third-party beneficiary claim in New York

2025To state a third-party-beneficiary claim, plaintiff must plead "(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for [its] benefit, and (3) that the benefit to [it] is sufficiently immediate . . . to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate [it] if the benefit is lost." ( Mandarin Trading Ltd. v Wildenstein , 16 NY3d 173, 182 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted].) Plaintiff has not shown that she was a third-party beneficiary of the subcontract between Tully and Sec-Curity.

2025To state a third-party beneficiary claim, a plaintiff must plead: "(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for its benefit, and (3) that the benefit to it is sufficiently immediate .. . to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate it if the benefit is lost" (Mandarin Trading Ltd v Wildenstein, 16 NY3d 173 [2011] citing Mendel v Henry Phipps Plaza W., Inc., 6 NY3d 783 , 786 [2006]).

2024(See NYSCEF No. 12 at 6, citing Wright v Herb Wright Stucco, Inc., 50 NY2d 837, 839 [1980], revg on op below, 72 AD2d 959, 960-961 [4th Dept 1979] [Cardamone, P.J., and Hancock, J., dissenting]; Stennett v Moveway Transfer & Stor., Inc., 97 AD3d 655 , 656- 657 [2d Dept 2012].) That these decisions have held express contractual incorporation of prevailing-wage requirements to be sufficient to support a third-party beneficiary claim does not, as Collins suggests, mean that this kind of express incorporation language is necessary to support a claim.

2024At most, Collins identifies a decision of the Court of Appeals, and one of the Appellate Division, Second Department, holding that an employee may sue as a third-party beneficiary to enforce contracts that expressly incorporate prevailing-wage requirements imposed by statute. ( See NYSCEF No. 12 at 6, citing Wright v Herb Wright Stucco, Inc. , 50 NY2d 837, 839 [1980], revg on op below , 72 AD2d 959, 960-961 [4th Dept 1979] [Cardamone, P.J., and Hancock, J., dissenting]; Stennett v Moveway Transfer & Stor., Inc. , 97 AD3d 655 , 656-657 [2d Dept 2012].) That these decisions have held express con

2024(See NYSCEF No. 12 at 6, citing Wright v Herb Wright Stucco, Inc., 50 NY2d 837, 839 [1980], revg on op below, 72 AD2d 959, 960-961 [4th Dept 1979] [Cardamone, P.J., and Hancock, J., dissenting]; Stennett v Moveway Transfer & Stor., Inc., 97 AD3d 655 , 656- 657 [2d Dept 2012].) That these decisions have held express contractual incorporation of prevailing-wage requirements to be sufficient to support a third-party beneficiary claim does not, as Collins suggests, mean that this kind of express incorporation language is necessary to support a claim.

2024At most, Collins identifies a decision of the Court of Appeals, and one of the Appellate Division, Second Department, holding that an employee may sue as a third-party beneficiary to enforce contracts that expressly incorporate prevailing-wage requirements imposed by statute. ( See NYSCEF No. 12 at 6, citing Wright v Herb Wright Stucco, Inc. , 50 NY2d 837, 839 [1980], revg on op below , 72 AD2d 959, 960-961 [4th Dept 1979] [Cardamone, P.J., and Hancock, J., dissenting]; Stennett v Moveway Transfer & Stor., Inc. , 97 AD3d 655 , 656-657 [2d Dept 2012].) That these decisions have held express con

2008Within the narrowest interpretation of the rule in Lawrence v. Fox , a beneficiary thus related to the promise has a standing to enforce it ( Seaver v. Ransom, supra, at pp. 237, 238 )." ( 245 NY at 53 [emphasis added].) In Fata , we upheld a third-party beneficiary claim in a case similar to this one, though the relevant statute in Fata was state, not federal.

1985Ill Dismissal of the third-party beneficiary claim was also proper. 1 The third-party beneficiary concept arises from the notion that "it is just and practical to permit the person for whose benefit the contract is made to enforce it against one whose duty it is to pay” or perform (Seaver v Ransom, 224 NY 233, 237 ; see also, Lawrence v Fox, 20 NY 268 ).

1985Ill Dismissal of the third-party beneficiary claim was also proper. 1 The third-party beneficiary concept arises from the notion that "it is just and practical to permit the person for whose benefit the contract is made to enforce it against one whose duty it is to pay” or perform (Seaver v Ransom, 224 NY 233, 237 ; see also, Lawrence v Fox, 20 NY 268 ).

