc. v. Sheldon (1966), 29 Wis. 2d 692, 699 , 139 N. W. 2d 606 , this court reaffirmed the position that a third person can only recover on a contract between two other persons if the claimant can show that the agreement was intentionally entered into “ ‘directly and primarily for his benefit.’ ” An indirect benefit, merely incidental to the contract between the parties, will not give rise to a third-party beneficiary claim. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Peters v. Peters Auto Sales, Inc.
green
2 sentences1969The necessity of a concise allegation supporting the third-party beneficiary theory is noted in Peters v. Peters Auto Sales, Inc. (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 346 , 155 N. W. 2d 85 . 1969The necessity of a concise allegation supporting the third-party beneficiary theory is noted in Peters v. Peters Auto Sales, Inc. (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 346 , 155 N. W. 2d 85 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.