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20 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rosegreen2 sentences2002See Rose, 268 Ill. 2002See Rose , 268 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences1983The Court stated that “the inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test.” ( 459 U.S. 553, 564 , 74 L. 1983The Court stated that “the inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test.” ( 459 U.S. 553, 564 , 74 L. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Fonner
green
2 sentences2010Fonner, 385 Ill. 2010Fonner, 385 Ill. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Brooks
green
2 sentences2003The admissibility of breathalyzer test results is well established, and therefore, to prove intoxication, the prosecution may utilize both the test results and the refusal to take the test." Brooks , 334 Ill. 2003The admissibility of Breathalyzer test results is well established, and therefore, to prove intoxication, the prosecution may utilize both the test results and the refusal to take the test.” Brooks, 334 Ill. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Bates
green
2 sentences2002E.g., People v. Bates, 165 Ill. 2002E.g. , People v. Bates , 165 Ill. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
People v. McCollum
neutral
1 sentence1993App. 3d 11 , 568 N.E.2d 493 ), this court modified the denial of a petition to rescind the summary suspension where McCollum was warned a refusal to take the test would result in a suspension of his driving privileges for six months. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Solzak
green
1 sentence1993App. 3d 119, 123 [, 466 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 ].” ( 152 Ill. 2d at 426 , 605 N.E.2dat490.) The focus of our supreme court’s opinion in Wegielnik, in considering the statute and due process, was the suspension of a motorist’s driving privileges resulting from a refusal to take the test. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Thomas
green
2 sentences1993One authority supporting admissibility of that refusal is People v. Thomas (1990), 200 Ill. 1993One authority supporting admissibility of that refusal is People v. Thomas (1990), 200 Ill.App.3d 268 , 146 Ill.Dec. 693 , 558 N.E.2d 656 , cited with approval by the majority. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Wegielnik
green
2 sentences1993App. 3d 119, 123 [, 466 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 ].” ( 152 Ill. 2d at 426 , 605 N.E.2dat490.) The focus of our supreme court’s opinion in Wegielnik, in considering the statute and due process, was the suspension of a motorist’s driving privileges resulting from a refusal to take the test. 1993Dec. at 696 , 605 N.E.2d at 490 .) The focus of our supreme court's opinion in Wegielnik , in considering the statute and *59 due process, was the suspension of a motorist's driving privileges resulting from a refusal to take the test. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Brennan
green
1 sentence1993(Brennan, 122 Ill. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Hurbean
green
2 sentences1990Whether one who has been asked to take a test has understood that such a request has been made is a question of fact to be determined by the court from all the evidence. *** But an understanding of the consequences of the refusal to take the test is not an element of understanding that a request to take the test has been made, nor a precondition of refusal.” Hurbean, 23 Ohio App. 2d at 126 , 261 N.E.2d at 297 . 1990Whether one who has been asked to take a test has understood that such a request has been made is a question of fact to be determined by the court from all the evidence. *** But an understanding of the consequences of the refusal to take the test is not an element of understanding that a request to take the test has been made, nor a precondition of refusal.” Hurbean, 23 Ohio App. 2d at 126 , 261 N.E.2d at 297 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Doherty
green
1 sentence1989(People v. Doherty, 144 Ill. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1984Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757 , 16 L. 1984Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757 , 16 L. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Malloy
green
1 sentence1984Therefore, we find that a refusal occurs only where, after a clear warning of the ramifications resulting from a refusal (see People v. Malloy (1980), 83 Ill. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
As & W. CLUB OF WAUKEGAN v. Drobnick
green
2 sentences1983Club v. Drobnick (1962), 26 Ill.2d 521, 524 .) We find that the dispute between the plaintiffs and the chief of police over submitting to the examination and the consequences of taking it or those resulting from a refusal to take the test establish an actual controversy here. *307 We next address the issue of whether the results of the polygraph examination are admissible at an administrative hearing before the board of fire and police commissioners. 1983Club v. Drobnick (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 521, 524 .) We find that the dispute between the plaintiffs and the chief of police over submitting to the examination and the consequences of taking it or those resulting from a refusal to take the test establish an actual controversy here. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Gene L. Welch v. District Court of Vermont Unit No. 5, Washington County
green
1 sentence1979It is not a testimonial assertion; therefore, the exclusionary principle of Miranda should not apply (Welch v. District Court (2d Cir. 1979), 594 F.2d 903 ; 3 Wigmore, Evidence §821 (Chadbourne rev. 1970)), an issue we need not here reach. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. LaPorte
neutral
2 sentences1974(People v. LaPorte (1960), 28 Ill.App.2d 139 , 171 N.E.2d 95 ; Jackson v. Jackson (1965), 55 Ill.App.2d 77 , 204 N.E.2d 153 .) Section 11 — 501.1(a) (9) states that a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test within 90 minutes shall constitute a refusal to take the test. 1974(People v. LaPorte (1960), 28 Ill.App.2d 139 , 171 N.E.2d 95 ; Jackson v. Jackson (1965), 55 Ill.App.2d 77 , 204 N.E.2d 153 .) Section 11 — 501.1(a) (9) states that a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test within 90 minutes shall constitute a refusal to take the test. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Jackson v. Jackson
neutral
2 sentences1974(People v. LaPorte (1960), 28 Ill.App.2d 139 , 171 N.E.2d 95 ; Jackson v. Jackson (1965), 55 Ill.App.2d 77 , 204 N.E.2d 153 .) Section 11 — 501.1(a) (9) states that a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test within 90 minutes shall constitute a refusal to take the test. 1974(People v. LaPorte (1960), 28 Ill.App.2d 139 , 171 N.E.2d 95 ; Jackson v. Jackson (1965), 55 Ill.App.2d 77 , 204 N.E.2d 153 .) Section 11 — 501.1(a) (9) states that a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test within 90 minutes shall constitute a refusal to take the test. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.