1976This is at issue with plaintiff’s contention that the third-party beneficiary rule spelled out in the field of nonpublic contracts (Lawrence v Fox, 20 NY 268 ) applies to this public contract between the New York State Thruway and the Chevron Oil Co. which was assigned by Chevron Oil Co. to the defendant Ettinger.

2025To state a third-party beneficiary claim, a plaintiff must plead: "(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for its benefit, and (3) that the benefit to it is sufficiently immediate .. . to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate it if the benefit is lost" (Mandarin Trading Ltd v Wildenstein, 16 NY3d 173 [2011] citing Mendel v Henry Phipps Plaza W., Inc., 6 NY3d 783 , 786 [2006]).

2011In the context of a third-party beneficiary claim, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for [its] benefit, and (3) that the benefit to [it] is sufficiently immediate ... to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate [it] if the benefit is lost” (Mendel v Henry Phipps Plaza W., Inc., 6 NY3d 783, 786 [2006]).

2011The latter approach accords with Fourth Ocean Putnam Corp. v Interstate Wrecking Co. ( 66 NY2d 38, 43-45 [1985]), in which summary judgment was granted against a third-party beneficiary claim in the absence of contractual language clearly pointing one way or another. {Id. at 45 [contrasting cases “upholding the third party’s right to enforce the contract (when) the language of the contract . . . clearly evidences an intent to permit enforcement by the third party . . . even though there was no duty of the promisee to the third party” (emphasis supplied)]; see also id. [that plaintiff “might ul

2011The latter approach accords with Fourth Ocean Putnam Corp. v Interstate Wrecking Co. ( 66 NY2d 38, 43-45 [1985]), in which summary judgment was granted against a third-party beneficiary claim in the absence of contractual language clearly pointing one way or another. {Id. at 45 [contrasting cases “upholding the third party’s right to enforce the contract (when) the language of the contract . . . clearly evidences an intent to permit enforcement by the third party . . . even though there was no duty of the promisee to the third party” (emphasis supplied)]; see also id. [that plaintiff “might ul

1958Judge Cardozo’s decision in Glanser v. Shepard ( 233 N. Y. 236 [1922]) stands as a living testament to the appropriateness and applicability of the third-party beneficiary rule in breach of warranty actions, particularly since public health is involved.

1957Continuing with Glanzer v. Shepard (supra) Judge Cardozo said (p. 241): 11 We state the defendants’ obligation, therefore, in terms, not of contract merely, but of duty.

2025Plaintiff has not provided facts or evidence to support that she was hired to work Tully's public work projects. ( Cf. Perez v Long Island Concrete Inc. , 203 AD3d 552, 553 [1st Dept 2022] [holding that plaintiffs pleaded a third-party-beneficiary breach-of-contract claim when they alleged they were supervised by one of the contract parties and paid by that party for work on that party's projects].) Plaintiff alleges only that she worked on projects for all general contractors.

2008Within the narrowest interpretation of the rule in Lawrence v. Fox , a beneficiary thus related to the promise has a standing to enforce it ( Seaver v. Ransom, supra, at pp. 237, 238 )." ( 245 NY at 53 [emphasis added].) In Fata , we upheld a third-party beneficiary claim in a case similar to this one, though the relevant statute in Fata was state, not federal.

1999In this case, the court declined to follow the third-party beneficiary doctrine set forth in Zamiarski , concluding that it was in direct contravention to the long-accepted rule in this State “that a deed with a reservation or exception by the grantor in favor of a third party, a so-called ‘stranger to the deed’, does not create a valid interest in favor of that third party” (Matter of Estate of Thomson v Wade, supra, at 573-574; see, Tuscarora Club v Brown, 215 NY 543 ).

1999In this case, the court declined to follow the third-party beneficiary doctrine set forth in Zamiarski , concluding that it was in direct contravention to the long-accepted rule in this State “that a deed with a reservation or exception by the grantor in favor of a third party, a so-called ‘stranger to the deed’, does not create a valid interest in favor of that third party” (Matter of Estate of Thomson v Wade, supra, at 573-574; see, Tuscarora Club v Brown, 215 NY 543 ).

1979If "payment” was contemplated then the plaintiff could qualify as a third-party beneficiary under their contract (see Hurd v Wing, 93 App Div 62 ; see, also, Case v Case, 203 NY 263, 266 ; Durnherr v Rau, 135 NY 219 ; 10 NY Jur, Contracts, § 239).